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This thesis considers the use of independence referendums in state-creation. It investigates 
whether and how an independence referendum affects secessionist dynamics, and may 
increase or decrease the likelihood of secession. The analysis consists of a quantitative 
and qualitative mixed-methods approach, which includes the creation of a new dataset on 
secessionist movements and independence referendums from 1905 to 2014, and an in-
depth comparative study of Quebec and Montenegro. Independence referendums, as 
sovereignty referendums, ask the ‘people’, symbolic holders of the sovereign authority of 
a state under a democratic regime, whether their sovereignty should remain represented 
by the current state, or by a new independent sovereign state. A distinction between 
unilateral and agreed independence referendums is made in order to consider when and 
how ‘the will of the people’ determines state-creation. It is argued that only an agreed 
independence referendum can ensure that the referendum itself determines the 
secessionist outcome. The thesis argues that independence referendums are an important 
legitimisation tool and their outcome’s binding effect is primarily a result of political, 
rather than legal, dynamics.  
The reasons behind the calling and holding of an independence referendum, and why a 
state government would consent to it, are analysed to account for a possible problem of 
endogeneity whereby the presence of an independence referendum might be determined 
by how likely the secessionist movement is to secede in the first place, regardless of the 
plebiscite. An institutional arrangement that allows for internal self-determination (such 
as ethnic-federalism), and access to executive powers at the regional level, was found to 
facilitate the mobilisation of the population in favour of secession, and the ability to call 
and hold a plebiscite. It is not in itself sufficient however to secure a majority in favour of 
independence, and other societal, political and economic contextual factors need to be 
taken into account to explain why a population would wish to secede.  
Focusing on consensual independence referendums agreed by both the government of the 
existing state and secessionist leaders, the thesis further explores when and how an 
independence referendum affects the likelihood of secession, notably existing popular 
support for independence. The thesis finds that the design and campaign in particular are 
important elements in deciding whose support counts, how much of it is needed, and how 
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it can be mobilised. Nonetheless, the referendum process, who participates in it and to 
what extent existing preferences on the question of independence can be altered are 
context-dependent. 
Finally, the perceived legitimacy of the referendum process and outcome are argued to be 
essential for the voting result to be binding on actors operating at the sub-state level, state 
level and international level and the independence referendum to successfully answer the 
question of secession. The review of independence referendums since the turn of the 20th 
century and the thesis findings suggest that independence referendums not only create 
important precedents within the state they are held, but also have international 
consequences. As democratic norms compete with the principle of state integrity and 
becomes entangled with a nationalist narrative, independence referendums may have an 























This thesis considers the use of independence referendums in state-creation and whether 
and how such forms of popular consultations can increase or decrease the likelihood of 
secession occurring. The thesis first reviews the existing literature around secession and 
independence referendums, along with the key concepts associated with them such as 
legitimacy, legality and democracy. Hypotheses are formulated based on existing 
knowledge around independence movements and referendums to consider what we would 
expect a referendum on independence to do when it is held, would it be in mobilising 
people to vote a certain way or how it would make achieving independence easier or more 
difficult and why.  
To test these hypotheses and learn about the consequences of independence referendum 
the first analytical section considers the practice of independence referendum over time 
and in a comparative perspective. A dataset referencing 225 secessionist movements helps 
uncover which type of secessionist movement have held and independence referendum 
between 1905 and 2014, which one have achieved statehood, and whether the presence of 
an independence referendum can account for the observed outcome. This first step shows 
that it is important to differentiate between a referendum process which is consented by 
the official government of the state and those that are held unilaterally by the secessionist 
movements.  
The second section analyses further the effect of an independence referendum on the 
likelihood of seceding by focusing on two case-studies: Quebec, and its two independence 
referendums in 1980 and 1995; and Montenegro in 2006. It starts by investigating how 
and why the referendums came about and how they came to be ‘agreed’ processes between 
the federal governments and the secessionist actors. The design of the referendum is 
scrutinised, from who could vote, on what question and how many votes in favour of 
independence were needed, to assess which of the Yes and No side was in a better position 
to win the referendum. Finally, the review of the referendum campaigns and the evolution 
of the electoral preferences shows which sides in favour or against independence was 
most successful in gathering support and whether the outcome was perceived by most 
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On the 18th of September 2014, a week after the official start of this PhD thesis, Scotland 
held a referendum asking its people whether they wished to remain part of the United 
Kingdom or become a new independent sovereign state. Three years on, the government 
of Catalonia followed the Scottish example and held a referendum to separate from Spain 
on the 1st of October. The UK government did not contest Scotland’s right to secede and 
engaged in negotiations over the referendum process leading to the Edinburgh Agreement 
in 2012. The Spanish government, on the other hand, has categorically refused to 
acknowledge the possibility of Catalonia separating and the Spanish Constitutional Court 
ruled secession unconstitutional (Keating 2017b).  
While both events call into question the constitutional and territorial integrity of their 
respective ‘host-states’, the case of Scotland was a consensual and legal process that 
markedly contrasts with the current situation in Catalonia. In Catalonia, on referendum 
day, the Spanish government sent police and riot forces to prevent voting, leading to 
scenes rarely seen in an established democracy of people being forcibly removed when 
trying to cast a ballot. The resulting overwhelming Yes majority (90% with an estimated 
43% turnout) was followed four weeks later by the Catalan government declaration of 
independence from Spain. This declaration of independence is unlikely to be recognised 
by the Spanish Government, the official, sovereign authority over the country at the 
international level. 
Secessionist movements call for a statehood on behalf of a people: a nation in need of a 
state and where the ‘people’ are sovereign. Calls for independence of a sub-national 
territory (here referred to as ‘region’) challenges the current dominant doctrine of states’ 
territorial integrity and its legitimacy. Sovereignty refers to the Westphalian principle that 
nation-states are independent actors within the international system and holders of the 
supreme political authority over their territory (Crawford 2006, 32). The advance of 
democratic norms and nationalism since the 18th century has led to the authority of the 
state and its legitimacy to be equated with its inhabitants. Sovereignty now also stems 
from the symbolic principle of popular sovereignty, a property of the people represented 
by its government (Şen 2015, 23).  
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Referendums in modern democracies are one of the few mechanisms allowing for the 
direct expression of the “will of the people” without the intermediary of political 
representatives. A sovereignty referendum offers an opportunity for the people to directly 
express their democratic right of self-determination by deciding where and how their 
sovereignty should be applied (Tierney 2009; Suksi 1993, 235). More specifically, it 
determines which institutions should represent their sovereign rights, have authority over 
them, and govern on their behalf.  
A sovereignty referendum on independence asks whether such sovereignty should be 
transferred to a new independent sovereign state. It originates from the combination of 
the democratic principle that people should rule themselves and that a self-identified 
cultural collectivity – as a nation – has a right to such self-rule in its fullest form: 
statehood. Accordingly, an independence referendum, as a state-creation device, is 
embedded within notions of legitimacy, democracy and self-determination. 
The recent events in Scotland, Catalonia and Crimea1 among others have generated a 
renewed scholarly interest in this form of public consultation over questions of 
sovereignty. Yet, little is known about their consequences. Do independence referendums 
indeed lead to statehood if a majority of the ‘people’ wish so? How do they affect the 
likelihood of successfully seceding? Can the very presence of an independence 
referendum affect the secessionist dynamics that brought it forward?  
 Understanding a possible growing trend  
 
The literature to date offers an extensive review of the historical practice of constitutional 
and sovereignty referendums, and its specific sub-type, independence referendums (e.g. 
Laponce 2004; Sussman 2006; Qvortrup 2014a/b; Mendez and Germann 2016). Yet, as 
pointed out by Mendez and Germann (2016, 4) there is a lack of conceptual and 
definitional consensus around sovereignty referendums and what constitutes an 
independence referendum in particular. Beyond chronological and conceptual reviews of 
independence referendums as a specific type of referendum, there has also been a growing 
body of literature on their normative and legal implications (Pavković and Radan 2007; 
Radan 2012; Tierney 2012; Vidmar 2013; Oklopcic 2015; Şen 2015).  
Some studies have considered whether sovereignty referendums are conducive to peace 
or further conflict (e.g. Laponce 2004; Wheatley 2012; Lee and MacGinty 2012; Germann 
                                                          
1 The Autonomous Republic of Crimea held a controversial referendum on March 16, 2014 on its 
status as the region was facing a military take-over from Russia. It gave the option to join Russia 
as one of its constituent republics. The referendum and its outcome was not internationally 
recognised and lead to tensions between Western countries and Russia.  
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2017). Empirical studies addressing the subject matter of independence referendums are 
more sporadic and overly focus on a few, predominantly western, case studies (e.g. 
Laponce 2009; Muñoz and Guinjoan 2013; Adam 2014) with Quebec being by far one of 
the most studied examples (c.f.. Lévesque and Pelletier 2005). Yet, these studies do not 
consider the role of the referendum itself, but rather study either the secessionist 
movements at large or the referendum campaign in isolation.  
I wish to address this gap in the literature by considering independence referendums 
within their subject matter: state-creation; and more precisely the secessionist dynamics 
that bring them forward. In order to better understand independence referendums, a 
review of their practice in a comparative perspective is needed to display how they come 
about, how they are conducted and their potential consequences. Furthermore, a 
comparative approach also allows for the identification of similarities, trends, difference 
and exceptions leading to a possible generalisation that can be used to analyse and 
understand future independence referendums.  
At the time of writing, in addition to Catalonia and Kurdistan having held a referendum 
in October 2018, at least two more independence referendums have been planned in the 
near future in New Caledonia (2018, from France) and Bougainville (2019, from Papua 
New Guinea); and possibly a second plebiscite2 in Scotland following the end of the 
‘Brexit’ process if the UK withdraws from the European Union. With over an estimated 
300 secessionist movements since the 1900s (Fazal and Griffiths 2014, 83), and over 
5,000 territorially concentrated groups which differ in their language or religion from the 
majority population of the existing state (Hannum 1990), there is potential for more 
independence referendums to be called and held. 
It is therefore essential to gain a better understanding of their role and consequences, from 
their bearing on the international state-system, to how they affect the societies in which 
they are held. As we will see in the first chapter, scholars are divided on whether they are 
helping answer political and societal conflicts generated by separatism peacefully, or 
whether they bring additional negative dynamics and generate more conflict. Indeed, the 
division generated between ‘Yes' and ‘No’ supporters during referendums may be 
heightened on issues of independence, leading to a form of “peaceful civil war” 
(Chambers 2001, 247). These arguments are mostly based on anecdotal evidence and the 
field stills lacks large or small-N studies to test such assumptions and understand the 
possible effects of independence referendums beyond legal or conflict studies.  
                                                          
2 This term is used interchangeably with ‘referendum’ throughout the thesis.  
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There is to date no systematic review of how many independence referendums do indeed 
result in secession in the first place, and whether the referendum was a determinant factor 
in the process. Independence referendums have taken place in a variety of contexts and 
under different formats. From Norway to Scotland passing by South-Ossetia and Eritrea, 
including peaceful and violent situations, well-established, centuries old ‘unions’ and 
newly born states, rich and poor regions, and where the legal right to secede was 
constitutionally asserted or silent. Some referendums are unlikely to have met the 
democratic credentials of a ‘free and fair’ process reflecting the genuine ‘will of the 
people’ on the question subject to them.  
Hence, it is worth considering to what extent independence referendums are comparable 
and which key variables matter in allowing for this form of consultation, as a popular 
consultation device, to operate and ‘let the people decide’. Furthermore, a better 
understanding of the role of independence referendums in secessionist dynamics, notably 
when and how it can make a difference to the likelihood of secession is important for 
practitioners to consider the advantages and drawbacks of this form of consultations as a 
means to answer separatist claims.  If the practice is indeed to become an essential step in 
state-creation in the future as the thesis will argue, then it is essential to know what we 
are dealing with.  
While an important question, I do not wish to make a normative statement about the 
morality of secession or referendums as a democratic instrument. They do arise as part of 
the general analysis in specific case-studies, but the focus remains on the empirical 
manifestation of independence referendums and their origins and consequences. This is 
an essential first step for future normative appraisal of the practice based on a deeper 
understanding of the mechanisms behind independence referendums.  
The overarching research question of the present thesis is what are the implications of 
independence referendums on secessionist dynamics? More specifically, I wish to know 
whether independence referendums increase or decrease the likelihood of secession, and 
if so, how? Since secessionism is both an internal – domestic – phenomena that affect 
society and politics within a state, and potentially an external – international – process 
with the need for international recognition of states that a peer has joined the international 
system (state-creation); I consider this question from the disciplines of International 
Relations and Political Science, and the underlying sociological and legal underpinning 
of both referendums and secession.  




Secession occurs when a territorial entity separates itself from a pre-existing state and 
receives international recognition forming a newly independent sovereign state. Wood 
(1981, 111) conceived secession as a political disintegration where political actors 
withdraw their loyalties, expectations and political activities from the justification of the 
current state. It is an act of separation, generally referred to by the leading protagonists as 
‘independence’, resulting in statehood. ‘Secession’ ‘separation’ and ‘independence’ are 
therefore closely associated but tend to have more or less positive connotation when used 
by practitioners and scholars alike.  
Secessionist dynamics, used here as an umbrella term encompassing the contextual factors 
feeding both the incentive and capability to secede, can vary considerably from one 
secessionist case to the next. From the history of the host-state and the region at stake, a 
particular set of institutions, societal makeup, or the economy, such circumstantial factors 
can affect the ability of secessionist actors to mobilise the population and stand against 
the host-state to achieve independence. The context and its perception also provide 
incentives for individuals to support a new sovereign state. How independence 
referendums fit in this picture and how in turn it may affect those dynamics, and whether 
and how it may increase or decreases the likelihood of secession occurring (centripetal or 
centrifugal tendencies) is yet to be addressed.  
Referendums are a political consultation device where the voters decide on the proposed 
question and, generally, determine the outcome. In this thesis, they include both binding 
and consultative referendums, and legal and illegal in regards to the constitution in line 
with existing comparative works (Mendez and Germann 2016, 4). Furthermore, 
referendums, especially on salient issues, have been found to be increasingly politically 
binding on the elites even when they are not in legal terms (Morel 2007; Goodin 2008).  
An independence referendum is an intervening variable within secessionist dynamics 
which brings the decision to secede into the hands of an electorate. I suggest it can have 
either a mediating effect: it reflects existing support for independence among the 
consulted people without affecting it, facilitating secession when support is above a 
majority; or a moderating effect whereby it can also affect the existing level of support 
for secession and therefore the secessionist outcome.  
Five major themes and arguments run throughout the thesis, connecting the state (macro-
level) and regional (meso-level) associated with secessionism, and individual voters 
(micro-level) behind referendums. First, I explore and argue for the essential legitimising 
role of independence referendums in secessionism through the ‘will of the people’. Within 
this, two important claims: firstly, the essential need to differentiate between an agreed 
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and unilateral referendum process. Only in an agreed process does the ‘will of the people’ 
determine statehood. Agreement is operationalised as both the host-state government and 
secessionist leaders consenting to the process by (a) a lack of outright opposition, and (b) 
engagement with the referendum process. Secondly, I argue that in an agreed process 
consent is more important than legality, and whether the region or the people subject to 
the referendum have a legal right to secede. The perceived legitimacy of the referendum 
itself is essential for actors to recognise its outcome as binding. 
Thirdly, based on the distinction between agreed and unilateral referendums, I argue and 
test that only the former is a state-creation tool allowing for direct popular participation, 
and should, therefore, be the primary focus of study when trying to answer the present 
research questions. An agreed independence referendum, because it removes the host-
state oposition, by default increases the likelihood of secession. Yet, we should account 
for the fact that a referendum may be called by secessionist actors when it is more likely 
to be won – when support for independence stands at 50 percent or above. Reversely, a 
host-state government may only consent to the plebiscite because secession is unlikely to 
happen due to low support. These two possibilities, along with other motivations behind 
the calling and holding of such referendums, are investigated to account for a possible 
problem of endogeneity whereby the presence of an independence referendum is 
associated with its secessionist outcome. 
Focusing on agreed independence referendums specifically, I argue that two major 
components play a role in increasing or decreasing the likelihood of seceding: the 
referendum design and campaign. The third focus of the thesis is therefore how the 
referendum design features can make a difference to the referendum outcome, especially: 
the franchise, special referendum quorums and the campaign design. Fourth, the focus on 
the referendum campaign as a mobilisation platform.  
Referendums campaigned for in a generally free and fair process, have a finite ability to 
change existing voting intentions, especially with highly salient issues such as the one of 
independence. This room for manoeuvre by either side of the debate also depends on how 
many undecided voters there are, and how strongly existing preferences are held. For 
analytical and theoretical purposes, I set this at a maximum of -20/+20 percent change in 
opinion on either side of the referendum debate with standard endorsement threshold of 
50 percent plus 1. Only in this situation is the referendum likely to act as a moderator and 




To be able to persuade a majority of voters to endorse or reject independence, I will 
demonstrate how both sides of the campaign mobilise support through a specific framing 
of the context highlighting the cost/benefits perception of independence or the status-quo. 
Framing theory, as an analytical and theoretical tool, is used to bring forward the 
campaigns framing strategies. Finally, the fifth recurring element throughout the thesis is 
the potential precedent-setting effect of independence referendums. That is internally 
within the existing host-state, and externally to other secessionist movements.  
 Thesis Structure  
 
The thesis is composed of three parts made of eight chapters. Chapter I, II and III are 
primary conceptual chapters. The first chapter discusses the core concepts employed 
throughout the thesis such as legitimacy, nationalism, democracy, self-determination, and 
state-creation. It also provides a review of the existing literature on sovereignty and 
independence referendums and argues for the important distinction to be made between 
agreed and unilateral referendums. The second chapter brings the independent literatures 
on secessionism and referendum together to consider when and how an independence 
referendum can affect the likelihood of secession occurring. I formulate hypotheses to be 
tested quantitatively (c.f. Appendix D) and review key aspects to focus on when analysing 
independence referendums derived from existing studies to guide my own analysis of the 
case-studies.  
Chapter III presents the thesis research design and methodology employed to answer the 
research questions. A quantitative and qualitative mixed-methods approach is used to 
consider when and how independence referendums affect the likelihood of secession. The 
first step consists of a quantitative overview of secessionist movements using a dataset 
compiled for the purpose of this study. Chapter III presents the dataset and 
operationalisation of key variables. The qualitative analysis is composed of two in-depth 
qualitative case-studies of Quebec and Montenegro’s independence referendums. I 
present the process-tracing and Discourse Analysis employed to study further the role of 
these referendums on the secessionist movements in Quebec and Montenegro, and the 
materials examined. 
Chapter IV tests the hypotheses formulated in chapter II. Using a sample of 225 
secessionist movements since 1905, I consider which secessionist movements have held 
an independence referendum, and their outcome accounting for key societal, political and 
economic variables identified in previous literature to affect support for secession and the 
capacity to secede. In light of the quantitative findings and review of the population of 
interest, I selected Quebec and Montenegro as two case studies to explore further.  
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Chapter V, VI and VII focus on the qualitative, comparative analysis of Quebec and 
Montenegro’s respective independence referendums. The first part considers the 
contextual similarities and differences of the two cases studies and why and how the 
plebiscites were called and agreed upon by the secessionist actors and the host-state 
governments. The second section focuses on the referendum designs, which side of the 
referendum option had the most control over it and could shape the process to its 
advantage. Finally, the last chapter considers the referendum campaigns and outcomes. It 
explores the levels of support for secession among the electorate and which side was most 
successful in mobilising voters and their campaign strategies. The referendum result and 
satisfaction with the process by the population, ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ side, host-state 
governments, and the international community response are assessed before discussing 
the long-term implications of the two plebiscites.  
The conclusion brings together the findings of the quantitative and qualitative analyses 
and to what extent the findings drawn from Quebec and Montenegro can be generalised. 
I also engage with remaining limitations and avenues for future research. Keeping in mind 
the words of Wambaugh: "Democracy cannot [...] be served by faulty plebiscite. If we are 
to keep the tool we must learn how to use it” (1933, 506), I hope this thesis to be a primary 
step towards achieving this by first getting a better understanding of independence 
referendums and their consequences, certainly not the last word; especially if they are to 





Sovereignty and the People 
 
 
 Introduction  
 
The advance of democracy since the 19th century and the waves of democratization 
following the second world war have led to the dominant view among scholars and 
politicians that a democratic state is the optimum form of government for individuals and 
the international system.3 In simple terms, democracy is generally understood to mean a 
form of rule by the people, or the expression of the “will of the people”. When we break 
down this simple definition and concepts within it, it soon becomes evident that a word 
we use so often remains very difficult to grasp, not least because of the presupposed actors 
of democracy: the people.  
Who constitute the people and where shall their “rule” be exercised has found an answer 
in the concept of the nation-state. The doctrines of democracy and the nation-state have 
developed in parallel since the end of the 18th century and are often conflated in their 
every-day usage. The nation is a body of people who share common cultural 
characteristics and inhabit a defined territorial unit, typically the state. In a modern 
democratic sovereign state, the people, as a ‘national community of fate’, embodies the 
sovereign and they rightly govern themselves and determine their own future (Held 2013, 
142). They hold the supreme power or authority of the territory and the laws that govern 
the state. In practice, democracy is applied through the representation of the people by 
political parties and politicians who then hold such authority on behalf of the people.  
Behind these very basic definitions lies a complex reality. States, their “people” or 
nation(s), democracy and sovereignty are all contested concepts with a variety of 
empirical manifestations. This chapter will review these concepts and how they form the 
stepping stone to understanding the nature and function of independence referendums. 
Furthermore, in order to gain a holistic understanding of independence referendums, 
literatures often considered in isolation need to be brought together to consider all the 
                                                          
3 Despite its prevalence in international relations and treaties, it has not yet been made a matter of 
international law (Rich 2001). The concept of self-determination can also be traced back to the 
French revolution (Cassese 1995, 11). 
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levels and systems within which such referendums operate. They range from the 
international system of state-recognition and its competing laws and norms, the state-
domestic system composed of a national government and its constituent territorial units, 
the national and regional-party system and the different groups and cleavages in society, 
to an individual casting a ballot on which political entity should ultimately embody his or 
her sovereignty.  
The first section of this chapter reviews the core concepts surrounding independence 
referendums by bringing together different literatures surrounding democracy, legality, 
nationalism and secession. The second part considers independence referendums’ subject 
matter: self-determination and statehood, including the normative debate on the right of 
secession and the practice of state-creation since the 20th century. The last section reviews 
the state of the art in the academic study of sovereignty referendums and its sub-category 
of interest: “independence referendums”. While an extensive mapping of the practice of 
sovereignty and independence referendums has been conducted (Sussman 2006; Laponce 
2010; Qvortrup 2012a; Mendez and Germann 2016), I argue that there is a lack of 
comparative studies to understand how independence referendums come about and their 
consequences in the broader secessionist dynamics that bring them forward. In light of 
this literature review and the gaps identified, this chapter concludes by offering a 
classification of independence referendums - “agreed” vs. “unilateral” - to identify when 
and how the “will of the people” is the determinant factor in state-creation.  
 
I.1. Sovereignty, People, and State 
 
I.1.a. Merging sovereignties   
 
Referendums asking citizens how and by whom they should be governed are far from a 
rare event.  Scholars have identified over 200 referendums on sovereignty (e.g. Qvortrup 
2012a; Laponce 2004; He 2002). They often take place during or following important 
changes in the international system, such as the Second World War or the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Most authors date the first use of a referendum on sovereignty in Avignon 
in 1791.4  While the early examples of sovereignty referendums were not conducted within 
today’s democratic procedural standards, they introduced the idea that popular consent is 
                                                          
4 Some scholars have recorded earlier popular consultations, such as in 1420 in the Duchy of 
Savoy and whether it should be annexed by Geneva (Gonssollin 1921, 31), or about a century 
later in Metz and Verdin and whether they should remain part of France in 1552 (Rourke, Hiskes, 
and Zirakzadeh 1992).  
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needed, or at least desirable, in settling disputes over borders and sovereign jurisdictions. 
Prior to the French and American Revolution titles of land changed almost exclusively 
through conquest or new alliances (Sussman 2006, 3).  
In order to understand independence referendums, we need first to understand their 
broader definition as sovereignty referendums. The concept of sovereignty in political and 
legal terms has undergone considerable alterations since 1648. In the first instance, 
sovereignty is a state-property at the international level. Second, it is a property of the 
people in a democratic system of government: it is about power within a polity and how 
it is acquired and manifested through politics. Although they are two distinct 
understandings of sovereignty, we will see in this thesis that they are closely intertwined 
in independence referendums and employed to be substantially in continuations of each 
other to support the secessionist cause (and how it can also, paradoxically, undermine it). 
The first understanding of the sovereignty of interest here is the traditional “Westphalian” 
principle of the nation-state’s monopoly on power over its territory and citizens 
commonly found in the field of international relations. From a realist perspective, it also 
means that the state has full discretion over how it uses its power and enjoys the right of 
non-interference from external actors. Equality among all sovereign states is also assumed 
(Jackson 2003, 782). Sovereignty is a horizontally distributed characteristic in the 
international arena where only states hold this property. This first definition of sovereignty 
is important in understanding its continued appeal. Indeed, it holds the belief that there is 
no higher authority or power than the one of the nation-state. 
This traditional Hobbesian association of sovereignty and state, or ‘conventional 
sovereignty’ (Krasner 2005), has been increasingly contested in both definition and 
practice. Firstly, with the emergence of the nation-state in the nineteenth century, 
sovereignty no longer is a property solely reserved to the state, but instead rests on its 
inhabitants and their consent, or  ‘popular sovereignty’ (Held 2013, 222). The perceived 
relationship between the authority of the state, its territory and its inhabitants changed.  
While it was previously embodied in the monarch, who symbolised alone the entity 
entitled to make laws and enforce them, it was transferred to the body of people who 
inhabit the state forming one “nation”. Sovereignty operates vertically, whereby the 
sovereignty of the state arises from the people, more precisely the citizens eligible to vote 
(electorate) and it is they who embody the existence of a state. 
Secondly, globalization has also eroded the principle of non-interference as the power and 
control over key aspects of a state’s traditional jurisdiction can no longer be confined, or 
kept in or out, of its borders. As states’ economies have become gradually interlinked, 
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requiring transnational decision-making, the ability of national governments to decide and 
exercise ultimate authority within their borders has become increasingly difficult (Held 
1991). Yet, state-sovereignty still remains an important principle in both empirical and 
legal terms and we cannot say that it has been fully transferred to supranational bodies or 
in favour of an international rights regime (Bellamy in Walker 2003, 180). As Keating 
pointed out: ‘sovereignty is said to be ebbing away, but new sovereignty claims are being 
made all the time’(2003, 204). 
The exercise of sovereignty is however not directly executed by the citizens of a state, 
personifying the “nation”, who instead elect representatives to make decisions on their 
behalf. It assumes a homogenous cultural or ethnic group that acts as a single entity; or 
more accurately in the case of representative democracy, a plurality or majority exercises 
their “will” through elected representatives. Accordingly, the people, as a nation, and the 
state become one and the ultimate holders of sovereignty. This means the citizens hold 
the supreme power or authority over the territory, its laws and are therefore self-
governing. A plebiscite on sovereignty is essentially about the allocation of power and 
what institution possesses the highest form of authority over specific policy areas in a 
given territory on behalf of a people or citizen body. 
I.1.b. Democracy, legitimacy and legality 
 
This modern and political understanding of sovereignty rests on the principle of 
democracy. The “sovereignty of the people”, or popular sovereignty, is at the core of the 
modern nation-state based on the democratic legitimisation of the state as opposed to a 
given, and absolute, right of states as an abstract entity. The authority of the state’s 
government is created and sustained by the consent of the people who elect it. Citizens, 
or the demos, therefore represent the source of all political power. In this 
conceptualisation, sovereignty and authority become almost synonymous with legitimacy 
(Jackson 2003, 791; Rogers 2004). 
One of the core assumptions of this thesis is that the primary role of an independence 
referendum is to legitimise secession. Legitimacy is essential for political actors to claim 
sovereignty over and on behalf of a people and territory (Şen 2015, 23). Legitimacy 
ensures authority (power and dominance) over the territorial unit and its subjects, essential 
to the existence of a stable sovereign state. Such authority does not need to depend on 
force, especially in today’s democratic systems. It rests on willingness and belief that the 
legitimate holder of authority shall be obeyed and the laws that emanate from them – 
would they be specific institutions or governments – should be obeyed and are binding 
(Weber 1978, 263; Schaar 1981). Legitimacy is not meant here to necessarily have a 
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positive connotation when used analytically. Rather, it is a social construct that frames 
actors’ actions and possibilities, which can itself become a tool and define what is 
appropriate and ought to be respected.   
Even something “legal” needs to have some form of legitimacy to function. Constitutions 
and laws do not operate in a vacuum. They need to be seen as reasonable and legitimate 
themselves as a medium to reliably ‘establish morally obligated relationships of mutual 
respect even among strangers’ (Habermas 1997, 460; Loughlin 2010). This legitimacy 
function of law- and over law- is particularly important in secessionism since the state and 
its sovereign authority at the source of law is contested. Habermas conceived legality as 
something closely related to legitimacy and democracy: ‘the modern legal order can draw 
its legitimacy only from the idea of self-determination: citizens should always be able to 
understand themselves also as authors of the law to which they are subject as addressees’ 
(1997, 408). This brings us back full circle to the source of state-sovereignty: the people.  
In situations where functions traditionally reserved to the central government are 
transferred to other institutions (subnational or supranational),  referendums have been 
increasingly perceived as being ‘politically obligatory’  (Germann and Mendez 2014, 21; 
See also Morel 2007; Hobolt 2009; Finke and König 2009; Dür and Mateo 2011). In such 
cases, the transfer of legislative powers is seen to require more than the legitimacy granted 
to political actors to make political decisions through elections and requires the direct 
expression of the electorate to legitimise the proposed change. Accordingly, sovereignty 
referendums exercise a double function: the first is a “subjectively binding force” over the 
relevant people, justifying their obedience to the new political authority through the 
expression of the majority’s consent. I will elaborate on this in chapter II when 
considering the legitimacy of the referendum process and its binding nature. The second 
is a “publicly symbolic declaratory force”, which ‘serves as an evidence of legitimacy to 
the international community’ (Şen 2015, 32; see also Beetham 1991, 18–19). In 
international relations, a high degree of consent in a plebiscite for a new state signals 
authority and the ability to exercise internal sovereignty (Murphy 1999, 547; Jiménez 
2013, 219). 
I do not wish to state that legality is irrelevant – rather, it is not sufficient without 
legitimacy, and conversely, strong legitimacy can overcome the absence of legality or 
generate it. For instance, in Scotland, the belief that the country and its people had a right 
to secede lead to the implementation of a legal framework to do so through a referendum. 
In Quebec, as we will see, the belief that the Quebec people had a democratic right to 
express their self-determination politically - or rather, the perceived illegitimacy of 
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denying it - lead to a consensual referendum when a legal take on the situation was absent. 
I will test this argument of downgrading the importance of legality throughout the thesis, 
both quantitatively by considering referendums which took place when a right of 
secession was in place and qualitatively when analysing the referendums in Quebec and 
Montenegro. By putting the emphasis on legitimacy rather than legality, this thesis departs 
from the existing literature on sovereignty and independence referendums which have 
considered the phenomena from a legal (domestic and international) and normative 
perspective (e.g. Haljan 2014; Şen 2015). 
I.1.c. Nationalism and secession 
 
Renan (1882) defined the nation as a “daily plebiscite”; a collective assertion of solidarity 
and the belief in a shared common past and future. Independence referendums put into 
practice the idea that common territorially concentrated collective entities, as distinct 
‘nations’ or “peoples” exist, and that they have a right to statehood. It is a mechanism to 
assert the sovereignty of a people and, through their consent, legitimise the creation of a 
state on their behalf. Yet, what is a “nation” and its constituent people and who gets to 
define them remains to be answered (Jennings 1956, 55–56, Fish 2015, p37-38, Beckman, 
2017).  
The ideal of the “nation-state” assumes that a “people” or “nation” really exists. When a 
political actor talks about the “people” or “nation” they often infer to the same coherent 
unit and specific members of a group inhabiting a territory and polity. But identity 
perception and sense of belonging might not be common to all inhabitants within the 
territorial borders of a state. We, therefore, hear of “nations without states”, “ethnic 
minorities”, “indigenous people”, groups which may be integral citizens of the state by 
law but are in some way or other distinguished from the majority based on their identities. 
Such groups are often at the centre of secessionist calls, challenging the sovereignty of 
the state based on the people from within. 
Secession is defined here as the process through which a sub-national territorial entity 
may become a new independent state (successfully secede) from an existing host-state.5 
Theories of nationalism can shed light on the origins of calls for secession from an existing 
host-state. They can serve as an explanatory tool or prism through which to consider the 
phenomenon of secession, and, in some cases as justification for secession. Primordialists 
argue that nations are formed out of pre-existing distinct groups (Connor 2004), although 
no modern scholar believes they are literally set in stone or have always been present 
                                                          
5 This definition follows Pavković and Radan’s (2007, 7–8).  
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(Hale 2008, 15). Since the current borders of states rarely match existing linguistic, 
religious or ethnic groups, there is the potential for more secessionist movements to 
emerge. The AMAR dataset, a recent extension of the MAR dataset, records 1202 distinct 
ethnic groups (Birnir et al. 2015), yet, not all of them have or will develop into a nationalist 
movement seeking their own independent state.   
Contrary to primordialists who believe that existing racial or cultural characteristics 
determine the existence of a nation, constructivists, while retaining the importance of a 
distinct history or territory (circumstantialism), argue that nations are primarily a social 
construct (Anderson 1991). They emphasise how these historical elements (founding 
myths) are articulated into a sense of common cultural and territorial belonging by 
individuals (Smith 1998, 188). Furthermore, a nation is a group who collectively adheres 
to the belief that they are a common people based on certain traits or characteristics and 
the collective is perceived as inherently limited and sovereign (Anderson 1991, 6). 
Nationalism is also conceived as a phenomenon closely associated with the state and 
political power. Its crucial border-generating function (Conversi 1995, 75) is of particular 
importance when considering state-seeking nationalist movements. Instrumentalists posit 
that nationalism is primarily driven by elites’ interests in socio-economic development 
and state-building, and serves as a tool to secure economic gains and power. For instance, 
Gellner (1983, 33–35) sees nationalism as a means to build a modern industrialised 
society made of an educated and homogenous population which uses the same language. 
Education, symbols and general political rhetoric in turn help perpetuate a sense of 
collective national identity within a population (Billig 1995; Hearn 2007). Nationalism 
can also be used for political purposes to help mobilise a population and legitimises the 
state and its ramifications by enforcing societal cohesion and the rule of law (Breuilly 
1993; Eriksen 1993). When the population is not homogenised competing nationalist 
movements may emerge within the same country.  
Yet, a distinct identity held by a territorially concentrated group does not necessarily result 
in a secessionist movement, and when it does, it faces different levels of success in 
mobilising the local population (Sorens 2008, 325–26). Furthermore, individuals may 
hold multiple identities or form a heterogeneous group in other aspects (see for example 
Herb and Kaplan 1999; Henderson 2007). Theories of nationalism taken in isolation often 
fail to explain why the “people” as an audience would readily embrace nationalism and 
the proposed identity, but more importantly, why this identity requires self-determination 
through the creation of a nation-state. 
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To rally support, saying a Scottish, Western Saharan or Kosovan sovereign state is needed 
because they are “Scots”, “Western Saharans”; or “Kosovars” is not sufficient. The state 
needs to serve a purpose that is currently not met within the existing arrangement within 
the host-state in relation to this identity. Why do Scots, Kosovars or any other such 
collective need a state? The answer, I will argue in the next chapter, will largely depend 
on context, but they all have themes in common, namely: self-determination – or the 
ability to decide without “foreign” intervention their own political affairs; preserve and 
ensure the survival of the nation, and/or achieve different economic and social aspirations.  
 
I.2. State-creation and the “Will of the People” 
 
Nationhood and statehood are closely connected with nationalism serving as a political 
legitimising force requiring that ‘ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones’ 
(Gellner 1983, 1). Hence, the nation-state has come to represent the “ultimate” form of 
self-determination. The right to self-determination, however, remains contested, from 
who is eligible to it and how it is to be applied. This section aims to place independence 
referendums within their subject-matter by first briefly reviewing the normative and legal 
right to self-determination. Secondly, the actual practice of state-creation is reviewed, 
notably the important step of international recognition, in order to consider the functions 
of independence referendums has tools of state-creation and legitimisation.  
 
I.2.a. Self-determination and right to secession  
 
Since the Second World War, the conceptualisation of state sovereignty based on its 
people has become a dominant discursive norm throughout the 20th and 21st century with 
the promotion of liberalism (McFaul 2004). Developing in parallel to a normative 
entitlement to democracy and human rights, the concept of self-determination has also 
had important implications for our current understanding of sovereignty and adds another 
layer to the relationship between sovereignty, state and people. It is also the aspect that 
relates most to independence referendums.  
The legal-political ideal that stems from self-determination is summarised by Fisch as 
every human being holding the  ‘right to live in the state, or more comprehensively in the 
politically organised community, of one’s own choice’ (2015, 8). Following World War 
II, self-determination came to be understood as the belief that each nation has a right to 
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constitute an independent state with its own government (Velasco 2014, 78). Self-
determination, however, does not necessarily mean that every individual or collective 
ought to have or can decide on, their own state and secession is its expected offshoot.  
Self-determination can be an individual and collective right and operationalised in two 
ways: ‘external self-determination’, applied according to Pomerance (1982, 1) as ‘the 
right of every people to choose the sovereignty under which they live’ (statehood) and 
‘internal self-determination’, defined as ‘the right of every people to select its own form 
of government’(within the existing state). The former is closely associated with Human 
Rights as embedded in the UN Declarations on the end of colonialism in 1960 and the 
Human Rights Covenants in 1966 which state that: ‘All people have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development’ (quoted in Morphet 1989). Such 
right, however, is only to be pursued within the existing state and it does not challenge 
states’ territorial-integrity outside of the colonial context (Fisch 2015, 8).  
It remains that the principle of self-determination serves as the battle cry for secessionist 
actors (Duffy and Saideman 2010, 42) and a competing principle of state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. Invoking self-determination is an important element in their discourse 
for justifying secession and the needs for a new independent state, both internally to the 
“people” concerned and externally to the international community. By calling on this 
principle, secessionist actors contribute to ‘challenging international norms and  borders’ 
(Schneckener 2008, 467). In the study of independence referendum, it is principally this 
association of self-determination qua secession that will be examined. Independence 
referendums should in turn also be considered in the larger phenomenon of nationalism 
and state creation, but beforehand, I wish to briefly address the question of who has a right 
to self-determination.  
Two broad philosophical and normative schools have tried to answer the question of who 
has a right to external self-determination, and therefore a right to secession. Starting from 
the individual perspective of self-determination some advance that any group of people 
can self-determine. Permissive and some liberal theories of secession advance that any 
territorially-concentrated group of individuals coming together, regardless of whether 
they share an ethnic or cultural identity, should be allowed to secede if they want to and 
can perform the basic responsibilities of an independent state (Beran 1984, 30–31; McGee 
1991). This broad view of a right to secession emphasises the civic understanding of a 
state based on a willingness to be a demos or political community as sufficient. This 
approach, however, makes for a broad and almost infinite right to secession, and possibly 
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destabilising, especially since this right of political association does not address the right 
to a territory and how it is often the latter that is disputed (Brilmayer 1991; Lehning 1998). 
The second perspective on self-determination as a collective right emphasises instead the 
ethnos: the nation composing the state over simply its citizenship. Primary right theories 
believe nations have a primary right to statehood (Miller 1995; for a critique see Horowitz 
2003). The major difficulty, in this case, rests with identifying such groups, and whether 
and to what extent they may self-identify as such. This is often the middle-ground 
justification used by secessionist movements. Critics reject the idea of justifying secession 
on the presumption that nations are entitled to their own states mainly due to the instability 
and violence it may generate and resulting new minorities (Wellman 2005, 125–26). 
Instead, they argue for the consolidation of the state and the democratic management of 
conflict (e.g. Chandhoke 2014, 58). The promotion of democracy and internal self-
determination via federalism or power-sharing have been recommended to bring power 
closer to “the people” and give  ‘groups control over their political, social and economic 
affairs’ (Brancati 2006, 625), without jeopardising the territorial integrity of the state (e.g. 
Lijphart 2004; Barten 2014).  
Other have focused instead on conditions and procedures as primary determinants of a 
right to secede. Firstly, Remedial Right Only Theory stresses the role of the state as the 
protector of its citizens and their human rights (Buchanan 1991, 2003; for a critique see 
Seymour 2007). If internal self-determination is not applied, or worse, the state actually 
actively persecutes a territorially concentrated group, secession may then be justified. The 
difficulty rests with identifying what counts as oppression (Cassese 1995, 129). For 
instance, the Canadian Supreme Court found that Quebec could not call on this principle 
since Quebecers were not  ‘denied meaningful access to pursue their political, economic, 
cultural and social development’ (Reference re Secession of Quebec 1998, 285). Yet as 
we will see in chapter VII, it still acknowledges a right of Quebecers to secede based on 
a liberal-democratic principle of secession similar to the one described above.  
Secondly, some have emphasised the process through which secession is to occur. The 
plebiscitary right theories support a right of secession when a majority has demonstrated 
its wish via a referendum to ‘withdraw their consent’ from the existing state (Pavković 
2000, 486; Moore 2001; Norman 2006). Other scholars have also been concerned with 
making the practice of secession, too often a violent affair,6 more regulated, and 
democratic. Beran’s (1984) democratic theory of secession supports referendums on 
                                                          
6 Wimmer et al. (2009) for instance identified 110 ethnic conflicts of which 60 had clear 
secessionist aims within the ethnic power relations dataset.  
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identity and boundary questions to deal with secession and emphasises the importance of 
consent and agreement in the process. 
The divorce analogy remains a popular argumentative route among the supporters of a 
right to secession especially from a liberal point of view. The argument rests on freedom 
of choice and that ‘no one can be kept in a community against his will’ and  ‘two sworn 
enemies cannot live, and cannot be made to live forever, in a house of bitterness and 
hatred’ (Weinstock 2001, 6).7 Even if one agrees with this proposition, it does not solve 
the problem of who gets to choose who can decide their statehood status.   
I.2.b. State-creation  
 
The existing literature on the right of secession regardless of the position defended is often 
disconnected from the actual practice of state-creation. I will now review the literature on 
how new states come to be and what principles or considerations dictate who has a right 
to statehood. It is a crucial element in the path to a successful secession, often overlooked 
in the secessionist literature which has instead largely focused on the incentives and 
capability of independentist actors to secede, which is covered in the following chapter. I 
will demonstrate that the discussion around self-determination and the practice of state-
creation (and recognition) rarely considers how people are to self-determine. Not solely 
pursue their political, economic, and cultural right (democracy), but actually, decide on 
where and how to exercise this self-determination. An independence referendum, and I 
will argue specifically an “agreed” independence referendum, offers a rare opportunity 
for external self-determination to be exercised by the people in which name sovereignty 
is called upon.  
Self-determination, in its external form, entails statehood. While it is by definition driven 
by an internal process made of a group of individuals seeking self-rule, it has 
consequences at the highest level: the international system. The international system 
refers to states, institutions and processes governing world politics. Its main actors are 
sovereign independent states and their governments. They form an international society 
or community which shapes norms and values which in turn constrains individual states’ 
behaviour, despite a lack of enforceability of international law and principles (Franck 
1988; Wendt 1999).  
Achieving external self-determination also means becoming a part of this international 
system as an independent sovereign state. The process of decolonisation is the only 
                                                          
7 For an extensive criticism of the divorce analogy see Aronovitch (2000). 
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example where the principle of self-determination was used to justify independence 
successfully (Coggins 2011, 442; Cattaruzza 2007). Since then, most scholars found 
limited evidence that the international community protects the principles of internal self-
determination and minority rights in the practice of state recognition (e.g. Murphy 1999, 
557; Vidmar 2013).  
The traditional, realist, view on state creation in international relations advances internal 
or domestic factors to explain how a new state enters the international state system. If an 
entity acts and looks like a state, then other states will accept it as a peer within the 
Westphalian state system (Bull 1977, 8; Waltz 1979, 88–89; James 1999, 460). The 
Montevideo Convention of 1933 offered identifiers of hallmarks of statehood with at its 
heart, the concepts of effectiveness and capacity: the ability for the state government to 
conduct internal and external affairs, levy taxes and control the population and territory 
(Grant 1998, 416).  
Territoriality was an essential component of decolonisation and remains an important 
factor of consideration in state-creation to this day. The uti possidetis principle of 
international law dictates that new sovereign states should be created out of existing 
territorially defined units such as republics (see for example Caplan 2005; Sassòli 2003; 
Radan 1999). The presence of a clearly defined sub-national territory within an existing 
host-state has been identified by Roeder (2007) among others as an essential explanatory 
factor in successful secessions; albeit this argument rests on the ability of local elites to 
mobilise the local population in favour of separation rather than facilitating entrance into 
the international system.   
On the other hand, the ability to exercise domestic authority and internal sovereignty is 
no longer enough. For example, Somaliland meets these international legal standards for  
“statehood” but lack the formal recognition needed to be internationally recognised as a 
sovereign entity (Eggers 2007, 222). While this  ‘declaratory theory of recognition’ 
(Murphy 1999, 548) might have been true in 1816 when 48 states populated the 
international system, by 1997, 212 new states entered the system on different grounds 
(Small and Singer 1997). Such grounds, however, are unclear and unsystematic: Lowe et 
al. refer to the emergence of new states following decolonisation as a  ‘discretionary’ 
practice (1992, 478). Furthermore, gaining statehood relies primarily on an essential step 
of recognition.  
Constructivist and sociological approaches to state-creation emphasise the social 
character of the system made of norms and identities and, above all, peer-recognition 
(Coggins 2014, 25–26; see also Philpott 2001). To gain full statehood, the international 
21 
 
society recognition is fundamental. In international law, the term “recognition” implies 
the formal acknowledgement that a state -and its government- exists and that such 
existence will be respected (Peterson 1982, 325). For an independent sovereign state to 
be recognised as such (gain external sovereignty) it needs to reach a certain threshold of 
recognition, or “critical mass”. Great Powers, notably the US, Russia, France and Great 
Britain, are generally the most important in setting the tone on whether a territorial entity 
will be recognised as independent. If all Great Powers recognise the new entity as a peer 
through an official diplomatic declaration other states typically follow suit and statehood 
is uncontested (Coggins 2014, 37–38).  
A problem arises when a great power and, crucially, the former host-state withstand 
recognition. The entity then risks being left in a grey zone between de-facto and de-jure 
statehood. Even if a sub-state entity has the capability to fight the host-state authority and 
fully govern itself without any interference, therefore acting as a state (de-facto 
statehood), it is not yet a fully sovereign independent state as it lacks international 
recognition (de-jure statehood) (Florea 2014). I refer to such cases as instances of 
“partition” rather than “secession” in this thesis.  
For instance, in February 1972 following the surrender of the Pakistani army in East 
Bengal, twenty-eight states recognised Bangladesh de-jure, while five also had extended 
de-facto recognition, setting the path for Bangladesh’s full independence. However, the 
US and China still supported Pakistan’s territorial claim to the region, and vetoed 
Bangladesh’s membership to the United Nations in 1972 and only recognising its 
independence in 1975, after Pakistan – the former host-state – granted recognition in 
February 1974 (Pavković and Radan 2007, 108). India’s recognition in 1971 as a major 
regional power, its military intervention and extensive international lobbying for other 
states to also acknowledge Bangladesh’s independence were crucial to its success, along 
with the complex geopolitical situation at the time, notably the distance separating the 
region from the host-state and Cold War rivalries (Crawford 2006, 143; Pavković and 
Radan 2007). 
No particular region or group enjoys a right to self-determination and gains international 
recognition on such grounds. Instead, secessionist movements need to rely on powerful 
allies in the international community to secure recognition of independence (Coggins 
2011).  Rich (1993, 63) finds that the recognition is now less predictable and  ‘a matter of 
political discretion’. The decision to recognise a seceding territorial unit and its 
inhabitants as independent is often based on the state’s own interests, especially if they 
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face secessionist movements themselves as they fear setting precedents (Coggins 2014, 
38).  
Crawford’s appraisal of unsuccessful attempts of sub-territorial entities to secede 
unilaterally since the creation of the 1945 UN Charter argues that ‘where the government 
of the state in question has maintained its opposition to the secession, such attempts have 
gained virtually no international support or recognition, […] even when other 
humanitarian aspects of the situation have triggered widespread concern and action’ 
(2006, 403). This is the case for Tibet in China, Abkhazia in Georgia or Kashmir in India 
for example. Similarly, Vidmar (2012, 363) concluded that the current practice of 
recognition and international law makes it very unlikely that a new state will be recognised 
by the international community without the consent of the host-state. Without the 
agreement of the existing state authority, a declaration of independence, because of its 
unilateral nature, (UDI) is unlikely to succeed.  
From this review of the practice of state-creation, three conclusions can be drawn in regard 
to independence referendums. Firstly, external self-determination is not currently a 
primary consideration in state-recognition. Accordingly, there is no reason to expect that 
an independence referendum in itself could determine statehood based on this principle. 
Secondly, the consent of the host-state is to date the strongest determinant of a successful 
secession. For the people’s will to determine statehood, the first thing to secure is the 
consent of the host-state that it will respect the wishes of the people, even if it means 
separation.  
Thirdly, the existing literature does not consider the role of independence referendums in 
the process of state-creation, despite the fact that some of the latest additions to the 
international system had an independence referendum such as Montenegro in 2006 or 
South Sudan in 2011. One partial exception is Radan’s qualitative review of possible legal 
elements, in internal law and within states, that may require referendums before territorial 
changes occur.8 He finds it to be rarely the case but stresses its increasing political 
necessity (2012, 18). This thesis also asserts the increasingly political need for such 
consultations. The next chapter will consider independence referendums as an intervening 
variable in secessionist dynamics and state-creation by formulating testable hypotheses.  
                                                          
8 Suksi’s review of 160 national constitutions found  only 15 cases having a clear provision for 
referendums at the regional or local level, and none have a mandatory referendum granting the 
right to people to decide on statehood (1993, 137, 145). Montenegro’s constitution is an 
exception not raised by Suksi, (c.f. chapter VI). 
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This review also shows the need to account for how the independence referendum stands 
in regard to the authority of the existing state and when the plebiscite can guarantee that 
the “voice of the people” will be a determinant factor in whether a new independent state 
is created, and therefore the referendum itself can affect the likelihood of successfully 
seceding. I will now elaborate on this distinction by reviewing the existing literature on 
independence referendums.  
 
I.3.  Referendums: Applying Sovereignty?  
 
A sovereignty referendum addresses the question of how sovereignty is applied and 
through which institutional body the citizens are represented and exercises the supreme 
authority over specific areas of government. Accordingly, the traditional use of 
referendums as enabling direct ‘popular sovereignty’ and the demos deciding on a specific 
issue, is expanded and applied to the very question of where and how this sovereignty is 
defined (Tierney 2009). They enable the direct involvement of the demos in determining 
the state and nature of its sovereignty; the right to make authoritative political decisions 
within a territorial unit, and where it should be located.9  
Germann and Mendez (2014; 2016), who offer the most extensive review of the literature 
to date, emphasise the shifting of power and sovereignty rights between at least two 
territorial centres as a crucial principle of sovereignty referendums and independence 
referendums especially. Moreover, sovereignty referendums can be considered 
constitutional referendums10  as they alter the way power is distributed among different 
institutions and such changes can imply a change in the constitution (Auer 1996).  
The term referendum, sometimes quoted as ‘referenda’, refers throughout the thesis as the 
practice of direct popular vote on, usually, a single political question.11 As the concept of 
sovereignty and the emergence of self-determination converged with new democratic and 
liberal norms, so did the use of referendums increase (Butler and Ranney 1994). 
                                                          
9 All scholars adopting this definition exclude relatively minor shifts related to autonomy of 
municipalities or second level administrative units except Laponce (2010; 2004) who considers 
referendums in Swiss Cantons.  
10 That is when the term is used as being about the subject of the referendum as opposed to 
‘constitutional referendums’ sometimes referring to referendums that have to be held to comply 
with the constitutional procedure of a country to enable certain changes (as identified by Kobach 
1993, 42). 
11 Sometimes citizens are asked to answer multiple questions by Yes or No, such as in the 
devolution referendum in 1997 in Scotland where one could say whether they agreed with the 




Furthermore, the shift between the state-centred sovereignty to people-centred 
sovereignty can be witnessed in the changing purposes of sovereignty referendums as 
well. While the first referendums, notably in France and Italy, were an instrument of state-
led nationalism to gain legitimacy following conquests through the means of a plebiscite, 
referendums held following WWII are now principally about people voting for a nation-
state. A ‘tool of state-led nationalism’ became a ‘tool of state-seeking nationalism’ 
(Sussman 2006, 6). 
Whether a referendum is an appropriate tool for democracy at large is not a primary 
concern in this thesis.12 Nor do I wish to question whether independence referendums are 
an appropriate tool to answer secessionist conflicts. Instead, I wish to gain a better 
understanding of the role they play in secessionist dynamics and how they may affect the 
likelihood of secession occurring by focusing on their empirical manifestations and 
consequences. While the literature on sovereignty and independence referendums to date 
has provided an extensive review of the phenomenon across time and developed 
typologies according to their functions, I demonstrate below some of the remaining gaps 
in the study of independence referendums and how this thesis offers to address them.  
 
I.3.a. Sovereignty and independence referendums  
 
Scholars have identified over 200 referendums on sovereignty asking people how they 
should be governed (c.f. Table I.1). They include a devolution of power from the nation-
state to handing over powers to supranational institutions such as the European Union or 
NATO (see also Laponce 2001; Qvortrup 2012; LeDuc 2003; Mendez, Mendez, and Triga 
2014). Among them, the number of independence referendums of interest varies 
considerably according to the definition employed by researchers.  
Classifying the different forms of sovereignty referendums that exist can be built on the 
subject matter based on the wording of the referendum question, the type of actors 
initiating the referendum (Suksi 1993), what particular aspects of sovereignty are being 
shifted, and which political entities is sovereignty shifting from and to (Rourke, Hiskes, 
and Zirakzadeh 1992; Germann and Mendez 2014). Alternatively, scholars focused on 
their consequences such as the redrawing of borders (Laponce 2010) and the creation of 
a more heterogeneous or homogenous region or states (Qvortrup 2012a). Table I.1 offers 
                                                          
12 For a review of this debate see among others Setälä (2006; with Schiller 2009), Mendelsohn 
and Cutler (2000) and Chambers (2001). 
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an overview of the typologies developed to date and how many referendums on 
independence have been identified.  
Within the existing literature, what I have defined below as independence referendums 
appear under different labels (Table I.1) and include different cases from one study to the 
next, which may not always be appropriate. He (2002) also includes in his empirical 
reviews of independence referendums the Belfast Agreement of 1998 which did not 
involve the creation of a new independent state. Sussman’s typology includes  
‘Independence Referendums’ which  ‘celebrate the independence of nation states’ and  
‘Secession/Downsizing Referendums’ which facilitate secession of territories (2006, 8–
9). The first category encompasses cases where the referendum was used as a celebration 
of “newfound independence” after successfully seceding but the causality is not clear here 
as it includes cases such as Norway in 1905 and Algeria in 1961 where the referendums 
were held as part of the process to gain independence (see chapter II and IV).  
Qvortrup’s definition of ‘ethnonational referendum’ includes events such as the vote on 
the Belgian King in 1950 that did not aim to alter the state’s boundaries or touch directly 
on identity. Furthermore, Qvortrup attributes the presence of referendums on ethnic or 
national issues – including independence referendum, to  ‘an inverse relationship between 
political competition and support for the proposed policy among the 
constituents’(Qvortrup 2014a, 6). In other words, the holding of a referendum depends on 
the competition faced by those calling a referendum and the median voter preference.  
 ‘The competition proximity model’ he finds  ‘explains secessionist 
referendums’(Qvortrup 2014a, 156). The way “opposition” is operationalised however is 
not clear. It sometimes seems to include  ‘military’ threat (Qvortrup 2014a, 43), other 
times a simple political opposition (e.g. Conservative vs. Labour in the UK). This fails to 
explain the incentives of the SNP to call a referendum when it did, as polls showed it was 
far from having a majority. Furthermore, it omits the capacity to call and hold a 
referendum in the first place. Qvortrup argues that referendums on secession will tend to 
occur following the lifting of a long-standing imperial hegemony  ‘only if there is a broad 
based elite commitment to polyarchic government in the country in question’(2014a, 12); 
a statement repeated in the conclusion which is not developed or demonstrated in the 
book.  
Finally, Mendez and Germann (2016) also count as independence referendums 
consultations on whether to adopt a new constitution stating the independence or 
sovereignty of the state, regardless of whether or not independence had already been 
granted (c.f. chapter III). I argue that independence referendums should be identified 
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primarily on their consequences: is the potential outcome of the referendum either the 
creation of a new independent state or the status-quo?13   
Since sovereignty referendums are  ‘a direct popular vote on a  reallocation of sovereign 
rights between at least two territorial centres’ (Mendez and Germann 2016, 5), in the case 
of an independence referendum these sovereign rights are no less than what a fully 
independent state would enjoy.  That is, the new state holds the Westphalian principle of 
nation-states as independent actors within the international system and has supreme 
political authority over its territory (Crawford 2006, 32). Although it is understood that 
such criteria are ideal principles and not absolute in practice. Sovereign nation states have 
increasingly delegated some of their decision-making powers to supranational institutions 
such as the European Union. Nonetheless, within existing regional and international 
institutions they retain ultimate sovereignty, especially as such institutions tend to suffer 
from a lack of legitimacy (Barrow 2005; Cohen 2012; Trimble 1997).  
The essential question is whether the sovereignty generated by the people consulted 
should be transferred to a newly created national-state and withdrawn from the existing 
one. Accordingly, the locus of identities, political expectations and loyalties in the 
seceding region is to be fully detached from the current territorial centre to create a new 
state. Independence referendums are therefore defined here as a process through which 
the electorate within a sub-national territorial unit (region) gets to decide on whether it 
should form a new sovereign independent state. Even if the question wording does not 
explicitly use the term “independence” or “state”, one of the possible intended 
consequences of the plebiscite should be secession. The methods chapter (III) discusses 
in more depth the case-selection process that sees the 43 to 90 independence referendums 
identified by previous scholars since the mid-19th century reduced to 43 plebiscites within 
a sample of 225 secessionist movements from 1905 to 2014.  
By adopting a strict definition of independence I ensure construct validity: do I have under 
study referendums that are indeed primarily about state-creation? As for reliability, given 
this very narrow definition, can I trust that another scholar would come to the same 
conclusion in my classification and are the cases selected internally consistent in their 
intended outcome that is the creation of a new independent sovereign state? Only by 
making sure we are indeed clearly dealing with an independence referendum, originating 
                                                          
13 The question may offer the possibility of a middle ground in either of those two options. For 
example, within the “status-quo” - that is remaining within the existing host-state - more 
devolved powers could be on the table for the region at risk of seceding. Conversely, a form of 
association between now two independent sovereign states could be offered. It remains that the 
effect of the referendum results in either the maintenance of the existing host-state territorial 
integrity, or the creation of a new independent sovereign state.  
27 
 
from a secessionist intent, can we understand the role it plays in the broader secessionist 
dynamics that brought it forward, whether it increases or decreases the likelihood of 
secession, and how.  
I.3.b. The need for a new typology of independence referendums   
 
The extensive literature on referendums, covered in more depth in the next chapter, can 
also give an insight into the possible roles and functions of consultations on the question 
of independence such as their legitimising functions (e.g. Walker 2003; Morel 2007) or 
why they are held (e.g. Cronin 1989; Dür and Mateo 2011). It includes many comparative 
works to classify and analyse this tool of direct democracy. Studies have focused on 
specific types of referendums according to their subject-matter, notably plebiscites on the 
EU (e.g. Svensson 2002; Hobolt and Brouard 2010; Hobolt 2009; Garry 2013), or case-
specific studies, with Switzerland the most studied case (e.g. Boyer 1992; Kobach 1993; 
Benz and Stutzer 2004; Rocher 2014). Single and small-N case-studies have also 
contributed to our understanding of certain plebiscite on questions of independence as 
well. The bulk of this empirical literature has focused on Quebec and Scotland (e.g. Clarke 
and Kornberg 2004; Laponce 2009; Adam 2014; Keating 2017a). A couple of studies 
have considered other instances of independence referendums, starting with Amiel (1976) 
and Dobelle (1996), for example, looking at the referendums held in French colonies; 
Baldacchino and Hepburn (2012) considering why inhabitants of small islands reject 
independence when asked in referendums; and Huszka’s (2013) study of the Republics of 
Yugoslavia’s independence referendums campaigns. Most studies looking at 
independence referendums outside of western democracies have focused on the role of 
international actors in the process rather than the referendum process per-se or its 
consequences (e.g. Friis 2007; Mayo 2010; Vidmar 2011, 2014). These studies, some of 
which I will return to later, remain ad-hoc and do not have their main purpose to 
understand the role of independence referendums and how they may affect the likelihood 







Table I.1: Sovereignty Referendums  
 
 
                                                          
14 Author’s subcategory that most closely matches definition used here.  
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Over the last decade, there has been a growth in comparative scholarly considerations for 
sovereignty and independence referendums from a legal and normative perspective. 
Academics have considered whether they apply the democratic principle of the will of the 
people and how they fit within the existing constitutional order (Mancini 2008; Tierney 
2012; Oklopcic 2012; Haljan 2014; Şen 2015) and discussed their desirability (Heraclides 
1997; Buchanan 2003). Some scholars have also considered whether sovereignty 
referendums are conducive to peace and find it an optimistic path (Laponce 2004; 
Laponce 2010; He 2002; Qvortrup 2012; Loizides 2014), while others remain skeptical, 
especially in post-conflict and divided societies (Wheatley 2012; Lee and MacGinty 
2012).  
These studies often focus on a set of cases and their outcome following a referendum with 
limited consideration for the causal mechanisms at play, despite all pointing out that the 
way the referendum is conducted is important. For instance, Wheatley (2012, 64) initially 
states that he specifically considers referendums on independence and makes the crucial 
distinction between what he labels  ‘Referendum-as-a-solution’, agreed to by all sides as 
part of a conflict resolution, and  ‘referendum-as-a-weapon’ used in undemocratic 
contexts.  
However, his empirical evidence is not derived from independence referendums strictly 
speaking and includes ‘referendums on fundamental, constitutional issues’ which he finds 
fail to accommodate minorities.  Accordingly, his operationalisation is not sharp enough 
to really understand the use and outcomes of independence referendums per-se; a 
shortcoming found in other works (see below). Nevertheless, Wheatley points to an 
important distinction to be made between the types of referendums dealt with, notably 
whether the referendum was a consensual process. Lee and MacGinty (2012) also believe 
that only in rare cases referendums in post-conflict societies have been able to bring peace 
as most cases suffer from the exclusion of key actors (see also Qvortrup 2014a, 147). 
Other scholars have also noticed that peaceful secession tend to happen  ‘constitutionally’ 
(Young 1994). That is when the host-state acknowledges the right of secession. Indeed, if 
the legality of secession is not disputed and secessionist actors have the consent of the 
central government secession will be peaceful and international recognition will easily 
follow  (Pavković and Radan 2007, 65–66). More recently, Sorens’ (2012, 7) study of 
secessionism included a review of  ‘quasi-legal secession’ defined as a (national or 
central) government that has explicitly ruled out military suppression of a democratic 
secession and found that the latter suffers far fewer instances of ethnic rebellion than a 
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state which declared their eternal indivisibility. When studying independence 
referendums, we should, therefore, pay attention to the type of referendum held, and 
notably whether it is a consensual process, and whether its outcome is respected.  
The “unilateral” nature of some referendums has been previously highlighted by legal 
scholars such as Gawenda (1946) who differentiates plebiscites according to whether they 
are held in accordance with domestic constitutional and international principles. Şen’s 
work on sovereignty referendums and international law expands on this with “de-facto 
unilateral referendums” held by secessionist groups. They contrast with de-jure 
independence referendums in the colonial context where the legality of the process is 
granted by the international community, and outside the colonial context where an 
international agreement exists or the constitution of the state allows it (Şen 2015, 42–44, 
66). Nonetheless, this definition omits the crucial role of the host-state government 
highlighted above. The national government is the ultimate “authority” over the territory. 
Accordingly, it is the only actor which can make the secessionist outcome possible 
following a referendum beyond the question of whether secession itself is legal. It is hard 
to say whether Croatia’s 1991 or Scotland’s 2014 independence referendums would 
qualify as de-jure following Şen’s definition.  
Croatia had a constitutional legal right to secede (c.f. chapter IV), while Scotland’s legal 
right to hold a referendum was formalised in the Edinburgh Agreement once the UK 
government had already consented that the choice to leave or remain within the existing 
union was down to the people of Scotland (BBC News 2011; HM Government and The 
Scottish Government 2012). Quebec held two independence referendums 1980 and 1995 
(covered in chapter V, VI and VII), and both times the federal government tried to 
persuade Quebecers to reject separation, warning them that, contrary to what the Quebec 
separatists were saying, they would lose all links with the federation and become an 
independent state resembling Cuba or Haiti  (Laforest 1995, 30–31; Clarke and Kornberg 
1996). The legality of secession was only affirmed and constrained to certain conditions 
in the Clarity Act of 2000. 
The secessionist and conflict-management literature’s coverage of sovereignty and 
independence referendums, in addition to being very sporadic, poses two problems: first, 
its analysis is limited to a Yes/No possible outcome of peace or conflict and overlooks the 
fact that an independence referendum could have simultaneously positive and negative 
effects on the divided society and the likelihood of a new state being created. This 
problem, which I partially investigate in chapter IV, has very recently been addressed by 
Germann’s (2017) PhD dissertation which tested quantitatively whether  “self-
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determination” referendums can help resolve conflict using the SDM-Eurasia dataset 
(Sambanis, Germann, and Schadel 2016). 
His cases comprise the independence referendums included in this thesis but also other 
“sovereignty” referendums such as the Belfast Agreement of 1998, Charlottetown Accord 
of 1992 in Canada, or the Bolivian referendum on the departmental autonomy of 2006. At 
the core of its argument a very similar typology of agreed vs. unilateral referendum is 
advanced in this thesis (see below).15 This work addresses the concerns raised above on 
the causal mechanisms between plebiscites and separatist conflicts, but it does not 
consider the effect of independence referendums on secessionist dynamics beyond the 
reduction or increase of armed-conflict.  
Secondly, there is to date no comparative study of the referendums’ effect on the 
likelihood of secession and which mechanisms inherited in the referendum procedure 
have a determining effect. The scholars reviewed above consider the Eritrean and 
Nagorno-Karabakh independence referendum on an equal footing. But how comparable 
are the latest examples of the Scottish and Crimean independence referendums? While all 
are about breaking away from the existing host-state their contextual settings are very 
different. Their referendums’ processes and their implication in regards to their legality, 
legitimacy, and democratic credentials vary considerably.  
To answer such shortcomings and for comparative and analytical purposes, I propose a 
distinction be made within independence referendums. This distinction should be based 
on the nature of the plebiscite and whether it has been agreed by the key actors 
representing the secessionist option and the status quo: the independentist leaders and 
representatives of the regional population whose status is to be determined in the 
referendum, and the host-state national government representing the supreme authority of 
the current sovereign state.  
I.3.c. Agreed independence referendums 
 
The figure below (Figure I.1) summarises the different levels within which an 
independence referendum operates. The international (1), state (2), sub-state (3) and 
societal/electoral (4) levels are composed of various actors which together interconnect 
those different levels and their systems of laws, norms and competing claims and 
dynamics. The key concept covered in this chapter - sovereignty, legitimacy, legality, 
democracy, self-determination, nationalism, and statehood - link these different systems 
                                                          
15 This work was published online a month before to the final draft of this thesis was submitted.  
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and actors together and are at the core of independence referendums. Accordingly, as the 
following chapters go deeper into analysing and understanding the role of independence 
referendums in secessionist dynamics such concepts will appear on multiple occasions 
and at different levels of analysis. They are both analytical tools and objects of study as 
different actors make claims and counter claims about what these concepts entail and 
which one takes precedent when dealing with an independence referendum and the 
possibility of secession.  
The primary function of an independence referendum is to legitimise the right to secession 
and achieve host-state and international recognition. It uses the latent sovereignty of a 
people – framed as a nation – to claim sovereignty over a territory and achieved statehood. 
When the referendum is an agreed process, the host-state opposition is effectively 
removed enabling the plebiscite to be determinant in whether secession occurs or not. 
Accordingly, an independence referendum that is not opposed by the central authority of 
the existing state considerably increases the likelihood of secession by removing the main 
obstacle to a successful secession by enabling international recognition. As illustrated in 
Figure I.1, only then an independence referendum become a direct mechanism allowing 
the “people” (level 4) to decide on statehood and join the international system (level 1).  
 





































Furthermore, an agreed process guarantees that the ultimate choice is down to the people, 
should a majority support independence. The Yes/No secessionist outcome is then 
determined by the level of support for secession. The independence referendum, as a 
political consultative tool, is also a political mobilisation platform (Smith 1976; Kriesi 
2008; Shu 2009). The referendum process itself, notably its design and campaign 
discussed in the next chapter, can, in turn, affect the likelihood of secession as an 
intervening variable by affecting existing secessionist dynamics and levels of support for 
independence. In this process, the host-state (level 2) and secessionists actors (level 3) 
discussed so far become clearer political actors made of specific political parties and “the 
people” a defined electorate (c.f. Figure I.1).  
An independence referendum result could be the mere reflection of how much support for 
secession existed prior to the referendum being called, or the referendum process itself 
could have affected the witnessed outcome. Prior to covering this function of an 
independence referendum as a political mobilisation tool and a possible mediator or 
moderator in secessionist dynamics in the next chapter, I wish to conclude this chapter by 
clarifying what I mean by an “agreed” independence referendum.  
“Agreed” independence referendums have two components: (a) lack of outright 
opposition and (b) engagement by the two primary actors enabling the presence of an 
independence referendum where the people get to decide; that is the regional secessionist 
movement leaders and the national government. The international community might be 
an actor in its own right (see next chapter), but given that the host-state has the power to 
agree to relinquish its territorial integrity it takes precedence. The first criterion for an 
independence referendum to qualify as an agreed independence referendum is that neither 
of those two parties opposes the referendum outright, especially the host-state since 
secessionists are more likely to initiate an independence referendum. By this I mean it 
does not explicitly say that the referendum is “illegal” and/or the outcome will not be 
recognised. By refusing to participate in the referendum process and denouncing it, it 
clearly becomes a unilateral endeavour.16  
The second criterion is engagement with the referendum process. This is demonstrated by 
either: (a) the national government consenting to a referendum taking place without 
negotiations or proposing a referendum to settle the secession dispute, (b.1) parties 
                                                          
16 Only two independence referendums were found to be a unilateral process because the 
secessionist side refuses to recognised the referendum process as it did not agree with the way it 
was being conducted or trusted the process to be free and fair: New Caledonia in 1987 and 
Montenegro in 1992 (c.f. chapter V). As outliers, they are systematically controlled for in the 
statistical analysis (see chapter III). 
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entering negotiations to hold a referendum, or (b.2) engaging with the process itself such 
as taking part in the campaign to argue for a Yes or No vote and acknowledging the 
possibility of secession. These actions show consent from the secessionist actors and 
especially the national government that the people do indeed get to decide on their 
political and territorial status. By engaging with the debate around independence and the 
referendum process to mobilise voters to vote a certain way, they validate and legitimise 
the referendum process and the implied right of secession that comes with it.  
Accordingly, I expect an agreed independence referendum – because of its consensual 
nature – to be politically binding (Setälä 1997, 140–41; Nurmi 1997, 33; Morel 2007; Dür 
and Mateo 2011, 472). Even if it is not legally binding and may require further 
parliamentary procedures for secession to happen, the importance of the subject matter 
and the democratic principle of national and electoral sovereignty it touched upon makes 
it very difficult for any of the actors to ignore the referendum outcome if they consented 
to the process prior to voting day. I do not make a distinction between binding and non-
binding due to the ‘political obligation’ generated by the referendums in the first place 
(Morel 2007). The “right to decide” can in itself be very important, even among No 
supporters as recent research in Catalonia has demonstrated (Keating 2017b). This creates 
tensions between the governing and the governed in a democratic system and questions 
the legitimacy of elites who should represent the citizens, and the state itself.  
This argument is based on the earlier discussion on democracy, legality and legitimacy 
surrounding the state and its relationship with its inhabitants. As previously mentioned, 
only Germann (2017) has made a similar distinction between agreed and unilateral 
referendums and his coding matches mine – supporting the reliability of my own work. 
However, his definition and justification for certain “agreed” referendums, notably the 
Quebec referendums of 1980 and 1995, are problematic. In his purely quantitative study 
of the effects of referendums on self-determination conflicts, Quebec’s justification as an 
agreed process is based on the ‘undisputed’ right to initiate a direct popular vote (Germann 
2017, 50). The qualitative study in Chapter IV and V notably will show that this was not 
the case. A qualitative approach to the study of independence referendum is important to 
appreciate the causal mechanism behind it.  
The Quebec referendums also represent a challenge to my own definition of “consent” 
(c.f. chapter IV). Nonetheless, it ultimately shows the importance of the underlying 
argument made here: direct engagement with the referendum legitimises and approves the 
argument that “the people” are the ultimate holder of sovereignty and they are the ones to 
decide whether to secede or not. This demonstration of consent leads to a politically 
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binding process which, even when the referendum process is contested, does not negate 
that the ultimate choice comes down to “the people”. If both parties feel they cannot deny 
or refuse the right of the electorate to decide, then they would find it very difficult to 
refuse to accept the decision it makes in a process where they were both involved and/or 
campaigned.  
Calling for a boycott, however, is a way to withdraw consent from the process by not 
recognising the electoral procedure (Anderson et al. 2005, 6; Norris 2014). A similar 
principle of delegitimisation – or fear of legitimising by engaging with it – takes place 
when certain parties boycott elections they do not trust to be a legitimate or free and fair 
process denying the resulting government their support (Lindberg 2004, 66–67). Another 
example is the refusal to engage with extreme-right parties for fear of legitimising them 
in the eyes of the electorate (Minkenberg 2003; Rydgren 2007, 255). A current example 
is the Spanish government’s categorical refusal to engage in talks with the Catalan 
government over a public consultation on independence, stressing instead that secession 
is illegal under the current constitution and we might now face a unilateral independence 
referendum by the end of 2017 (BBC News 2017).  
This is not to say that a unilateral referendum is deprived of any consequences. I believe 
a unilateral process still conveys legitimacy to the secessionist project, and conversely, 
the illegitimacy and lack of authority of the existing host-state (Farley 1986). It shows the 
capacity of the separatist actors to mobilise support and fight against the status-quo. 
Scheindlin (2012) finds that referendums, whether on independence or constitutional 
changes, play a critical role in articulating political intentions and democratic legitimacy 
internally and externally in partitioned states lacking international recognition, even if 
purely at the symbolic level.   
This classification, essential for analytical purposes to ensure we are indeed dealing with 
a referendum which is there to settle a question subject to the electorate, is not perfect. 
For a start, latent consent can never be as clear as a formal agreement.  In the former, the 
host-state government keeps some “room” in recognising the referendum outcome by 
keeping some ambiguity as the case of Quebec will demonstrate in chapter V. 
Nonetheless, even in a formal agreement, the secessionist outcome can be dismissed by 
either party claiming the process was not free and fair, for example, and therefore trying 
to delegitimise its significance (see chapter VII). Yet, putting those referendums into a 
unilateral referendum process would be misleading and an erroneous interpretation of the 
understanding of what is taking place by the actors involved. Consideration for borderline 
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cases, such as the referendum in Iceland in 1944 or the Faeroe in 1945 (chapter IV) will 
test this categorisation’s merit and limitation in more depth.  
Another challenge with classifying independence referendums along these categories is 
identifying the “host-state”. This is a case of the general understanding of the situation – 
especially by states which have the power to grant recognition – of who is the entity at a 
given time representing the supreme – sovereign – authority over the territory. For 
instance, when the referendums were held in the Baltic States, the communist government 
and Gorbachev representing the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were the 
only ones who granted consent and recognition on behalf of the existing state. However, 
by the time the last referendums in the eastern republics were held, there was not much 
left of the USSR. The succession of secessions and the internal political instability it had 
generated resulted in the “dissolution” of the union, but not officially until December 23, 
1991. Recognition by the international community was also based on the purposeful use 
of terminology avoiding the term “secession” – frowned upon in the current international 
system – but that the state ceased to exist (c.f. chapter IV). 
Actors around the referendum, from members of the public, specific groups, parties, the 
host-state government, or specific sovereign state (e.g. “Great Powers” at the time), will 
have varying degrees of legitimisation power in the way they engage with the process.17 
While the definitions of “agreed” focus on the region-host-state relationship and who 
represent the sought-after nation-state18 and existing state, other actors should be 
considered to refine our understanding of independence referendums. It is not realistic to 
expect to find a referendum process where every single group or individual agrees with 
what is taking place. 
Some level of boycott is therefore possible. I only focus on the host-state government and 
secessionist leaders as the core actors whose consent is needed, but they may wish to make 
their consent conditional upon other actors also agreeing to the referendum. For instance, 
Serbia backed the pro-Serb opposition parties in the referendum in Bosnia-Herzegovina19 
in 1992 and Montenegro in 2006. Specific segments of the population or other interest 
                                                          
17 For example, the OSCE and Council of Europe refused to oversee the referendum in 
Transnistria in order not to give legitimacy to the process (Quinlan 2008; Blakkisrud and Kolstø 
2011). A referendum was held in the partitioned territory, officially under the jurisdiction of 
Moldova, in 2006. The referendum asked whether to renounce independent and become part of 
Moldova or retain independence, with the possibility to integrate the Russian federation in the 
future.  
18 The secessionist movement claims a state on behalf of a specific group or “nation”. Yet, the 
territory it claims may be heterogeneous.  
19 This referendum was coded a unilateral since one of the three peoples whose status was to be 
set by the referendum boycotted the process, backed by the entity which claimed to be the 
successor host-state. An alternative coding does not substantially alter the findings of this thesis.  
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groups not representing the government or leading independentist organisations may still 
contest the process. When such groups or organisations represent a third of more of the 
electorate, therefore representing a substantial part of the population deliberately 
boycotting the process, the implementation of the referendum outcome, even when both 
key actors identified consent, can become challenging.  
Independence referendums - even when consented by all parties - can still be contested in 
their form. Referendums can easily be manipulated. The referendum’s design, and who 
has the most control over it, has the potential to considerably affect the likelihood of 
secession being endorsed and how legitimate the outcome is perceived to be can greatly 
impact the likelihood of secession occurring, even potentially cancelling out its binding 
effect if the process is not perceived by a key actor to be the true representation of the 
people’s will; it remains that by having consented to the process in the first place, this will 
is still ultimately binding.  
These elements of legitimacy in the process itself will be considered again in the next 
chapter when considering the effects of an independence referendum on the likelihood of 
secession and notably support for secession. Indeed, it is an underlying principle that 
colours all the analytical chapters to follow as the core function of independence 
referendums.   
Finally, the normative principle of democracy and self-determination explored above 
creates a specific context of what becomes appropriate or not. Appropriateness can be a 
strong motivator to hold a referendum as I will discuss in the next chapter, which can also 
lead to precedents (non-written convention) (Morel 2007, 1057). Referendums can 
generate transnational spillovers creating new standards of what counts as an appropriate 
way to deal with a political question. This has been the case with referendums on supra-
national sovereignty such as the EU (Oppermann 2012, 2013; Dür and Mateo 2011). 
Cunningham and Sawyer (2017) have shown that secessionist movements learn from one 
another and frame their claim of self-determination to generate a sense of legitimacy.  
The use of an independence referendum, as more precedents are set, is likely to become a 
more commonly used secessionist tune by secessionist movements in a position to call it 
(c.f. next chapter). The people on whose name new states are called have historically 
rarely been a consideration in the practice of state creation or recognition, but as more 
precedents of independence referendums are set, we can expect referendums to become 




Conclusion   
 
This chapter has reviewed how and why questions of sovereignty and territorial change 
have increasingly been the subject of referendums. The conflation of the nationhood, 
statehood and democracy has put the – rhetorical – legitimisation of the state in the hands 
of the “people”.  The existing literature on sovereignty referendums, and its sub-category 
of interest, independence referendums offers an extensive mapping exercise of their 
practice and their normative and legal standing. However, their consequences are less 
clear.  
This thesis sets out to start filling this gap and argues that a more restrictive definition of 
independence referendums, and for their categorisation as either “agreed” or “unilateral” 
is needed. This is essential to engage in a comparative exercise to shed light on how they 
come about, why, and their consequences on the secessionist dynamics from which they 
emanate. Accordingly, this thesis is the first study to place independence referendums 
within their subject matter (secession) as opposed to their nature (sovereignty 
referendums).  
Agreed independence referendums have been identified as the only instance when – prior 
to the votes being cast – we can expect the referendum and the “will of the people” to be 
determinant in the outcome given the current politically-discrete practice of recognition 
which gives priority to the principle of states’ territorial integrity (Radan 2012, 9). 
However, an agreed independence referendum also leaves it to the electorate to decide 
whether a new state should be created or not. Accordingly, only within such cases, we can 
start to consider how the referendum itself can affect the likelihood of secession taking 
place, through its design and its campaign. The next chapter addresses this possibility and 
the inherent problem of endogeneity: independence referendums may be more likely to 
take place because they are more likely to lead to a majority in favour of independence in 
the first place, but less likely to be agreed upon as the host-state might prefer to consent 
to a referendum if support is low.  
The review of independence referendums as instruments of democracy, self-
determination and consensus seeking mechanisms emphasised in this literature review 
does not deny the need to address pressing questions as to the real intentions of political 
actors calling them and resulting manipulations of the process. Indeed, referendums are 
rarely called as a genuine wish to answer an idealistic principle of democracy and 
legitimacy (Setälä and Schiller 2009;  Qvortrup 2012).  
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Furthermore, referendums typically aggregate complex sets of preferences into a very 
limited and extreme Yes/No choice (Setälä 1999, 14–16; Newton and Geissel 2012; 
Bochsler and Hug 2015). A one-day event can have lasting, unforeseen and irreversible 
long-term political consequences based on a small majority. Even if secession does not 
take place, it can create lasting division and highlight fundamental problems with the 
current state of affairs that could keep challenging the state and every-day politics even if 
secession is temporarily off the agenda. The majority mechanism of plebiscites, known as 
the “tyranny of the majority”, leaves out important groups and minorities whose own 










Secessionist movements call for an independent sovereign state on behalf of a people. 
While their existence and strength can be assumed to be a partial reflection of existing 
popular support for secession, the people, in whose name a new state is called, have 
historically rarely had the ultimate say on the question of independence. An independence 
referendum allows the people to make this choice. It adds a fourth secessionist dynamic 
to the one of the secessionist movement, the host-state response, and international 
recognition: the aggregated individual support for secession. Who are the “people” given 
this opportunity to decide, and under what circumstances can they have a decisive impact 
on the referendum outcome?  
The previous chapter review of the existing literature on independence referendums and 
functions of referendums in regard to legitimacy, popular sovereignty and statehood has 
led to a subclassification of independence referendums to help answer this question. 
Holding an independence referendum does not guarantee that voters will have the last say 
on which sovereign state they wish to live under unless the process is consented by the 
government of the existing host-state. A unilateral independence referendum does not 
have the legitimate and politically binding effect of its agreed counterpart. Only in a 
consensual process do voters and the number of ballots cast in favour of secession ensure 
that the “will of the people” determines statehood. Yet, the referendum process itself can 
constrain and shape actual support for secession and, ultimately, the outcome. 
The major difficulty in answering the overarching research question of the thesis rests 
with unpacking the complex relationship between the context within which the 
secessionist movement operates, and how the context itself determines the nature and 
strength of the secessionist movement, the presence of an independence referendum, and 
the witnessed secessionist outcome. An inherited problem of endogeneity (simultaneous 
causality) becomes apparent in analysing independence referendums. Namely, is the 
context where a referendum is held one that is already more favourable to secession 
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occurring? And is a referendum more likely to be held, and consented upon by the host-
state, because of the existing level of support for secession?  
This chapter reviews the literatures on secession and referendums in order to investigate 
how an independence referendum interacts with secessionist dynamics and, as a result, 
potentially increases or decreases the likelihood of secession. It brings these two extensive 
and largely independent literatures together by limiting the review to the major elements 
that relate directly to independence referendums, from the secessionist movement and 
context that brings them forward, to referendum campaigning and mechanisms of 
electoral mobilisation. Within both scholarly approaches, academics have adopted 
different underlying assumptions or arguments about the nature and functions of 
secessionism or plebiscites. While I will adopt some of them for analytical purposes, I do 
not aim to directly address these debates and instead I use these literatures as a stepping 
stone to identify what to concentrate on and what might be expected when analysing 
independence referendums and their consequences.  
Continuing from the conclusions drawn in the previous chapter, I first formulate testable 
hypotheses (resumed in Appendix D) and more general expectations and assumptions to 
consider the effect of an independence referendum on the likelihood of achieving 
statehood (HSec) and its possible mediating effect. Furthermore, the general assumptions 
uncovered in the existing literature on legality (HLaw), and the need to distinguish 
between agreed and unilateral plebiscites is assessed. I then consider why an 
independence referendum may be called and agreed upon (HRef) by secessionist actors 
and the host-state government. The last section moves on to consider how the referendum 
itself and its design can affect the secessionist outcome, notably by acting as a moderator 
on the level of support for independence (HSup).  
The organisation of this chapter follows the logic of going from a broad, macro, 
perspective on whether referendums lead to secession derived from the previous chapter 
(DV=Secession/State creation), to a more in-depth analysis of why and how referendums 
on independence come about in the first place (DV=Referendum held/agreed). The last 
section focuses on the referendum process effects at the micro level, notably how its 
design affects the electorate and support for secession (DV=Support). The hypotheses are 
operationalised in the next chapter and tested empirically in chapters IV and VII on 
quantitative evidence (dataset or polling data); while the knowledge and expectations 
drawn from the existing literature reviewed closely informed the qualitative analysis of 





II.1.a. The will of the people and state-creation 
 
An agreed independence referendum can act as a moderator and mediator in secessionist 
dynamics. It is a potential mediator when the secessionist movement is already strong in 
its capacity to mobilise the population and already has within the region a high level of 
support for separation. In such cases the agreed independence referendum, by removing 
the host-state opposition, facilitates secession. It can also have a moderation effect when 
support for independence in the region is still close to a majority of the electorate 
supporting independence but a 50 percent plus one majority remains within the margin of 
error, meaning the polls leave uncertainty that this threshold will be reached on voting 
day. In this scenario, the independence referendum process itself, from how it is designed 
to the referendum campaign, can potentially affect the voting outcome and whether a 
qualifying majority ultimately supports separation from the existing state. Prior to 
considering when and how the independence referendum process can affect the 
secessionist outcome, I first consider the effect of holding an independence referendum 
on whether secession occurs.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, state-recognition - the process through which a 
secessionist movement can achieve full statehood - is currently not dictated by any 
international law or consistent norm with the exception of colonialism. The principle of 
self-determination called upon by secessionist movements to justify their right to 
statehood has only been accepted as a criterion for recognition in this latter case. This is 
due to a combination of changes in international norms and what was deemed acceptable 
under the growing influence of the principle of democracy and human rights, along with 
the practical capacity of colonial powers to withstand such movements for independence 
(Cattaruzza 2007). Furthermore, colonial territories differ in two important ways when 
compared to current secessionist regions. First, their territory was not a constituent part 
of a host-state (e.g. France), but a colonial empire and they were typically separated by a 
sea or ocean.20 Secondly, the colonial population did not have full citizenship status.  
Accordingly, colonial cases are initially included in the analysis but subsequently dropped 
for reasons of comparability and as a form of control for a “colony” effect. Indeed, given 
the literature review, I expect colonies to be much more likely to have achieved statehood 
regardless of the presence of an independence referendum. Given the international 
                                                          
20 This led to the principles guiding decolonisation since the 1960s to be coined the ‘salt-water’ 
doctrine (Österud 1997).  
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pressure for decolonisation since the 1960s especially, it is likely that a colony would have 
achieved statehood even without a plebiscite, and while the referendum itself may have 
facilitated secession at the time, it did not substantially increase its overall likelihood of 
succeeding.  
HSec.1:  Colonial Secessionist movements should result in a successful secession, 
regardless of whether a referendum was held.  
From Finland to Namibia, and the latest case of South Sudan, successful secessions do 
not follow a specific trend outside of the colonial context, with the exception of the host-
state lack of opposition or international pressure for it to grant recongition. If the 
independence referendum process is consensual, the host-state government acknowledges 
the right of the people within the region to secede, therefore resulting in independence if 
a majority supports it. On the other hand, a unilateral referendum, because it lacks the 
politically binding nature of its agreed counterpart is not expected to result in the creation 
of a new independent state, regardless of the level of support for separation.  
HSec.2: Having held a unilateral independence referendum does not make a region more 
likely to have achieved independence than if no referendum was held. 
HSec.3: Having held an agreed independence referendum makes a region more likely to 
have achieved independence than if a unilateral referendum, or no referendum, was held. 
Furthermore, one of the core arguments of this thesis is that a consensual referendum 
process, where the secessionist leaders and the host-state government agree that the 
“people” are to ultimately decide on their political status, is more important than whether 
secession itself is legal. Conversely, a constitutional right to secede does not mean that an 
independence referendum will be a consensual and a binding process on the host-state 
government. I will test these assumptions in Chapter IV and chapter V:  
HLaw.1: An agreed independence referendum does not require a constitutional right to 
secession.  
HLaw.2: A constitutional right to secession does not guarantee an agreed independence 
referendum process.  
Overall, this means that whether the referendum is an agreed process, and whether a 
majority of voters endorse separation will be the most important determinant factors in 
the secessionist outcome, not the constitutional legality of secession which has been the 
concern of many normative scholars discussed in the previous chapter.  
HSec.4: A unilateral independence referendum should not result in secession, even if a 
majority of voters endorse independence, and even there is a constitutional right to secede. 
HSec.5: An agreed independence referendum should result in a successful secession if a 




II.1.b. Mediator and moderator 
 
Because an agreed independence referendum is a consensual process between the host-
state government and secessionist leaders, it is expected that both parties will respect the 
referendum outcome. However, the way the referendum is conducted and whether the 
process was perceived to be acceptable (free and fair) by the actors involved is also 
important. Furthermore, the referendum process could affect the initial level of support 
for secession, increasing or decreasing the appeal of independence, and therefore affect 
the likelihood of secession beyond simply facilitating separation where support for 
independence among the population is already high. Indeed, the referendum result could 
simply be a reflection of existing support for independence. If support for independence 
is already over a majority of the electorate it acts as a facilitator (mediator) in achieving 
statehood by removing the host-state opposition to secession. Yet, the referendum process 
could affect the existing support for independence and therefore act as a moderator (see 
Figure II.1).  
 






Secessionist actors who wish to call for an independence referendum would consider their 
chance of winning the referendum, and therefore existing support for secession. If there 
is no majority support for separation, they will need to assess their chances of breaching 
the gap in support during a campaign to achieve a qualifying majority. Inversely, the host-













believes it can lead to the rejection of independence, asserting its own legitimacy and 
putting the question of separation on the back burner, at least for a time.  
Besides, regardless of the existing level of support for independence in the region, the 
secessionist actors need to be in a position to be able to call an independence referendum 
in the first place and, especially in a unilateral process, hold the vote. Secessionist 
movements in a position to call and hold a referendum may already be quite successful in 
mobilising the population or their capacity to withstand the host-state authority, and, 
potentially more likely to achieve independence regardless of the referendum. 
Accordingly, prior to considering in more depth when and how an independence 
referendum, as an intervening variable, can increase or decrease the likelihood of 
secession, we first need to better understand when independence referendums are more 




II.2.a. Why do referendums occur? 
 
While the legitimising function of referendums and independence referendums, in 
particular, is evident, it is still too simplistic an explanation as to why they are held and 
when. The literature reviewed below is limited in its ability to account for why 
referendums on independence are sometimes used or not, and the role of sub-national or 
international actors in the process as opposed to the national government which is 
traditionally the initiator of referendums. Several scholars have agreed that a general 
theory of why referendums occur is difficult to establish and the presence or absence of a 
referendum may be best explained as a unique product of a specific historical process and 
contextual setting (Lijphart 1984; Morel 1993; Gallagher and Uleri 1996, 235; Dür and 
Mateo 2011).   
The referendum literature has identified common, not mutually exclusive, incentives to 
call a plebiscite on a national government which may also be applied to regional actors 
(Björklund 1982; Morel 1993; Dür and Mateo 2011). First, the referendum may be a 
required step to implement the desired change (see the case of Iceland in the next chapter). 
Secondly, a political minority uses the electorate to go forward with a policy it cannot 
alone achieve in parliament or the referendum is used as a conciliatory device to reach an 
agreement within a divided party. The 1962 referendum on Algerian independence, for 
instance, was used to pass a proposal when no legislative majority could be achieved. It 
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can also be used to remove a specific issue from the political agenda. According to Pinard 
and Hamilton (1977), the Parti Québécois decided to call a referendum to remove the 
question of independence from the elections debate and get elected (c.f. chapter V).  
Finally, the referendum might be seen as an essential step to make the desired outcome 
acceptable to the public (Morel 1992, 836–37, 2007). Even then, ‘it is generally possible 
to discern the preferred outcome of those who planned and organised the referendum 
strategy’ (LeDuc 2002a, 720). More specific to sovereignty referendums, an 
independence referendum can be a mechanism for conflict-resolution. It was used by the 
UN to intervene in East-Timor and South Sudan and help reach an agreement and bring 
peace between the host-state and region (Maley 2000; Martin 2001; Christopher 2011). A 
referendum on independence may also be organised to legitimise the military seizing of a 
territory as in Crimea (Vasovic and Collett-White 2014).  
Secessionist actors will call an independence referendum when they believe they can 
achieve a majority to further their goal of achieving statehood by invoking the concepts 
of democracy, self-determination and sovereignty explored in the previous chapter. Even 
if secessionist parties already have a majority in the regional parliament they may not 
have a majority of electors on their side and feel they cannot use their government 
mandate to declare independence.  
The timing of the plebiscite can be controlled to optimise one’s chances of winning it 
(Romer and Rosenthal 1978; Polborn and Willmann 2004), based on polling data (Walker 
2003, 52). In certain circumstances, the timing of the referendum might have been 
determined long in advance. For instance, in South Sudan, the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) and the temporary Sudanese constitution included an independence 
referendum clause and when and how it should be done. While such parameters could to 
some extent be shaped by the North and South leaders during the peace negotiations, it 
had to be done without knowing what the context would look like in the six years that 
separated the agreement and the deadline to hold a referendum on the independence of 
South Sudan. 
The referendum offers a chance to achieve and demonstrate that a majority of the 
population supports separation, by mobilising the undecided and averting internal 
opposition. Accordingly, the existing level of support for independence will be an 
important factor in the decision to call a plebiscite and needs to be taken into account to 
consider whether the referendum process itself can affect the likelihood of secession 
taking place. That is if secessionist actors find themselves in the position to call a 
referendum in the first place. 
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Perhaps one of the most fundamental criteria for an independence referendum to be 
witnessed is feasibility. Secessionist actors need to be in a position to call and hold a 
plebiscite. This is especially true for unilateral referendums. A group with no political 
representation, in a region with no devolved political infrastructure of its own, may find 
it difficult to mobilise and organise a referendum. For a popular consultation to take place, 
secessionist actors need to have places to hold the vote, print ballots and campaign for 
people to go and vote, and they need to guarantee that they can do so safely.21  
In order to answer the research question of whether and how an independence referendum 
affects secessionist dynamics, and more particularly the likelihood of secession occurring, 
we need to account for its interconnectedness with secessionism itself and the context 
where it is held. Indeed, the contextual setting is crucial as it determines existing support 
for independence prior to the referendum being called, whether a referendum will be 
called and agreed upon, and how the referendum itself can affect this context and decrease 
or increase the chances of secession. The literature on secession has considered what 
motivates individuals to support independence and uncovered sociological, political and 
economic explanations. They need to be accounted for when predicting the presence of 
an independence referendum and the likelihood of secession occurring.  
II.2.b. Where do referendums occur? 
 
The region and host-state characteristics (e.g. regime type, territorial constitutional set-
up) provide elements that can increase the capacity of secessionist movements to seize 
control of the region and mobilise support for independence in order to achieve secession, 
and, reversely, stand against them. The type of host-state government faced by 
secessionist actors and how it answers initial calls for independence in particular can 
account for the strength of the secessionist movements and the tactics employed (political 
or violent means) to achieve statehood. I expect that factors found in previous research to 
be associated with increased support for independence to make the holding of an 
independence referendum more attractive and likely to be held, as it is more likely to be 
won by the secessionists. On the other hand, where support for secession is high, a host-
state government may be much more reluctant to concede to a referendum it is very likely 
                                                          
21 The Nagas independence referendum represents an outlier as mentioned in the previous 
chapter. The referendum was a “signature referendum” not making use of these infrastructures 
and is therefore systematically controlled for in the statistical analysis. The Naga National 
Council campaigned for the secession of the Naga territory from India and creation for a 
sovereign Naga state. It held an independence referendum without the consent of the Indian 
government on 11 May 1952 and claimed that 99.9% of the Nagas wanted independence. There 
are however no reliable figures on turnout.  
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to lose.  
This chapter does not pretend to be a full review of the factors linked to support for 
independence or the complex dynamics of secessionism. Nor do I wish to test existing 
theories on what drives individual support for secession. Instead, I will consider the main 
arguments and variables in the literature - both quantitative and qualitative - to take into 
account and control for when considering the presence of an independence referendum 
and the likelihood of achieving independence, accounting for the likely underlying 
aggregate support for independence. 
Societal explanations  
 
Derived from the discussion on nationalism in the previous chapter, ethnic distinctiveness 
has often been seen as a precondition for separatism. The more culturally distinct in 
religious or linguistic terms a regionally concentrated group is, the more readily it can be 
set apart from the host-state and therefore be mobilised in favour of independence (Sorens 
2005, 318). This can, however, be mitigated by how long the region has been part of the 
“union” with the host-state allowing for integration and accommodation within the larger 
national unit. Citizens can feel attached to both the regional and state identity with 
different intensities - referred to as ‘dual’ or ‘nested’ identities (Mendelsohn 2002; 
Moreno 2006; Henderson 2007) - and may not wish to dismiss their host-state even if they 
support more (internal) self-determination.  
HRef.1: an independence referendum is more likely to be held in a region where the 
population is culturally distinct from the host-state population.  
HRef.2: an independence referendum is less likely to be held the longer the region has 
been part of a union with the host-state.  
Violent conflict between the host-state government and secessionist actors22, or the state-
majority and regional minority can affect identity by creating a context of “ethnic security 
dilemma” where individuals feel their very existence is threatened because of their 
identity. In turn, said identity and conflict re-enforce each other (Posen 1993; Lake and 
Rothchild 1998; Sambanis and Shayo 2013; for a review of the literature see Kaufman 
2006). This leads to a context of high polarisation between different groups which makes 
it more likely that the inhabitants of the region witnessing violence will mistrust the host-
state. The literature has extensively assumed a hardening of identities in the context of a 
                                                          
22 This may depend on how representative of the regional population the secessionist actors are. 
Some secessionist movements have the capacity to wage war on the central government of a state 
to seize a territory  but they may not have much actual popular support for the said cause (P. 
Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009; J. D. Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
50 
 
security dilemma which would lead to strong support for secession and less ability to 
compromise on a middle-ground option, such as more autonomy. 
Some studies seem to confirm this dynamic. A study of opinion polls in the de-facto states 
of Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Transnistria shows that only 
inhabitants of Transnistria are likely to reconcile with their host-state as the level of 
violence was much lower at the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union (O’Loughlin, 
Kolossov, and Toal 2014, 452). Support for independence is also motivated by security 
and economic concerns for Russian minorities in separatist Russian republics 
(Hagendoorn, Poppe, and Minescu 2008). A survey in Sudan in 2010 and 2011 showed 
that Northerners who experience rioting and violence by southerners in 2005 were more 
likely to support South Sudan independence but less likely to want southerners remaining 
in the North (Beber, Roessler, and Scacco 2012, 2014; see also Cederman et al. 2015).  
It shows that negative intergroup attitudes hardened by political violence make individuals 
less willing to live alongside different groups associated with this violence, making them 
more likely to support the region seceding from the host-state, even if they are concerned 
about the economic cost of secession. These few examples suggest that security trumps 
other concerns such as economic or purely political concerns, and the former are closely 
tied to identity and the experience of violence. Accordingly, where such violence occurs, 
support for independence should be very high, meaning an independence referendum will 
certainly result in a strong majority for secession. However, the presence of violence is 
an indication of the host-state’s unwillingness to compromise and suppress secessionist 
attempts (Bartkus 1999; Ker-Lindsay 2013), which makes the holding of an independence 
referendum, especially an agreed process, more difficult without external intervention 
(see below).  
HRef.3: an independence referendum is less likely to be held if violent confrontations 
occurred between the region at risk of seceding and the host-state.  
State and regime instability can also be a contributing factor to secession. A weak and 
changing regime gives an opportunity to declare independence as the host-state might not 
have the capability to enforce its rule throughout its territory and prevent the holding of 
an independence referendum and a de-facto secession.23 It also loses legitimacy in the 
eyes of the population which may then be more likely to support independence in a time 
of uncertainty and insecurity (Rose 2000, 7; Saideman et al. 2002). Furthermore, the 
international community will be faced with a situation where the host-state is unable to 
                                                          
23 The collapse of the USSR is the most notorious example, see chapter IV. This context is also 
more likely to lead to multiple secessions (Ayres and Saideman 2000, 98).  
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fulfil its basic function of enforcing authority within its territory, potentially making 
recognition more likely, increasing the appeal of an independence referendum for 
secessionist actors. 
HRef.4: an independence referendum is more likely to occur during a period of political 




In addition to those elements, since referendums are primarily a political phenomenon, 
political factors are likely to play an important role in accounting for their presence and 
outcome. An important variable, which may moderate many of the other variables 
identified in the literature to affect secessionist dynamics, is the type of host-state regime.  
Democratic host-states are less likely to see violent secessionist movement and extreme 
forms of mobilisations (Ellingsen 2000; Scarritt, McMillan, and Mozaffar 2001). 
However, authoritarian regimes may also be in a good position to prevent or suppress any 
form of secessionist mobilisation. Scholars have found a u-shape relationship between the 
level of democracy and the presence of ethnic violence where very autocratic states are 
equally likely to experience violent secessionist mobilisation than democracies 
(Mousseau 2001). 
An established, stable, democracy has been portrayed as the best medicine for separatism 
and secession taking place, although it is not ‘secessionist movements-proof’ (Dion 1996; 
Brancati 2008). Democracy is conceived as an essential component of advocates of 
internal self-determination or remedial rights only theories to answer the political 
grievances behind secessionist demands before secession can be considered as an option 
as seen in the previous chapter. The latter explains secessionism as a consequence of 
systemic discrimination and resulting grievances within a minority group (Gurr 1970, 
2000; Bermeo 2002, 108). When a culturally distinct population suffers cultural, political 
or economic discrimination, domination, exploitation or repression by the host-state or its 
dominant group, they can be more readily mobilised, especially in taking radical actions 
(Fox 2000, 19; Gurr 1970).24 A democratic host-state, because of the protection of human 
                                                          
24 The relationship between grievances, violence and mobilisation is likely to be more complex 
however. Who initiates violence and under what circumstances and whether the actions were 




rights and the representative democracy it offers is believed to alleviate those grievances, 
therefore removing incentives to separate.  
On the other hand, while support for independence is likely to be lower in democracies 
than anocracies or autocracies, an established democratic host-state may facilitate popular 
mobilisation for secession through traditional political channels for secession and 
facilitate the calling and holding of an independence referendum. Because a democratic 
regime relies on the principle of popular support, freedoms of expression and human 
rights, it might be more difficult to prevent the emergence of a secessionist movement and 
prevent the holding of an independence referendum. Furthermore, because of these 
principles, a national government may find it harder to disapprove outright the plebiscite, 
making it more likely to be an agreed process (see below).  
HRef.5: an independence referendum is more likely to occur in a democratic host-state.   
A similar paradox can be found in the territorial organisation of the host-state. Ethnic-
federalism, where at least one federate unit is drawn along ethnic-lines, allows for the 
regionally distinct population to self-govern on devolved matters. This arrangement gives 
‘opportunities to participate in government, giving groups control over their political, 
social and economic affairs’ (Brancati 2006, 625) allowing for internal self-determination. 
Power-sharing goes further by allowing for political decision-making powers at the local 
level (self-rule) but also guarantees a form of executive power at the national level 
(shared-rule) (Lijphart 2004, 97–98; Erk and Anderson 2009, 192). Such arrangements 
should, therefore, lessen the incentives for the regional population to secede since they 
have an opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination regionally, while also 
being represented at the national level. Power-sharing may, therefore, lessen support for 
independence, making secession less likely and weakening the appeal of calling a 
referendum, while incentivising local elites to remain within the union by garanting them 
influence at the state-level.  
 HRef.6: an independence referendum is less likely to occur if power-sharing is in place. 
Yet, these political arrangements, which have been used to accommodate a territorially 
culturally distinct population, therefore, reducing the incentive to secede, have also been 
argued to be responsible for facilitating secession by increasing its feasibility. The 
scholarship remains divided on whether autonomy provision, through devolution or 
federalism notably, increases or decreases the likelihood of secession (e.g. Anderson 
2004; Guibernau 2006). Roeder (2007) believes ethnic-federalism is a primary predictor 
of secession. Autonomy can have the indirect effect of encouraging secessionism because 
it enables the growth of regional parties (Brancati 2006; Sorens 2005), and can increase 
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their capacity to mobilise the population in favour of secession thanks to direct access to 
political power and resources (Erk and Anderson 2009; Lecours 2012). This increases 
both the ability to gather initial support for secession and the ability to call an 
independence referendum.  
HRef.7: an independence referendum is more likely to occur in an ethnic-federation.   
A region which has devolved powers within the union with the host-state may still not be 
governed by the specific cultural group inhabiting it if the regime is not democratic or it 
has little support. Accordingly, we should also account for whether the specific ethnic 
group or nation within the region dominates the regional government. While this ensures 
that internal-self-determination is more likely to apply, if these representatives are 
members of secessionist parties, this may considerably facilitate the calling and holding 
of an independence referendum. The fact that secessionist actors find themselves in a 
position to hold executive powers within the region is likely to be an indication that some 
support for independence is present – although not necessarily a majority (depending on 
the electoral system), nor that all their electors support independence (Sorens 2008; 
Richez and Bodet 2012). Voters may even support an independence referendum without 
supporting secession in the hope to put pressure on the central government to make 
concessions towards more autonomy (Siroky, Mueller, and Hechter 2016; Rourke, 
Hiskes, and Zirakzadeh 1992, 111–14).   
HRef.8: an independence referendum is more likely where the region’s culturally distinct 
population representatives dominate the regional government.   
 
Economic explanations  
 
The last core of the secessionist literature focuses on economic factors to explain 
separatism. The arguments from a “grievance” perspective emphasise relative economic 
deprivation and structural inequality as a source of mobilisation for a new independent 
state (Gurr 1970, 2000).  Support for secession would, therefore, be stronger among 
inhabitants of a poorer region relative to the rest of the host-state (Horowitz 1985, 131; 
Sambanis and Milanovic 2011). Electoral studies in Quebec found that individuals who 
expected to make gains in term of protecting their cultural distinctiveness and economic 
welfare were more likely to support independence (e.g. Mendelsohn 2003; Blais and 
Nadeau 1992; Howe 1998).  
Yet, if the host-state allows for redistribution of resources among its parts (as is generally 
the case in well-established democracies) and subsidises the region, support would 
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decrease as independence might be economically less viable. Furthermore, economic 
considerations can also be seen in association with nationalism and the modern nation-
state welfare policies (Rokkan et al. 1999, 265; McEwen 2006) which reinforce allegiance 
to the state and the national body of solidarity (Keating 2001, 21). Accordingly, more than 
the region being poorer, the nature of the host-state and its own wealth and system may 
be more important in determining support for independence, and therefore the appeal of 
holding an independence referendum to achieve secession through the ‘will of the people’.  
HRef.9: an independence referendum is less likely to occur in richer host-states.    
On the other hand, the ‘greed’ theory of secession advances that secessionist movements 
are primarily driven by great economic prosperity (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier, 
Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009; Sambanis and Milanovic 2011; Sorens 2011). Most of these 
studies, however, have focused on the presence of natural resources and secessionist 
conflict intensity as opposed to the general likelihood of achieving independence or actual 
popular support for secession. Nonetheless, richer regions are in a better position to attract 
support for secession as they present a more viable independent state (Alesina and 
Spolaore 2003; Hechter 1992). Accordingly, an independence referendum becomes 
attractive as support can be gathered around the promise of economic gains. In a similar 
manner, more populous regions can make a more viable state (Alesina and Spolaore 1997; 
Fazal and Griffiths 2014). 
HRef.10: an independence referendum is more likely to occur in more populous regions.      
HRef.11: an independence referendum is more likely to occur in a richer regions relative 
to the host-state.    
While economic resources increase the capacity and incentive to secede, and therefore the 
desirability of holding an independence referendum to legitimise the claim to statehood, 
it does not guarantee recognition. The host-state might be more likely to oppose secession 
given it has more to lose if the region secedes. Secessionist actors may also consider the 
response of the host-state when calling an independence referendum. Within the 
secessionist scholarship, the host-state government response to secessionist movements is 
presumed to be either accommodation or repression (and more rarely, ignoring the issue) 
(Frombgen 1999, 98; Gallagher Cunningham 2014). 
In extreme cases, the call for an independence referendum and its preparation may escalate 
tensions further and the secessionist movement risks facing a violent repression from the 
government. Ideally, the national government will agree to the referendum ensuring a 
consensual, politically binding process that acknowledges the right (of the people) to 
secede. When the host-state government refuses to acknowledge the plebiscite, it can be 
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annulled or altered. For instance, Catalonia rebranded its original independence 
referendum into a public “consultation” after the Spanish Government and Constitutional 
Court declared a referendum on independence illegal (Kassam 2014). Two years later, the 
Catalan separatists seem now set on holding a (unilateral) independence referendum in 
October 1st, 2017. In doing so, they risk the Spanish government preventing the holding 
of the plebiscite and an escalation of conflict (Buck 2017).  
II.2.c. Why ‘agree’?  
The other side of the coin of secessionism is the central government which represents the 
state at risk of being dismantled. This state government is critical in making the “option 
of secession” possible and therefore enabling a referendum on independence to truly fulfil 
its function as a popular consultative device to enable the “people” to decide. Why would 
a host-state government consent to an independence referendum and risk losing part of its 
territory and population when the current international norms favour its territorial 
integrity?  
States, as international actors, and their national governments face both internal and 
external motivations and constraints. From a neorealist perspective, states wish to 
maximise their power and seek relative gains within an inherently anarchic international 
system (Waltz 1979). Accordingly, they will be particularly attached to their territorial 
borders and attempt to suppress any threat to their authority and power (e.g. in the form 
of economic resources). From a liberal and constructivist perspective, however, states also 
seek and are constrained by, norms, ideas and the desire to be part of a domestic and 
transnational society (e.g. Moravcsik 1997; Hopf 1998). Unlike realist and neorealist 
approaches which see preference as constant and intimately linked to power, in liberal, 
and especially constructivist perspectives, such preferences and motivations can change 
according to the internal environment and domestic pressures such as concerns for 
democracy and human rights covered in the previous chapter (see for example Checkel 
1997; Goodman and Jinks 2004; Botcheva and Martin 2001).  
In addition to the internal system influencing state behaviour and motivations, the 
domestic level plays a crucial role in the behaviour of the host-state government, 
especially in democracies where the government’s re-election is dependent on the 
electorate. Even authoritarian regimes, albeit to a lesser extent, seek legitimacy from the 
population and find themselves constrained by it (Linz 2000; Schatz 2006; Burnell 2006). 
Public opinion, culture, internal organisations and even the personality of individual 
leaders at the time can account for why a government decides to behave a certain way 
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(Kaarbo, Beasley, and Lantis 2002). When it comes to answering a secessionist challenge, 
Ker-Lindsay (2013) identifies six reasons why states oppose secession:  an emotional 
attachment to the territory; the outcome of internally-displaced persons; economic factors; 
historical and cultural issues; fear of further secession (see also Walter 2006); and national 
pride.  
Taking both realist and constructivist concerns into account, I propose three main 
explanations, not mutually exclusive, for why a host-state may concede to an 
independence referendum and open the possibility of secession. They are: (a) the host-
state government has reasons to believe a majority support for secession is very unlikely 
and therefore accepts the independence referendum as a means to “settle the question” in 
its favour; (b) fighting or making concession to keep the region is not deemed to be worth 
it; and (c) the host-state government has no choice but to concede to the referendum as 
refusing it would be deemed too costly. Some include pragmatic, other more ideological 
considerations.  
The literature reviewed above has helped identify specific contextual factors associated 
with increased or decreased support for secession among the population. They still apply 
here as incentives and institutional facilitators to call and hold an independence 
referendum which can also apply to agreed independence referendums in particular and 
are therefore not repeated here. Factors that are associated with increased support and 
incentives for secessionist actors to hold a referendum, however, might be reversed in an 
agreed process as the host-state might be more reluctant to consent to the plebiscite as it 
is more likely to lose it.  Furthermore, if the region is relatively richer than the host-state, 
the national government may be less inclined to grant recognition to a referendum process 
and risk losing one of its richest parts.  
While I expect secessionist movements to call and hold an independence referendum 
when they believe they have a majority support in favour of independence, the host-state 
government might be more inclined to agree to the process because it believes that support 
for secession lacks a majority. When polls show very low levels of support (around or 
below 30 percent), a central government might decide to allow an independence 
referendum to take place if it feels confident a large portion of the population does not 
favour secession. An “It won’t happen” approach. Giving in to the secessionists’ demand 
for a referendum can be a strategy to settle the question in favour of the status quo and 
weaken the movement.  
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On the other hand, where there is uncertainty on how much secessionist support exists, or 
there are reasons to believe that support is above 50 percent, I expect a government will 
abstain from taking the risk of agreeing to a referendum. If HRefA.1 below applies, we 
will see variables associated with an increased likelihood of witnessing an independence 
referendum because support for independence is expected to be high under the specific 
societal, political and economic variable discussed above, reversed in an agreed process.  
HRefA.1: A host-state government will consent to an independence referendum being 
held if support for secession is low.  
More rarely, a host-state government may even pre-emptively organise a referendum 
when faced with a secessionist movement if it is confident to win the plebiscite, boosting 
its legitimacy over the territory and population and symbolically weakening the separatist 
movement. Only two independence referendums were found to be initiated by the national 
government: Montenegro in 1992 (covered in Appendix C), and New Caledonia in 1987.25 
The Kanak pro-independentists boycotted the referendum as they did not agree with the 
franchise proposed by the French government which made them an electoral minority. It 
is difficult to assess however how many of the 41 percent of the abstentionist electorate 
purposefully boycotted the referendum (Mohamed-Gaillard 2003, 181). 
Granting an independence referendum, even when confident that secession will be 
rejected by the electorate, can be dangerous for the host-state government as it sets an 
important precedent. Once the right of the people to decide has been asserted, and the 
union legitimised through a referendum, it becomes difficult to contest the holding of 
another referendum in the future.26 Furthermore, such precedent can also be applied to 
existing or possible future secessionist movements within the territory, increasing the 
likelihood of secession occurring overall (see HRefA.2b below). Accepting to give an 
option to secede is a very important step in recognising the right to secede, and one, I will 
argue throughout this thesis, difficult to reverse.   
Secondly, fighting for the territory and population in question might be considered a 
fruitless endeavour. At the time Sweden conceded to Norway’s secession, Stockholm did 
not have much to gain economically or politically from retaining Norway. It was already 
                                                          
25 The referendum was held on the 13th September by the French authorities. voters were given 
the choice of remaining part of France or becoming independent. Only 1.7% voted in favour of 
independence with a turnout of 59 percent. The French government rejected the involvement of 
UN observers and the proposal by the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front desire to 
amend the eligible electorate to only include the indigenous population.  




extensively decentralised, poor, and the (forceful) union between the two was less than a 
100 years old. France or Great Britain did not have the financial or military capabilities 
to fight against the rising secessionist wave within their colonial territories. Departing 
from territorial possession might become a necessity, especially when international norms 
made colonialism increasingly unacceptable (Goldsmith and He 2008).  
The state government may find that the costs of trying to prevent secession outweigh the 
benefits, or may even welcome separation (if it has to extensively subsidise the region for 
example) and prefer to keep “good” neighbouring relations (Hechter 1992; Fossum and 
Haglund 2008). The referendum is then agreed upon as an acceptable way to decide on 
secession - as some normative scholars covered in the previous chapter have argued - and 
justify further the loss of its territorial integrity. This may be particularly true if the region 
population represents a large share of the total host-state population, adding pressure on 
the government to consent to the “will of the people” being heard as the latter represents 
a large share of its citizenry.  
HRefA.2: A host-state government will consent to an independence referendum being 
held if it deems the cost of retaining the territory and population outweigh the benefits.27 
HRefA.2a: an agreed independence referendum is more likely to occur the 
bigger the population of the region at risk of seceding is relative to the host-state. 
HRefA.2c: an agreed independence referendum is less likely to occur if the host-
state faces other secessionist movements within its territory. 
Finally, the third reason identified and closely linked to the second is the cost related to 
not consenting. Firstly, this could be linked to a diplomatic cost. The international 
community through the channel of an international organisation such as the United 
Nations or the European Union can put pressure on a national government to hold an 
independence referendum as a means to resolve its internal conflict (HRef3.a). This was 
the case in East Timor and South Sudan for example (Martin 2001; Christopher 2011). In 
the case of Sudan and South Sudan, the UN intervention and use of incentives and 
sanctions helped reach a peace agreement which included the holding of a referendum on 
independence (Brittain et al. 2010, 27).28  
                                                          
27 When it comes to the relative wealth of the region, which may increase support for 
independence, the host-state may also oppose a referendum because of the risk associated with 
losing one of its wealthiest parts (c.f. HRefA.2 below).  
28 External intervention in secessionist conflicts and the holding of a referendum can also lead to 
the plebiscite being hindered. In the case of Kashmir, the Security Council established certain 
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Secondly, the cost can be political. Not consenting to an independence referendum taking 
place and abiding by a democratic norm can fuel separatist sentiment or an escalation of 
conflict and be counter-productive. A government chooses the referendum path to escape 
the responsibility of having to make a decision (Şen 2015, 25; Morel 2007). Hypothesis 
HRef.5 discussed above, that independence referendums are more likely in more 
democratic host-states, also applies to agreed referendums in particular. This is especially 
the case where a majority of the population in the region supports a “right to decide” by 
referendum, even if it does not support independence. This was the case in Montenegro 
(c.f. chapter V), and in Catalonia where the latest survey research suggests that over 70 
percent support a referendum, with support for independence standing at around 45 
percent (Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials 2016; Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió 2017).   
HRefA.3: A host-state government will consent to an independence referendum being 
held if it deems it feels it has no choice but to do so due to external (e.g. great-powers or 
international organisations) or internal constraints (e.g. popular protest). 
Meanwhile, the secessionists may consider the implications of losing a referendum on 
their future chances of achieving independence and assess the response of the central 
government. If it declares the process illegal from the start, the secessionist actors may 
wish to delay the plebiscite and try to reach an agreement. If an agreement is reached, the 
secessionists may have to contend with a less favourable design or assess the possible 
concessions made during the referendum process by the host-state rendering the union 
more attractive. The reasons beyond calling a referendum and an agreement on behalf of 
the host-state government are therefore likely to be cumulative and weighted against each 
other, and therefore very context-dependent. The most difficult, and interesting situation 
I believe will arise when the polls suggest that the referendum result is too close to call. 
The secessionist movements and host-state are both in an uncertain situation and in a weak 
position to make a concession to agree on a referendum process. Indeed, in such 
circumstance the referendum design and the campaign become crucial in determining the 
referendum outcome and whether secession will occur.  
 
II.3. Support for secession  
 
In an agreed independence referendum, the “will of the people” decides the secessionist 
                                                          
conditions to be fulfilled for the referendum to take place, such as the withdrawal of the Pakistani 
army followed by the Indian army (Chandhoke 2014b, 62). 
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outcome. Support for independence is therefore crucial in determining whether a new state 
will be created or the existing union with the host-state will endure (referred here as the 
status-quo). The question remains whether the referendum and its outcome are simply the 
reflection of existing support for independence. Does it only facilitate secession when 
support for independence among the consulted population is already high (mediating 
effect)? Or could the referendum impact the level of support, increasing or decreasing it 
from the moment it is called or the referendum campaign starts, therefore acting as a 
moderator on the likelihood of achieving independence?  
I first consider where the presence of an independence referendum is most likely to make 
a difference to the level of support for secession, and in particular where this effect can, 
in turn, determine the secessionist outcome. Secondly, I focus on how the referendum can 
affect the voting result through the referendums’ design and campaign (Figure II.2). At 
their core is the concept of support. In this thesis support is conceptualised in three ways: 
(1) whose support counts (and how much of it is needed), (2) actual support for the Yes 
or No option on independence, and (3) support for the referendum outcome in general 
articulated through satisfaction with the referendum process. A referendum offers strong 
procedural legitimacy to achieve independence; that is if the referendum procedure and 
outcome are perceived as legitimate and a “free and fair” process.  
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satisfaction with the referendum process is essential and should be considered throughout 
the study of plebiscites. As with elections, the referendum process needs to be seen as fair 
and legitimate to ensure the ‘loser’s consent’ (Nadeau and Blais 1993, 553; see also 
Anderson et al. 2005). Referendums are generally a zero-sum game.29 The losing side, 
would it be pro or against independence, will by definition be dissatisfied with the 
referendum outcome. To ensure that they will not contest the result and the outcome will 
be respected by all sides, the perceived procedural fairness of the referendum process, that 
is that the process was open and equal, is crucial (Weatherford 1992, 150).  
Concerns over procedural justice, but also the perceived legitimacy of the actors involved 
in the process (Hegtvedt and Johnson 2009), are important to ensure the referendum and 
its outcome are seen as binding (Hechter 2009, 284–85). While the host-state and 
independentist organisation remain the core actors to grant consent before and after the 
referendum, their supporters or opposition parties’ own assessment of the events can 
pressure them to endorse or refute the referendum outcome. Even when both official sides 
acknowledge the outcome, if part of the electorate does not believe the referendum process 
to have been fair, it damages to some extent the overall legitimacy of the result.  
A free and fair process can be understood as a process which truly allows for the 
expression of “the will of the people” and both sides stand an equal chance if the median 
voter was completely undecided or unbiased. It is characterised by the fulfilment of certain 
criteria, or their absence, such as respecting spending rules or investigating the breach of 
such rules (van Ham 2015, 716). Electoral integrity, defined as broad guidelines and 
norms found in international commitments, protocols and guidelines (e.g. OSCE) about 
what constitute good electoral practices for a free and fair process (Norris 2014, 9) have 
been operationalised differently and are, beyond such basic guidelines, context-specific. 
They generally include checks and balances on the legal framework, electoral 
management bodies, voters’ registration process, the campaign and voting process, such 
as campaign finances or easy access to polling stations, media coverage, or how the votes 
are counted (Bishop and Hoeffler 2016, 609; van Ham 2015). 
The legitimacy of the process and acceptance of the outcome by all actors involved is 
important for the post-referendum stability and to put an end to the ‘peaceful civil war’ it 
might have generated (Chambers 2001, 247). It also affects further political behaviour, 
the likelihood of witnessing conflict following an election or plebiscite, and the overall 
regime stability (Norris 2014). In an unstable situation, referendums like elections can 
                                                          
29 Possible concessions made by the central government on further power for the region or 




create a particular competitive context which offers new incentives and opportunities for 
violence, which can be mitigated by system design and fighting impunity (Höglund 
2009).The perceived legitimacy of the process and electoral integrity is also believed to 
be positively related to turnout (Birch 2010), further strengthening the legitimacy of the 
outcome. This further supports the assumption formulated in chapter I about the 
legitimisation role of independence referendums.  
II.3.a. Where can a referendum affect support for secession?  
 
In an agreed independence referendum, the referendum campaign, in particular, can affect 
actual support for independence by mobilising voters in favour or against separation. 
Previous scholars have demonstrated that campaigns do matter and can have an important 
educational role (Freedman, Franz, and Goldstein 2004; Biggers 2012). They can 
incentivise or hinder turnout (Nai 2013; Leininger, Rudolph, and Zittlau 2016), and 
ultimately determine how people vote (Hobolt and Brouard 2010). There are limitations 
however to how much a campaign can achieve in mobilising the electorate to vote a 
certain way. LeDuc’s (2003) study of 23 referendums in 14 countries found that, while 
referendum campaigns can be very volatile, when the referendum question touches on a 
sensitive and  salient issue, such as the one of separation, opinions on the matter are 
already likely to be well formed, leaving little room for political actors to convince 
individuals to vote the other way.  
This can be mitigated however by how acquainted with the presented propositions the 
public is prior to the referendum campaign (LeDuc and Pammett 1995; Lachapelle 1998; 
LeDuc 2002a/b; 2007). How strongly people hold their view on independence prior to the 
referendum will also play in the balance. Extreme polarisation among the electorate, 
where attitudes toward the question of independence are starkly divided along partisan-
lines or firmly held along a Yes/No divide, would limit the ability of either side of the 
campaign to gain votes in favour of their preferred option. Voting predispositions will 
again depend on the issue at hand and the general context of the plebiscite (LeDuc 2002a, 
712; Farrell and Schmitt-Beck 2003, 138; Holbrook 1996).  
HSup.1: the more familiar and polarised the electorate is with the debate around 
independence prior to the referendum being called, the less volatile it will be, 
limiting the ability of the independence referendum to affect the likelihood of 
secession occurring.  
Furthermore, scholars who studied referendum campaigns found the status-quo option in 
the referendum to be at an advantage (e.g. Cronin 1989; Margolis and Mauser 1989; 
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Neijens and Praag 2006). Yet, comparative studies have shown that ‘while there is a 
tendency for the No side to win more support in referendum campaigns, there is no 
universal law that suggests that it is easier to defeat a referendum than to win one’(LeDuc 
2003, 152). This status-quo bias is primarily attributed to the risk-adverse nature of the 
electorate (e.g. Nadeau, Martin, and Blais 1999; Hobolt 2006, 627; Liñeira, Henderson, 
and Delaney 2017).  
Independence referendums, according to Verge and colleagues (2015, 516), provide an 
excellent opportunity to study the relationship between uncertainty and risk-taking given 
the very complex issue the creation of a new state entails. Referendum campaigns on 
independence are also much less likely to be low-salient, low-information events that 
characterise other types of referendums (Liñeira, Henderson, and Delaney 2017, 167). 
Under such circumstances, LeDuc notes, ‘the outcome of the contest becomes highly 
unpredictable’ (2002, 713). Moreover, we may question the No side advantage as it is 
very likely to be dependent on context, and most studies on electoral behaviour or 
campaigning in referendums have focused on western democracies.30  
Staying in a union with the existing host-state may be perceived as more of a risk for a 
group victim of violence or political discrimination. In such circumstances, we may 
expect support for independence to be already very high in the contested region. When 
support for separation stands at 70, 80 percent or above, the referendum campaign, while 
it may still slightly decrease or increase support for independence, is unlikely to be able 
to bring support for the continuation of the union above 50 percent. Secessionist actors 
can then confidently call an independence referendum, even if they have to concede to a 
more heterogeneous eligible electorate or a special quorum to validate the referendum 
outcome (see below). On the other hand, the host-state might be less inclined to concede 
to a referendum taking place since it is almost certain to lose it.  
Based on the previous studies mentioned above on electoral volatility in referendums, I 
believe that the two campaigning sides31 would realistically hope to gain a maximum of 
15 to 20 percentage points during the referendum process.32 This range is also informed 
by the most data-rich case of Quebec (c.f. chapter VII). This is somewhat of an arbitrary 
                                                          
30 Works that have considered plebiscites outside Western democracies remain broad and 
normative in nature, or focus on procedures rather the electorate or the campaign itself (e.g. 
Farrell and Schmitt-Beck 2003; Hwang 2006; Kersting 2009; Norris 2014). Partial exception are 
Mendelsohn and Cutler (2000) and Beigbeder (1994).  
31 The Yes and No vote meaning may be switched in the referendum question.  Throughout this 
thesis the “Yes” vote always refers to endorsing independence unless stated otherwise.  
32 I assume a fairly homogenous regional population here, although who the electorate is can in 
turn considerably affect the level of support for secession (see below). 
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measure and highly dependent on the context prior to the referendum being held. Initial 
support for independence will need to stand between 30 to 70 percent of the electorate for 
the referendum process to stand a chance of moderating the relationship between the 
presence of secessionist movements and state-creation through electoral support. This 
range will in turn also be moderated by the level of familiarity with the independence 
debate and to what extend existing preferences are entrenched within the electorate 
(number of undecided or hesitant voters) (HSup.1 above).  
Even if the referendum campaign does not mobilise a majority of voters to cast a ballot in 
favour or against independence, it can still increase support for independence, or reduce 
it, and therefore affect the likelihood of secession in the future. Unfortunately, data on 
how public opinion stood on the question of secession prior to the referendum being called 
is hard to come by and these hypotheses cannot be tested quantitatively (c.f. 
methodology). Nonetheless, initial support for independence is context-dependent, with 
certain factors discussed above such as cultural distinctiveness of the region’s economic 
situation determining why and how many citizens support staying within the existing state 
or separating from it. Looking at the contextual settings of states, regions and populations 
which have held an independence referendum and the level of support for independence 
expressed during the referendum can still give a clue as to where the referendum might 
have had a mediating or moderating effect. 
II.3.b. Support for independence: context and salience  
 
Before going into further details on how the referendum process can affect support for 
independence, it is important to explain what constitutes and determines support. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, theories on nationalism can help understand the 
presence of sub-nationalism and secessionism. They account for how elites, as nationalist 
entrepreneurs, can construct - whether for personal gains or genuine belief in the 
nationalist cause - a sub-nation out of pre-existing population characteristics or history. 
Yet, they are insufficient to explain why the proposed distinct identity is salient within 
individuals and, more importantly, why it requires self-determination through the creation 
of a nation state.  
The contextual setting is crucial to answering this question. The current state needs to be 
perceived to fail in some ways aspirations and needs related to a distinct collectivity. This 
distinct collectivity becomes a specific group or political cleavage around identity who 
are said to have specific concerns and objectives. Within them, individual voters have 
more refined preoccupations and interests. “National”, “ethnic” and “political” forms of 
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mobilisation are often considered in isolation in the literature (e.g. Levinger and Lytle 
2001; Hooghe 2005; Beissinger 2002; Kriesi 2008; Strijbis and Kotnarowski 2013). The 
nature of independence referendums brings them together as an intersecting social 
movement and political issue. Social movements are a ‘vehicle for articulating and 
pressing a collectivity’s interests and claims’ (Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2008, 3). In the 
specific cases of secessionist or nationalist movements, such claims are linked to a 
specific territory and the need for new sovereignty rights (Rokkan et al. 1999; Tilly 1978).  
Human needs theories propose that all humans have certain basic universal needs and, 
when not met, lead to conflict (Danesh 2011). Individual security and survival would be 
the primary concern and the first thing that would need to be addressed (Maslow 1943; 
Marker 2003). Once such basic need is met (the “bottom” of the pyramid of needs), other 
issues such as economic opportunities or political expression become a concern. Such 
needs go further than biological needs and are about one’s identity, recognition, or self-
expression as an individual or group (Rothman 1997; Deci and Ryan 2000). Furthermore, 
it has been argued that the lower the need in this pyramid, the more powerful its effect on 
incentivising human beings to act (Maslow 1943; Burton 1997). The literature on 
secessionism has often directly or indirectly touched upon such concerns. From 
“grievance” to “greed” theories, secessionist motivation has been seen as an individual’s 
pursuit of private interests, whether basic human needs or economic gains (e.g. Gurr 1970; 
Hechter 1992).  
The core premise of this thesis is that people will decide on whether to support secession 
on the status-quo based on a cost/benefits calculation of what they value most, accounting 
for this hierarchy of needs. Rational-choice theory can help to conceptualise and 
operationalise the link between contextual factors, real or perceived needs, and decision-
making in the context of secession. Rational choice is not reduced here to personal 
economic interest, although studies have shown that it is a major consideration when 
assessing secession in some independentist movements such as Scotland or Catalonia (e.g. 
Howe 1998; Curtice 2013; Guntermann 2012; Muñoz and Tormos 2015).  Furthermore, 
rationality is expected to be ‘bounded’ (Simon 1982), meaning that based on human 
cognitive constraints, individuals do not necessarily choose the optimum option because 
their ability to process every possible scenario or outcome is limited  (Ostrom 1998, 9). 
This is particularly true when it comes to independence and what may happen following 
a Yes victory.  
The context within which individuals operate determines what they value and may wish 
to pursue through concrete lived experiences, but also how the contextual situation around 
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them is perceived. Notably, how they stand as individuals or a group relative to others 
contributes to mobilising people to act and protest their condition according to social 
movement theories (Guimond and Dube-Simard 1983, 536; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). 
Through shaping the understanding of this context, a process known as “framing”, 
individuals can also be encouraged to support independence when they previously did not. 
Existing support for independence prior to the referendum being called will therefore also 
depend on how successful secessionist actors have been in their initial mobilisation effort. 
I will elaborate on this below when reviewing the referendum campaign and how it can 
provide a platform to further increase or decrease support for secession and the likelihood 
of secession occurring.  
Finally, emotions can play an important role in incentivising one to act and influence 
decision-making, which, as Kaufman argues, should not necessarily be seen in opposition 
to rationality (1999, 135). Social and psychological studies have shown that for people to 
“care” about issues some emotional involvement is needed (e.g. Kuklinski 2001; 
Groenendyk 2011; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015).  This is why identity has generally 
been considered a strong predictor of support for independence due to its emotional appeal 
(e.g. Connor 1994, 38; Smith 2013, 72–75). This identity and its place within the existing 
host-state can also be what is sought after, such as the protection or recognition of the 
group’s distinctiveness and status. Social psychology has demonstrated the importance of 
group-based collective identity as being more than people who share common 
characteristics and experiences, but also actively engage with the ‘image of what the group 
stands for and how it wishes to be viewed by others’ (Brewer 2001, 119).  
Yet, identity should not be confused with identification and how it potentially affects 
one’s decision-making process on a specific issue. Moore views national identities as ‘the 
product of broad social and economic changes that render these social categories as both 
politically important, and ones with which people identify’ (2001, 12).  Identification, in 
turn, can serve as a lens through which individuals interpret the social world  (Simon and 
Klandermans 2001, 321; Brubaker 2004; Hale 2008, 33). Hale, building on psychology, 
conceptualises identification as an ‘uncertainty-reducing device’, especially when it 
comes to economic matters, that helps one evaluate the context around him or her and 
make a decision on how to act (2008, 140–41).33 Whilst a very useful way to think about 
the role of identity in explaining the relationship between secessionism and individual and 
                                                          
33 Jupille and Leblang (2007) for instance found that even when it comes to monetary issues such 
as whether to adopt the Euro, identity can play a role in an elector’s assessment of its desirability.  
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collective action, one should be careful to systematically attribute someone’s behaviour 
to his or her sense of identity.  
Identity can be an important factor in mobilising voters to support independence and take 
action to achieve it, but I believe it is rarely a sufficient element, nor sometimes is it 
essential. Individuals may endorse or reject independence purely for economic or 
ideological concerns, without identity playing a part in the assessment of the situation and 
potential outcome. Nonetheless, a regional group with a strong sense of identity is easier 
to mobilise collectively as discussed above (Brancati 2008, 33). Accordingly, support is 
likely to be higher in regions which have a distinct language and/or religion from the rest 
of the host-state population than if they share both.  
This does not mean that support for secession will be very high among the individuals 
said to belong to this specific national construct; especially if the region is itself 
heterogeneous (see below). Accordingly, I do not expect identity by itself to determine 
whether support for independence is very high prior to an independence referendum being 
called such that the referendum process is unlikely to reverse the trend. Nonetheless, 
certain contexts are more likely to strengthen the importance of ethnicity as the only 
relevant political identity and how it relates to other economic, political or societal 
considerations (Gagnon 1994, 132).  
Following this proposition, violence, as discussed above, can be closely linked to identity 
as a re-enforcing mechanism, furthering the divide between a distinct cultural group and 
the rest of the host-state population (Kaufman 2006; Cederman et al. 2015). If individuals 
feel their very existence is threatened, support for independence should be high. While 
the presence of violence was hypothesised to make the presence of an independence 
referendum less likely for capability reasons (HRef.3), if a referendum is held, it is 
expected that support will likely be high, and the referendum process is unlikely to 
substantially affect existing support for secession, and especially the secessionist 
outcome.  
Likewise, I expect that a population that lacks political access and representation, notably 
to self-determine through either devolution, federalism or the ability to have 
representatives in power at the regional or national level, will be more likely to support 
statehood. Even if, paradoxically, the presence of these institutions can potentially make 
mobilisation for secession easier (Hechter 2000; Brancati 2006; Roeder 2007), and the 
presence of an independence referendum more likely (HRef.7 and HRef.8).  
HSup.2: Support for independence will be higher among an electorate which has 
experienced violent conflict and/or lacks access to political representation.  In this context, 
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the referendum will act a mediator, facilitating secession, but not a moderator and 
substantially affect existing support for secession and the likelihood of seceding.  
When it comes to the other societal, political and economic factors identified earlier to be 
associated with increased or decreased support for secession, assessing their effect on 
support is more challenging. Experience of violence and lack of political access are two 
elements where “absolute” gains can be made: survival (of individuals or the group as a 
distinct cultural body), and ability to govern oneself. Whether someone would trade off 
possible economic gains under independence for an emotional attachment to the host-state 
or political representation within a stable host-state government even if in a minority 
position within it, is much more difficult to assess. Similar to the reasons behind the 
calling for a referendum, and for the opposite side to agree to one, such factors are likely 
to be context-dependent, cumulative and weighed against one another.  
A democratic, stable, long-standing economically developed host-state which allows for 
autonomy should have an electorate less inclined to support independence and take the 
risk of independence.34 Yet, even in such contexts, secessionist movements can endure 
and find sufficient support to be in a position to call for an independence referendum 
threatening the integrity of the existing state (Lecours 2012), and even nearing a majority 
support, as in Quebec in 1995. Surveys have shown that in such contexts, economic 
evaluations are important (e.g. Blais, Martin, and Nadeau 1998; Howe 1998; Guntermann 
2012; Richez and Bodet 2012; Curtice 2013; Jolly 2014; Muñoz and Tormos 2015). This 
further shows the importance of mobilisation and how the context can be framed in a way 
that increases (or decreases) support for secession. Finally, low or high support for 
secession in the electorate can be particularly difficult to capture when it may remain 
unclear who are the people whose support matters. Before engaging with how the 
referendum campaign can play a crucial role in increasing or decreasing the likelihood of 
secession by mobilising the “people”, we need to consider who the people are.  
II.3.c. Referendum design 
 
The referendum design is crucial as it sets whose support is needed, how much of it is 
required (turnout and endorsement), and by whom and how this support can be mobilised 
in favour or against independence in the referendum campaign (Figure II.1). Accordingly, 
who has control in crafting the referendum design can potentially have a lot of power over 
the referendum outcome. Where no constitutional provision exists on referendums or the 
                                                          




modalities remains vague, the secessionist actors may be in a position to design the 
referendum on their own or have to work with either the internal opposition or host-state 
government to shape the procedure. The opposition will likely wish to add constraints in 
the referendum process to make secession through these means more difficult to achieve. 
The first thing to determine is the electorate and what constitutes a binding majority.  
The electorate 
 
The first important question is who are the people who are to exercise their sovereignty 
and decide on how the latter should be exercised? Who among the host-state leaders or 
the regionalists’ secessionist leaders gets to decide who votes can have considerable 
weight on the voting outcome. Both sides will want to maximise their support base. 
Furthermore, electoral boundaries in an independence referendum have important 
symbolic and empirical consequences in regard to identity and the outcome. How the 
population is defined and bounded is crucial in defining the future demos and its identity, 
from cultural markers to residency or citizenship. Each approach presents potential 
controversies and may have lasting consequences on the future definition of the collective 
“we”. The idea of the people is generally employed to emanate legitimacy, solidarity and 
emancipation as discussed in the previous chapter, but when operationalised, it can 
become a negative tool of categorisation and suppression (Badiou et al. 2016).  
The question of franchise is particularly interesting as it touches upon the definition of the 
nation, what is it based on, and how, in turn, the electorate matches this conceptualisation. 
This is not something that needed to be raised in the standard literature on referendums as 
their subject does not involve a definition of the demos beyond the usual electorate.35 We 
would expect the secessionist side would want to exclude the host-state electorate as they 
are likely to be opposed to the dismantlement of the state.36 Their exclusion can be 
justified by the fact that they are not part of the “nation” to decide on whether it needs its 
own state. Yet, they are also potentially affected by the referendum outcome and their 
exclusion can be contested (Goodhard 1981, 141). How the people are “framed” - and I 
would add, negotiated - results in both a territorial demarcation and franchise rule (Tierney 
2012, 59). The boundaries of the sub-national identity that is claimed by secessionists may 
not follow the heterogeneous demographic borders of the targeted “nation-state”. The 
eligible electorate can, therefore, be more or less favourable to one side of the referendum 
                                                          
35 Sovereignty referendums such as the Charlottetown Accord in Canada were held within 
provinces simultaneously. Similarly, Northern Ireland voted on the Belfast agreement while a 
constitutional referendum touching on the matter was also held in Ireland.  
36 The 1962 referendum on Algerian independence which was simultaneously held on the French 




How eligibility is determined and who is included can also impact the perceived 
legitimacy of the referendum outcome. Excluding certain groups means that they may not 
feel bound to the plebiscite’s result and therefore threaten its efficacy in answering 
whether independence is to take place, or the future legitimacy of the new-state (e.g. first 
nation in Quebec – chapter V).While some referendums follow citizenship and residency 
rules matching the standard voting body in elections (e.g. Quebec), others focus on 
residency (e.g. Scotland), or ancestry (South Sudan).37 In the case of displaced populations 
or recent settlements by a host-state population, the electorate can become even more 
contentious. In Western Sahara, disputes with Morocco over the eligible electorate have 
been a major impediment in implementing the independence referendum requested by the 
UN since 1973 (UN General Assembly 1974; Jensen 2005).  
It is likely that none of this translation of a nation or people into an electorate will satisfy 
everyone. Following existing procedures, however, such as the eligible electorate in 
elections, may help avoid too much controversy and strengthen the legitimacy of the 
process as existing (legal) instructions are followed and match the exciting sub-national 
demos. Even then, independence referendums have been criticised because the majority-
rule is bound to override minorities’ wishes (Bowler and Todd 2001). For instance, some 
minorities within the USSR seceding republics rebelled against their independence 
process, leading to violent confrontations in Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh among 
others (Tierney 2012, 72). 
Minorities within the claimed territory can be a challenge for separatist movements if they 
do not favour independence. Firstly, they can boycott the referendum, weakening its 
legitimacy in representing the “voice of the people” – as they challenge both the definition 
of nationhood and the existence of a new state. Participating in the referendum would 
mean giving ‘legitimacy to what they see as an objectable process’(Anderson et al. 2005, 
6). Secondly, if special quorums are in place requiring a specific turnout figure or level of 
endorsement for independence, they can make it much more difficult for the secessionist 
to meet the criteria if they constitute an important fraction of the population (see below).  
The condition within which people can register to vote, or cast their vote can also affect 
the outcome; the registration procedure can be made difficult for certain groups. 
                                                          
37 To be eligible to vote in the independence referendum one had to be born to parents – both or 
either – who belonged to an indigenous community residing in Southern Sudan before January 
1956, or whose ancestry is “traceable” (‘Southern Sudan Referendum Act 2009’ 2010 Art. 25). 
This criterion remains ambiguous since what constitutes an indigenous community was never 
defined and did not take into account nomadic populations (Şen 2015, 239). 
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Furthermore, people need to be able to vote without fear of reprisal or concern for their 
physical security. This was a major concern in East-Timor where the UN and the Security 
Council established the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to ensure ‘a 
secure environment devoid of violence or other forms of intimidation’ (Şen 2015, 102). 
Other procedures can be put in place to encourage turnout and make it less risky or time-
costly for voters to participate such as voting by mail, which was found to increase turnout 
while also producing a slight change in the mix of participants (Donovan, Tolbert, and 
Smith 2009, 18). 
Turnout and Quorums 
 
Once the eligible electorate has been identified, rests the question of how many voters 
need to cast a ballot for the referendum proposal to be recognised, and how many of them 
need to have endorsed the proposed change. Voting rules are important as they create 
incentives for strategic abstention.38 They also directly affect the legitimacy of the 
outcome. It demonstrates that this indeed was what a majority of people support and that 
the vast majority of the “people” did express themselves, leaving less room for ambiguity 
and contestation. While the winning side of the referendum may wish to see a high turnout 
to complement getting a majority of Yes or No votes, it is more important for the 
secessionists since the status-quo is generally the default option. Low turnout is less 
harmful to the opponents of independence who can also contest the outcome on the 
grounds that it is not truly representative of what – enough or most – people want.  
Quorum requirements for turnout mean that the referendum will only be valid if a said 
percentage of the eligible electorate turns up to the polls. They are justified by a need to 
avoid distortions in outcome due to low turnout  (LeDuc 2003, 172) and a safeguard 
against a minority of voters exploiting general apathy if the referendum does not gather 
much interest  (Qvortrup 2005, 173). Quorum rules in referendums are relatively common 
in many established democracies (Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhães 2009, 544).  While 
engagement with the referendum process is a legitimate concern, applying such quorums 
can be problematic in practice and alter the balance between supporters of the referendum 
proposal and its opponent. 
Uleri (2002) considered the effect of participation (turnout) quorums in Italy and found it 
made abstention a purposeful act for those who oppose the referendum proposals.39 The 
                                                          
38 Hizen and Shinmyo’s (2010) study for example found that voters vote sincerely in equilibrium 
if there is no imposed threshold or very low. Voters who favour the status quo however may 
abstain from voting if there is a high threshold. 
39 See also Côrte-Real and Pereira (2004) for a cross-national study. 
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European Commission is wary of their use and stated in its ‘Code of Good Practice on 
Referendums’ that it takes a minority to ‘desert the ballot box in order to impose their 
viewpoint’ (Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhães 2010, 544).  Political parties and interest 
groups will also use this requirement to their favour by distorting the incentives to 
mobilise voters and secure the status-quo (Herrera and Mattozzi 2010). ‘As a result, the 
mere existence of a quorum requirement may suppress turnout’ and create a paradox 
where the threshold may have been met if it wasn’t required (Aguiar-Conraria and 
Magalhães 2010, 544). This negative effect seems to apply primarily if the opinion 
surveys prior to the referendum showed the Yes side winning  (Aguiar-Conraria and 
Magalhães 2010, 78). To remain “fair”, Zwart suggests that ‘when insufficient 
information makes the optimal quorum unknown, it is, in general, more harmful to set the 
quorum too high than too low’ (2009, 675). 
HSup3: the presence of a quorum on turnout can invalidate the expressed support for 
independence and make it more difficult to achieve secession. 
Yet, existing research has shown that sovereignty referendums and independence 
referendums, in particular, tend to enjoy very high levels of turnout whether participations 
quorums are in place or not  (He 2002; Germann and Mendez 2014).40 Quorums on turnout 
might therefore not be as much of a concern as the need for a special majority.  
Endorsement or approval quorums require that a simple majority votes in favour of the 
referendum proposal, or that such majority represents a certain percentage of the total 
electorate. Again, this rule reflects a concern for the legitimacy of the outcome (Altman 
2013). Secessionist leaders will prefer a strong support for independence to be reflected 
in the referendum as it gives them legitimacy; not only to secede but also a robust start 
for the new state and government. Yet, it makes secession more difficult than a traditional 
requirement of a majority of 50 plus one. Herrera and Mattozi (2010) reached a similar 
conclusion when it comes to approval quorums as participations quorums and found that 
both are at risk of manipulation and boycott where a minority can decide for the majority. 
Indeed, a qualified majority requirement can favour the status-quo if any sufficiently large 
minority exists (Barry 1965, 315). This is important in independence referendums where 
the population might not be homogenous in ethnic terms. Using data from all national 
referendums held within the European Union member states since 1970 Aguiar-Conraria 
and Magalhães (2009, 79) found that ‘under referendum systems that include only an 
                                                          
40  When examining all possible types of referendum however this rule is breached. Butler and 
Ranney (1994) found that turnout averaged 15 percentage points lower than that found in general 
elections in the same countries. 
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approval quorum or no quorum at all, voting for one of the options can only increase that 
option’s chance of victory, never decrease it’, while this is not true for turnout quorum as 
we have seen. 
HSup4: The presence of endorsement quorum will make it more difficult to achieve a 
qualifying majority support in favour of independence, and therefore secession.  
 
Actors and Resources 
 
The referendum design is also about who can campaign, and how, to mobilise voters. 
Actors and their resources are important for the effectiveness of the campaign and, once 
again, the perceived legitimacy of the process. de Vreese (2007, 7) identified the most 
important categories of actors involved in the referendum design and campaign as (a) the 
political elites, (b) civil society or specific interest organisations, (c) the media, and (d) 
the electorate. Furthermore, some can act as veto-players: actors whose agreement is 
necessary to change the status-quo (Tsebelis 2002; Hug and Tsebelis 2002). I have 
identified here the host-state government as the critical actor whose consent is necessary 
to change the status quo, but other actors can contribute to legitimise or delegitimise the 
process further. From a secessionist perspective as well, the legitimacy of this goal can be 
considered according to the legitimacy of the actor calling for independence, why they do 
so, and how (procedure), according to Baer (2000).  
The context is likely to once again mitigate the perception of these actors and processes. 
In an older, established democracy citizens are more likely to be politically socialised and 
see the electoral procedures as being intrinsically fair (Blais, Gidengil, and Nevitte 2004), 
while patriotism or party loyalties may build a ‘reservoir’ of support for the outcome of 
what is to be a democratic process (Bowler et al. 2015, 1). International observers from 
international organisations or third states representing the international community can 
bring legitimacy by ensuring that  international standards are met when they might 
otherwise be lacking (Norris 2014, 75–76).41 International monitoring of elections or 
referendums is a growing norm (Santa-Cruz 2013; Hyde 2017).  It has increasingly come 
under criticism however, as it does not sufficiently take into account the undemocratic 
situation and bias prior to the elections or plebiscites (Geisler 1993; Hohe 2002). It was 
also found to increase the chances of boycott by political actors set to lose (Beaulieu and 
                                                          
41 These standards have been endorsed in a series of authoritative conventions and treaties by 
international organisations such as the UN General Assembly and member states of the 
organisation, or the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe discussed when 
reviewing Montenegro (Norris, Frank, and Coma 2014, 790) .  
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Hyde 2009).  
In addition to initial support for independence being biased toward one side, prior to the 
referendum being put in motion one side may already be in a better position to engage 
with the public during the official referendum campaign. This is especially true for the 
secessionist side which has the advantage in framing the debate on the question of 
independence (see below). The referendum design can, however, constrain the number of 
campaigning actors and their type, how much they can spend, and for how long.  
Typically, a pro and against groups are formed to campaign in a referendum with a binary 
option (Wirth et al. 2010, 330–31). They are then restricted and monitored on how much 
money they can spend, how much airtime they get and what campaigning materials are 
used. This may mean that traditionally rival parties and organisations will need to work 
together (LeDuc 2000). This can pose a challenge for heterogeneous campaigning groups 
to find compromises on a campaign strategy when they have potentially very different 
political ideologies. Then again, numerous, diverse and competing parties coming 
together can also be a strength for the Yes or No side in strengthening and legitimising 
their message.   
Campaign expenditures have been criticised if not properly regulated as going against a 
free and fair process and regulating the ballot box (Mastro, Costlow, and Sanchez 1980; 
Bowler and Donovan 2000; Johnson 2010). Typically, both sides will be allocated a 
certain sum by the regional or state government to campaign; however, they are likely to 
also be able to raise their own funds (possibly within a given limit). How much oversight 
and enforcement is possible, and whether breaches to the rules will be prosecuted will be 
important in ensuring that both sides have equal resources and only their arguments and 
how convincing they are, determines the votes. This will, in turn, ensure the legitimacy of 
the outcome and that the losing party will respect it.  
Such checks and balances, however, are likely to only be applied to the official campaign 
period and biases may be pronounced prior to its official start. In addition to modern 
campaigning involving considerable amounts of money, a lot of manpower can be devoted 
to preparing and conducting it (Farrell and Schmitt-Beck 2003). One way to get around 
campaign expenses is to rely on volunteer campaigners. How much manpower the Yes 
and No side have to campaign on the ground, distributing leaflets and talking to voters, 
and organise rallies is important for mobilisation (Lynch 2015). This form of campaigning 
is also an indication of campaign intensity which contributes to higher turnout (Kriesi 
2005, 116). On the other hand, intensive, negative and “bitter” campaigning may hamper 
the losing side’s ability to accept the outcome (Nadeau and Blais 1993, 556).  
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Finally, the media is an important intervening actor in the campaign as the primary relay 
of the Yes and No campaign and events leading up to the referendum. It also contributes 
to the framing process of the plebiscite on independence - or ongoing “strategic game” - 
by reporting events but also commenting on them more or less favourably (Aalberg, 
Strömbäck, and de Vreese 2012; Dekavalla 2016). The focus on the campaign as a 
strategic game also means a focus on drama, conflict and ultimately negativity. The 
personalisation of politics and focus on conflict may lead to increased polarisation or 
cynicism in the political process (Van Aelst, Sheafer, and Stanyer 2012; Vreese and 
Semetko 2002), threatening, in turn, the legitimacy of the democratic process and outcome 
(Cappella and Jamieson 1997, 238; Patterson 1993). Some scholars still believe that their 
effect is not that great (e.g. Newton 2006) and not all negative: the media can contribute 
to citizens’ knowledge of the issue at stake and engagement, with coverage of opinion 
polls stimulating attention and participation  (e.g. Norris 2000). 
The question 
 
The last element of the referendum design that could increase the likelihood of secession 
occurring by rallying support for independence or the status-quo is the wording of the 
referendum question. Scholars have documented that the wording is an important factor 
in swaying voters in the desired direction (Yale and Durand 2011, 58). For instance, when 
asked "Should the United Kingdom come out of the Common Market?", the British 
electorate favoured staying in the European Economic Community (EEC) at 55 percent. 
The percentage of surveyed voters who supported staying in raised to 63 percent when 
asked: “Should the United Kingdom stay in the Common Market?". That is an 8 
percentage point difference according to the question’s wording (Butler and Kitzinger 
1976). A question on “independence” might be less sensitive to the wording than other 
topics if it is already a familiar and salient issue and its aim– state-creation – is clear.  
The effect of the referendum question is closely related to the framing effect and the 
broader ‘framing’ strategy employed by actors in the campaign (Marsh 2007). I expect 
that manipulation of the question’s wording is more likely to occur in favour of the 
secessionist side and if the debate around independence is a fairly new phenomenon. The 
opposition and host-state will want a clear yes/no answer to the question of secession such 
as “Should X secede/separate from/become independent?”. On the other hand, the 
secessionists may want to soften their stance by mentioning a form of continued union, or 
even a second referendum to alleviate anxieties and mitigate uncertainties among the 
electorate. An unclear or complex question may, however, impact the legitimacy of the 
outcome as it might not be clear what people actually voted for.  
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In some referendums, the subject at hand can become a secondary issue, and the process 
a ‘second-order’ election whereby the endorsement of the proposal or its rejection is used 
to assess the popularity of the government in place (Garry, Marsh, and Sinnott 2005; 
Leininger, Rudolph, and Zittlau 2016). Given the importance and sensitivity of the 
question of independence, I believe it is very unlikely to happen in an independence 
referendum. Furthermore, voting on staying within the existing polity or creating a new 
one is in itself an indirect evolution of the current state of affairs and the national 
government in place. The referendum question and campaigning strategies, however, can 
still shape the understanding of the issue at hand. 
II.3.d. Referendum campaign  
 
The referendum campaign is the ultimate chance for pro-independence and pro-union 
actors to make their case and shape the referendum outcome to decide the fate of the 
existing state and its region. Political - electoral - campaigns have been extensively 
studied (e.g. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 2005; Claassen 2011; Biggers 2012; 
Vowles 2013; Nadeau et al. 2008); and referendum campaigns, in particular, are starting 
to catch up (e.g. Holbrook 1996; Farrell, Farrell, and Schmitt-Beck 2003; Marsh 2007; 
Suiter and Reidy 2013; de Vreese and Semetko 2002; de Vreese 2007a). From these 
previous works, we know that campaigns are very important in mobilising voters and 
explaining the electoral or referendum result (e.g. Martin 2004; LeDuc 2007; de Vreese 
2007b). The ability of either side to mobilize the electorate, as discussed above, will 
depend on existing levels of polarization and familiarity with the question of 
independence (HSup1).42  
Referendums campaigns, in a free and fair process, are all about persuasion. This operates 
through rhetoric and has three essential components following Aristotle’s mode of 
persuasion: Ethnos, Pathos, and Logos (Dillard and Pfau 2002). Ethnos refers to the 
messenger, and its credibility, authority and reliability in conveying the message. Pathos 
is about appealing to the public’s emotions and imagination, while Logos refers to the use 
of logic and rationality to convince. Together, they contribute to the framing of the context 
and why independence should be endorsed or not.  
The referendum: a mobilisation and demobilisation platform for independence 
 
                                                          
42 Although this level of analysis is beyond what I can afford to cover in the thesis, it is worth 
pointing out that different types of voters are affected differently by the campaign (c.f. Nadeau et 
al. 2008), and even if the eligible electorate is the same as in elections, the one that actually 
participates in a referendum may be different (LeDuc 2007, 27). 
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The campaign offers a learning opportunity for voters to familiarise themselves further 
with the topic to be decided upon and make up their mind (Mendelsohn and Cutler 2000; 
Arceneaux 2006; Nadeau et al. 2008; Biggers 2012). The exposure to the debate offers a 
very visible and potentially far-reaching mobilisation platform for secessionists, creating 
a momentum and making secession the main issue on the agenda in a much more efficient 
way than what a normal election would allow for (centrifugal dynamics). In a standard 
election at the national or regional level, while independence might be on the agenda, 
parties opposing it may wish to focus the debate and frame core issues away from it. In 
an -agreed - independence referendum, it becomes inevitable.  
The campaign, and the longer it runs for, increases voter learning opportunities 
(Stevenson and Vavreck 2000). The literature on the effect of the length of the campaign 
on the referendum outcome is scarce due to the difficulty in isolating its effect; but it 
seems it has, at best, a minimal effect in swaying voters (Panagopoulos 2013). 
Nonetheless, if the independentists are engaging in the referendum without a majority, 
they may, therefore, benefit from a longer campaign to make their case. They may prefer 
a shorter campaign if they already are winning in the polls so as not to allow the No side 
to dissuade voters to endorse separation.  
HSup5: The longer the referendum campaign, the more opportunities offered to increase 
support for independence and the likelihood of achieving statehood.  
However, in an agreed independence referendum, the No side also gets a chance to 
campaign for the status-quo, therefore potentially cancelling out the Yes side mobilisation 
effect (centripetal dynamics). That is not to say that a No campaign will always be present 
or significant. In the referendum held in Mongolia or Norway, campaigners to retain the 
union were virtually non-existent (Radchenko 1945). When a No side campaign is 
present, and run well, it might cancel out any efforts of the Yes side to mobilise support 
for independence. This renders the measurement of the persuasive effect of the campaign 
difficult (Sheafer 2005, 86). I would expect that the presence of a No side campaign can 
reduce support for secession, especially when the context is not extremely polarised and 
cancel the potential benefits of a long campaign for independentists.  
HSup6: the presence of a No side campaign reduces support for independence.  
Reduction of support for independence can also be achieved by making concessions to 
the regional population, such as further autonomy or investments, affecting the cost-
benefit calculation of voters in weighted independence. The host-state government has an 
advantage over the secessionist regionalist actors since, as the current “ultimate” 
sovereignty of the state, it is in a better position to grant promises made during the 
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campaign. The independentists are in a more speculative position and cannot offer the 
same level of certainty. The participation of the central government, however, can be 
perceived positively or negatively by the electorate depending on whether its interference 
is seen as legitimate, along with voters predispositions towards message-senders (ethnos) 
who provide voting cues (Borges and Clarke 2008). The personality and charisma of the 
leaders on both sides of the debate have been found in some studies to have a significant 
effect on the efficacy of communication (Pammett and LeDuc 2001; De Vreese 2004; 
Mughan 2009). A magnetic and trustworthy leadership is not only important in making 
the message more convincing, it can be crucial in the perceived ability of the individual 
to deliver the promises or policies proposed during the campaign. Furthermore, cultural, 
intellectual and economic elites can give credibility to the message or help reach specific 
groups (e.g. Johnson and McIlwraith 1998; Whigham and May 2017).  
To make their decisions, voters rely on what they know of the political parties and top 
personalities campaigning (Bowler and Donovan 2000). They typically consult campaign 
pamphlets, television advertising and direct mailings (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). The 
mass media (daily newspapers, TV, radio) are the primary relay of the campaigning 
camps’ messages to the public (Bennett and Entman 2000; de Vreese and Semetko 2004). 
Different channels will reach different electoral profiles and it is, therefore, difficult to 
single out which channel might be most effective (Norris 2006). Furthermore, certain 
media are already known to be biased, which may in turn already be reflected in their 
readership’s attitudes on the question of secession.  
Nonetheless, the direct or relayed messages are important to help voters form their choice 
and the way the media selects specific narratives or interprets them may offer an 
advantageous platform to one of the campaigning sides (Jenkins and Mendelsohn 2001, 
213), although it is something very difficult to measure or demonstrate (Livingstone 1996, 
321). The coverage of a referendum will be focused on leadership, tactical motivations, 
and the race between the Yes and No vote around polls, and, more controversially, 
interpretation of leaders’ declarations and arguments. Achieving a balanced coverage is 
more difficult in referendums than normal elections according to Jenkins and Mandelson 
(2001, 216–17), because more actors are involved, including the public itself, than 
individual candidates to be elected.  
We may ask whether the electorate is sufficiently informed, and informed correctly and 
whether the options and consequences entailed are fully understood (Lupia and Johnston 
2001). The campaign offers a space for debate that in itself can enhance the legitimacy of 
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the process and outcome (Stromer-Galley and Muhlberger 2009), although it does not 
guarantee a genuine deliberative process  (Tierney 2012, 114). 
National, Ethnic, and Electoral Mobilization 
 
How specific groups are mobilised as one “nation”, is important to understand the political 
mobilisation strategies employed in independence referendums. The context does not only 
determine the emergence of secessionist movements and their likelihood of secession, it 
also dictates how secession is framed and how popular support can be gathered. I agree 
with scholars that ethnic mobilisation is not drastically different from other forms of 
mobilisation or contention, notably political mobilisation (E.g. Hooghe 2005, 977; 
McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). Ethnic politics go further than just nationalism as it 
links pre-existing identities to material calculations (Hale 2008, 33). Using a rational-
choice approach to individual decision-making discussed above links the context, its 
rhetorical framing by elites, and the “people’s” decision to support secession or the 
preservation of the host-state together. 
The essential step of framing43 enables elites to influence the understanding of the existing 
context to politicise collective identities by pointing out the shortcomings of the status-
quo, but also how the host-state is ultimately unable to accommodate their needs and a 
new state is needed. In turn, they need to convince the members of the said nation to take 
action, from supporting a secessionist political party, participating in demonstrations, 
taking up arms against the host-state or, in our case, a comparatively low-cost action of 
casting a “yes” ballot in an independence referendum.  
While framing theory is a constructivist micro-level approach to the study of secessionism 
and political movements, I believe it is useful in understanding how the individual level 
interacts with the macro-level of state-behaviour. Framing touches upon the idea of what 
a state is, what it stands for and the role of its inhabitants, leading to the collective action 
(and counter-reaction) generated by secessionist movements. Secessionist actors are 
“nationalist entrepreneurs” as they propose and frame a group as a nation, generally based 
on shared cultural markers such as language, religion, or territorial ancestry (c.f. previous 
chapter). This form of “ethnic” national mobilisation is more limited than its “civic” 
counterpart which proposes a broader understanding of the nation often based on 
residency and citizenship (Lecours 2000, 154–56; Brubaker 1992), offering by extension 
a broader electorate.  
                                                          
43 I discuss the theory of framing as an analytical tool to link the contextual macro-level, and the 
individual micro-level in the methodology chapter.  
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Even when such distinct ethnic groups exist, identity markers need to be politicised and 
require seeing nationalism as a form of politics (Breuilly 1993, 1). The exertive literature 
on (election) campaigns demonstrate how the campaign serves to galvanize voters’ 
fundamental predispositions and create an ‘activation’ effect where personal traits and 
preferences become a core driver in the voting decision process (Selb et al. 2009, 155). In 
particular, party affiliation is argued to serve as a short-cut in the decision-making process 
(Arceneaux 2006), or help guide political judgement on a specific issue (Holbrook 1996). 
Party affiliation can potentially be a reflection of one’s position on independence, 
especially if one supports an outright separatist party. Even so, it does not mean that this 
electorate is necessarily secured. For some, opinions on sovereignty reflect a strongly 
held, fundamental belief in a nation or political identity, whilst others will consider the 
question from a cost/benefit approach about which output they value most (economic, 
cultural, social) and the ability of either option to deliver (LeDuc 2002a, 713). 
The referendum campaign can make a difference by mobilizing so far uninterested, 
undecided or hesitant voters, or changing the mind of those that expressed a preference 
prior to the independence referendum being called. During the campaign, the electorate is 
exposed to how the proposed change in the referendum relates to their values and attitudes 
and which of the Yes or No answers best serves them (Selb et al. 2009, 158; Suiter and 
Reidy 2013). This is done through framing and rhetorical persuasion. The way a problem 
is expressed and formatted can have a powerful effect on the decision made to solve it – 
notably when employing a loss and gain frame (Dillard 2014). The campaign can also 
shape the understanding of the referendum question, and what is at stake.  
Context Framing  
 
Frames can be defined as ‘schemata(s) of interpretation (…) to locate, perceive, identify, 
and label’ a specific issue (Goffman 1974, 4:21). It consists of selecting ‘some aspects of 
a perceived reality and making them more salient in a communicating context’(Entman 
1993, 52). The theory rests on the assumption that an issue can be viewed from many 
possible perspectives. Accordingly, framing is the process through which a particular 
conceptualisation around an issue is developed (Matthes 2012, 252). An isolated argument 
is not a frame but falls within argumentative dimensions composing a framing process of 
the issue of secession, itself contributing to the formation of the overall rhetorical strategy.  
Frames and counter-frames, which are not merely counter-arguments but alternative 
constructs of the same issues within the deliberative setting of the campaign, are created 
by elites and the media on both sides (Rhee 1997). Through analysing often-contradictory 
claims and justifications, the argumentative framework is made visible.  Further, since a 
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referendum is based around a Yes/No – for/against outcome, the frames and arguments 
employed by both sides of the debate may claim the exact opposite through a different 
understanding of the situation in an attempt to counter the opponent’s argument and 
proposed frame.  
I believe independence referendums fit generic frames (de Vreese, Semetko, and Jochen 
2001, 108). Although they are “single-issues” referendums, the question of independence 
can be framed much more widely than a referendum on gay marriage or a specific 
constitutional reform such as changing the electoral system, for example. Secession 
touches on a multitude of topics from identity to the economy, specific societal policies 
or even foreign policy. But frames are not generated out of the blue. They rely primarily 
on the existing context and structure, and what can be drawn from it (Kriesi 2004, 72; 
Chong and Druckman 2007, 119). Actors instrumentalise discursively the context to 
highlight (real or perceived) problems with the status-quo and offer solutions through the 
creation of a new independent state, or demonstrate the value of the union and the 
undesirability of secession.  An independence referendum should therefore never be fully 
disconnected from its contextual setting in order to understand how and why it came 
about, to what extent it can be a mobilisation platform – and how it can, in turn, affect the 




This chapter has brought together two strands of academic literature so far largely 
considered in isolation. The literature on nationalism and secessionism, and how context 
determines the capacity and incentives to secede was combined with the mobilisation 
potential of referendums, in order to assess how referendums on independence can affect 
secessionist dynamics. For an independence referendum to mediate or moderate the 
likelihood of secession, however, the process needs to be consented by the secessionist 
actors and host-state government. Furthermore, unilateral and agreed independence 
referendums might also have different origins. Nonetheless, in both cases existing support 
for independence is likely to be an important factor in the decision to call and hold a 
plebiscite.  
In order to identify when and how an independence referendum can increase or decrease 
the likelihood of secession we need to address a problem of endogeneity where the 
contextual setting within which the secessionist movement operates might determine 
existing support for secession, the presence of an independence referendum, how likely it 
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is to be an agreed process, and its outcome making the isolation of the referendum effect 
challenging. Furthermore, based on existing knowledge of referendum campaigns, I have 
argued that, while the referendum process may still increase or decrease support for 
secession, support for separation needs to stand around 50 percent, +/- 20 percent for the 
plebiscite process to stand a chance of determining the secessionist outcome.  
The design and referendum campaign is crucial in this context in increasing or decreasing 
one side of the debate’s chances of success. Which of the secessionists or host-state 
proponents can shape whose support is needed, how much of it is needed and how it can 
be mobilised has a better chance of influencing the referendum, and secessionist, outcome. 
Support for independence among the electorate is the determining factor in secession. The 
campaign is therefore crucial to mobilise voters. By framing the context to their advantage 
and highlighting the cost and benefits of secession, proponents of secession and the status-
quo try to convince voters to cast a Yes or No ballot. Satisfaction with the referendum 
process is also important for the outcome to be perceived as the “free and fair” expression 
of the “will of the people” by all actors concerned, from the population, political parties, 
host-state governments and international community.  
The next chapter will review the method employed in the thesis to answer the research 
questions and test the hypotheses formulated here to guide the analysis on how 
independence referendums increase or decrease the likelihood of secession. Chapter IV 
will then test some of the assumptions uncovered here quantitatively, before turning to 
the comparative study of Quebec and Montenegro to further understand the role of 










One of the challenges of the research question is isolating the impact of referendums on 
secessionist movements and distinguishing contextual effects that make referendums 
more likely from the potentially transformative effects of referendums themselves. This 
chapter details the methodology used to answer the research questions and materials 
analysed. To understand when independence referendums take place and what part they 
play within the broader secessionist dynamics that brought them forward, this thesis 
employs a multi-methodological approach. The rationale behind the use of a mixed-
method of quantitative and qualitative sequential design is threefold.  
Firstly, since we are dealing with an under-studied topic, a general overview of the 
phenomenon is needed in order to start explaining it. Moreover, using what we already 
know of secessionist movements and referendums, I can use a deductive approach to start 
tackling the research questions through a large-N review whilst still leaving enough space 
for an inductive approach to explore and better understand the phenomena (Blaikie 2000, 
243–45). Secondly, the quantitative and qualitative approaches are complementary 
(Greene, Caracelli, and Graham 1989, 259). While the quantitative approach enables 
exploration, through a large-N review, of the effect of an independence referendum on the 
likelihood of secession and control for confounding factors, a qualitative approach goes 
more in-depth into the analysis and explores how independence referendums interact with 
secessionism using a more inductive approach. Thirdly, the quantitative analysis assisted 
the identification of the case studies for the qualitative analysis through the review of the 
population of interest characteristics.  
The first quantitative step serves two purposes. First, as a primarily descriptive review, it 
helps situate the practice of independence referendums within the process of state creation 
and the specificities of regions having held one. The analysis also makes the distinction 
between agreed and unilateral referendums throughout to consider to what extent they 
differ at the macro-level. Secondly, it tests some of the assumptions uncovered in the 
literature covered in chapter I and II about the legality of secession, factors linking a 
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referendum being held, and secession occurring. Accordingly, this initial quantitative 
approach offers a first insight to answering the research question of when an independence 
referendum could make a difference. The quantitative analysis helps eliminate 
unsupported hypotheses and narrow down factors and cases to consider when turning to 
an in-depth analysis of independence referendums.  
The qualitative analysis that follows studies in a comparative perspective two cases – 
Quebec and Montenegro – to further our understanding of the effect of independence 
referendums on the likelihood of secession. Key variables identified in the literature 
review on secessionism and referendums in chapter I and II are considered again within 
the case-studies to cross-examine the quantitative findings. Furthermore, the in-depth 
study of Quebec and Montenegro and their respective plebiscites brings a more nuanced 
and thorough answer to the research question, shedding light on the complex phenomena 
that surround referendums on independence which cannot be captured by a quantitative 
analysis; notably how complex factors such as societal, economic and political variables 
interact.  Furthermore, as discussed in the previous chapter, I make use of different 
theories around secession and mobilisation at the macro (state or region-wide), meso 
(group), and micro (individual) level to guide the analysis and link the different levels and 
contexts such as framing theory and rational choice theory. 
Hence, the mixed-method approach serves both as a two-step approach in tackling the 
research questions, and a triangulation purpose, giving a more detailed and balanced 
picture of the studied phenomena and increasing the accuracy of the findings (Ivankova, 
Creswell, and Stick 2006, 3). This approach is also supported by the existing literature on 
secessionism and direct democracy, which has frequently adopted both methods. (e.g. 
Collier and Hoeffler 2006; Sambanis and Milanovic 2011). Triangulation, used to 
strengthen the accuracy of the data and findings by considering different perspectives 
(Pierce 2008, 90), is also applied through the use of a variety of sources such as 
contemporary documents, reports and speeches, secondary academic sources, and 
fieldwork undertaken in Montenegro and Quebec. Given the sensitive topic of 
independence, it is essential to cover different perspectives (Yin 2003).  
 
III.1. Quantitative Analysis 
 
The first part of the analysis is a quantitative assessment of the effect of independence 
referendums on the likelihood of secession. Summary statistics produced by a quantitative 
overview will be valuable in themselves to identify the population of interest, its 
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characteristics and frequency in order to assess where it stands in the universe of 
secessionist movements and acts of secessionism (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). The 
strength of a quantitative approach rests with the statistical analysis ability to identify 
correlations and control for key variables known to affect the likelihood of secession in 
order to isolate the possible effect of an independence referendum.  
Logistic regression analysis, in particular, enables one to examine the impact of various 
factors on a dichotomous outcome. The model will test when referendums and secession 
are more likely to happen, controlling for factors shown in previous studies to affect the 
likelihood of secession (e.g. level of democracy of host-state, distinction of the regional 
population from host-state population). More importantly, a logistic regression analysis 
will enable the identification of key variables and correlations with the potential to make 
predictive claims in future situations.  
Furthermore, the quantitative analysis output helped identify “typical cases” by looking 
at the smallest possible residual, meaning that what we observed is very close to what we 
would expect given our hypothesis or model. Conversely, cases that stand out are 
highlighted at one end or another of the hypotheses given a particular variable. Cases with 
a large error terms (residual) in the logistic analysis can bring an additional understanding 
of where independence referendums occur and their outcome. Outliers or deviant cases 
can be investigated further to understand why they do not fit a particular hypothesis that 
seems to hold for other cases and point to potentially omitted variables (Bennett and 
Elman 2006b, 262).  
This study is the first broadly quantitative study of independence referendums and their 
interaction with secessionist outcomes. A new dataset using previous data available on 
variables known to affect the likelihood of secession and adding key variables of interests 
has been compiled for the purpose of the study. Since regions and their population are the 
core entities at stake in an independence referendum, and their characteristics are key to 
secessionist activity, all the variables are collected on a regional basis or in relation to the 
region’s status vis-à-vis the state.  
 
III.1.a. The dataset 
 
The dataset was built to enable comparison between secessionist movements 
which have held an independence referendum and those which have not in order to 
understand when such plebiscites occur and the role they played in the likelihood of 
secession taking place. The sampling method is first derived from Coggins’ dataset. This 
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dataset offers numerous advantages over other more famous datasets on separatism such 
as EPR or MAR. Secessionist movement are defined as a nationalist group aiming to 
separate from an internationally recognised host-state44 in order to create a new 
independent state (Coggins 2011, 454). In addition to sharing this key definition, Coggins’ 
dataset Secession and great power recognition dataset version 2.0. comprises more cases 
meeting this criterion than other largely used datasets in the field of territorial politics 
such as MAR or Soren’s.45  
For instance, out of the 275 secessionist movements identified by Coggins from 1931 to 
2000, 136 are not included in MAR. The time frame considered by Coggins was extended 
to 1900, enabling the inclusion of further cases such as Norway which seceded from 
Sweden in 1905, and Ireland from the United Kingdom in 1922. I also removed some 
borderline cases such as Monaco in 1993 which gained formal international recognition 
but without the event being a clear case of secession from France, and the Jura region of 
Switzerland which was not a clear case of secessionism but rather a movement to amend 
regional borders within the existing state (Buechi 2012). 
The selection includes cases which have held referendums on independence but also 
samples from countries which have not, and accounts for regions which have seceded and 
others which have not, therefore serving as control variables and helping to identify 
potential biases. Together they form the universe of cases based on states and their regions 
hosting secessionist movements resumed in Table III.1. 
Table III.1: Referendum on secession sample space 
(DV/IV): INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM (DV): SECESSION 
YES NO 




                                                          
44 This excluded the referendum in Republika Srpska of 1991, since Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
not recognised as a state at the time.   
45 I used the Domestic Data set focusing on secessionist regions as opposed to the International 
Data set which focused on home-states and great-powers relations (Coggins, 2011). The author 
also kindly agreed to share a former version of her dataset which included more variables on the 
secessionist group profile than the version available online and her PhD thesis detailing the 
operationalisation and data source (Coggins, 2009).  
87 
 
Because the broader aims of this thesis are to explore independence referendums’ 
consequences and to offer a possible tool to deal with secessionist conflict, studying the 
entire universe of groups aspiring to statehood, along with what they claim as their 
territory, is ideal. Selecting all ethnic minority groups, such as those in the EPR or MAR 
datasets, would be inaccurate as not all minority groups within these two datasets seek a 
sovereign independent state. Some “regionalist” movements campaign instead for more 
local autonomy. Although this is also about bringing the principle of representative 
sovereignty closer to people, it does not call on the full capacities of an independent state 
and an equal footing in the international arena.  
Furthermore, selecting minority groups within host-states does not mean that the former 
self-defined as a collective, or if they do, they may not attribute their identities any form 
of political salience. I wish here to maintain the ‘possibility’ principle, whereby all cases 
are comparable and, without considerations for their characteristics (key factors), would 
be assumed to have the same chances of witnessing a specific outcome (Mahoney and 
Goertz 2004). It would be very surprising to see a group offered an independence 
referendum if it never actually voiced any desire for it in the first place. Accordingly, the 
presence of secessionist movements seeking independence is a key criterion in the 
selection process.  
Although more than one secessionist organisation can be present within a region, since 
the secessionist movements represent the same people and the same secessionist goal, and 
the study is primarily interested in whether the people they represent will want to secede 
from the host-state, it is not essential to make such distinction.  The relationship we wish 
to assess is between the “centre” (the host-state) and “periphery” (region), while Coggins 
made such distinction as she is interested in which secessionist movements gain 
international recognition. The total number of cases was therefore reduced and amended 
from 256 to 224. The variables retained from Coggins’ dataset were checked and corrected 
or updated to match the new time-frame ranging from 1905 to 2014. Secessionist 
movements that have now ended since the creation of the dataset were also re-coded (e.g. 
East Timor, South Sudan).  
All cases share three criteria. Firstly, the group was considered to have, or be attempting 
to, secede by having formally declared independence or the wish to gain independence 
from the host-state. The attempt to secede is defined by Coggins as any of the following 
acts: (1) formal declaration of independence. (2) The start of violent conflict between a 
group within the region and the host-state with the stated demand for full sovereignty 
followed by a formal declaration of independence (retroactive coding). (3) Non-violent 
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actions such as the formation of an independentist party or peaceful public organisations 
or demonstrations making a formal declaration of independence. 
Secondly, the group in question must make a claim to a specific territory and its population 
which is to form the newly independent state. This excludes so-called “pirate-states”, 
whereby there is a claim to a population but not a territory, and platform islands where 
the reverse holds with a claim to a territory but without a population. Thirdly, the 
secessionist movement must claim at least a 100 square kilometres under Coggins’ 
operationalisation, and the movement must have lasted a minimum of one week and 
involved at least 1,000 inhabitants. A small exception was made for St-Kitts and Nevis. 
Coups-d’état and revolutions claim jurisdiction over the entire territory of the host-state 
and are also excluded. If a group does not declare independence but is granted 
independence unilaterally (e.g. South African Bantustans) they do not qualify as 
secessionist movements. Excluded as well are cases where the emergence of a new state 
was agreed by a colonial government prior to its declaration of independence. Colonies 
which unilaterally declared independence are considered a secessionist attempt and 
therefore included, although colonial cases will be dropped from more extensive analysis 
(see below). 
Cases of irredentism whereby the secessionist group seeks to separate from their current 
host-state to join another pre-existing state are excluded (e.g. Turkish Cypriots).  Coggins 
makes however also includes the secessionist movement if the state the irredentists hope 
to join does not make an equal and opposite claim to control the seceding population and 
territory. In such circumstances, it is often not clear what the ultimate status of the territory 
might be. While it is clear that the region in question rejects its union with its current host-
state, it is likely to prefer independence to the current union, even if the ultimate goal may 
be to join an existing host-state. Crimea is an example. The possibility of joining an 
existing state can change the cost/benefit calculation of seceding since it is not solely 
about the region being able to perform as an independent country. I controlled for these 
cases using a dummy variable indicating irredentist tendencies which are run on all 
models to ensure it does not affect the overall findings. It was never found to be significant 
with the DVs of interest, nor affect the impact of other variables in multivariate models.  
Secessionist movements represent only one aspect of the population of interest. Indeed, 
at the core of the thesis are independence referendums. Independence referendums are 
used both as a dependent variable when trying to understand where they are more likely 
to occur, and a key independent variable when trying to explain secession in the statistical 
analysis. I therefore partially select cases on the dependent variable as I add to the existing 
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sample all independence referendums identified (either to a case already on the list – e.g. 
Scotland, or adding a new case, e.g. Norway). This approach is not uncommon in 
international relations studies. It offers a more efficient strategy to collect data by ensuring 
its substantive content and enabling the research to have more sophisticated measure 
within fewer, but conceptually more relevant, observations (King and Zeng 2001b, 695). 
Furthermore, this approach helps alleviate the logistic regression small sample bias 
explained below.  
III.1.b. Bivariate and logistic regression analysis 
 
The first part of the large-N analysis presents descriptive statistics on secessionist 
movements, and independence referendums and contrasts their outcome using a series of 
bivariate tests. The profile of cases having held an independence referendum and its sub-
type - either agreed or unilateral- is reviewed focusing on key regional, group and host-
state factors. All tests are performed using the statistical software SPSS, with the 
exception of the Firth’s Penalised Likelihood to predict agreed independence referendums 
where the command was run on R.   
Although there are sufficient cases to conduct statistical analyses, we still face ‘small N 
problems’(Gerring 2004).  That is, ‘many variables, a small number of cases’ (Lijphart 
1971). We can only control for so many variables affecting an outcome to compare and 
isolate the ones of interest.  This empirical reality means that an extensive logistic 
regression analysis controlling for many intervening variables will not be possible 
(Greenland, Schwartzbaum, and Finkle 2000). I enter around ten explanatory variables 
depending on the sample size for the model run to predict referendums or secession to 
keep in line with the statistical rule of thumb of having 5 to 10 events per predictor (c.f. 
Vittinghoff and McCulloch 2007; and Courvoisier et al. 2011, 1000). An expectation is 
made with the linear regression on support for secession in independence referendums (n 
below 30) which is used for exploratory purposes.  
A common problem in logistic regression is the biased estimate of odds ratios (ORs) in 
small sample sizes (fewer than two hundred observations), leading to a great chance of 
committing a type II error (King and Zeng 2001b, 693). It means that the model may 
underestimate the occurrence probabilities and biases the standard errors of the logit 
coefficients (King and Zeng 2001a, 146–47). To alleviate this shortcoming, the 
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confidence intervals and effect size should be considered as well, and avoid highly 
correlated predictors46 into the logistic model (Courvoisier et al. 2011, 999). 
This problem is particularly likely when trying to predict agreed independence 
referendums. Indeed, the bias found in the maximum likelihood estimation of the logits 
model in small-sample is aggravated by the number of cases in the less frequent of the 
two predicted categories, here, agreed independence referendum equals “1” as they are 
only 10 events (7% of the sample excluding colonies). To ensure that some variables are 
not detected to be predictors of agreed independence referendum because of this bias, I 
run a second test to correct for this possibility. Three alternatives exist: exact logistic 
regression, King and Zeng correction, and Firth’s PMLE.  After careful reading of 
comparative studies of the three techniques (e.g. Heinze and Schemper 2002), I select the 
Firth’s PMLE as it performs best even in cases with a small sample and very few events.47  
When analysing continuous variables, as some are not normally distributed, either due to 
the nature of the variable or the small-N in the case of independence referendums, I 
systematically ran a Pearson’s r and non-parametric tests such as Spearman's Rho for 
correlation, and Kruskal-Wallis to compare means as a robustness check. I only found the 
tests to vary on rare occasions, flagged in the chapter, which strengthens the reliability of 
the findings.  
I also systematically ran sensitivity checks. All tests conducted are done once including 
all cases, and a second time excluding the repeated instances of independence 
referendums in Quebec (1980 and including 1995) and South Ossetia (1990 and excluding 
2006). This controls for the repetition of the secessionist movement in the dataset and a 
possible path-dependency between the first and second independence referendum where 
the first referendum might have facilitated the holding of a second one and its outcome 
(witnessed Yes percentage votes in favour of secession). The exclusion of the second 
independence referendums never changes the results substantially. I also control for three 
important outliers by running every model including, and excluding, them from the 
sample to see if their presence substantially alters the results.  
First, the unilateral referendum in Montenegro in 1992 which, once colonial cases are 
excluded, is the only independence referendum lead by a pro-unionist regional 
government. It was still retained as an independence referendum due to the context within 
                                                          
46 This problem is particularly acute when USSR/SFRY cases are included in the model (c.f. next 
chapter).  
47 Exact logistic regression does not work with non-discrete covariates as it necessitates too much 




which it was held. Whilst the referendum was originally called by the government in 
Belgrade to try to secure the union, only pro-Yugoslavia Montenegro held a plebiscite at 
the end. The Montenegrin secessionists at the time rejected the referendum as they did not 
trust the government to run a fair process. Following the ruling of the Badinter 
Commission covered in the next chapter, Montenegro clearly had a right to secede and 
the international community was ready to side with the independentists had they 
participated in the process and won a majority of the vote (c.f. Appendix C).  
The referendum held in Catalonia in 2014 is also unclear due to its “consultative” nature. 
The Catalan government repeatedly declared its wish to secede and even passed a 
‘Declaration of Sovereignty’ in 2013 stating that the people of Catalonia had a right to 
independence and to decide on it (Morató 2016). The Catalan government initially 
announced an independence referendum to decide on its status but amended this stance 
following the Spanish Government opposition (Jones 2017). After the Constitutional 
Court of Spain blocked the Catalan government’s attempt to hold an official referendum, 
it was postponed and rebranded as a ‘process of citizen participation’(Kassam 2014). 
Given its overly “grey” nature it is therefore also included and then removed from the 
models as a sensitivity check. I discuss the case of Catalonia in the concluding chapter. 
While other independence referendums were officially labelled “consultative” or not 
“binding”, such as the one held in Lithuania or Scotland, they clearly were held to assert 
the will of the people as politically binding and determinant.  
The Nagas referendum of May 1951 also stands apart as a ‘signature referendum’ held in 
the hills by the Nagas National Council which resembles more a petition (Chasie and 
Hazarika 2009, 4).48 The lack of access by secessionist actors to institutions to hold a vote 
could explain this choice, along with the reality of the terrain making the organisation of 
a unilateral plebiscite challenging. This case is controlled for when not already excluded 
from the sample due to a lack of data (e.g. no turnout figure).  
III.1.c. Limitations  
 
The three examples of outliers identified above prior to any test being run show the 
difficulty, and room for interpretation, in the process of identifying independence 
referendums, and classifying them as agreed or unilateral processes. Being open about 
cases that may be excluded or included, offers the possibility of introducing or removing 
them from the analysis if an external observer may disagree with this classification. I 
believe my classification is more restrictive than previous scholars who employ a wider 
                                                          
48 This case is also considered an independence referendum by Mendez and Germann (2016).  
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definition of independence referendums, therefore possibly excluding relevant cases – and 
restraining reliability – but ensures stronger content and external validity. Similarly, cases 
such as Crimea can be viewed from different perspectives – including its annexing by 
Russia. By checking for a possible “irredentist effect” I ensured that such cases did not 
substantially affect the results.  
The difficulty of identifying consent - and therefore an agreed independence referendum 
- lies first with the ability of the host-state to oppose the referendums; e.g. the case of 
Iceland in 1944, or in the case of the USSR discussed in chapter IV which was an almost 
non-existing entity by the time the last independence referendums were held. Secondly, 
cases where the opposition within the region and host-state clearly engage with the 
process and campaign for a No vote, yet do not explicitly admit that a right to secede is 
present can also be problematic as “consent” remains limited (as in Quebec, c.f. chapter 
V). To operationalise the agreed category, priority was given to the actions undertaken by 
the host-states in legitimising the referendum process by either participating in negation 
over its conduct and/or actively taking part in the referendum campaign (no boycott). It, 
therefore, engaged with the pro-independence arguments and tried to convince the 
electorate to vote in favour of the continuation of the union, acknowledging secession as 
a possibility.  
A small sample size is common when studying phenomenon at the international level 
(King and Zeng 2001b, 693).49 While statistical tests can be performed on the average 
sample size of 120 to 90, it becomes a challenging endeavour when it comes to data 
availability for regional economic measures and multicollinearity. First, the time span 
considered (1905-2014) means that some data, especially at the regional-level or group-
level has never been collected. Secondly, a lack of governmental transparency and 
missing or uncertain indicators for some key variables are a recurrent problem throughout 
this thesis when studying secessionist movements outside Western democratic countries. 
Often, the missing data create a clear bias in the sample with cases prior to 1980 and those 
in sub-Saharan and south-east Asian host-states being under-represented. By excluding 
certain variables which lead to a sample size below a 100 and running separate models 
with the problematic variables I ensure that they do not affect the overall conclusion of 
the study while also checking that the bias created is not the explanation for any possible 
effect generated by this variable (see next chapter).  
                                                          
49 Using longitudinal data would have enabled consideration of long-term and dynamic effects of 
independence referendums on secession, however given data availability for the type of variable 
considered this was not feasible. 
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What is more, accurate measurements and conceptual validity of the dataset had to be 
assessed and traded with the need to gather data for all, or most, of the cases. Indeed, the 
same data source for any given variable should be used whenever possible as it ensures 
consistency and reliability. The dataset and measure will never be perfect, but for the 
purpose of this study, the priority was to ensure that the measures used are accurate 
enough to account for variances and differences between contexts so as to measure if and 
when variables matter (Hancké 2009). Furthermore, the electorate voting in the 
independence referendums does not necessarily match the population in the region or 
“group” tested. There should, however, be a strong overlap. When no clear administrative 
boundaries of the potential new-state were present, as for the Kurds in Turkey, the 
administrative regions claimed by the secessionists were added and averaged to give an 
indication of how the proposed independent state and its current inhabitants stand on 
societal, political and economic variables compared to the host-state. 
Another limitation is inherent in the quantitative method itself. Statistics unravel 
correlations between variables, not causation. They tell us there is indeed some kind of 
relationship between two variables but they do not say much about the nature of this 
relationship. Indeed, secessionism and referendums are complex phenomena and not all 
of their empirical manifestations are measurable, leaving room for error or incomplete 
causal hypotheses. The good news is that most of the limitations uncovered here can be 
alleviated by the second methodological approach. Before turning to the qualitative case-
studies, I first present the operationalisation of the key variables discussed in chapter I 




Due to data availability, a time-series and nested analysis, which would provide a more 
accurate representation of what is being studied, had to be excluded. To test our 
hypotheses, the independent variables (e.g. GDP per capita, the level of democracy, 
regional population) are measured for the year of the referendum, or the closest available 
date. If no referendum was held but secession or partition took place, the year it occurred 
serves as a reference point. For regions where no referendum was held and no secession 
occurred, the variables were measured for the year 2008 as it offered the most consistent 
amount of data over the sample, in line with Coggins’ dataset ending in 2008, and thanks 
to most datasets used to abstract political and economic including this year.  
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When no data were available for the year of interest, the latest measure, plus or minus 
four years was used, ensuring first that no major events would substantially change the 
coding, such as an economic crisis, major political events, constitutional reforms, or 
displacement of populations occurring. While not ideal, the expansion to four years was 
needed to be able to cover cases prior to 1980s as there is limited data availability. In some 
instances, such as for Norway, manual coding for dummy variables was undertaken based 
on a more in-depth study of the case and respecting the existing operationalisation of the 
variables employed. Some measures were also selected or transformed to allow for 
comparison over time and space. Appendix A shows a list of all cases and Appendix B 
reviews the operationalisation and coding of all the variables in the dataset. 
Cases 
 
The dataset is constructed to reflect the relationship (“name”) between a region hosting a 
secessionist movement (“regioactor”), defined as a nationalist group wishing to separate 
from its current state (“stateactor”). If the group has irredentist tendencies, meaning that 
it may wish to join another pre-existing state, but such state did not make an equal and 
opposite claim on the secessionist region, I record it with a dummy variable (“Irrend”) to 
control for a possible effect. Some states have more than one secessionist movement (e.g. 
Burma-Shans, Burma-Karens), and some groups are present in more than one country 
(e.g. Iraq-Kurds, Turkey-Kurds). Both are coded as separate instances of secession. I also 
recorded colonial cases (“colony”) to distinguish between secession and decolonization. 
Although the two concepts are related in many aspects and answer the definition of 
secession above, they differ in two important ways. First, colonialism was characterised 
by the devolution of authority from an imperial government to a territory but the latter is 
not directly integrated into the polity.  It is a geographically separated territory from the 
central authority by sea (further than 100 miles of its shoreline) or with no continuous 
borders. Because of the special political and geographical relationship, we cannot really 
speak of “home” or “host” state since colonies were never fully integrated within the 
existing sovereign entity. Secondly, because of this history, the process of decolonization 
itself can be differentiated from other forms of secessionism in that it is not always clear 
which actors can be considered to have demanded self-rule.  
It should also be pointed out that defining “independence” is not always an easy task. 
Some questions’ wording and campaigns rely on the idea that independence does not 
mean total separation and a form of “union” or “sovereignty-association” as portrayed in 
Quebec, is still possible. I consider such cases to be about independent –sovereign- 
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statehood. The aim of the secessionist is still to be recognized internationally as an 
independent country, and the union proposed, even if it entails a reduction in 
“sovereignty”, does not negate this; in the same way that the European Union does not 
negate the existence of France or Poland, or as “Brexit” in the UK has shown, bound its 
constituent entities. Such supra-national arrangement does blur the lines and seem(ed) to 
be decreasing the attractiveness of independent statehood, especially for already 




The dichotomous coding of whether a referendum was held or not (“Refheld”=1 or 0) was 
made possible using a strict definition of the type of referendum on secession dealt with.  
Three datasets were consulted to identify independence referendums. The International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) has a database of “direct-
democracy”, providing information on procedures, turnout, and outcomes. The SUDD 
Institute database and search engine for direct democracy include all referendums in 
independent states and autonomous regions since 1791. Finally, the Direct Democracy 
Database (C2D) developed by the Centre for Democratic Studies in Switzerland records 
popular votes held at the national, subnational and local level worldwide and offers a 
comprehensive list of independence referendums. 
The referendum question might not be the best way to determine the nature of the 
referendum as it sometimes deviates from the term “independence” although it is 
ultimately what is at stake. For instance, in East Timor, the question put forward to its 
inhabitants was on whether they accepted to have more autonomy within Indonesia. By 
refusing to endorse this proposal, East Timorese gained independence (Martin 2001). A 
historical overview was conducted to unveil the developments preceding the referendums 
to ensure they fit the definition.  
Unlike Mendez and Germann (2016), referendums to adopt a new constitution asserting 
a political and territorial entity’s independence, when secession has already been granted 
or asserted via a prior independence referendum (e.g. South Ossetia), are not recorded as 
independence referendums. Referendums on the status of Islands in the Americas, such 
as the five Puerto Rican status referendums are also not included for comparative purposes 
as achieving independence was not the primary intent of those calling the referendum and 
was offered as one option among others. Similarly, independence in small islands such as 
in the Caribbean Netherlands held in 2004 and 2005 in Bonaire, Saba and Saint Marteen 
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were also excluded from the analysis due to data availability and comparability.50 
Previous studies have shown a distinct trend among such cases of rejecting independence 
when offered via an independence referendum (Hepburn and Baldacchino 2016).51 
An interpretative approach focusing particularly on secessionist actors and the central 
government’s actions revealed when the referendum process was agreed by both the 
secessionist movement representatives and the host-state and therefore coded 1 on the 
“Refagreed” variable. The consultation of additional historical research also enabled the 
identification of “unilateral referendums” (“Refheld”=1 but “Refagreed”=0), whereby a 
referendum on independence took place but does not answer the criteria of interest. If the 
dominant organisation representing the group whose status is at stake in the independence 
referendum, boycotted the referendum then the latter is coded as a “unilateral 
referendum”. The concerned parties are deemed to have rejected the legitimacy of the 
referendum. 
In the same way that it is important to account for all possible types of secessionist 
movements and contexts in order to appreciate when an independence referendum can 
make a difference, consideration for different types of independence referendums permits 
a more extensive and rigorous analysis via comparison.  The thesis focuses on consensual 
referendums over all types of independence referendums therefore limiting the number of 
possible variables affecting the secessionist outcome and generating a constant (Lijphart 
1971). Indeed, as the definition of the type of secession and referendum is stretched the 
universe of cases and contexts becomes more dissimilar and less comparable (King, 
Keohane, and Verba 1994).  
In addition, the percentages of “Yes” votes (“Yes%”) and the turnout (“Turnout”) 
percentages based on registered voters are recorded for both legitimate and illegitimate 
referendums.52 The C2D and SUDD databases were used to obtain such figures in a 
majority of cases along with Nohlen and Stöver’s (2010) data handbook on elections in 
Europe for former units of the Soviet-Union. In some cases, UN or official figures were 
used. Based on the total registered electors I also calculated the actual Yes votes out of 
the total eligible electorate (“Yeselect”) as a mean to control for turnout when analysing 
contextual factors linked to support for independence.  
                                                          
50 Laponce (2010) also includes in the list of independence referendum French territories such as 
Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, not included in Germann and Mendez (2016).   
51 The case of New-Caledonia is included however and it is somewhat of an outlier in the current 
sample, but is subsequently dropped when excluding colonial territories.  
52 Turnout for Catalonia was calculated from reported averages and estimations in the press. No 
figure could be retrieved for Nagas. 
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The dataset also accounts for the presence of quorums. If the referendum included specific 
rules regarding turnout or approval rate, the variable quorum would take on the value of 
1 if it had one or both requirements, and 0 if a simple majority in favour of secession with 
no other specific rules were found. This means that in certain cases we have a majority 
for the Yes (50 per cent plus one), yet no secession. “Qtype” records whether the quorum 
was about (1) turnout, or (2) endorsement, “Qtresh” records the percentage of the 
electorate required.  
Since I also wish to study the effect of the referendum design, I also took into account the 
length of the campaign (“lengthcamp”). This variable proved difficult to operationalise 
given that the actual official referendum campaign is rarely the start of the mobilisation 
process by either side of the debate. Rather than the official referendum campaign dates, 
I used the date when the referendum was “officialised” until voting day, that is when the 
secessionist leaders passed the necessary legislations to kick start the referendum process. 
In the case of a unilateral referendum where this might not be feasible, the date when the 
holding of the referendum was clearly set out publically by a formal declaration of intent 
is used. This measure I believe offers a more valid representation of how much time the 
campaigners had to really work towards mobilising the population; although the Yes side 
is likely to already have engaged in mobilising the population.  
In addition, I also record when a No to independence campaign was present on the ground 
(“Nocamp”). This variable by definition is closely correlated with an agreed process since 
by definition in a unilateral referendum one of the two parties, usually, the side favouring 
the status-quo is absent. Yet not all agreed independence referendums had a clear No side 
mobilised and campaigning (e.g. Norway in 1905), so it is worth considering. This 
measure is not the most reliable however as it is based on readings of existing studies and 
reports of the referendum process. It is very subjective and there is a challenge in 
classifying official, registered No campaigns, and unofficial ad-hoc effort to mobilise in 
favour of the union.  
After reading available accounts of the referendums I decided to code this according to 
whether a No side campaign was officially registered to campaign during the referendum 
process and campaign period. When no such information was made available, as for 
Mongolia in 1944, it had to be a judgement call based on existing knowledge. Since the 
referendum there was conducted while the “region” was de-facto independent from China 
but under the Soviet Union supervision, it is unlikely that a No to independence 
(remaining under the official Chinese sovereign state) was present to campaign in favour 
of the union.  
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To test one of the core arguments made in the thesis, namely that consent is more 
important than legality when it comes to independence referendums and secession, I 
reviewed the constitutions of all the cases having held independence referendums and 
coded 1 the cases which had an explicit right to secede, and 0 when the latter is forbidden 
or there was no mention of it “Legal”. This coding differs from Sorens (2012, 7) “semi-
legal” secession which focused on the situation where the host-state government has 
officially stated that it will not militarily repress a peaceful secessionist movement. It was 
not possible to create a similar variable to consider whether the referendum itself could 
be held legally at the regional level prior to the referendum being called due to insufficient 
information in some cases. This aspect is considered however in the qualitative analysis 
of Quebec and Montenegro.  
Outcome 
 
The main outcome of interest is whether secession occurred (dummy “secession”), 
defined as the creation of a new independent sovereign state recognised by the 
international community as a peer. A region is coded as having successfully seceded from 
its host-state when all Great Powers at the time welcomed the new entity as a state by 
making an official statement through their foreign ministries and starting diplomatic 
relations with the country (C.f. Coggins 2006, 91).  
Finally, I also record whether a secessionist movement has ended (dummy “Endsec”). 
That is, when one of the followings occurs: (a) the host-state-region relationship 
disappears because the former no longer exists (e.g. colonial power or Soviet Union)53; 
(b) secessionist actors renounce the goal of independence or cease activity (e.g. because 
of military defeat) or agree to a settlement short of full independence implying it 
renounces its secessionist goal (the year of the agreement is the end date); And finally, (c) 
the host-state formally agrees to grant secession or a plebiscite to determine independence 
which leads to statehood. Coggins codes the year of independence as the year Great 
Powers recognised the state. I follow this same coding, except if an independence 
referendum took place where the year of its holding takes precedence over independence 
(e.g. East Timor 1999 referendum vs. full recognition achieved in 2002 after a UN-
supervised transition period). If the popular vote rejects independence, no end date is 
assigned unless one of the events described above occurs.  
                                                          
53 Successor states such as Russia (USSR) are not coded as having seceded but enter the dataset 
as a new host-state. 
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The year of independence mostly reflects the new country’s entry into the COW dataset 
which uses the League of Nations or United Nations membership as an indicator of 
statehood (Correlates of War Project 2016). While a useful proxy, it may miss important 
cases in this study, as the year of the referendum and recognition of independence by the 
host-state and Great Power may not coincide with the year of accession to such 
organisations. Whether the referendum leads to secession is what matters, regardless of 
whether it took a few months or a year to fully become independent, as long as it was a 
result of the plebiscite. Chapter IV discusses the difficulty in assessing whether the 
referendum had something to do with the secessionist outcome in the case of the USSR 
and Yugoslavia.  
Societal variables 
 
To measure how the region’s inhabitants’ identity differs from the host-state’s population, 
I use the “distinct” variable employed by Coggins (2011, 455) indicating the extent of 
linguistic or religious differences between the group and the host-state. If the two levels 
share a language family the case is coded 0, if different, then 1.54 For religion, the state’s 
majority religion is compared to the secessionists’.55 If they share the same religion then 
the indicator is coded 0, and 1 if the majority of people in both units have a different 
religion. If given the value of 2, it means the region differs from the rest of the country 
along those two dimensions. Although ethnic identities may change over time, there is 
usually sufficient group cohesion for ethnic groups to be considered stable identity 
categories (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, 23). 
This measure is not without drawbacks. First, it fails to capture how homogenous or 
heterogeneous the regional population actually is. A good example is Montenegro 
analysed further in the thesis. Only about 40 percent of the population identified as 
“Montenegrin” at the eve of the independence referendum in 2006. Yet, its inhabitants are 
all understood to be “Montenegrins” as a distinct group – if only because of their residence 
or country of birth – from Serbs living in Serbia. Accordingly, the variable 
“distinctiveness” is more a measure of the existing distinct trait that can be drawn upon to 
draw the “nation” – rendering mobilisation easier (c.f. previous chapter) - than what it is 
actually perceived to be based on. While Fearon (2003) offers measures of heterogeneity 
                                                          
54 Language families were originally identified by using the Ethnologue database (Gordon 2005). 
If the majority population did not share a common language, the national language or language of 
government was used. The variable was carefully checked and corrected when necessary (e.g. 
Quebec not coded as having a distinct language).  
55 The five major world religions (Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam and Judaism) were 
used, smaller distinction were then recorded between Sunni, Shia and Sufi Islam or Protestant, 
Catholic, Orthodox (Coggins 2011, 455).  
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at the national-level, it was not possible to retrieve a similar indicator that would cover a 
substantive amount of the sample. Secondly, physical markers or other cultural traits (e.g. 
customs) offering alternative distinctive markers are not captured. Thirdly, I was unable 
to construct a valid and reliable measure that would capture possible dual-identities and 
competing constructs of such identities. The qualitative analysis addresses this limitation.  
As a partial alternative, and to capture further the possible relationship between the region 
and the host-state, I create a new variable “lghtunion” recording how many years the 
region in question has been integrated within the larger polity. The best approximation 
was used looking for treaties and decrees inaugurating a union or alteration of territorial 
sovereignty following military victories (e.g. Scotland-RUK 1707, Norway-Sweden 
1814). The length of the union is not reported for cases coded as colonies as it is difficult 
to determine when the region was integrated into the empire and moreover it makes little 
sense in the conceptualization of “union” whereby it becomes a shared polity. However, 
if the newly-independent colony faces an internal secessionist movement, the year of 
independence is accounted as the start of the union. The length of the union is an important 
control as it might reflect the integration of the region and its population within the wider 
state beyond just knowing about the institutional arrangement between the two (e.g. 
power-sharing) which might be a recent occurrence.  
As a societal measure for potential polarisation and secessionist capability, instances of 
violence between the host-state and the secessionist movement or regional population was 
recorded within living memory of the population, operationalised here as 70 years.56 The 
variable “Violence” was coded using the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme the Peace 
Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) (Gleditsch et al. 2002) and the COW intrastate war data 
(Sarkees and Wayman 2010), where 1 denotes violence having occurred and 0 the lack of 
violent confrontations. PRIO dataset only starts in 1946, while the COW dataset goes back 
to 1816.  Events such as the October crisis in Quebec (c.f. Ross 1995) was not coded as 
violence as the measures start with a minimum of 25 related deaths per year.57   
Finally, I also record the number of secessionist movements faced by the host-state in the 
year of interest (“multisec”). If the secessionist movement recorded was the only 
separatist movement within its territory at the time, the variable is coded 0; if one or more 
was taking place at the same time as the case observed it is coded 1. It should be noted 
                                                          
56 This arbitrary measure was selected to reflect the mean world-wide life expectancy at birth in 
2008 (c.f. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN) to reflect the presence of 
violence between the host-state and the region within living-memory.  




that the intensity and strength of the secessionist movement varies considerably within 
the same host-state and across time within the same region. This possibly weakens the 
validity of the secessionist movements’ case-selection depending on how active or 
relevant the movement is within regional or state-level politics for the year recorded. Yet, 
it strengthens the reliability of the dataset as it samples a wide range of secessionist 
movements, not only in contexts but also in their intensity and means employed to further 
their separatist goals.  
Political variables 
 
A crucial contextual variable in the hypotheses is the regime type of the host-state 
(“DemLev”). The level of democracy is measured using the Polity IV data set (Marshall 
and Jaggers 2002). The combined revised polity score, ranging from +10 (strongly 
democratic) to –10 (strongly autocratic), records the level of democracy of the host-state. 
Some countries of interests such as Somaliland and Bosnia Herzegovina are coded as 
“countries of interregnum”, “anarchy” or “ongoing transition”, in which case the previous 
available yearly measure is used.  
I chose this indicator of democracy over others for three reasons. First, it covers most of 
the cases and dates needed. Indeed, the Polity IV study measures long-established 
members of the international system since 1800 until 2014 (as opposed to Freedom House 
starting in 1972). For new independent states, the year of independence or the first 
measure available after it was used as a starting point. Secondly, in terms of validity, 
Polity IV performs well thanks to its focus on elections which can be observed and 
verified more readily than other measures such as rights, especially given the timespan 
considered. Thirdly, the focus on the quality of institutions and elections, concerns that 
can apply to referendums as well, are important to control for when considering the effect 
of plebiscites (as DV and IV) and other political variables. Ethnic-federalism and power-
sharing, for example, can be officially in place, yet they do not function in practice due to 
the lack of competitive elections precluding the region’s distinct population to exercise 
internal self-determination.  
The drawback of this measure of democracy is that it fails to account for the argument 
made in the literature about the importance of the respect of human rights which would 
allow for individual or collective internal self-determination, not an overly acute problem 
given the high correlation between the democratic score in Polity IV and other measures 
of civil and political liberties such as Freedom house (Högström 2013, 216). Finally, a 
limitation includes the restriction to states having achieved independence with a 
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population greater than 500,000, excluding cases such as St Kitts and Nevis which 
required the search for an estimation by experts (Gunson, Chamberlain, and Thompson 
2015, 245).  
From the same dataset, I also consider the stability of the host-state regime 
(“Regimestab”). Regime durability refers to the number of years since the most recent 
regime change, that is a change of three points in the Polity score described above within 
three years or less. If a host-state scores 0 or close to it this means it has just witnessed a 
transition in regime in the year of observation.  
A crucial variable, heavily debated in the secessionist literature explored in the previous 
chapter, is whether the region at risk of seceding is an ethnic-federal unit. Based on 
Roeder’s (2007) original conceptualisation58 the dummy variable “ethnicfed” records 
when the representatives of the distinct “ethnic group” inhabiting the region have the 
possibility to hold institutional control over it (such as their own legislative and executive 
powers)  (Roeder 2009, 204).  
Power-sharing systems are also considered. Based on the Ethnic Power Relation dataset 
(EPR3) (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013)59, 
the dummy variable “PowerS” records cases where the regional distinct inhabitants have 
representatives in a formal or informal power-sharing arrangement. This is 
operationalised by the EPR scholarly team as any arrangements where leading 
representatives of distinct ethnic groups divide executive powers and can have an 
influence in political decision making at the national level. While using this measure 
ensures more reliability than would be achieved if I were to manually code a measure of 
power-sharing, the combination of both formal and informal power-sharing can be 
problematic as the latter is not a secured form of representation compared to a formal – 
constitutional – arrangement, and may in itself lead to grievances.  
Finally, the dummy variable “regrep”, also taken from EPR, takes into account whether 
the regional distinct population representatives dominate the local executive. This is an 
important factor to consider as many of the institutional theories on whether ethnic-
federalism increases or decreases the likelihood of secession is dependent on whether 
                                                          
58 Unlike Roeder, colonies are not considered ethnic-federations however due to conceptual 
validity (see point above on compatibility between colonial cases and other types of secessionist 
movements).  
59 While not ideal in terms of conceptual validity, the use of EPR considerably strengthens the 
reliability of the measurements in the dataset than any manual coding would allow with 734 
“politically relevant” ethnic groups considered from 1946 to 2014. Furthermore, EPR creators offer 
a clear operationalisation which enabled the careful coding of cases prior to 1946.  
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possible secessionist actors do indeed hold control over the region. Unfortunately, it was 
not possible to break this further according to whether the representatives in power were 
indeed secessionists. Not only it is very difficult to find existing databases on secessionist 
political parties outside of Western-democracies (Sorens 2005; Hale 2008), coding such 
parties can be a challenge. For instance, in the former Soviet Union the same parties and 
political elites that originally endorsed the union held independence referendums when it 
became clear that the latter would not survive (e.g. Turkmenistan). Finally, not all 
secessionist groups have the ability to mobilise through formal political channels and can 
be forbidden (e.g. India (Sorens 2012, p42)).  
Another variable that would have been extremely interesting yet faces the same challenges 
described above is the share of the electorate that voted for such parties. Scholars usually 
measure ethnic party support, and therefore their relative strength in the region, as the 
share of votes it receives in the constituencies which it contests (e.g. Sorens 2005; Winter 
and Tursan 2003; Gordin 2001). Yet, the share of votes or seats can be biased by the 
electoral system and ethnic geographical distribution which does not correctly reflect 
actual popular support. Survey data on the electoral behaviour of ethnic groups is scarce 
(Strijbis and Kotnarowski 2013, 2), and presented a major challenge in determining the 
effect of the referendum on support for independence.  
Economic variables 
 
Economic factors have been identified in the literature as important explanatory variables 
accounting for the presence and strength of secessionist movements. This is unfortunately 
where the dataset is most lacking as finding reliable data for the cases and timespan 
considered has been particularly challenging, especially at the regional level.  
National GDP per capita (“NatGDPcap”), is measured using the Maddison Project GDP 
per Capita estimates in Geary-Khamis dollars60 allowing for international and temporal 
comparability of the estimates (Bolt and van Zanden 2014). This dataset has been 
identified as the most reliable and valid for the present study as, in addition to the measure 
being comparable across time and space, it goes far enough to be able to have an estimate 
of the national GDP per capita for all cases of interests. Because the analysis is not 
“nested”, but individual cases are constructed a “host-state-region”, some host-states are 
repeated. This poses a problem of multicollinearity with the same GDP figure being 
                                                          
60 Also known as the International Dollar. It is a hypothetical currency which represent the same 
purchasing power parity that the U.S. dollar had in the United States at a given point in time; in 
this dataset it is set at 1990. 
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repeated if secession, a referendum or the end of a secessionist movement occurred in the 
same year, or very closely (e.g. USSR and SFRY). This problem is address by running 
multicollinearity checks and removing such cases from the analysis.  
The same dataset provided figures for the national population (“Natpop”) used to estimate 
the relative size of the region at risk of seceding population compared to the total host-
state population (“RegPopNat”). The figure for the regional population (“Regpop”) had 
to be retrieved from a variety of sources, including the OECD, World Bank, national 
statistics or email queries to the national statistics bureau. When the territorial unit at risk 
of seceding did not correspond to existing administrative boundaries, the units that most 
closely matched the territory claimed by the secessionist movement were taken into 
account and averaged.  
A similar process had to be undertaken for an estimate of the GDP per capita of the region 
of interest. It was not possible to compile a similar comparable measure across time and 
cases. Accordingly, I prioritised finding a figure for the year of interest for the region and 
then finding a matching comparable figure at the national level to enable me to construct 
a measure of relative wealth (“RegGDPnat”) capturing how much poorer or richer the 
region is relative to the host-state. This variable suffers from a large number of missing 
cases and creates a clear bias with cases prior to the 80s and recent cases in some African 
and South East Asian states representing most of the omitted secessionist movements. 
Accordingly, this variable is only added in a separate model to retrieve a larger-n and 
avoid this bias.  
 
III.3. Qualitative Analysis  
 
Although the mixing of both quantitative and qualitative methods is based on two different 
‘cultures’ (Mahoney and Goertz 2006), the case study method brings them together within 
a positivist approach to achieve a better understanding of independence referendums and 
their consequences. This thesis indeed posits that knowledge can be inferred from 
empirical observations, in this case specific instances of independence referendums. The 
strengths of a qualitative comparative small-N approach are numerous. For a start, it can 
overcome some of the quantitative limitations uncovered above, from the limited ability 
of the quantitative analysis to test possible causal mechanisms or problems in the construct 
validity of the variables employed. Moreover, it goes a step further and enables me to 
focus on the how rather than if: how and when does the referendum make a difference? 
This means highlighting, sometimes complex, causal mechanisms and intervening 
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variables (George and Bennett 2005, 20–22). The qualitative approach also ensures high 
levels of conceptual validity alleviating the quantitative analysis shortcomings. 
Accordingly, it is both an additional and different way to address our research questions 
(Blaikie 2000).  
The in-depth comparative case study using process tracing and discourse analysis (DA) 
enables a better understanding of the role of independence referendums in two different 
secessionist movements and contexts. The use of DA and framing theory allows me to 
connect context, agency and voting behaviours that lie behind both secessionism and 
referendums, and their outcomes. Process-tracing is a method of analysis to evaluate 
causal processes (Collier and Mahoney 1996); although the causal mechanisms examined 
here are not necessarily directly observable, as they comprise social or psychological 
processes (George and Bennett 2005). This approach helps capture the complexity and 
multiplicity of ways an independence referendum may impact secessionism and compare 
it across cases to uncover potential systematic or unsystematic patterns. These two aspects 
of the qualitative studies are detailed below and include a review of the primary and 
secondary sources used for the study, along with the fieldtrips undertaken in Montenegro 
and Quebec and their contribution to the study.  
III.3.a. Comparative case-study and case-selection 
 
The qualitative approach focuses on the contextual setting before, during, and after the 
referendum to uncover the strength of the secessionist movement (institutional and 
popular support) at these different stages. It investigates in depth the mechanisms that 
influence the dependent variables: the reasons behind the presence of an independence 
referendum, the independence referendum effect on the secessionist dynamics in the 
regions it is being held, and the referendum and secessionist outcome. This is made 
possible by uncovering similarities, differences and patterns across independence 
referendums.  
The qualitative case study analysis also contributes by testing further the deductive 
approach adopted in the quantitative analysis and brings a more inductive method which 
still allows for broader generalisations (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). This exercise 
is conducted as a cross-case analysis of the independence referendums in Quebec and 
Montenegro. It also has some elements of within-case analysis as it tries to uncover how 
the secessionist movement stood just before, during, and after the independence 
referendum, as well as studying the latter as a process in itself (Tansey 2007). This more 
intensive analysis and unstructured approach allow me to follow unexpected or 
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unanticipated processes and improve the accuracy of the analysis, increasing the validity 
of the findings in regard to the effects of an independence referendum (Bryman 2006). 
Furthermore, the two case-studies and three independence referendums are 
complementary to the large-N analysis. They help determine whether the correlations 
found in the statistical analyses are spurious (the dependent and independent variable are 
not really associated,) or endogenous (the effect of a particular variable is determined by 
other variables) (Bennett and Elman 2006a, 458). Finally, the case-studies should be 
considered with reference to the large population of which they are part and engage with 
analogous phenomena. Generalisation is possible as long as the contextual factors are 
carefully taken into account. Concrete, context-dependent knowledge is extremely 
valuable given that the independence referendum is unlikely to disappear anytime soon.  
Case selection 
 
The assembling of the dataset on secessionist movements and independence referendums 
exposed the population of interests. This subpopulation of secessionist movements having 
held an independence referendum varies considerably in profile and outcome (measured 
in how many successfully seceded and the percentage of Yes in favour of independence). 
To select the cases that will be studied in more depth out of the 10 independence 
referendums of interest identified I divided them into sub-groups according to their 
contexts and outcome in light of the quantitative findings. These 10 cases were coded as 
agreed processes following a careful review of 50 independence referendums identified 
by previous scholars using secondary literature and historical overviews of the events if 
they met the three criteria described above. They are: Norway (1905), Mongolia (1945), 
Faroe Islands (1946), Quebec (1980 and 1995), Eritrea (1993), Nevis (1998), East-Timor 
(1999), Montenegro (2006), South Sudan (2011) and Scotland (2014).  
 Out of the 10 referendums, six lead to secession and four the status quo. Some were held 
in stable, established democracies and economically developed host-states, others in poor, 
undemocratic, unstable and violent contexts. To represent best this population and draw 
conclusions from it, the case-studies should reflect these differences (Gerring 2008, 646–
47).  
Furthermore, to assess what role the referendum played, information on how support for 
independence stood before and after the plebiscite is essential, along with whether and 
how support for secession evolved throughout the referendum process. Frustratingly, very 
few cases meet this last criterion. Opinion polls or survey data are extremely hard to come 
by, even in more recent cases such as South Sudan in 2011.  
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Chapter II’s review of the referendum literature has demonstrated that referendum 
campaigns, in a generally free and fair process, have a finite ability to change existing 
voting intentions, especially with highly salient issues such as the one of independence. 
This room for manoeuvre by either side of the debate also depends on how many 
undecided voters there are, and how strongly existing preferences are held. For analytical 
and theoretical purposes, I set this at a maximum of -20/+20 percent change in opinion on 
either side of the referendum debate with a standard endorsement threshold of 50+1. This 
means that support for independence needs to stand at around 30 to 70 percent prior to the 
referendum for the referendum design or process - notably campaign efforts by either side 
of the debate - to have the possibility to affect the secessionist outcome one way or 
another. 
A “most similar” or “most different” case selection approach by looking at the statistical 
analysis residuals is impeded by the number of confounding factors around the presence 
of an independence referendum and secessionist outcome: those regions who voted in 
favour of secession were likely to be strongly secessionist from the outset, and vice-versa 
for those who favoured the status quo. Cases with support for secession around 50 percent 
are particularly interesting as they are more likely to have started with a more even 
distribution of preferences on the issue of independence prior to the referendum being 
called than referendums that show over 80 percent support for secession.  
Furthermore, only in this type of context, when the situation is not overly biased towards 
the status quo or independence, does the referendum and its process, from its design to 
the referendum campaign, really stand a chance of influencing the secessionist outcome. 
Analysing cases where no data on support for independence prior to the plebiscite is 
available and support for secession was likely to be very high from the onset, limits the 
ability to consider whether and how the referendum impacted secessionist dynamics. 
The cases which met best the criteria of representability of different context, data 
availability, and the ability to assess whether and how the referendum may have affected 
the witnessed outcome in terms of support and secession and the secessionist outcome 
were identified as Montenegro, Quebec and Scotland.61 Montenegro and Quebec also 
have additional advantages as case-studies for the purpose of this study. Firstly, Quebec 
had two agreed independence referendums, whilst Montenegro had a unilateral 
referendum in 1992. The case of Quebec, in particular, allows me to consider the potential 
path dependency between the 1980 and 1995 independence referendums, and how 
                                                          
61 Quebec and Montenegro independence referendums results were amongst the closest result to 
50 percent plus 1 votes in favour of secession, especially the second Quebec referendum.  
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independence referendums can set precedents and constrain or help either side of the 
debate on secession. 
Secondly, Quebec has the advantage over Scotland that more materials are available to 
review the referendums and reflect upon the events since the PhD started a week prior to 
the Scottish Referendum, in September 2014. This case, among others, is nonetheless 
mentioned throughout the thesis to contrast and debate the findings. Thirdly, Quebec and 
Montenegro offer the most variation on key variables of interest. Indeed, while Quebec is 
part of a stable, wealthy and democratic Canadian federation, Montenegro was part of a 
series of undemocratic or autocratic unions with Serbia, beset with economic difficulties 
much more pronounced than what was ever witnessed in Quebec, and in the much tenser 
context of war in the Balkans. While both Montenegro and Quebec are part of a federation, 
their position within the political regime differs along with the composition of their 
societies, notably in terms of size and distinctiveness from the rest of the union they are 
part of. Furthermore, Montenegro had a clear right of secession and saw considerable 
external-international-supervision in the referendum process, while Quebec had neither. 
Chapter six explores their similarities and differences in more depth.  
The presence of an agreed independence referendum provides the constant variable in the 
comparative case-study analysis. I wish to understand how it came about in both cases, 
and what its consequences were on their respective secessionist dynamics. Accordingly, 
this comparative case study design does not religiously follow the “Most similar” or 
“Most different” case selection process (c.f. Rihoux and Ragin 2009) since the agreed 
independence referendum is both the core DV and IV of interest. Ideally, a third case 
study representing a more unstable, violent context within which an agreed independence 
referendum can take place such as South Sudan or Eritrea would have also been 
considered to truly reflect the range of contextual settings (variation on the IVs). Due to 
data availability and the challenges of time and resources during a PhD, such cases could 
not be considered in more depth in the thesis.  




In addition to gathering the primary and secondary sources covered below, the trips to 
Montenegro in June-July 2016 and Quebec in April -May 2017 were essential to get a 
deeper understanding of the two case studies, gain a more critical perspective and refine 
the analysis. No amount of research and reading can replace the knowledge and subtle 
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understandings gained by actually experiencing the society and political environment one 
wishes to study. This was also important given my own experience of the Scottish 
Independence referendum process which can lead to a biased view or certain expectations. 
Fieldwork enhanced the reflexivity needed as a researcher, bringing more validity to the 
research (Creswell 2013, 186). Informal discussions with political actors and academics 
in Montenegro and Quebec brought precision to the study of independence referendums 
as a political and legal phenomenon. Particular attention was paid to the authors’ and 
discussants’ background given the polarised and sensitive nature of independence 
referendums to identify potential bias in their coverage or discussion. 
One of the major challenges however was to ensure that both sides of the independence 
question were covered. The expression that “history is written by the winners” was at risk 
of becoming reality during my fieldwork. While the dominant Montenegrin Party and 
winner of the 2006 independence referendum, the Democratic Party of Socialists of 
Montenegro (DPS), welcomed me into their office and provided an English-speaking 
members of staff for a day to help me retrieve the documentation sought I was unable to 
get a formal meeting with their main opposition, and leader of the No campaign in 2006, 
the Socialist People's Party of Montenegro (SNP), now succeeded by the New Serb 
Democracy (NSD). My emails remained unanswered and through local contacts, I was 
only able to get a brief, informal meeting with a member of parliament and a discussion 
with a pro-Serb journalist.62  
It was never my intention to rely on interviews for this research as the main data source. 
Firstly, the independence referendums took place in Montenegro 10 years ago, and 36 
years for Quebec, meaning that the recollection of the events might not be accurate or be 
biased by the events that both cases experienced in the post-referendums period. 
Secondly, to be valuable the interviews would have needed to include people that were 
involved at the core of the referendum process (participated in the negotiations or closely 
oversaw the referendum process) bringing an issue of accessibility, especially in 
Montenegro where key political personalities are still in office. Dr Jelana Dzankic, despite 
being originally from Montenegro, struggled to get interviews with the relevant actors. 
Other scholars familiar with the country also advised against it given what it would a) 
bring to the thesis, b) the cost and time constraint, and c) the likelihood of getting 
interviews or valuable information from them in the first place as a female foreign student.  
                                                          
62 Dr Ivan Vuković, University of Montenegro, and Professor Sinisa Vuković, visiting from the 
John Hopkins University, were very helpful in getting contacts. 
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For Quebec, the 1980 referendum was less covered than the 1995 referendum but poses 
the problem that many of its key actors are no longer alive or active in the public scene. 
One of the unanticipated difficulty was that the 1980 independence referendum tended to 
be overlooked in the discussions, people generally being much more marked by the 1995 
independence referendum as it is closer in time, but was also perceived as much more 
“intense” given the close result. Nonetheless, exchanges with Canadian and Quebec 
scholars were particularly valuable in confirming and refining my hypothesis on the 
Canadian government approach to the independence referendum but also taking into 
account areas of disagreements with this interpretation. Thirdly, given the extensive media 
coverage both Quebec referendums enjoyed, important opinions and perceptions of key 
actors can be found within their public declarations and/or interviews conducted while the 
events were taking place.  
The informal exchanges with scholars and practitioners in Quebec and Montenegro were 
aimed at breaching gaps in understanding, accessing data, and gathering multiple 
perspectives and accounts from experts on what can be very emotionally charged and 
polarising historical events. Background research on the people interacted with was 
needed to know whether the interlocutor was likely to come from a Serbian or Canadian 
perspective, or a Montenegrin or Quebecer perspective, for instance. Despite not 
conducting formal interviews good ethical practices were respected. All the people I spoke 
with were made aware of my research aims and what I sought to gain from our exchange 
and how the information would be used. This makes the approach adopted in this research 
almost an ethnographic study as it seeks to obtain a hostility point of view of the object 
of study, and a ‘native’ perspective (Atkinson 2006; Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, 1–
3).   
While no interviews were conducted, for ethical reasons, I still made clear my intentions 
when contacting discussants by email or meeting them for the first time, detailing in 
writing the aims of my PhD and how the exchanges with them would be valuable to refine 
my analysis, help me locate data and provide a general and more thorough understanding 
of the societies studied. On the off-chance that I decided to quote them, I proposed to send 
them a consent form and information sheets on the research but this was not needed after 
all.  
Primary and secondary sources 
 
Primary sources encompass contemporary documentation surrounding the independence 
referendums of interest: the constitutional and legal documents around its legality and 
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design, official reports from governments and organisations on the referendum process 
and results, and official campaign materials used by the No and Yes sides. I also was able 
to visit the advertising agency which designed the Yes side campaign in Montenegro, 
MAPA63, and take pictures and make copies of a sample of their campaign material. They 
also provided me with a documentary done on the Yes side campaign containing video 
clips aired at the time which had just been finished to celebrate the 10th anniversary of 
independence.64 
Another important archival source was the major newspaper articles at the time of the 
plebiscite. They were used both as a primary source for an analysis of the media coverage, 
and secondary sources for process-tracing and framing analysis purposes (see below). For 
Montenegro, newspapers and journal articles from 1999 to 2006, focusing particularly on 
2001, 2005 and 2006 when the referendum was at the core of the agenda (c.f. chapter IV) 
were consulted to provide an insight into the political situation at the time. Over 300 
articles on Montenegro translated from Serbo-Croatian into French by Le Courrier des 
Balkans65 covering the 1998-2007 period were consulted. While in Podgorica, I also 
visited the national archives to review all the official campaign period news coverage in 
Vijesti and Dan. Thanks to the help of a fellow Montenegrin PhD student and a translator 
I was able to collect and select materials to be fully translated and later analysed notably 
on the referendum campaign strategies employed by the Yes and No side.  
The newspaper covered include: Vijesti, an “independent” daily Montenegrin newspaper 
although known to be under government oversight, but which remains of good journalistic 
quality and uses the Latin alphabet; Pobjeda, the government’s newspaper written in 
Cyrillic script; and The Montenegrin Monitor, a weekly journal particularly commended 
by the pro-independence intellectuals in Montenegro. Created in 1990, it has remained 
independent throughout its existence and remained critical of Djukanović even when the 
DSP adopted a secessionist agenda. To account for the No side of the campaign 
perspective the major Pro-Serbian Montenegrin newspaper Dan was consulted.  
Belgrade’s perspective was also considered with the consultation of two Serbian 
newspapers Vreme and DANAS. They were either retrieved from Le Courrier des Balkans, 
the personal collection of Professor Florian Bieber who kindly sent me some of the 
original resources he had gathered during the referendum or through my visit to the 
                                                          
63 http://www.mapa.co.me  
64 The campaign materials were not properly archives, there are therefore not directly quoted 
when used in chapter VII unless directly quoted, which instead provides a concise account of the 
No and Yes campaign. 
65 http://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/  
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national Montenegrin archives.66 For Quebec, I used the online La Press, made available 
by the Bibliotheque et Archives National du Quebec. It is the most widely read 
Francophone, pro-federal, newspaper in Quebec. In addition, a Francophone, pro-
sovereigntist paper in the 1990s under Lise Bissonnette67, Le Devoir distributed in Quebec 
was also used along with The Globe and Mail, a Canadian-wide Anglophone newspaper. 
I also made extensive use of the secondary historical and societal accounts of Montenegro 
and Quebec in academic books and peer-reviewed journals in English, French, and Italian 
from mostly Montenegrin and Serbian authors, and English and French-Canadian authors. 
Theories of nationalism and state-building, along with the broader literature on the 
secessionist movement, helped narrow the focus on what aspects of history, society and 
politics would be most relevant when considering the plebiscite. This is particularly useful 
as a mechanism of comparison between the case studies.  
Extensive external involvement in the Montenegrin independence referendum process 
leads to numerous and valuable briefs and reports being published from 2000 to 2007 on 
the referendum process, including specifications on the referendum design, the 
negotiation process and controversies. The European Commission, Council of Europe and 
OCDE/ODHIR reports in particular offer very detailed records on the negotiations and 
points of contention in designing the referendum. The Centre for Democracy and Human 
Rights (CEDEM)68 public opinion surveys and polls from 2004 to 2007 were also 
consulted to assess (a) the Montenegrin citizens’ level of support for secession, (b) their 
national identity, and (c) which political and societal matters were most important for the 
population around the independence referendum.  
These opinion polls were cross-validated with the more limited surveys in regard to 
timespan and sample size conducted by the Centre for Monitoring and Research (CEMI 
– Centar za Monitoring i Istraživanje).69 The choice to use the CEDEM data and the 
rejection of alternatives such as opinion polls recorded through time in the press were 
made after careful consideration and discussion with scholars specialising on Montenegro 
and the Balkans to assess which data was more reliable (consistent, comparable coverage) 
and methodologically valid. This is especially relevant in Montenegro since the press is 
known to be biased towards one political side, and information on the methodology or 
                                                          
66 The campaigning materials used by both sides of the campaign have not been properly 
archived and referenced but are still used for the analysis of the overall campaign strategies here.  
67 In 1980, Claude Ryan – a No defender - ran Le Devoir (Wiseman 2013, 89–90). 
68 For more information on the centre see the official website http://www.cedem.me/en/.  
69 Information on the centre is available on their website http://cemi.org.me/en/.  
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sample size employed in the polls reported in the news could not be recovered, even with 
the help of a translator.70  
While in Montenegro, CEDEM staff, which includes academics, were particularly helpful 
in locating sources and reports on the referendum process in addition to providing their 
own materials gathered during the period of interest. For instance, Professor Srdjan 
Darmanović, founder of CEDEM and former Montenegrin ambassador to the US and 
colleagues at CEMI kindly shared their many briefs and reports on the referendum process 
in Serbo-Croatian and English, including the review of the media used in the thesis by 
providing further translation and explanations on the methodologies used. These two 
organisations also closely liaised with the European Union, the United States, OECD and 
Council of Europe during the referendum process helping me get a better understanding 
of their involvement in the referendum.  
Quebec represented much less of a challenge in retrieving primary and secondary sources, 
and in a language, I could readily understand as a native French speaker. While many 
more polls were taken during the referendum process in Quebec, giving a more reliable 
review of the movements within the electorate across the period of interest, the ambiguity 
of what “sovereignty”, and especially “sovereignty association” entails make assessing 
actual support for independence as understood in Montenegro (or Scotland or South 
Sudan for example), difficult (Yale 2008; Yale and Durand 2011). Thanks to the help of 
scholars at McGill University and the University of Montreal I was able to consider a 
wide range of datasets and opinion polls to select the ones that would best allow me to 
compare the changes in public opinion as the independence referendums unfolded in 
Quebec and Montenegro. With the second independence referendum now over 20 years 
ago, declassified information and accounts collected by Canadian scholars and journalists 
also helped me to review and contextualise the time period of interest (e.g. Croisat, 
Petiteville, and Tournon 1992; Cardinal 2005; Hebert and Lapierre 2014). 
III.4.b. Conceptual and analytical tools 
 
The different sources collected were used in two ways. First, they help proved a thick 
description in line with the process-tracing approach, setting the context of the 
phenomenon of interest, and presenting the sequencing of events that lead the referendum 
to be a) called, b) agreed upon, c) conducted, and d) its outcome recognised. Secondly, 
the documents, notably primary sources, were interpreted and critically analysed as 
temporally and historically situated accounts (Prior 2004). Using existing academic in-
                                                          
70 Something not uncommon, regardless of the context (see Bhatti and Pedersen 2016). 
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depth case studies and contemporary official reports of the selected cases, campaign 
manifestos and opinion polls, the qualitative analysis identified relevant internal 
homogeneity or heterogeneity related factors between the two case-studies having held an 
independence referendum. Furthermore, a within-case study approach using those 
materials enabled me to assess how the independence referendums affected secessionist 
dynamics within Montenegro and Quebec and how support for secession evolved from 
the moment the plebiscite was called, to voting day and the creation of a new independent 
state (Montenegro) or the sovereignty question in Quebec today.  
Process-tracing 
 
Within-case and cross-case analysis will be used to determine why the referendum was 
called at the time, how it was agreed by both the host-state and secessionist actors, and 
whether its presence and outcome were critical in increasing or decreasing the likelihood 
of the regions seceding. This is done through process-tracing. Far from a simple “story-
telling” method, process tracing goes beyond a simple ‘detailed narrative or story 
presented in the form of a chronicle that purports to throw light on how an event came 
about’ (George and Bennett 2005, 210). It is a mechanism to evaluate causal processes 
between an independent variable (here the independence referendum) and outcome 
variable (secessionist outcome) (George and Bennett 2005, 206). Given the quantitative 
evidence in chapter IV, a simple linear relationship between the two is too simplistic. The 
very presence of the independent variable of interest is likely to be linked to the dependent 
variable in the first place. Process tracing, unlike statistical analysis, is not only about 
identifying possible causal effects but also the causal mechanisms. 
I aim to identify in the case studies the key events and elements that set the path to (a) the 
agreed independence referendum, and (b) the secessionist outcome witnessed, namely 
whether a new independent state was created or not; accounting for the fact that the two 
are not unrelated or distinct. Indeed, factors linked to (b) may determine the presence of 
(a), while (a) may affect (b). Accordingly, the thesis offers a detailed reconstruction of the 
temporal sequencing of three agreed independence referendums and uncovers the reasons 
behind their presence and outcomes. This approach is particularly useful in disabling the 
shortcomings of the quantitative approach in the preceding chapters and capturing the 
empirical complexity of the phenomenon being studied. 
The review of the sequencing of core independent and dependent variables of interest, 
along with intervening variables also enables me to refine the validity and reliability of 
the operationalisation of the variables used in the quantitative analysis. For instance, it 
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can help answer more clearly what it is about the measured “level of democracy”, 
“distinctiveness” or “legal right to secession” in the quantitative analysis that plays a role 
in the independence referendum process.  
While some hypotheses have been advanced as to why agreed independence referendums 
happen and their implications on secessionist dynamics (theory-testing), this thesis is 
equally theory-building. Accordingly, the following chapters are not aiming to “confirm” 
a theory or hypothesis but rather to help better understand the devices through which an 
agreed independence referendum can increase or decrease the chance of secession at the 
societal, legal, and political level. They are regrouped under the label “secessionist 
dynamics” which are not limited to the strength of the secessionist actors in material or 
electoral terms but how they interact with their environment. 
Although process-tracing is concerned with timing and sequencing of events, their 
interaction and effects are not necessarily linear. Events interact with one another through 
“feedback loops”. “Small” events, even early on, may have a significant impact on the 
outcome while what may seem like “bigger” events may not have as much effect 
compared to preceding events in explaining the referendum result (Pierson 2004, 45, 
2000). Furthermore, process-tracing allows me to consider the key actors involved in the 
referendum process through the careful descriptions of events it requires (Mahoney 2010, 
125–31). The analysis is also multilevel in this regards (Henderson 2007, 12), as the 
international, national, sub-national, group and individual levels are reviewed to grasp a 
better picture of how the independence referendum interacts with those different levels. 
Discourse Analysis and Framing Theory 
 
Discourse Analysis (DA) is both a theory and method which posits that discourse has 
social, political and cultural implications. It is used to analyse linguistics in order to 
facilitate the understanding of a social phenomenon we wish to study (Gee 2014). It is 
said to be critical when it assumes an underlying power and political dimension and 
wishes to bring it to light (Dijk 1993; Fairclough 2013). DA is important to understand 
the polarisation process that takes place in secession and is at the forefront of the 
independence referendum. Indeed, this thesis is not just about secessionist movements but 
referendums as an important political process and mobilisation instrument.   
This political dimension of independence referendums is best considered through 
discourse analysis of texts and speeches and their empirical consequences. I am not just 
interested in what the secessionist actors, the host-state representative of individuals do 
(sequencing of events) but also how they are doing it with words (e.g. constructing groups, 
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allies and enemies) (Wood and Kroger 2000, 5, 9). Most important of all, how they 
construct the understanding of who are the “people”, and how does this, in turn, match 
the electorate that is to decide. We also need to account for the fact that discourse is 
embedded in a context of frameworks of understanding and broader socio-cultural 
structures and processes (Dijk 1997, 15, 21). Accordingly, the analysis of discourse means 
paying ‘attention to the structure of language (“grammar”) and how this structure 
functions to create meaning in specific contexts’ (Gee 2014, 8). 
DA was an important starting point in the decision to rely upon framing theory and assert 
the relevance of theories of ethnic and political mobilisation to understand why and how 
independence referendums come about, and how they are justified. DA is conducted 
through the careful reading of original sources such as legal documents, speeches, 
campaign manifestos to identify keywords, metaphors, lexicons and visuals used. It also 
requires a critical approach71 by questioning what was said and how, what was not covered 
and who is speaking and which groups or actors are represented.   
The present study followed Chong and Druckman’s frame-identification process which 
combines the inductive and process-tracing approach described above. Firstly, an 
inductive identification of initial ‘culturally available frames’ by analysing prior works 
on the subject helped grasp the issue (Chong and Druckman 2007, 106–7). The 
secessionist movements in Quebec and Montenegro did not emerge in a vacuum, nor did 
the idea of referendums. Pre-existing contextual factors shape both the decision-making 
process of actors and their discursive justification for their actions or goals. The framing 
process is also a critical analytical tool to connect the contextual factors explored in the 
quantitative analysis of the decision to hold an independence referendum (if it is within 
the capacity of secessionist actors), the decision of the host-state government to consent 
to it, and voting behaviour in independence referendums. All stages have in common a 
contextual setting, but not all aspects of the context are relevant for each stage, nor do 
they serve the same function as they can be framed in different, and competing, ways. 
Theories of framing and political communication help identify main narratives and the 
construction of specific arguments employed by the Yes and No side to argue for or 
against an independence referendum and to convince voters. Framing theory is a 
complementary method and conceptual framework already discussed in the previous 
                                                          
71 This thesis does not employ a fully-fledged Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) approach which 
typically focuses on social problems, power-relations, inequalities and the performativity of 
discourse in society. 
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chapter as an essential when analysing the referendum campaign in order to understand 




This chapter laid out the methodological structure of the thesis to investigate the role 
played by independence referendums in secessionist dynamics and state creation. The 
advantages and drawbacks of the quantitative and qualitative mixed-method approach 
were considered. The use of both method of analysis, in addition to overcoming their 
inherited limitations, is well suited to address the under-studied societal and political 
process that is independence referendums. First, it reviews the independence referendum 
within its phenomena of interest: secessionism, unlike other studies which focused on it 
as a type of sovereignty referendum or its legal and normative implications. 
Secondly, through the use of logistic regression, I will analyse factors associated with the 
outcomes of interest (independence referendums, and agreed referendums, in particular, 
secession and support for secession); and how in turn an independence referendum, as an 
intervening variable, affects the likelihood of secession and the levels of support for 
independence. Thirdly, the two methods combined allow to explore, describe and explain 
independence referendums, adopting an initial inductive approach to guide the analysis 
yet leaving enough room for a deductive approach to drawing generalizable conclusions 
about independence referendums.  
I have also discussed the diverse type of sources, both quantitative and qualitative, that 
have been used in the analysis allowing for triangulation and a deep understanding of the 
object of study. They serve both to conduct the process tracing of events to understand 
what leads to independence referendums and their outcome, who was involved in the 
process and how. The framing-analysis helps understand how the contextual setting 
allowed for the legitimisation of a referendum, what “agreement” is based on, and how 
the electorate was mobilised to vote in favour or against secession. Closely experiencing 
the societies under study was essential to refine my understanding and reading of the 
primary and secondary materials. 
The object of study remains a complex phenomenon and further study will be needed to 
fully grasp it. This thesis does not wish to be the final word but a first step in tackling 
important questions. Case selection for the qualitative analysis is particularly problematic 
in this study and an external observer might find other sets of cases of independence 
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referendums more suited to enable generalisation. The combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methods nonetheless lessens these shortcomings, since the statistical analysis 
will set key variables and “profiles” creating specific contexts to which the in-depth case 
study analysis findings will most likely apply. Accordingly, the thesis conclusions will 











While previous studies of independence referendums have focused on the practice within 
sovereignty referendums at large, this chapter considers them within their subject matter: 
secessionism. Using a dataset referencing 225 distinct secessionist movements from 1905 
to 2014 it investigates the profile of states and regions which have held an independence 
referendum in an effort to determine when they are likely to occur, and whether the latter 
was a consensual process. Appendix A presents the full list of cases in the dataset and 
whether an independence referendum was recorded and its type. Appendix B shows the 
full list of variables in the dataset and their source. The quantitative analysis allows me to 
test some of the hypotheses elaborated in the previous chapter and what factors contribute 
to increasing or decreasing the likelihood of a region becoming independent and the role 
of an independence referendum as an intervening variable in the process.  
This chapter expands on the existing quantitative studies of both secession and 
referendums in a number of ways. First, it is the first dataset to collect data on 
independence referendums beyond the percentage of endorsement of the independence 
option and turnout, by also considering the contextual setting within which they are held, 
such as how democratic is the country where it takes place or the region’s population 
distinctiveness. Secondly, it offers a new dataset on secessionist movements expanding 
on Coggins’ list and adding to the existing works of Soren (2015), Collier and his 
colleagues (2009), or more ambitious projects such as MAR or EPR from which some of 
the variables have been retrieved. Most quantitative studies on secessionism do not focus 
on secession per-se however, nor solely on actors wishing to create a new independent 
state.72 They often use proxies such as support for secessionist parties or secessionist 
conflicts. Thirdly, this dataset considers the fate of a large sample of secessionist 
movements and the process through which new states emerge. 
                                                          
72 Except for Coggins (2011) whose selection criteria restrict regions and groups analysed to 
those with an independentist agenda, offering a helpful start for case-selection.  
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The first stage of the analysis considers how many cases referenced seceded, and whether 
the independence referendum might have played a part in it. Secondly, where 
independence referendums, and agreed referendums, in particular, are more likely to take 
place is considered. Finally, I turn my attention to support for secession in independence 
referendums to identify in which context the plebiscite may act as a moderator on 
secession.  
IV.1. Secession and Independence Referendums: A 
Quantitative Overview 
 
IV.1.a. State-creation since the 19th century 
 
The dataset is composed of 225 distinct observations of host-state-region separatism.73 
Among them, 107 achieved independence (48%), while 118 did not succeed in creating a 
new independent state. However, among the movements which did not secede, not all are 
still active to this day. Of all secessionist movements in the dataset, less than half (40%, 
n=89) are still ongoing today, meaning that they did not result in secession or the end of 
the secessionist movement without independence. 136 distinct calls for independence 
have ended since 1905. That is the 107 secessionist movements who achieved independent 
statehood, but also 29 more cases which ended without secession occurring.74 This can be 
explained by three main events. 
 In the first case, the dichotomy of interests: “host-state – secessionist movement” sees 
the first actor disappear. This is the case for the Karen independence movement under 
British rule which ended with the withdrawal of the colonial power from Burma.75 
However, a new secessionist movement appeared under “Burma-Karen” as the new “host-
state” was freed from external domination and Karen people and their territory were 
brought under the Burmese central government jurisdiction. This outcome is closely 
linked to the dissolution of the host-state whereby the colonial power or former states such 
as the USSR or Yugoslavia no longer exists. 41 percent of host-states in the dataset met 
this fate. Often a succession of secessions leads to the dissolution of the state, but not 
                                                          
73 The dataset includes 228 cases as French Somaliland (Djibouti), Quebec and South Ossetia 
held two independence referendums. These repetitions are systematically controlled for in all 
tests run by removing the second independence referendum from the sample. Their removal was 
never found to substantially alter the results, accounting for the general robustness of the 
findings.  
74 Secession is defined as the successful attempt by a distinct identity group to withdraw from the 
host-state, and be internationally recognised as a new independent sovereign state.  
75 At the time the Karen people fought for the British Empire against Burma and Japanese troops 




necessarily all secessionist movements resulted in a new independent state and are 
therefore coded as secession having occurred (e.g. Tartars moving from the sovereign 
jurisdiction of the USSR to its successor state Russia). Another possible outcome is the 
disappearance of the secessionist movement. This could be because of a total military 
defeat (e.g. Balkars in USSR in 1943, Hyderabad secessionist attempt in India in 1948)76, 
and/or because the secessionist movement never gathered much support from the 
population or it settled for more autonomy within the existing host-state and officially 
abandoned its secessionist goals.  
Sometimes military victories by the secessionist side would result in a territorial partition 
but not in a formal secession. That is the inhabitants enjoy de-facto statehood whereby 
they govern themselves without any interference from the internationally recognised host-
state, but not de-jure which would also mean that the new state is recognised by the 
international community and accepted as a sovereign actor in the international arena (e.g. 
Transnistria partition from Moldova). Fourteen cases of partition have been recorded in 
the dataset (6.2 percent).  
All but nine of all secessionist movements that were also colonial cases have ended in the 
creation of a new state.77 All secessionist colonial cases in the dataset have now ended 
except for France-New Caledonia.78 While 88 percent of colonial cases achieved 
independence, only 22.7 percent of non-colonial cases did.79 The association between the 
region being a colonial unit, and secession occurring is statistically significant at the 95 
percent confidence level. A logistic regression shows that colonies have a 28 times greater 
likelihood of successfully seceding than regions which do not have a colonial status. This 
review supports HSec.1 that colonial secessionist movements should result in a successful 
secession.  
                                                          
76 More research on these specific cases would be needed to ensure that the military defeat was 
indeed the primary cause behind the secessionist movement ending and the subsequent lack of re-
insurgence. The Tamil secessionist movement, which after 26 years of conflict was official 
defeated in May 2009 and no substantial new secessionist activity has been recorded since (Nieto 
2008; Hashim 2013), yet the movement still exists and has been campaigning for an 
independence referendum (Dibbert 2016).  
77 Exceptions are: France - Alawites (Hatay), France-Casamance, France-New Caledonia, Italy-
Sanusis, UK-Baluch, UK-Karen, UK-Rhodesia (North), UK-Rhodesia (South (whites)), UK- 
Nevis.  
78 Note that this will constitute an outlier along with Comoros and Nevis under the British 
Empire, since I decided to not consider small Islands-metropoles referendums due to 
comparativity and data availability. Since these cases will not be part of the main analysis they 
are retained here.  
79 In the dataset created by Coggins (2006, 108) starting in 1945 , we find very similar 
distributions: 18.5% of non-colonial cases achieved secession, while 75 percent of all anti-
colonial movements eventually gained independence.  
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Among the colonial cases, only seven (8%) had an independence referendum. Note that I 
have excluded some cases which have been classified as independence referendums by 
academics studying sovereignty referendums, notably the 12 to 17 referendums80 on the 
new French constitution which would change the status of some of the colonies to be 
within the Communauté Française. This new arrangement did not exclude independence, 
but a No would mean outright independence.81 Only Guinea decided to opt for “pure and 
simple” outright independence, while Niger approved the new arrangement by 75 percent 
of the 37 percent of registered voters who cast a ballot.82 Two years later, the eleven 
remaining West African members became independent and were admitted to the UN, 
some of whom retained their Communauté membership until it was formally abolished in 
1995. 
Out of eight independence referendums held in colonies referenced in this dataset, only 
half were also followed within the year by a successful secession. These referendums in 
Algeria (1962), Western Samoa (1961), Djibouti (1977) and Comoros (1974)83 were also 
agreed independence referendums with a majority voting in favour of independence. The 
last agreed referendum also took place in the former French Somaliland (Djibouti) in 
1967.  Independence was only approved by 39 percent of the electorate with a turnout of 
95 percent. Ten years later, another independence referendum resulted in an 
overwhelming majority in favour of independence (99.8% Yes, 77 % turnout).  
The last three referendums were unilateral processes and did not result in statehood 
following the plebiscite. The white population of Southern Rhodesia held an 
independence referendum in 1964 which was not recognised by the UK, nor the majority 
in favour of secession acknowledged by the international community (Onslow 2005). 
Nevis held a unilateral plebiscite in 1977 to separate from the UK and its colonial entity 
of St-Kitts and Nevis, it also held a second referendum - agreed this time - in 1987 to 
separate from the now independent St Kitts and Nevis Federation (see below). Finally, the 
                                                          
80 That is the 12 colonies that will eventually gain independence between 1958 and 1960. 
Laponce also includes in the list French territories such as Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon or Algeria.   
81 There are some potential controversies over this understanding of the referendums. President 
de Gaulle wished the referendum to be clearly about an in/out option on secession. Yet, the 
Consultative Constitutional Committee and African leader’s understandings did not match the 
one of the French President who was also concerned at the time about the repercussion these 
referendums would have on Algeria. There are clear indications that for them, endorsing the 
community did not mean renouncing independence. C.f. Skurnik (1967 especially pages 329-
331; for a more in-depth discussion see Borella 1960. Television news shows that it was 
understood independence could be achieved even when endorsing the French Community, see 
ORTF 1958).  
82 Schmidt (2009, 22) also notes the suspiciously high turnout and endorsement in other colonies 
and finds evidence of coercion.  
83 Mayotte remains under French control as a majority rejected independence.  
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independence referendum of New Caledonia in 1987 was boycotted by the secessionists 
and resulted in a majority in favour of remaining with France (Connell 1987, 43; Clark 
1988). An (agreed) independence referendum is due to be held in the island before 
November 2018 (Bonnefous 2016). 
This review further provides support for hypothesis HSec.1, and some support for 
hypotheses HSec.2 and HSec.3 by showing that even in the colonial context, an agreed 
independence referendum where a majority supported independence led to statehood, 
while it did not in a unilateral process. However, the unilateral process includes two cases 
where the secessionist movement only claimed part of the existing colonial territory 
showing the importance of the principle of uti-possedis and that the existing legal colonial 
borders are not to be broken (c.f. chapter I). Finally, these few cases also show the 
potential precedent-setting property of independence referendums with three secessionist 
movements having held, or due to hold, two independence referendums.  
Reviewing the nature of the relationship between what I call “host-state” and “region”, 
colonial and territorial mandates over a territory and its people have a very high success 
rate in obtaining independence. In practice, it is often characterised by a withdrawal of a 
foreign power from a distant territory which was never fully integrated into the state and 
central system of governance, and granting state sovereignty to people that were never 
fully-fledged citizens of the host-state. Presented like this, it is not too surprising to see 
how on both moral and practical grounds, agreeing to grant independence to such regions 
and the international community recognition is a likely outcome. 
The situation is more complex in today’s world where almost all secessionist movements 
take place within the host-state continuous territory and when the population within the 
region constitute an integral part of the state’s citizenry. Accordingly, for reasons of 
comparability and as a means to control for this “colony” effect on the likelihood of 
secession, the quantitative analysis performed below exclude cases coded as colony when 
exploring which variables are associated with the presence of an independence 
referendum and those affecting the likelihood of secession occurring and support for 
independence.84  
IV.1.b. Independence referendums and secession  
 
From 1905 to 2014, 36 independence referendums have been recorded.  This is less than 
previous works on sovereignty referendums which have identified between 45 to over 70 
                                                          
84 There was not sufficient data to add Bougainville to this list which is due to have an agreed 
independence referendum in 2019 (The Economist 2017). 
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independence referendums (colonies included) since the mid-nineteenth century (e.g. 
Laponce 2010; Qvortrup 2014b; Mendez and Germann 2016). However, as we have seen 
in Chapter I and III their definition of independence referendum is sometimes too broad 
for analytical and comparative purposes.  While the dataset used for this study likely has 
some missing cases within the actual population: some secessionist movements are 
missing; it applies a much more rigorous definition of independence referendum, and what 
constitutes an agreed referendum, than previous works enhancing reliability, construct 
validity and external validity (population and ecological generalisability). With 24 percent 
of the 141 secession movements in the dataset (excluding colonies), independence 
referendums are not such a rare event. Among them, 10 (7%) have been identified as 
consensual process, or “agreed” independence referendums.   
Table IV.1 shows the non-colonial secessionist cases outcome. While there is a 
statistically significant difference in the seceding outcome between cases which have held 
an independence referendum and those that did not (56% successful secession vs. 12%), 
and this difference applies to both agreed and unilateral referendums when compared to 
cases that did not hold a plebiscite, there is no difference in secession success rate between 
agreed independence referendum and unilateral referendums.  
Table IV.1: Independence Referendums and State-Creation  
 
 
From this simple comparison we can already see that independence referendums may 
indeed have an impact on secessionism, most importantly of all, the successful creation 
of a new independent sovereign state. While hypothesis HSec.3 that having held an agreed 
referendum leads to an increased chance of having achieved independence is supported, 
this finding disproves hypothesis HSec.2 that secession is not more likely to occur if a 
unilateral referendum was held compared to cases where no referendum was held at all. 
Before considering further this outcome and notably where the “will of the majority” was 
                                                          
85 The percentages are rounded. Figure excludes the second Quebec and South Ossetia 







SECESSION (%) 60 54 12 
NO SECESSION (%) 40 46 88 
N 10 24 107 
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respected, I consider whether the legality of secession can account for this unexpected 
outcome.  
 Legality  
 
Of the 36 referendums held, 17 had a constitutional right to secede. Among them only 
three were agreed referendums, while the other eight referendums were consensual 
processes where the constitution was silent on the right to secede. This supports 
hypothesis HLaw.1 that an agreed independence referendum does not require a 
constitutional right to secession. Furthermore, among unilateral independence 
referendums, 14 were held in a region where the host-state constitution stated a right to 
secession. Only in the case of Catalonia it has been argued that the Spanish constitution 
prohibits secession (Guibernau 2014, 14). This supports hypothesis HLaw.2 that a 
constitution right to secession does not guarantee a consensual independence referendum. 
I further test the argument of legality in secession by considering whether having a legal 
right to secession correlates with successfully seceding from the host-state. 88 percent of 
regions which held an independence referendum where the constitution allowed for the 
possibility of secession have successfully seceded, while only 21 percent did where the 
constitution was silent on the matter or forbade it.86  
Among the 15 cases to have held an independence referendum, had a legal right to 
secession and successfully secede, 12 were part of the former Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia, while South Sudan and Montenegro were also agreed referendums. The only 
other case to have a unilateral referendum and a legal right to secede and achieving 
statehood is Iceland in 1944. I hypothesised earlier that secession should take place when 
a majority of voters support independence in a consensual process, while a unilateral 
process is not expected to lead to secession, regardless of a majority in favour of 
independence or legality. In order to test the hypotheses on the differences between agreed 
referendums and unilateral referendums, I investigate further the correlation uncovered 
here and consider to what extent the independence referendums were a causal factor in 
the secessions witnessed in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.   
I do not wish to engage in the extensive debate on the causal and contributing factors to 
the succession of secessionist attempts and ultimate dissolution of the two federations. I 
                                                          
86 For a more complete picture and decisive conclusion on the impact of a constitutional clause of 
secession on the likelihood of achieving statehood, all host-states constitutions in our sample 
should be reviewed and coded appropriately. I could not undertake this work due to time 
constraints, data availability (some constitutions cannot easily be found), and interpretability 
(reliable translation into French or English).  
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wish to point out instead how the independence referendums are never considered in the 
process and do not seem to be determinant factors in the successful secession of USSR 
and SFRY republics. Analysing the complex historical process that lead to the plebiscites 
in both host-states goes beyond the scope of this chapter and further research would be 
needed to fully appreciate the role of the referendums in these two particular contexts. 
Nonetheless, the value of the comparative lessons that can be drawn from those two cases 
in separatism studied has been questioned (e.g. Hale 2008, 250; Sambanis and Milanovic 
2011), and I will apply this caution here.  
Lithuania was first to hold a successful independence referendum and declare its 
independence, both of which were not recognized by the Soviet federal government. The 
two other Baltic states and eventually other eastern republics followed with their own 
plebiscites and unilateral declarations of independence (UDI). Gorbachev refused to 
recognise the right of Lithuania to secede and the referendum process and outcome. He 
declared on March 31, 1990 in a broadcast that Lithuania’s declaration of independence 
would have ‘grave consequences’ if it failed to be immediately annulled (Eastwood 1993, 
318). This reaction went somewhat contrary to the fact that the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics founding treaty of 1922 included a right of secession for each republic, a right 
then entrenched into the constitution. Furthermore, the annexation of the Baltic states had 
been ruled contrary to international law by the Congress of USSR People’s Deputies in 
1989 (Kreptul 2003, 69–70; Murphy 1999, 557–58).  
The international community only responded to the Baltics UDI in August 1991. The 
European Community took the lead and within 10 days the three Baltic states had been 
widely recognised internationally. None of the major powers and European Community 
Members, however, used the term “recognition”. Instead, all welcomed the “restoration 
of sovereignty” lost in 1940, while the other republics were the result of dissolution and 
not secession (Rich 1993, 38). In his analysis of the process of recognition, Murphy (1999, 
558) does not find evidence that the presence of democratic institutions - or a democratic 
process that is barely, if at all, mentioned - was a significant factor in promoting foreign 
recognition (see also Mullerson 1993, 482; and Cassese 1995, 262–64).87  
                                                          
87 Not all former republics which are now independent states held an independence referendum. 
Among the 25 secessionist movements referenced within the USSR and SFRY, 14 held an 
independence referendum and 12 were followed by secession. Among the 25 secessionist 
movements, 68 percent of the two host-states’ regions hosting a secessionist movement have now 
become a new independent state as opposed to only 13 percent for secessionist movements in 
other contexts. Secessionist regions within the USSR or SFRY are more likely to secede than in 




In the former Yugoslavia, the role of the referendums seems to be retrospectively more 
important, although again not determinant, except maybe for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 
Croatian and Slovenian leaderships held unilateral referendums asserting that their right 
to self-determination vested in both international law and the Yugoslav constitution 
(Oklopcic 2008, 41). While recognising that ‘it is only up to Yugoslav people to decide 
on their future’ (Brioni Accord, July 7, 1991), the European Community decided to get 
involved as the region saw an escalation of violence and called on an arbitration procedure 
to decide on the future of the SFRY and its constituent units. While the Arbitrary 
Commission (known as Badinter) did mention the expressed will of the population in the 
republics to secede, it was never part of the final assessment to decide on whether they 
should be recognised as it was ruled that the republics had a constitutional right to secede, 
not the people (Pomerance 1998, 32).  
Accordingly, despite also having held an independence referendum with a majority 
endorsing separation, Kosovo was not recognised as it was not a constituent republic able 
to claim utis-possedis status (Murphy 1999, 562). For Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Arbitrary Commission stated that appropriate guarantees should be provided by the 
republic for recognition to be considered ‘possibly by means of a referendum of all the 
citizens of the SRBH without distinction, carried out under international supervision’ 
(Türk 1993 Annex 3. Emphasis added). Soon after the ruling, the European Community 
expected an independence referendum to be held in order to recognise independence 
(Caplan 2005, 57). While this referendum was “agreed” by the secessionist actors and the 
EC acting as the major international actor that could grant recognition at the time, it was 
not consented by the entity (claiming to) represent the host-state nor one of the three major 
groups whose sovereign status was to be settled in the referendum. Serbians boycotted the 
referendum process which was followed by an escalation of conflict. 
To conclude, there is still room to consider the possible effect of independence 
referendums in these two contexts and further research could be undertaken, but what is 
clear is that they were not the most important factor in explaining the end of the SFRY 
and USSR. On the other hand, agreed independence referendums as defined in this paper 
are expected to deliver the last word on whether a region successfully secedes or not and 
these two host-states should be controlled for when trying to understand the effect of 
independence referendums on the likelihood of secession. With the exception of republics 
within the Soviet Union and Yugoslav host-state, the only unilateral referendum to be 
followed by independence is Iceland in 1944.  
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Iceland had a legal right to secede from the union it formed with Denmark in the Act of 
Union of 1918. It allowed the existing union to be re-negotiated after 25 years, and even 
put an end to it after three years if negotiations failed, provided that a two-thirds majority 
in the Icelandic assembly (Althing) supported separation and the decision was ratified by 
three-quarters of the voters in a national referendum. The Icelandic government did not 
wait for the three-year negotiations period and, while Denmark was under Nazi 
occupation, passed a new legislation allowing it to declare independence with a simple 
majority of the electorate endorsing the end of the union with Denmark (Hardarson 1974, 
50). 
Meanwhile, the Danish government asserted that Iceland should wait for the end of the 
war to allow for the existing procedure to carry through and refrain from immediate 
severance as it was not in accordance with the law (Karlsson 2000, 320–21). While the 
king of Denmark made a final plea against the referendum being held stating the 
consultation outcome could not be recognised under such circumstances, 99.5 percent of 
Icelandic voters cast a Yes ballot to abolishing the union with Denmark. On 17th of June 
the king conceded to recognise the new state, but in Denmark, the government and the 
population felt betrayed (Hardarson 1974, 53, 110). The referendum process was opposed 
by the exiled Danish government which argued it to be illegal and that it did not engage 
with the referendum process. Yet, secession was still very likely since even if Iceland 
waited for Denmark to be freed from Nazi occupation and followed the existing procedure 
it could have seceded since the host-state did not ultimately oppose secession itself, but 
the timing and means through which it happened.  
IV.1.c. When is the “will of the people” determinant?  
 
When controlling for the referendums held in the former Soviet and Yugoslav federations, 
there is no longer a statistically significant difference in success rate in achieving 
statehood between cases which have held a unilateral independence referendum and 
secessionist movements which did not (n=10, 11 with the repeated South Ossetia 
plebiscite). Having held an agreed independence referendum, however, is still associated 
with greater odds of achieving independent statehood compared to secessionist 
movements which never held a plebiscite or a unilateral referendum. Likewise, having a 
legal right to secede is not correlated with having successfully seceded when excluding 
the USSR and SFRY, regardless of whether the referendum was unilateral or agreed 
confirming hypotheses HSec.2, HSec.3, HLaw.1 and HLaw.2, and ultimately hypothesis 
HSec.4 that a unilateral independence referendum does not result in secession, even if a 
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majority of voters endorse independence, and even when there is a constitutional right to 
secede, with the notable exception of Iceland in 1944.  
Support for independence in the 36 referendums recorded here stands on average at 84.4 
percent (median 96%), with the minimum support in the Montenegrin independence 
referendum from Yugoslavia in 1992 standing at 3.14 percent. This referendum is an 
outlier in the current sample as the only referendum boycotted by the pro-independentist 
side. Accordingly, this referendum will also be accounted for in the following analysis by 
running all models including it, and then excluding it to ensure it does not overly influence 
the results. The maximum officially recorded Yes support for independence stands at a 
100 percent in the 1945 Mongolian People’s Republic independence referendum (Outer 
Mongolia region formally part of China).  
This referendum is not only an exception in its result, but also in how it came about. Outer 
Mongolia was already a de-facto state still claimed by China. Mongolia was granted 
recognition by China following a plebiscite under an agreement reached with the Soviet 
Union in August 1945 which had control of the region since the 1920s (Ballis 1951, 172). 
The Mongolian People’s Republic welcomed the opportunity and, with oversight from 
the soviets, organised a referendum on independence. This official result contrasts with 
Soviet official documents which reported irregularities such as foreign nationals voting, 
but it has not been possible to get a more accurate estimate (Radchenko 1945). 
Among unilateral independence referendums support for secession stands on average at 
90 percent (SD 20%) vs. 70.8 percent (SD 25 %) for agreed independence referendums. 
Since the data are negatively skewed a nonparametric test - Independent Sample Kruskal 
Wallis Test - was conducted and showed the difference between the two types of 
referendums is not statistically significant.88 When breaking down support for 
independence according to whether the region successfully secedes or not it becomes clear 
that the “will of the people” does not necessarily determine statehood in independence 
referendums. Within the 19 referendums that did not lead to independence support for 
independence among the population consulted stands at 76 percent. It is higher at 92 
percent for the independence referendums that were followed by the successful secession 
of the region and international recognition.89  
                                                          
88 A standard independent t-test shows statistical significance at the 95 percent confidence 
interval. The figures drop to 60 and 80 percent support for independence out of the total eligible 
electorate (accounting for turnout). 
89 The difference between whether the region seceded or not is statistically significant in a 
standard t-test but not in a non-parametric test.  
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Where a unilateral independence referendum was followed by statehood, support for 
independence stood at 93 percent (SD 7%) which was not found to be statistically 
significantly different from those that were not followed by secession shortly after (87%, 
SD 28%).90 This further supports hypothesis HSec.4. On the other hand, agreed 
independence referendums which have led to secession have an average Yes vote in 
favour of secession of 88.7 percent (SD 18%), while among those which did not result in 
statehood support is just below the simple majority: 49.4 percent (SD 8%). The difference 
in support for independence between agreed independence referendum and their 
secessionist outcome is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence interval, 
demonstrating that in consensual referendums the “will of the people” is overall 
determinant.91 The difference between the two is even more pronounced when accounting 
for turnout: 84 percent where secession occurred vs. 38 percent where the region is still 
part of the host-state. Hypothesis HSec.5 is therefore supported: An agreed independence 
referendum results in a successful secession if a majority of voters endorse independence, 
even if it does not have a constitutional right to secede. 
Although this last hypothesis is supported by the quantitative review, there are two 
exceptions. Despite 62 percent of Nevisians voting in favour of independence in 1998, 
Nevis is still part of the federation with St Kitts. A two-thirds majority was required for 
the referendum to be approved under the constitutional clause that gave the island of Nevis 
a legal right to secede. The result was not contested by the 2427 voters who casted a valid 
ballot in favour of independence out of almost 6800 eligible electors.92  
In 1946, the Faroes voted 50.73 percent in favour of separating from the Kingdom of 
Denmark. The Danish government had agreed to the referendum and despite being taken 
by surprise by the resulting narrow majority, it was inclined to conceding to independence 
(West 1972, 187–88). The Faroes Government declared independence on the 17th of 
September. Yet, with a difference of 161 votes between the valid Yes and No ballots, 
which when accounted for, put the total support for independence at 47.2 percent with a 
turnout of 67 percent, and internal division between and within political parties in the 
Faroes on how to proceed, the Faroes parliament was dissolved. New elections brought a 
pro-union party into power which two years later secured more autonomy (Adler-Nissen 
                                                          
90 Support goes down to 78% vs. 71% when run on the total yes votes adjusted to the total 
number of eligible voters.  
91 This can also be observed in a t-test and non-parametric test when removing the second 
Quebec referendum.  
92 Two-thirds of the members of the Nevis Island Assembly also had to validate the referendum 
result (Constitution of Saint Christopher and Nevis 1983, Art. 113). For a review of the Nevis 




2014, 5; Kjørsvik 1991, 40–41). A referendum on independence was planned for May, 
26th 2001 but was cancelled due to disagreements between the Faroese negotiators and 
the Danish government.93 The Faroes people are expected to vote in a referendum on April 
2018 which would assert their right to independence and that they should be consulted by 
referendum about questions related to independence or further integration with Denmark 
(Spongenberg 2017).94 
The two Danish outliers, Iceland and the Faroe Islands, suggest that the perceived right 
and legitimacy of secession and the referendum process matter and may be ultimately 
determinant despite what the constitution or a consensual referendum result says. The 
overwhelming support for independence in Iceland, and its lack in the Faroes which lead 
to both Danish and a majority of Faroes politicians to declare the result inconclusive, 
indicate that the will of the people, when clear and combined with an implicit or explicit 
acceptance from the host-state (either officially stated or entrenched in a legal agreement), 
can be determinant. Yet, the Danish government was surprised by the slim majority 
support for independence in the Faroes and it is likely that it consented to the referendum 
because it was confident that the secessionists would not win. Furthermore, the Faroes’ 
politicians were divided on the use of the referendum, and some endorsed its holding in 
the hope to secure more powers, not independence (Ackren 2006).  
We cannot yet exclude the possibility that the cases which have held an independence 
referendum were more likely to successfully secede in the first place, irrespective of the 
referendum. On the other hand, an agreed independence referendum might be more likely, 
because support for secession is low, and therefore a secessionist victory unlikely. In order 
to understand how an independence referendum can affect the likelihood of secession, we 
need to account for where they are more likely to occur and why.  
IV.2 Where do Independence Referendums occur?  
 
I start the analysis by a series of bivariate tests on the key variables identified in chapter 
II related to either the capacity or incentive (existing support) to call and hold an 
independence referendum from the secessionist actor’s perspective. The descriptive 
statistics are detailed in Table IV.2. From this basic overview, two contextual variables 
seem to set apart secessionist regions which have held an independence referendum from 
                                                          
93 Independence was argued to be too “costly” as Denmark did not allow for any transition period 
(Ackren 2006, 227). 
94 The Icelandic government advises the Faroese government on matters regarding independence 
(Adler-Nissen 2014, 23; Bergmann 2014). 
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regions which did not held a plebiscite:  being part of an ethnic-federation and having the 
distinct regional population representatives in government in the region.  
The bivariate analysis, therefore, does not provide support for the ten hypotheses on where 
referendums are likely to occur (HRef), except for Hypotheses HRef.7 that independence 
referendums are more likely to occur in ethnic-federations and HRef.8, where the region’s 
distinct population representatives dominate the regional government, but for agreed 
independence referendums only. Almost 70 percent of all referendums referenced here 
have taken place in sub-national territorial and jurisdictional units inhabited by a distinct 
cultural group, as opposed to only 32 percent among regions which did not have an 
independence referendum. 70 percent of agreed independence referendums also took 
place where the distinct cultural group representatives were in government in the region, 
whilst in regions which did not hold a referendum, it is 25 percent.  
These hypotheses are further tested and kept as controls in a series of logistic regression 
models with whether a referendum was held or not as the dependent variable (Tables 
IV.3). Three models were run: first with the full sample (excluding colonies) and adding 
a control for whether the region is part of the former Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. To 
control for their over-representation and resulting multicollinearity, they are removed in 
the second model. In the third, the region’s relative wealth is added. The same logic was 
applied to investigate where agreed independence referendums, in particular, occur, and 
adding variables hypothesised to be associated with the presence of this type of 
referendum in particular in chapter II.  
I first test Hypotheses HRef.1, 2, 3 and 4 that an independence referendum is more likely 
to be held where the population is culturally distinct from the host-state population95; less 
likely however the longer the region has been part of the host-state; or if violent 
confrontations occurred between the region and host-states; and finally, more likely at 
times of political instability. I enter these variables as a block and find that only whether 
violence occurred is a marginally statistically significant predictor of an independence 
referendums having been held (p>.10). When controlling for identity, length of the union 
and regime durability, a region which has experienced violence as a result of its 
secessionist movement might be less likely to have held an independence referendum.  
Controlling for the societal-related variable above, I add political factors: the level of 
democracy, predicted to increase the chances of an independence referendum taking place 
(HRef.5) (although it can paradoxically decrease support); whether power-sharing is in 
                                                          
95 For instance, Western Australia’s population was not culturally distinct (in language or 
religion) from the rest of the host-state in 1933.  
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place as it is expected to lessen support for independence and therefore make secession 
less likely, and decrease the appeal of holding a referendum (HRef.6); whether the region 
hosting a secessionist movement is part of an ethnic federation (HRef.7), expected to 
increase the likelihood of witnessing a referendum; and finally whether the region’s 
culturally distinct population representatives dominate the regional government (HRef.8).  
The model is considerably improved by adding political factors with a Nagelkerke R 
Square of .21 as opposed to .05 when considering societal factors alone. This 
improvement is due to the variable accounting for whether the region hosting the 
secessionist movement is part of an ethnic federation. Being part of an ethnic federation 
is associated with four times greater odds of having held an independence referendum 
than a region which is not part of this form of territorial arrangement. 
The model is completed by introducing economic variables, except for the region’s 
relative wealth compared to the host-state (HRef.11). The introduction of variables 
accounting for the Host-state GDP per capita and the size of the regional population does 
not substantially amend the model, with neither of them being predictors of referendums 
when controlling for societal and political factors. There is, therefore, no grounds to 
support Hypothesis HRef.9 that independence referendums are less likely to occur in 
richer hosts-states and HRef.10 that independence referendums are more likely to be held 
in more populous regions.  
In addition to these variables, I also control for whether the region was part of the former 
Soviet Union or Yugoslavia to account for possible demonstration and domino effect in 
holding independence referendums and the fact that they account for 40 percent of all 
independence referendums held in the dataset. This control proves to be the strongest 
statistically significant predictor of witnessing an independence referendum: a region has 
5 times greater odds of having held an independence referendum if it was part of the 
former USSR or SFRY when controlling for societal, political and economic factors 
linked to support for independence. Furthermore, in addition to being part of an ethnic-
federation still being associated with three times greater odds of having held a referendum, 
having representatives of the culturally distinct group in the regional government and 







Table IV.2: Summary statistics and bivariate review of secessionist movements profile 
 
 No Referendum Referendum Unilateral Referendum Agreed Referendum 
Societal Factors       
 Host-state level 
measure 
Length of union (years) 71.29 
(n=97) 
77.17 61.92 113.3 
Regime durability (years)  29.28 22.86 16.29 30.9 
Region/Group level 
measure 
Distinctiveness - share both language 
and religion (%) 
39.3 36.1 37.5 40 
 In one dimension (%) 39.2 47.2 41.7 50 
In two dimensions (%) 21.5 16.7 20.8 10 
Violence – Yes (%) 63.6 47.2 (*) 50 40 
Political Factors       
 Host-state 
level measure 
Level of democracy  
(Polity IV average score) 
2.51 2.22 1 4 




Power-sharing – Yes (%)  29 41.7 37.5 50 
Regional government – Yes (%) 25.2♯♯ 33.3 16.7¤¤ 70¤¤ ♯♯ 
Economic Factors       
 Host-state 
level measure 
















9.8 7.9 14 












(see parentheses ‘n’ for updated sample size for each variable and category) 
107 36 24 
(controlled for SO2) 
10 
controlled for Q2) 
**, *, (*) Statistical significant difference (p>.01, p>.05) or marginally (p>.10) between No Referendum and Referendum Held. [chi-square, independent samples T-test and Kruskal-Wallis Test].  
¤¤, ¤, (¤) Statistical significant difference (p>.01, p>.05) or marginally (p>.10) between Unilateral Referendum and Agreed Referendum. [chi-square, independent samples T-test,  Kruskal-Wallis Test]. 




In order to control for the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and limit 
the problem of multicollinearity, I remove those cases from the sample in Model R.II. 
Among societal variables having experienced violence is again marginally statistically 
significant with decreased odds of having held an independence referendum (HRef.3). 
Controlling for political and economic factors reveals that ethnic-federalism is marginally 
significant and associated with 3.1 greater odds of witnessing a plebiscite on 
independence.96 I also tested for possible interaction effects here such as cultural 
distinctiveness with violence (potential “hardening” of identities as suggested by the 
literature in chapter II), distinctiveness and the length of the union or being part of an 
ethnic-federation, but none of them showed substantial alterations to the model. 
In the last model (R.III) I add the region’s relative wealth compared to the host-state. This 
considerably reduces the sample size with almost 57 percent of the sample (excluding 
USSR/SFRY cases) missing (c.f. chapter III for resulting bias). While none of the societal 
variables by themselves proved statistically significant, being part of an ethnic-federation 
is once again statistically significantly associated with greater odds of having held a 
referendum compared to regions which are not part of this specific territorial set-up. 
Moreover, having the regional group representative in the regional government is also 
marginally significant when controlling for other political, societal and economic 
variables associated with increased or decreased support for independence in the 
secessionist literature. It seems, overall, that institutional capacity and political 
opportunity are the most likely predictors of an independence referendum being held as 
opposed to incentives to secede, although a more in depth qualitative review is needed to 




                                                          
96 It becomes statistically significant when controlling for the Nagas referendum, and/or the two 
repeated referendums in Quebec and South Ossetia.  
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Table IV.3: Referendum held – Logistic regression 
 
 Model R.I  Model R.II 
Excluding USSR/SFRY  
Model R.III 
 Excluding USSR/SFRY 
Explanatory variable 
(Compares characteristic stated vs. absent) 
Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff.  s.e. 
Population culturally distinct in language and/or 
religion -.01 .51 .41 .62 .22 .88 
Length of union .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
Violent conflict -.25 .54 -1.04 .68 -.59 .80 
Regime durability -.43 2.15 -.99 2.33 -1.81 2.79 
Level of democracy .68 1.09 .85 1.18 -1.48 1.63 
Power-sharing .74 .54 .22 .61 .81 .91 
Ethnic-federation 1.31 .56* 1.14 .60(*) 1.96 .76* 
Regional government 1.02 .58(*) .80 .59 1.20 .73(*) 
National GDP per capita  -4.43 2.36(*) -3.77 2.38 -3.09 2.73 
Regional population  -1.70 1.95 .31 3.58 -.44 4.05 
USSR/SFRY member 1.67 .74* 
  
Regional GDP per capita/National GDP per capita   -3.44 3.25 
Constant  -2.40 1.09* 
-1.90 1.21 -.25 2.03 
N 120 96 67 
Nagelkerke R Square .292 .217 .329 
(*) p>.10, * p>.05, ** p>.01 
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IV.2.a. Agreed referendums 
 
Incentives to secede among the population, and therefore support for secession may still 
play a role in whether the referendum is a consensual process.  In addition to the capability 
and incentives variables, I will test here the variables hypothesised to specifically relate 
to the referendum being consented to by the host-state. We should keep in mind that some 
of the variables identified to increase the incentives to hold a referendum because they are 
associated with increased support may work in the opposite direction and make an agreed 
referendum less likely as it is more likely to result in a majority in favour of independence.  
I repeat the same model used for investigating when an independence referendum is likely 
to take place and run it on the dichotomous outcome: agreed independence referendum 
held =1, no agreed referendum held = 0. In this first model in Table VI.4, Model A.I, only 
the regional groups’ representative being in power at the regional government is found to 
be a statistically significant predictor of an agreed independence referendum being held 
(10 times greater odds of witnessing a consensual plebiscite than a region which does not 
have the distinct population representatives in power). In addition, when the two 
economic variables are added, the length of the union becomes marginally significant and 
associated with greater odds of witnessing an agreed independence referendum, along 
with the national GDP per capita associated with decreased odds of having held such 
referendum the richer the host-state is (p.>10).   
However, when adding a control for the Soviet and Yugoslav host-states, or removing 
them from the sample it is not statistically significant and the Wald statistic is halved. On 
the other hand, being part of an ethnic-federation becomes statistically significant at the 
90 percent confidence level.  
In the Second model, in addition to removing the Soviet and Yugoslav cases to reduce 
multicollinearity, I add two variables which have been identified as potentially relevant 
contextual factors when dealing with an agreed independence referendum. First, in 
addition to controlling for the population size (HRef.10), I also consider the size of the 
regional population relative to the host-state (HRefA.2a) expected to make an agreed 
independence referendum more likely. I also add dummy variables accounting for 
whether the host-state faces multiple secessionist movements (HRefA.2c). These two 
hypotheses are not supported when controlling for societal, political and economic 
variables associated with incentives or the capacity to secede. Having representatives in 
the regional government remains significant and associated with an increased chance of 
holding an agreed referendum. Adding the region’s wealth relative to the host-state 
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(Model A.III) results in regional government representation only being significant at the 
90 percent confidence level. 97 
Model A.IV follows Model A.II again but uses firth-logit to correct for a possible small-
sample and rare-event biases which fail to detect significant variables. The firth-logit 
shows the presence of representatives at the regional level as the only, marginally 
significant, predictor of agreed referendums. The advantage of using this test is the 
slightly smaller confidence intervals than in a standard logistic regression.  
Finally, while it is not possible to test hypothesis HRefA.3 that an independence 
referendum is more likely to occur if international actors (Great Powers or international 
organisation) have intervened in the secessionist conflict on the whole sample, the 
residuals from these series of regressions help provides some indication that it may hold 
true to some extent. The only three cases that show standardised residuals above 2 
standard deviations are Eritrea, South Sudan, and especially East-Timor. A possible 
explanation for why the current model fails to predict these referendums, in particular, 
might be that they were unlikely to hold an independence referendum – whether agreed 
or not – without external intervention to facilitate the referendum process and act as 
‘brokers’ or ‘mediators’ (I. Svensson 2007). 
To summarise, there is no indication to support HRefA.1 that a host-state government will 
consent to an independence referendum being held if support for secession is low 
(operationalised as the opposite of hypothesis HRef.1 to HRef.11, expect for HRef.5 on 
democracy). It is also particularly difficult to test HRef.2 that a host-state government is 
more likely to consent to an independence referendum being held if it deems costs of 
retaining the territory and population outweigh the benefits in the multilevel statistical 
analyses. HRefA.3 is partially supported if we account for outliers, and a possible missing 
variable in the model: international involvement could make an independence referendum 
more likely to be held and agreed upon. Further investigation is required, especially when 




                                                          





Table IV.4: Agreed referendum held – Logistic regression and Firth-logit 
 Model A.I  Model A. II 








(Compares characteristic stated vs. absent) 
Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Population culturally distinct in language and/or 
religion .02 .920 -.15 .988 -.501 1.15 
-.18 0.77 
Length of union .01 .01 .01 .01 .02 .01 
.01 .01 
Violent conflict -1.33 .94 -.84 1.09 -.45 1.29 
-.79 0.86 
Regime durability .36 3.16 -.06 3.33 1.20 3.60 
.35 2.7 
Level of democracy -.46 1.72 -.29 1.87 -2.10 2.53 
-.29 1.51 
Power-sharing .73 .93 .58 .99 .75 1.25 
.35 0.75 
Ethnic-federation 1.66 .86(*) 1.68 .92(*) 1.62 1.00 
1.16 0.73 
Regional government 1.77 .87* 2.00 .94* 2.02 1.12(*) 
1.34 0.73(*) 
National GDP per capita -3.96 3.44 -4.26 3.79 -5.58 4.04 
-2.63 2.83 
Regional population  4.73 4.67 3.56 5.45 -.72 5.95 
3.06 4.31 
USSR/SFRY member  -20.72 7096.1 
      
Proportion regional population/host-state  1.46 2.32 3.05 3.08 
1.09 1.87 
Host-state faces more secessionist movements  -.50 1.12 -.14 1.35 
-.34 0.90 





Constant  -3.16 1.77(*) -3.49 1.99(*) -.92 2.81 
-2.37 1.49 
N 120 96 67 96 
Nagelkerke R Square .419 .393 .364 - 
(*) p>.10, * p>.05, ** p>.01 
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Overall, none of the variables directly associated with support on its own such as cultural 
distinctiveness or the region’s economic wealth have been identified as predictors of 
independence referendums. The only variables that may hold some explanatory power for 
where an independence referendum is held, and an agreed independence referendum is 
held, in particular, are more closely related to institutional factors that can facilitate the 
calling and holding of an independence referendum: ethnic-federalism and regional 
government power.98 Paradoxically, these institutional features that make the holding of 
an independence referendum more likely to take place may decrease support for secession, 
while where they are absent support for secession may be higher. Other scholars (e.g. 
Roeder 2007; Brancati 2006) would argue the contrary, such institution fuels 
organisations against the host-state. This quantitative review, therefore, remains 
inconclusive as the dynamics behind holding an independence referendum are likely to 
be too complex and context-dependent for a quantitative review to be able to shed light 
on the phenomenon. Nonetheless, to complete this analysis I consider these models on 
where referendums are more likely to occur and the likelihood of successful secession 
taking place reviewed above in combination.  
IV.2.b. Independence referendums and the likelihood of secession 
 
A last set of models are run, this time using whether secession occurred (1) or not (0) as 
the binary dependent variable. In the first model shown in Table IV.5, I run the same 
model as model R.I and A.I, by first running societal variables as a block. Whether 
violence occurred and regime stability are found to be associated with decreased odds of 
seceding. Their effect remains when controlling for political and economic variables, and 
being part of an ethnic-federation is statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence 
level, with increased odds of having seceded. When controlling for whether the cases are 
part of the former Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, only this latter variable is a significant 
predictor of having seceded. Being part of this host-state leads to 12 times greater odds of 
having achieved statehood than being part of another host-state. Furthermore, National 
GDP per capita is also marginally statistically significant with a higher GDP per capita 
associated with decreased odds of seceding.  
                                                          
98 Furthermore, to further test the two sets of models on where independence referendums occur, 
and agreed ones in particular, I also ran all models keeping USSR/SFRY cases and adding a binary 
control for them but removed the variable on national GDP per capita as it is the most sensitive 
variable to multicolinearity here, and only used relative wealth as an economic variable for wealth 
(n=89). The results proved to be very similar throughout the models with only ethnic-federalism 
and regional government being significant or marginally significant predictors. When adding the 
controls for repeated referendums and potential outliers the findings are fairly robust.  
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In the second model, I run the same variables but this time add in turn whether a 
referendum was held, and secondly, whether this referendum was an agreed process. 
When adding the first control for whether a referendum occurred or not, the latter is 
statistically significant and associated with increased odds of witnessing secession. 
However, being part of the former USSR or SFRY still shows the greater odds of having 
successfully seceded, controlling for societal, political and economic factors – none of 
which are statistically significant. Adding whether the referendum was agreed or not 
(shown in Model Sec.II) renders the presence of a referendum (whether unilateral or 
agreed) statistically insignificant, while being part of the former Soviet Union or 
Yugoslavia remains the only predictor of a successful secession (p>.01).  
Model Sec.III shows the same model but without cases in the former Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia in the sample. The presence of violence as a result of the secessionist 
movement remains associated with decreased odds of having achieved statehood 
compared to regions which did not experience conflict (P>.05) and remains so throughout. 
States which have a higher GDP per capita are also less likely to have had a region secede 
while more populous regions have increased odds of having achieved statehood, but both 
are only statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level. The addition of whether 
a referendum was held or not does not prove to be statistically significant, and only 
whether violence occurred remains a predictor. Having held an agreed independence 
referendum leads to greater odds of having seceded than if a unilateral referendum or no 
referendum was held when controlling for societal, political and economic factors.99  
In model Sec.IV the sample size is considerably reduced and having held an agreed 
independence referendum is not associated with increased odds of having successfully 
seceded while being in a richer host-state as measured by its GDP per capita leads to 
decreased odds of having achieved statehood along with having experienced conflict. To 
test whether these findings are linked to the addition of this variable or are the result of 
the restricted sample size, I ran the same model without the cases where data on regional 
GDP per capita is missing. Running the same model on the same restricted sample gives 
very similar results than when relative wealth is accounted for. Accordingly, it seems that 
an agreed independence referendum not being associated with greater odds of seceding is 
more likely to be the result of the restricted sample than the economic status of the 
secessionist region.  
                                                          
99 Removing the Catalan referendum does not change the results. When removing the Nagas 
referendum and/or the second Quebec and South Ossetia referendums, cultural distinctiveness 
becomes marginally significant (p>.10) with greater odds of having seceded (5.8). Three outliers 
can also be identified: Slovakia, Namibia and Iceland.  
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To conclude, controlling for factors found in the literature to increase or decrease support 
for secession and increase the capability of secessionist actors to stand against the host-
state, holding an agreed independence referendum increases the likelihood of achieving 
independence. An agreed independence referendum is, therefore, a mediator, making 
secession possible where a majority of the electorate supports independence. Yet, could 
the referendum process also be a moderator and increase the likelihood of secession 
occurring by increasing support for secession where a majority previously lacked? In 
order to fully test this hypothesis, before and after polls would have been needed, but such 
data is not available (c.f. chapter II and III). Looking at the contextual settings of states, 
regions and populations which have held an independence referendum and the level of 
support for independence expressed during the referendum can still give a clue as to when 
the referendum might have had a mediating or moderating effect.  
 
IV.3 Support for Independence 
 
In order to analyse where an independence referendum can potentially affect the existing 
level of support for secession, I ran a series of bivariate tests on the percentage of Yes 
votes in favour of independence in the 36 independence referendums under study.100 This 
is used as an indication of which factors are associated with increased or decreased levels 
of support for independence.  Notably, I wish to identify variables associated with very 
low or high support (operationalised as lying somewhere below 30 or above 70 percent) 
where the referendum process is unlikely to have been able to determine the referendum 
outcome, although it may still have affected the level of support witnessed.  
We should be careful however when drawing conclusions from unilateral referendums, 
and even some agreed referendums, as they lack a free and fair procedure that would 
guarantee that the witnessed outcome is the genuine reflection of the electorate – or the 
inhabitants of the region affected depending on the franchise and who participates. 
Nonetheless, agreed referendums, especially in established democracies, are more likely 
to be a more genuine reflection of “the will of the people”, albeit not perfect. 
 
                                                          
100 Recall: The analysis excluded the Montenegrin referendum of 1992, and the Yes result 
adjusted for turnout excluded Nagas. 
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IV.3.a. Support for independence in referendums 
From the bivariate analysis (Table IV.6), five variables show the percentage of support 
associated with them being almost systematically over 70 percent across the independence 
referendums, controlling for whether they were agreed process, outliers and including and 
excluding USSR and SFRY cases. Among regional populations that are distinct in either 
language and/or religion from the rest of the host-state, mean support for independence 
stands above 70 percent. Although, it is only statistically significantly different from 
regions which share both characteristics when running the analysis on the percentage of 
Yes vote adjusted for turnout among agreed referendums. Political variables are more 
robust predictors of high levels of support, such as whether the host-state is a democracy, 
power-sharing is in place, or the region’s distinct population dominates the regional 
government. When such forms of political representations are missing, support for 
independence stands above 70 percent. Furthermore, the presence of violence shows the 
most consistent association with very high levels of support for independence (above 90 
percent), even when controlling for turnout and outliers Lowest mean support for 
independence is found within democracies and where the population shares both language 
and religion with the rest of the host-state (around 53% mean Yes votes).  
This simple review provides some support for the assumptions laid out in chapter 2. 
HSup.2 anticipated that support for independence will be high among an electorate which 
has experienced violent conflict and/or lacks access to political representation.  In this 
context, the referendum would act a mediator, facilitating secession, but not so much as a 
moderator and substantially affect existing support for secession and the likelihood of 
seceding. Furthermore, the host-state’s Polity IV score and GDP per capita are correlated 
with lower levels of support for secession (moderately strong relationship using 
Spearman’s rho). The effect of violence on support is fairly consistent in the multivariate 
regression analysis (Table IV.7). Other continuous variables such as the length of the 
union are not correlated with support for independence measured by the percentage of 






Table IV.5: Referendums and the likelihood of seceding – Logistic regression
 Model Sec.I Model Sec.II 
Adding Referendum Held & 
referendum Agreed 
Model Sec.III 
Adding Referendum Held & 
referendum Agreed    
Without USSR/SFRY cases 
Model Sec.IV –  
Adding relative regional 
wealth to Sec.III 
Explanatory variable 
(compares characteristic stated vs. absent) 
Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Population culturally distinct in language 
and/or religion .78 .58 .89 .63 1.73 .99 .02 1.12 
Length of union .01 .01 .00 .01 -.00 .01 -.00 .01 
Violent conflict -.79 .60 -.75 .65 -2.59 .99** -4.85 1.89** 
Regime durability -1.55 2.74 -1.15 2.90 2.13 3.70 7.20 4.54 
Level of democracy .72 1.16 .79 1.28 -.07 1.44 -1.58 2.16 
Power-sharing .07 .60 -.13 .66 -1.21 .87 -1.86 1.31 
Ethnic-federation .40 .62 -.12 .71 -1.42 1 -1.88 1.19 
Regional government .36 .64 -.10 .76 -.35 .85 -1.89 1.35 
National GDP per capita -5.99 3.08(*) -4.79 3.32 -6.45 3.88(*) -13.01 5.44* 
Regional population .21 1.87 .48 1.90 6.82 4.35 9.29 5.88 
USSR/SFRY member 2.52 .82** 2.73 .98**   
  
Regional GDP per capita/National GDP per 
capita 
    
  .97 4.14 
Referendum Held    .90 .65 -.90 1.29 1.52 1.70 
Referendum Agreed   1.68 .99(*) 4 1.65* 2.54 1.85 
Constant  -1.92 1.22 -2.20 1.36 
-.50 1.48 4.43 3.15 
N 120 120 96 67 
Nagelkerke R Square .401 .482 .469 .629 
(*) p>.10, * p>.05, ** p>.01 
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The referendum design, notably the presence of quorum does not seem to affect the level 
of support for independence. Whether an endorsement or turnout quorum is in place is not 
associated with statistically different Yes means. Levels of turnout are also not statistically 
significantly different according to whether there was a quorum in place or not with an 
average of 86 and 84 percent of the electorate participating in the consultation. Only six 
cases required a special majority in favour of independence ranging from 55 percent of 
the electorate (Montenegro) to 66.7 percent (Kosovo). We, therefore, fail to reject the null 
hypothesis and find evidence to support hypotheses HSup3 and HSup4 that the presence 
of quorums on turnout or endorsement will decrease support for independence or 
invalidate the Yes votes and make it more difficult to achieve secession (with the 
exception of St Kitts and Nevis in 1998).  
While the unilateral referendum in New Caledonia and Catalonia, and the agreed 
plebiscite St Kitts and Nevis had a turnout below 60 percent, low turnout does not seem 
to be a major concern in independence referendums. This can be explained in part by the 
fact that not all referendums are necessarily democratic processes and their outcome - 
both in terms of Yes votes and turnout – are not an accurate representation of participation 
levels and endorsement and should be studied with caution. Nonetheless, accounting for 
turnout remains important. When considering the percentage of Yes votes, adjusting for 
turnout, the mean Yes vote among cases where secession did not occur stands at 63 
percent compared to 86 percent when a new-state emerged (80 percent average turnout in 
the first case and 95 percent in the latter); a statistical difference which is not detectable 
when only focusing on the official Yes votes without accounting for turnout, except 
among agreed independence referendums (see also Figure IV.1).  
Our ability to consider the effect of the campaign on support for independence in a 
comparative perspective is very limited given the lack of polling data prior to the 
referendum.  Using a bivariate analysis, I consider if longer campaigns are associated with 
increased support for independence as they would offer more opportunities to mobilise 
voters to achieve statehood (HSup5). The bivariate analysis shows a negative correlation. 
Longer campaigns are correlated with decreased support for secession. However, this 
relationship is not robust when looking solely at unilateral referendums, or in agreed 
independence referendums when accounting for turnout. We should therefore be careful 
in interpreting this result. It could be that secessionist actors who call an independence 
referendum favour a longer campaign as a way to mobilise support because support is low 
in the first place, and the length of the campaign itself does not have an effect on existing 
support for independence itself.  
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A similar problem of causality can be seen when trying to assess the impact on a No side 
campaign. Following hypothesis HSup6, I expect a No side campaign to reduce support 
for independence and therefore the likelihood of securing statehood. This measure, 
strongly correlated with an agreed process, is indeed associated with decreased support 
for secession. The multivariate linear regression also confirms this effect (Table IV.7). 
We cannot exclude however the possibility that a No side campaign is more likely to be 
present because support is still low in the first place and opponents to secession wished to 
ensure that support remains low and the independence referendum is laid to rest following 
a No victory.101 While it is also where it is more likely to potentially make a difference, it 
is not possible to assess the No campaign effect without knowledge of levels of support 
for independence prior to the plebiscite being called. 
I ran a linear regression to have a general idea of how the variables investigated in Table 
IV.6 perform when considered together.  Given the small sample size, the interpretation 
needs to be very cautious. S.I notably, which chooses the presence of violence to be the 
only consistently significant variable associated with higher levels of support (p>.05 - 
.10), suffers from multicollinearity due to the over-representation of the USSR and SFRY 
host-state (GDP per capita in particular). Removing them in S.II considerably alleviates 
this problem and the regression standardised residual and PP plot shows that the model 
performs relatively well despite the small sample size.  
The presence of violence remains significant, or marginally so, throughout and associated 
with increased support for independence until the control for the level of democracy of 
the host-state is added. Referendums which are an agreed process are associated with 
lower levels of support for secession; which is what we would expect given some of the 
hypotheses on why a referendum would be consented by the host-state. Controlling for 
whether the referendum was an agreed process, however, stretches the model due to the 
accumulation of factors linked to the presence of such referendums. Adding variables on 
the referendum design only the No side campaign presence is a significant factor in the 
model in explaining support for independence, showing a negative relationship. However, 
when running the same model on the total Yes votes in favour of secession adjusted for 
turnout (n=21 in Model S.2), it is no longer significant, while the presence of violence is 
(p>.05-.10). 
  
                                                          
101 The review of agreed referendums which have a No side campaign confirms this bias with the 
two referendums having the highest official Yes support for independence (Mongolia and 
Norway) missing a No side campaign. 
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Table IV.6: Support for Secession in independence referendums – Bivariate 
 
 Yes %  
All Referendums 
Yes %  
All Referendums- 
USSR/SFRY excluded  
Yes % Unilateral 
Referendums -
USSR/SFRY excluded  
Yes % 
Agreed Referendums 
Societal Factors  Distinctiveness - share both language and religion  72.2 *%2 67.9*%2 87.6 53.2(%) 
Distinctiveness – have different religion and/or language 91.3 *%2 90.2*%2 97.2 81(%) 
No Violence  74.2*%2 68.1*%2 86.6 57.5*% 
 Violence 95.7*%2 97.3*%2 99.1 92.5*% 
 Host-state is a democracy 77.3 77.3(*) 93.4 53.2*%2 
 Host-state is not a democracy  89.4 94.3(*) 99.9 92.1*%2 
 
Political Factors  Not Ethnic-Federation 90 90 94.7 82 
Ethnic-federation 82 75 94.3 64.5 
 No Power-sharing  93.5*% 93.8*% 99.5% 85.8(*) 
Power-sharing 71.7*% 69.4*% 85.9% 58.4(*) 
Region’s distinct group representative not in regional 
government  
91.2(*) 97.1(*) 99.1 92.4(%) 
 Region’s distinct group representative in regional 
government 




 No Quorum  84.1 83.6 94.1 70.4 
 Quorum (either endorsement or turnout) 85.9 78.9 99.5 72 
 Yes-side campaign only 91.3*% 97.8* 97.3 99.9*2 
 Yes and No side campaigning  73.5*% 64.6* 66.2 64.4*2 
 
Total n 
(see parentheses ‘n’ for updated sample size for each variable and category) 
36 22/21 
(controlled for SO2) 
 
11/10 
(controlled for SO2) 
11/10 
(controlled for Q2) 
*Significant non-parametric test.  
% Significant when accounting for turnout (total Yes/eligible electorate).  
2 Significant when removing repeated referendums.  





Tables IV.7: Support for secession in independence referendums – Linear Regression 
 
 
 Model S.I  Model S.II 
Excluding  USSR/SFRY  
Model S.III 
 Excluding Unilateral 
Referendums 
Model S.IV 
Excluding  USSR/SFRY 
Explanatory variable 
(Compares characteristic 











distinct in language and/or 
religion 
12.87 7.87 11.40 5.94(*) 11.94 10.30 7.56 7.05 
Violent conflict 9.69 7.33 8.65 6.08 3.51 13.17 13.79 8.08 
Level of democracy -6.31 17.69 -16.14 11.27 -40.26 23.81 -6.66 14.82 
Power-sharing -8.11 8.59 -3.84 6.45 -8.11 10.28 -3.65 8.88 
National GDP per capita  -38.61 25.36 -33.08 15.79(*) -20.74 24.85 -25.65 26.52 




Referendum agreed    -17.22 4.98**   
  
Quorum        6.58 10.19 
Campaign lenght       .02 .02 
No side campaign       -24.54 5.81** 
Constant  84.71 17.48** 99.24 13.28** 108.04 18.48** 89.05 15.00** 
N 36 22 11 17 
Adjusted R2 .457 .772 .731 .814 
(*) p>.10, * p>.05, ** p>.01 
149 
 
This quantitative review, while enlightening, is insufficient to understand the role of 
independence referendums in complex secessionist dynamics. The simplification of 
multifaceted concepts such as identity or economic grievances into aggregate-level 
measures and the limitation brought by data availability limits our ability to uncover the 
relationship between the IVs and DVs of interest and requires further, qualitative, 
investigation. 
 
IV.3.b. Where could the referendum process have made a difference?  
 
Figure IV.1 resumes the sampled - agreed - independence referendums’ results. No 
referendum resulted in less than 40 percent support for independence, while five show 
levels of support above 70 percent. This overview also shows big disparities at times 
between the official Yes votes and the total Yes vote proportional to the total eligible 
electorate (accounting for turnout). Amongst the highest percentage of Yes votes are the 
Norwegian referendum of 1905 and the plebiscite held in the de-facto state of Mongolia 
in 1954. The other three more recent cases, Eritrea, South Sudan and East Timor are three 
undemocratic and violent contexts where external intervention was crucial to secure the 
holding of an independence referendum.  
I would also expect such cases to have a more restricted ability for a referendum campaign 
to make a difference given the more polarised context, and lack of political and 
institutional consolidation which would enable the type of campaign covered in the 
literature in chapter II, such as party-cues, or mass-media effect. This is all the more 
reason to study such contexts, but one such case-study would probably require a PhD 
thesis in itself. Furthermore, under the premise laid out in Chapter 2, it is unlikely that 
support for independence in these cases stood below 60 or 50 percent prior to the 
referendums being called. Accordingly, while the referendum process and design could 
still have affected the final results shown here and the perceived legitimacy of this 
outcome, it is unlikely that they were determinant in achieving a qualifying majority 







Figure IV.1: Support for Secession in Independence Referendums 
 
 
The other six agreed independence referendums show support for independence below 70 
percent, especially when accounting for turnout which shows more variations than in the 
four cases with high levels of support for independence. These six cases may, therefore, 
be eligible for further study as potential contexts where the referendum may have had a 
moderating effect on the secessionist outcome. As discussed in the previous methodology 
chapter, Quebec and Montenegro were singled out as the two case-studies which are best 
suited to tackle the thesis research questions given their state and regional profile and data 
availability. I will now turn to them to further investigate the role of their respective 
independence referendums, how and why they came about, and how they may have 




The quantitative review of secessionist movements and the use of independence 
referendums has confirmed that it is worth distinguishing between a consensual-agreed-
referendum process and a unilateral referendum to understand the possible effect of such 
consultation on the likelihood of creating a new independent sovereign state. Furthermore, 
it has shown that a right to secede is (a) not necessarily associated with a consensual 
independence referendum whereby the plebiscite’s outcome decided the fate of the region 
and whether it is to become a sovereign state; and (b) there is no evidence that it increases 
the likelihood of successfully seceding in combination with an independence referendum 




Sudan - South Sudan
Indonesia - East Timor
St.Kitts and Nevis - Nevis
Serbia and Montenegro -…
Denmark - Faroe Islands
Canada - Quebec II
UK - Scotland
Canada - Quebec I
Yes vote proportional to total electorate Valid Yes votes
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when controlling for secessionist movements which were part of the dissolved USSR and 
SFRY.  
Explaining the presence of independence referendums, and agreed referendums in 
particular is challenging. While both forms of consultations seem more likely where 
institutional provisions are in place – notably ethnic-federalism and access to the regional 
government – allowing secessionists to seize control of the region (capability), these 
variables correlations with lower support for secession provides possibly contrary 
incentives. While such institutions help mobilise support for independence, they also may 
reduce incentives to separate in the first place. Analysing support for secession in 
independence referendums has also highlighted that where violence occurred and means 
of self-government within the host-state are denied or limited, the electorate shows strong 
support for independence. 
By reviewing the population of interest, I have identified Quebec and Montenegro as the 
two case studies to further investigate the role of their respective independence 
referendums in secessionist dynamics. The quantitative review, while informative, has 
proven very limited in its ability to explain why and when independence referendums 
come about, and their causal effect on secession. The following three chapters will review 
qualitatively the reasons beyond the referendums in Quebec and Montenegro, why and 
how they came to be agreed processes, how their respective referendum designs increased 
the chances of secession occurring, and finally how the referendum campaign affected 










The review of the role of independence referendums in state creation in the previous 
chapters and quantitative analysis have shown that -agreed- independence referendums 
considerably increase the chance of secession occurring. The analysis also uncovered 
some important confounding factors associated with both the presence of a referendum, 
and increased or decreased support for secession which makes the isolation of the 
independence referendum effect on existing secessionist dynamics difficult to assess. 
Furthermore, the quantitative analysis, while important to map the practice and outcome 
of such plebiscites, does not allow to explore in depth how an independence referendum 
increases or decreases the odds of secession taking place. By using process-tracing and 
comparative case study analysis, this chapter offers an in-depth review of the sequences 
of events leading up to three independence referendums and their outcome to gain a better 
understanding of their implications on secessionist dynamics.  
This comparative study is the first to consider how referendums on independence come 
about in two different contexts and uncovers the important factors and actors in the 
process. It is also one of the rare comparisons between Quebec and Montenegro, as 
nationalist and political comparative scholars often overlook the latter.102 In the next three 
chapters, the role of the independence referendums in the two secessionist movements is 
assessed. It offers a chance to re-consider the hypotheses formed in chapter II, along with 
the extensive literature on referendums and what to expect in both cases. This step offers 
a more inductive approach to answer the thesis research question. Montenegro became a 
new independent state in 2006. To this date, there has not been a systematic review of the 
independence referendum role in the process - notably which aspects were crucial in 
achieving statehood. While Quebec is still part of Canada, the independence referendums 
may still have had an impact on the Quebec secessionist movement, the union with the 
rest of Canada (ROC), and future chances of achieving independence.  
                                                          
102 Rare exceptions include Oklopcic (2012).  
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This chapter starts with a brief historical overview of Quebec and Montenegro and how 
they came to be distinct territorial units within their respective host-states. Key differences 
between the two cases along the variables identified in chapter II and examined in chapters 
IV are reviewed. The origins of their respective secessionist movements, the population 
support for independence and the host-states’ response helps understand how strong the 
movements were prior to the calling of the referendum. Secondly, the context is 
considered in order to identify which factors were catalysts in the ability to call and hold 
a referendum on independence. Finally, the Serbian (acting as the federal government at 
the time) and Canadian government response to the independence referendums are 
assessed to understand how they came to be “agreed” upon. This chapter, therefore, serve 
as the background upon which to assess how and to what extent the referendum design 
and campaign made a difference to the witnessed outcome in the following two chapters. 
 
VI.1. Quebec and Montenegro  
 
An in-depth study of Quebec’s and Montenegro’s independence referendums gives an 
opportunity to review key variables identified in the secessionist literature, notably: 
identity, the presence or absence of violence, state of union, regime stability, democracy, 
power-sharing, ethnic-federalism, regional executive power, national and regional 
economic prosperity and population size. A qualitative approach goes much further than 
the quantitative analysis in the previous chapter, which accounts for these variables in a 
rigid, quantifiable way, as it allows to uncover their more complex nature, functions and 
interactions in two empirical cases. The review below demonstrates that Quebec and 
Montenegro have a lot in common along those variables. Yet, their history, society and 
the nature of the relationship with their host-state resulted in these factors having different 
meanings, importance and implications through their complex and context-specific 
interactions. 
VI.1.a. Contextual setting: territory, people and history 
 
Quebec and Montenegro have little in common in their history, geopolitical context or 
demographics. The history of what is now called Montenegro Crna Gora (meaning “black 
mountain”) can be traced back to AD 395 when Slavic tribes started settling in the Stara 
Crnagora region (Old Montenegro).103 Old Montenegro was free from Ottoman 
                                                          




incursions and its people started to differentiate themselves from other populations in 
what is now the North of Montenegro (Berane) (Morrison 2009, 4–5). With the territorial 
expansion of the Old Montenegro, also came large numbers of minorities in addition to 
Montenegrins who considered Belgrade their spiritual and political centre. These geo-
historical differences are still present today with people inhabiting the historical capital of 
Cetinje and its surroundings more likely to identify as Montenegrin while inhabitants in 
the north as Serbian,  in the east in Ulcini and at the Kosovo border as Albanian or Croatian 
along the bay of Kotor and Tivat.104   
The presence of Francophones in what is now Canada dates back to the French 
explorations of the North-Americas and the creation of the New France settlement. The 
Francophone territory of what is now Quebec was taken by the British in 1759. Great 
Britain agreed in 1763 to protect Catholicism in the region, and French culture and distinct 
laws remained dominant in most of the New France territories. The Quebec province’s 
boundaries were amended and extended to include increasingly larger numbers of 
Aboriginal peoples in the north of the territory in particular (Wherrett 1996, 2–3). 
Although Quebec remained overwhelmingly Francophone, 81 percent in the 1971 census 
(Young 1995, 4), Anglophones and subsequent waves of immigration have since made 
the province more heterogeneous (see next chapter).   
At times, independence was a dormant issue in Quebec and Montenegro, despite having 
elements that would have prompted many theories of nationalism to expect a secessionist 
movement to develop, such as a distinct history and identity or a sub-national territorial 
entity (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Anderson 1991; Brubaker 1996).  Quebec has an 
advantage however in its Francophone population, and to a lesser extent religion 
(Catholicism vs. Protestantism), being more readily set apart from the rest of the - 
Anglophone - Canada, offering a primordial element to potentially foster a sense of 
groupness and social ties (Hechter and Okamoto 2001, 191). Yet, this distinction was 
never politicising in a way that would enable national mobilisation until the 1960s as 
primordialist theories would have expected. Changes in circumstances in both cases – 
although through very different dynamics – offered a window of opportunity to mobilise 
support around an independentist agenda. 
Montenegro also differs from Quebec as it has a history of former independence. 
Montenegro maintained an independent state for over 500 years when the rest of the 
                                                          
104 For an anthropological overview and historical developments of Montenegro’s history see 
Durham (1928). The term “Montenegrin” employed here refers to a clear identification as being 
part of the Montenegrin nation as opposed to identifying as Montenegrin because one is a 
resident of the republic.  
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Balkans was under Turkish domination and was officially recognised as a sovereign 
international entity in the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The following Balkan wars in the 
early 1900s however left ‘Montenegro unguarded and open to Great Serbia penetration’ 
(Banac 1988, 280). According to Morrison, unification was ‘agreeable’ to the majority of 
Montenegrins who adhered to a greater Pan-Slav nation (Pavlovic 2003, 86). At the turn 
of the 20th century, emerging nationalism in Montenegro was strongly rooted in Serbhood 
under the reign of King Nikola I Petrovic’s105 state and nation-building efforts. He 
modernised the country by developing and centralising its administration and 
infrastructures, building schools and departing from the traditional tribal politics under a 
Pan-Slav rhetoric emphasising the shared religion, language and common myths and 
symbols with Serbia (Fleming 2002).106 Nonetheless, Montenegrins continued to be 
defined through their residency as a separate republic with a unique history strongly 
associated with the Black Mountains and the heroism of its tribes against the Ottoman 
dominance (Cross and Komnenich 2005, 11). 
There was, and remains to this day, contention about the difference between a 
“Montenegrin” and “Serbian” identity and the manner in which unification occurred in 
1918.  The union was declared in a state of confusion in the absence of King Nicola by 
some members of parliament in Podgorica rather than the historical capital of Cetinje. The 
Greens (Zelenaši), a supporter of Montenegro’s independence, besieged Cetinje and 
surrounding towns during the “Christmas uprising” and subsequently launched guerrilla 
action against the Whites (Bijelaši)  supporters of the union (Morrison 2009, 35; Banac 
1988, 286). Lacking popular support, and with internal division over the restoration of 
full independence or just Montenegro’s “pride” in the unification process, the Greens’ 
independentist movement died down (Djilas 1958, 189). Although secessionist voices 
emerged sporadically throughout the subsequent unions, keeping the legacy of 
independence alive with waves of increased polarisation among the population107, they 
would only become a pre-eminent political force in the 2000s.  
During the communist period manifestations of a distinct Montenegrin identity were 
limited (Pavlovic 2003, 90) or strongly associated with Serbdom which reinforced the 
‘national homo duplex’ in Montenegro (Darmanović 2007, 28). Meanwhile, in Serbia, 
Montenegro had always been perceived as part of the same “Serb” nation although some 
members of the Serbian elites did not see this as a contradiction to Montenegro being 
                                                          
105 Ruled from 1860 to 1918. 
106 This is not to say that assimilation into a wider Serbian national corpus was universal. A 
divide could be seen between young, educated and city-bred Montenegrins and inhabitants of 
remote villages who still identified with their historical tribe (Pavlovic 2003, 84–85).  
107 E.g. during WWII and the Italian occupation of Montenegro. 
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independent at a time where dynasties ruled most of Europe (Pavlovic 2003, 94–95).108  
The union between Serbia and Montenegro is, therefore, a relatively old and stable affair, 
however, the nature of this “union” was not. It went from the post-WWI merging with 
Serbia, to the first and second Yugoslavia and its remaining Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY), only comprising Serbia and Montenegro after it voted to preserve the 
union in an independence referendum in 1992, also subject to considerable controversy 
(see Appendix C for a review of this episode). In 2003, the EU attempt to prevent 
independence resulted in the last union known as the “State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro” which lasted three years. This contrasted with the smoother and politically 
stable transformation of the postcolonial Canadian confederation into a federation.  
As in Montenegro, Quebec’s integration into the “union” of provinces that is Canada bears 
different historical interpretations which are still important today in understanding the 
separatist claim. A dual interpretation of history and the merging of Canadian and 
Quebec’s history has led to polarised understandings of what constitutes modern Canada 
and the “Quebec crisis” of the 20th century. On one side, French Canada, or more 
specifically some Quebecers, see the confederation as a dual entity within which they 
represent a distinct founding member (Taylor 1994, 81). Most Anglophones see an equal 
association of provinces not differentiated along language or ethnicity (Balthazar 1992, 
42).109 When Canada became independent, Quebec, as a confederate member, was an 
active participant of the Act of Union between the Upper and Lower Canada (Ontario and 
Quebec) which started the process of federalisation.  
The confederation, and later Federation did not explicitly recognise Quebec as a distinct 
nation from Canada but did account for the fact that it included ‘French 
Canadians’(Gagnon 2009, 20–21). Whereas the confederation ensured the ‘survivance’ 
of the French Canadian nation (Keating, 2001:78), it is also what protected it from 
separatism according to many scholars. It ‘allow[ed] for the expression of grievances and 
provided an outlet for alternative social and economic ideas’ (Cormier and Couton 1998, 
68). It was understood that the federation could protect Quebec’s culture and politics 
(Quinn 1979, 42). Nevertheless, outside of Quebec, the French language did not fare as 
well and relations between Francophones and the English-speaking majority were tense 
at times (Jackson and Jackson 1997, 227). 
                                                          
108 Russia has historically been an important actor in the region and a Serbian ally. However, 
during the period of interest it did not appear to have played a major role; a fact confirmed by 
discussions with scholars and politicians in Montenegro.  




The “birth” of these unions is controversial and reveals a different understanding of the 
nature of the host-state and its relation to its constituent units. Nonetheless, their 
populations were not politically discriminated against, and both federal systems enabled 
their respective population to self-govern, although the FRY was an unconsolidated 
democracy limiting individuals’ ability to exercise self-determination (c.f. HRef.7 
notably). Moreover, the federal set-up also ensured that Quebec politicians could be 
involved in the wider host-state affairs through a form of ‘cooperative federalism’ 
(Cameron 1999), while Montenegrin elites were accommodated at the federal level as 
well throughout the consecutive unions, limiting grievances within sub-national elites to 
mobilise against the centre.  
The communist period was particularly to the advantage of Montenegro, which despite its 
small size (2% of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s population), ‘punched 
above its weight’ in the Yugoslavian federation thanks to its over-representation within 
political and public functions (Morrison 2009, 66). The republic had the biggest citizens 
membership to the League of Communist of Yugoslavia and ‘many in Montenegro were 
committed to the concept of Yugoslavism’ (Cohen 1989; Morrison 2009, 81). Following 
the collapse of Yugoslavia, its local communist party was the only one to survive the 
dissolution of the Yugoslav federation  and to remain with Belgrade (c.f. Bieber 2003b, 
11–42). Furthermore, the Republic of Montenegro, despite its heterogeneous population, 
did not experience ethnic violence like its neighbours, although its army still participated 
in the conflicts alongside Serbia. While Quebec and Montenegro did not witness a large-
scale violent conflict as a result of their respective secessionist movements, once again a 
quantitative coding might fail to capture slight differences when it comes to their societal 
settings in the period of interest. 
Prior to the Parti Québécois coming into power in the province, another non-parliamentary 
independentist actor adopted a much more radical strategy. Le Front de Liberation du 
Quebec (FLQ) founded in the early 60s conducted a series of attacks and bombings 
between 1963 and 1970 which killed seven people.110 The “October crisis” showed a 
radicalisation of the secessionist demands and some members of Quebec society’s 
frustrations with the current system. The federal government headed by Prime Minister 
Pierre Elliot Trudeau decided to invoke the controversial War Measure Act to stop the 
FLQ, overriding fundamental rights and privileges of the common law in the Canadian 
Bill of Rights. The departure from peaceful (on the secessionist side), and normal 
                                                          
110 For a review of the movement and its history see Morf (1970) and Ross (1995) . These attacks 
do not meet the definition of large-scale violence used in the operationalisation of the variables in 
chapter III.  
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democratic procedures (on both sides) found little support among the Quebec population 
(Lachapelle 2005; Clément 2016). 
When Montenegro started to seek more autonomy in 1997 (see below), Belgrade’s 
response was much more aggressive and centralising than what was witnessed in Quebec. 
Slobodan Milosevic, the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1997 to 
2002, attempted to further centralise the federation and federal authorities ceased to pay 
pension contributions to Montenegro which answered by diverting the payments for the 
federal budget into its own accounts.  In 1998 Milosevic threatened to intervene militarily 
in Montenegro, to which the  Montenegrin government answered by creating its own 
alternative security force to protect itself from the armed forces of Yugoslavia (Bieber 
2003a, 33). An escalation of tensions and violence was avoided thanks to Montenegro’s 
small and closely-tied population, according to Dzankic (2009, 301). This episode, 
reminiscent of the recent conflicts in the neighbouring - newly independent - countries, 
worried the international community and the EU in particular (The Economist 1999). They 
were concerned about where further secessionist aspirations may lead and a possible 
return to civil war in the Balkans.  
Quebec and Montenegro, although both relatively poorer than their host-states, 
experienced different levels of economic development as a result of the general wealth of 
their respective host-states. Quebec’s market economy represents around 22 percent of 
total GDP of Canada (Somers and Vaillancourt 2014, 242 (average 1966-2000)). It 
remains poorer than other provinces such as oil-rich Alberta and Newfoundland or the 
most populous province of Ontario. Quebec is one of the 10 provinces within the Canadian 
federation covering about 15 percent of its North-American territory and comprising a bit 
less than 30 percent of its population. It is also the second most populous province, with 
8.215 million inhabitants in 2014 (6.5 in 1980). The north of the territory is sparsely 
populated and its vast territory hosts substantial natural resource, notably in the mining 
sector and forest resources. In contrast, the Montenegrin republic was much smaller than 
its Serbian neighbour: it represented only 5 percent of the FRY population, only slightly 
more than six hundred thousand people, and about 13 percent of the FRY territory. Its 
economy is primarily reliant on service based industry focused on tourism after its small 
industrial sector retracted considerably following the end of the SFRY. Accordingly, 
compared to Montenegro, Quebec was better suited for independence in absolute terms. 





The review of the history and contextual factors along key societal, political and economic 
variables identified in the secessionist literature to be associated with support for 
independence are insufficient to explain the emergence of secessionist movements in 
Quebec and Montenegro and how they found themselves in a position to call for an 
independence referendum. The - partial - mobilisation success in rallying Quebecers and 
Montenegrins as a potential state-seeking nation needs to be accounted for. It can be 
explained by a shift in context and its instrumentalisation by political actors.  
The emergence of Quebec nationalism and separatism is attributed to the Quiet 
Revolution culminating in the 60s. The modernisation of the province through increased 
industrialisation, urbanisation and secularisation helped the mobilisation of Francophone 
elites and a new middle-class who found themselves unable to access the highest, 
Anglophone-dominated, economic and political occupations (Fenwick 1981, 206). 
Changes in Quebec society and the weakening of traditional actors such as the Church, 
historically an important source of influence in Quebec society (Hughes 1943), and the 
defeat of the conservative Union Nationale, led to an opening in the province’s political 
structure. This socio-political paradigm shift, similar to what Gellner (1983) would 
identify as a change in the traditional balance of society creating new collective interest, 
is however overly deterministic in explaining the rise of Quebec nationalism. It cannot 
account for why it did not fully succeed – especially since other historical episodes could 
have led to such structural opening (e.g. WWII, Quinn 1979).  
The framing of the new context and political mobilisation by a new independentist party 
along a Quebec national narrative is a crucial explanatory factor. A narrative of relative 
deprivation and political and economic grievance experienced by Francophones was first 
exposed by the provincial Liberal party “Maître chez nous” political manifesto (Guimond 
and Dube-Simard 1983). The Parti Québécois, officially founded in 1968 by Lévesque111,  
took on the narrative more vehemently enabling it to increase its vote share in the 1970s, 
notably thanks to its emphasis on  the socio-economic disparity (real or perceived by 
Francophones) between the two language groups and the cultural protection of the French 
language.112   
                                                          
111 A former member of the Liberal Party, Lévesque disagreed with the federal response to 
Quebec’s requests for further accommodation within the federation and formed the Mouvement 
Souverainté-Association rallying some of the members of the existing independentist parties 
which had so far failed to gain popular support (Güntzel 2000, 374). 
112 ‘the root of English-French conflict in the economic inequality between the groups and the 
lack of French control over economic institutions in Quebec’  ‘notable disparities in income 
between Canadians of French and British origin’ (‘Report by the Royal Commission on 
Bilingualism and Biculturalism’ 1967, 208). 
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Lévesque framed separation as an option of last resort, the rest of Canada having failed to 
accommodate Quebec’s need for great autonomy (Saywell 1977, 4–5). The PQ adopted 
an “etapist” – a step by step – approach to secession, re-labelled “sovereignty”, in 1971. 
This strategy included first securing provincial power before convincing a majority of 
Quebecers to endorse statehood, which was not to break all links with the Canadian 
federations. The ambiguity over the aims of the PQ and its framing of secession 
necessitated recurrent public re-emphasising of its independentist goal, and, at times, 
created tensions among its members (Morin 1975; Saywell 1977, 120).  
The political environment, rather than broader societal context as in Quebec, better 
accounts for the reconstruction of Montenegrin nationhood between 2001 and 2006.113 
Montenegro’s long standing secessionist parties such as the Alliance of Montenegro 
(Liberalni Savez Crne Gore –LSCG) or the Social Democratic Party (SDP), never 
succeeded in gathering enough popular support to make it into government. The 
unconsolidated democratic state of the republic and FRY could be partly to blame (c.f. 
Bieber 2004), but analyses of the electorate confirm that, even with such institutional 
obstacles, a large portion of the population was for long disinclined to support them (Jenne 
and Bieber 2014, 448). The turning point occurred when the dominant political force in 
the republic split in 1997.  
During the mid-1990s, the FRY essentially functioned as a unitary state thanks to elite 
congruence between the two republics under Milosevic’s government. The federation was 
composed of two chambers: the council of citizens and the council of republics. The latter 
membership was evenly divided between the two republics. The two entities could design 
their own constitution and the competencies of the federation were very loosely defined 
leading to the union holding, paradoxical, confederal and unitary features while working 
as a consociation thanks to the grand coalition of Serbia and Montenegro’s ruling parties 
(c.f. Malešević 2000 for a review of the federal design). The two disproportionate 
republics, however, quickly proved dysfunctional due to their different economic and 
policy needs. Serbia’s leadership efforts to further strengthen the federal government 
powers, especially when Milosevic took its presidency in 1997 were felt to be detrimental 
to the much smaller republic. 
The situation was made worse by the UN sanctions on the FRY which plunged 
Montenegro into an economic crisis (Morrison 2009, 107). The international embargo 
helped strengthen the grip of the Montenegrin oligarchy on political institutions and the 
                                                          




private sector, while in Serbia many companies remained state-owned (Malešević and 
Uzelac 2007, 697). Although independence was completely off the agenda, the tension 
between the two capitals grew over the years notably when Serbia put pressure on 
Montenegro to abolish its defence and foreign ministries and set a trading restriction 
cutting supplies when Montenegro attempted to distance itself from the war in Kosovo 
(Bieber 2003a, 28–29).  
Prime Minister Djukanović, strong figurehead of the former Montenegrin Communist 
party rebranded the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) wished to distance Montenegro 
from Belgrade’s detrimental economic and international policies. Bulatović, the president 
of Montenegro at the time and another strong figure of the party, remained loyal to 
Milosevic and formed the Socialist People’s Party (SNP).114 Djukanović anti-Milosevic, 
pro-western and democratic rhetoric was welcomed by the republic’s ethnic minorities, 
the Serbian opposition and the international community which offered their support as 
long as independence was off the agenda (Dzankic 2009, 170; Tadic 1999).  
Even before Djukanović’s DPS independentist agenda became clear in 2000, its position 
in government facilitated the implementation of nation-building policies on language and 
state symbols115 to differentiate between the Montenegrin and Serb identity schemas 
(Dzankic 2014, 362). The DPS started by reinstating the Montenegrin Orthodox Church 
(MOC) over the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), primarily as a means to further distance 
itself from Milosevic and gathered support from the religious population. There followed 
a progressive and steady re-instauration of symbols of Montenegrin statehood. The Latin 
and Montenegrin dialect (Ijekavski dialect of Serbian) over the former official “Serbo-
Croatian” was emphasised, although Cyrillic scripts remain in use. This nation-building 
agenda culminated in the 2004 Law on State Symbols setting the new Montenegrin flag 
and the national anthem (Lazarević 2011).  
The use and definitions of these symbols were subject to contestation among political 
parties which had now formed into two, pro-Montenegrin and pro-Serb, blocks and 
provoked ‘a similar degree of polarization among the people’ (Dzankic 2013, 365; Jenne 
and Bieber 2014). The 1997 Presidential elections and the 1998 Parliamentary elections 
resulted in an almost even split for the recently divided DPS and SNP, gathering together 
                                                          
114 Huszka attributes the split of the party to economic circumstances and the need to retain 
electoral support (2013, 108). Dzankic interviews also point to competition over the control of 
money flow and black markets within the DPS as an important factor in its division rather than a 
genuine concern for Serbian-Montenegrin relations (2009, 167–68). 
115 Some of the historic Montenegrin figures used to promote Montenegrin distinctiveness 




over 95 percent of the total votes. Djukanović won the second round with 50.8 percent of 
the vote (OSCE/ODIHR 1997). At the time, the DPS discourse was not about secession 
but the need for Montenegro to free itself from Milosevic rather than the union with 
Serbia. By the early 2000s, however, the DPS discourse had become increasingly 
independentist, matching its nationalist policies and implementation of “creeping 
independence” between 1998 and 2001.  
After coming to power Djukanović’ efforts to separate Montenegro from Serbia resulted 
in an almost de-facto Montenegrin state. By 2001 most ties with the FRY were broken 
until the fall of Milosevic. Following the change of government in Serbia, the 
Montenegrin government re-authorised federal and Serb representatives within the FRY 
office in Podgorica. By then, Montenegro had a different currency (the German mark and 
then Euro in 2002), financial system and established independent foreign relations with 
the West (the US and EU in particular) who had welcomed its opposition to Milosevic (S. 
Vuković 2015, 431). The only remaining competencies of the FRY in the early 2000s 
were mainly membership of international institutions, military service, Yugoslav 
passports, and air traffic management (International Crisis Group 2001; de Vrieze 2001).   
The Montenegrin government policies of nationhood and statehood and politicisation of 
the Montenegrin identity resulted in a new political cleavage within Montenegro’s society 
as it backlashed with the counter-formation of a strong Serbian identity and support for 
the union with Serbia (Dzankic 2009, 2013).116 At the start of the communist period, 91 
percent of Montenegro’s inhabitants identified as “Montenegrin”, referring principally to 
their residency and a label compatible and supplemental to other identities such as “Serb” 
or “Yugoslav”. Since 1998, the number of Montenegrin identifiers dropped to below 40 
percent in the 2011 census, while those identifying themselves as “Serb” rose to a similar 
level (Jenne and Bieber 2014, 431, 435).117  
With the transformation of Quebec society and the Parti Québécois campaign, the 
historically articulated conflict around Francophones vs. Anglophones and their 
protection inside and outside of Quebec, which did not question the existence of Canada 
itself, had successfully become about the Quebec society vs. Canada (Fenwick 1981, 211). 
While the use of the term “Québécois” was previously limited to people living in Quebec 
city, it became a label for inhabitants of the whole province carrying a consciousness of 
                                                          
116 While Džankić uses the term ‘political cleavage’ to refer to this new divide within 
Montenegrin society, Bierber (2002, 7) avoids it since political divisions do not strictly follow 
ethnic line thanks to the DPS attempt to attract minorities (see chapter 7).  
117 The authors find evidence of the shift towards greater Serbian identification in the North of 




society and pride as opposed to simply being French-Canadian (Balthazar 1992, 
664).While most Francophone inhabitants of Quebec self-identified as French Canadian 
or Canadian in 1970 (44% and 35% respectively), In 1990 the majority identified as 
Quebecois (59 percent, vs. 29 for French Canadian and 9 for Canadian)  (Pinard 1992, 
493).  
Yet, it did not mean that all of PQ supporters were nationalist endorsing the need for an 
independent Quebec. Despite a form of Quebec national identity making grounds and 
becoming politicised, it did not overhaul the attachment of the Quebec population for 
Canada or their Canadian identity (Blais and Nadeau 1992; Henderson 2007). When 
Quebecers are particularly dissatisfied with the Canadian federal government, notably 
after the failures to amend the constitution to accommodate their demands for special 
status within the federation (e.g. Meech Lake Accord in 1987), they tend to, more or less 
temporarily, identify primarily as Quebecers over Canadian (Mendelsohn 2002; Blais et 
al. 1996). 
In both cases, national - ethnic - secessionist mobilisation was only partially successful. 
Polls showed support for independence under the political elites campaigning efforts – 
one from a position of power (DSP) the other seeking it (PQ) – increasing from below 20 
in the early 70s to a potential of over 30 percent in Quebec at the end of the decade, and 
to around  20 to 30 percent in the mid-1990s118, to between 40 to 50 percent in 2001 in 
Montenegro with an even distribution of undecided respondents (Croisat, Petiteville, and 
Tournon 1992, 43; Yale and Durand 2011; CEDEM 2002, 3; Huszka 2003, 47). While 
not a majority, it was sufficient for the secessionist actors to form a government in their 
respective regions and trigger an independence referendum.  
 
VI.2. Independence Referendum Call  
 
VI.2.a. Access to power  
 
While some organisations and political parties advocating Quebec and Montenegrin 
independence existed throughout Canada’s history and the union between Serbia and 
Montenegro, some of which in Montenegro had called on an independence referendum 
before, they never became important political forces. The turning point for Montenegro 
                                                          
118 It was not possible to retrieve exact figures from a reliable source for Montenegro in the mid-
1990s. Estimation from 1992 referendum and discussions with scholars specialising on 
Montenegro.   
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took place in 1997 with a schism in governing elites. The incumbent successfully rallied 
support around an increasingly independentist agenda based on a narrative already found 
in the existing marginal independentist parties such as achieving more liberal, democratic 
states, and joining the European Union. In Quebec, the independentist actors first needed 
to mobilise sufficient support to come to power. In both cases, access to the regional 
government was crucial in the ability to call and organise an independence referendum 
further supporting HRef.8.  
The 2000 federal elections were held in a particularly tense context as Milosevic curtailed 
Montenegrin federal representation in the FRY a week before the elections (Morrison 
2009, 179). In an interview during the summer of 2000, when asked about a possible 
independence referendum, Djukanović did not express any hurry in holding a plebiscite 
if his party was to win the upcoming elections. Instead, he believed that reforms were 
needed notably attempting a ‘renewed union’ and they ‘ought to respect the profound 
division within Montenegro’ (Rackovic 2000). The increasingly ambiguous 
independentist agenda became crystal clear when Djukanović called on anticipated 
elections to consolidate his power after Milosevic’s fall. The distancing from Belgrade 
and the FRY authorities on grounds of opposing Milosevic’s wars and authoritarianism 
could no longer hold, and the US and EU now expected Montenegro to resume its original 
place in the federation (Friis 2007, 70).119  
The government of Podgorica was not ready however to relinquish its autonomy and share 
power with its considerably bigger and more powerful neighbour despite the federal 
design not being particularly disadvantaging to Montenegro (albeit on paper rather than 
practice, Sekelj 2000, 58–59). Furthermore, tensions with Belgrade and the newly elected 
Democratic Alliance (DOS) government were still high, as the latter did not diverge from 
Milosevic’s centralist vision of the union. The new FRY president Vojislav Kostunica in 
2000 (and Serbian Prime Minister in 2004) in particular was not trusted to concede power 
to Montenegrin elites outside Serbian control (Bieber 2003b, 35). Finally, the Serbia 
democratisation process and the likelihood of joining the European Union in the near 
future remained slim for the federation, going against the DPS political rhetoric since 
1997 (Friis 2007, 70). The incumbent was also facing corruption scandals and an 
increasing number of social protests by 2001 (Borović 2001) and the need to ensure its 
political future. 
To satisfy the EU and US demands the DPS and its reluctant For a Better Life coalition 
partners proposed a new arrangement between two independent states in 2000, known as 
                                                          
119 For perspective on individual EU state members c.f. Heimerl (2004).  
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Montenegro’s “Platform II”. The proposal, in addition to emphasising Montenegro’s 
history as an independent state, also stated the need to hold a referendum on independence 
in the two republics which were to come together again into a loose confederation as two 
sovereign and independent states (Caspersen 2003, 109; Dzankic 2009, 315–16). This 
proposal was already present in the Liberal Alliance and SDP manifestos in the early 
1990s. The Serbian government, however, made it clear that the only acceptable 
framework was a common federation where Montenegro would be given a status similar 
to that of Quebec within the Canadian federation, a position supported by the opposition 
in Montenegro, leading to a stalemate (Dzankic 2009, 319).  
In the 2001 parliamentary election the new political cleavage within the Montenegrin 
citizenry was clearly set with a For Independence coalition on one side lead by the DPS, 
and For Yugoslavia headed by the SNP. The DPS and SDP coalition lost their 
parliamentary majority (42 percent of vote-share) and formed a minority government 
thanks to the LSCG, a DPS long-standing critic, headed by Filip Vukanovij (almost 8 
percent of vote-share). The pro-Serb and federal collation formed of the SNP, Serbian 
People’s Party (SNS) and the People’s party (NS) gathered 40.5 percent of vote shares 
(Bieber 2003b, 36).120  
Neither Quebec or Montenegrin secessionists could count on an electoral majority when 
they called an independence referendum. The PQ secured 41 percent of the votes in 1976 
in the Quebec general elections, defeating the Quebec Liberal Party (PLQ). Although it 
did not have a majority, the PQ won 71 seats enabling it to form a government and 
implement the “sovereignty” referendum promised in their campaign manifesto (Cloutier, 
Guay, and Latouche 1992, 35–36). Pinard and Hamilton (1977) believe the party would 
have gained even more support if it had not been perceived as a threat by some Quebecers 
because of its independentist agenda. Indeed, support for independence stood at the very 
most at 40 percent, depending on the question’s wording, when they took hold of the 
provincial government.  
The PQ binding itself to hold an independence referendum without securing a majority 
support prior to it was a risky strategy. Not only were the chances of losing the referendum 
high, it could have alienated the Quebec electorate which was very attached to the 
Canadian federation and not convinced by the secessionist call. The ambiguity of the 
referendum question and the step-by-step process which included a second referendum 
should the first one be successful (c.f. question in the next chapter) sheds doubt on whether 
the party was fully committed to holding an independence referendum in 1980. The 
                                                          
120 For a review of Montenegro’s political scene c.f. Goati et al. (2015).  
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Péquistes were very aware of their chances and did everything to “soften” the 
independentist agenda. The federal response, however, paradoxically, made sure that the 
referendum was indeed about an in or out option (c.f. chapter VII). 
Following the sovereigntist defeat in 1980, the “patriation” of the Canadian constitution 
in 1981, which until then remained officially under the responsibility of the British 
Parliament, offered the first opportunity to implement the promises made by the No 
campaign to answer Quebec’s grievances. The “renewed” federalism, awaited by all 
Canadian provinces was concluded without Quebec Premier Lévesque who opposed what 
he saw as a centralisation of the federation by Trudeau during the ‘Night of the Long 
Knives’(Harder and Patten 2015, 3, 160–61). To this day, Quebec has not enacted the 
Constitution Act of 1982. The federal government initiated two further constitutional 
changes to bring Quebec within the constitution. Both the Meech Lake Accord, followed 
by the Charlottetown Accord which had to be approved by a Canadian-wide referendum 
failed to be adopted as they failed to recognise a special status for Quebec within the 
federation. Accordingly, in 1995, the 1980 concerns for the French language “survivance” 
and the socio-economic situation of Francophones was reframed by the sovereigntists to 
focus more on the constitution and the place of Quebec in the Canadian federation 
(Pammett and LeDuc 2001, 275).  
After the Yes defeat in 1980, Lévesque accepted the referendum outcome and in an 
emotional speech declared ‘My dear friends, if I understand you correctly, you are saying: 
‘until next time’’ (Lévesque 1980a). The opportunity arose again in 1994 after a 
successful campaign focused on the economy and overcoming constitutional failures. The 
PQ lead by Parizeau had already made clear its plan to hold a second independence 
referendum if elected in its campaign manifestos. While it started with a stronger “Yes” 
support base in 1995 than in 1980, the PQ only secured 44.8 percent of the votes in the 
provincial elections, just over the 44.3 percent gathered by the PLQ opposition under the 
leadership of Daniel Johnson.  
The party was joined by two new independentist actors in Quebec -and for the first time- 
in the federal political scene. The 1993 “earthquake election” brought the new 
sovereigntist Bloc Quebecois121 (BQ) into the Canadian House of Commons as the main 
opposition to Jean Chrétien’s Liberal government. It aimed to promote considerable 
constitutional reforms and aspired to make Quebec a “sovereign state” (‘Le Manifeste Du 
Bloc Québécois’ 1991, 2). The Action Democratic du Quebec (ADQ) was formed by 
                                                          
121 The Bloc Quebecois was formed under the initiative of Lucien Bouchard, former Tory following 
the defeat of the Meech Lake Accord in 1991. 
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former Liberal politicians Jean Allaire and Mario Dumont dissatisfied by the party’s 
endorsement of the Charlottetown Accord in 1992 (Gagnon and Lachapelle 1996, 178). 
The ADQ did not have a secessionist agenda but supported the PQ government in the 
referendum.  
 VI.2.b. Why ‘let the people decide’?  
 
The context sets rules of appropriateness on actors which may restrain perceptive and 
possible actions (March and Olsen 1998). In both cases, a referendum was needed to 
secure internal and external legitimacy in order to achieve sovereign statehood. With an 
almost evenly divided population in Montenegro and a clear lack of a majority in Quebec 
for independence, even secessionist partisans could contest a form of state creation 
without a clear popular mandate and what would have been perceived as an authoritarian 
and illegal seizing of the republic and province by their respective governments. 
Montenegrin and Quebec secessionist elites both ruled out means to achieve statehood 
found in other secessionist movements such as an armed confrontation with the host-state 
or declaring independence without, or prior to, holding a plebiscite. 
Violent actions were not envisaged by either the PQ or DPS and their independentist 
coalition partners. A military defeat of Serbia to secure independence in the early 2000s 
would have been highly unlikely due to the difference in size and resources between the 
two republics. A descent into conflict was exactly what the institutional community was 
worried about, and pushing unilaterally for independence and risking an escalation of 
violence would have been detrimental to the DPS and its coalition partners’ goal of 
obtaining international recognition, especially with the pro-European, democratic 
rhetoric adopted in 1997 to distance themselves from Serbia in the first place.  
Finding enough resources and manpower to support such confrontation with the 
federation in Canada was not an option for Quebec secessionists. The experience with 
the FLQ demonstrated a few years earlier the real risk of alienating further the Quebec 
population from contemplating separation. As a member of a consolidated democracy, 
such actions would have been counter to everything Quebecers and Canadians are used 
to. Within the party, notably for Lévesque in 1980, a democratic, progressive accession 
to independent statehood was at the core of the agenda. Respect for democratic principles 
was also clearly laid out in their Manifestos (e.g. McKenzie 1972; Parti Québécois 1994, 
16). 
In both cases, in order to claim sovereignty on behalf of a people, such people need first 
to clearly endorse separation; either through giving a strong electorate mandate to the 
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secessionist party (at least more than 50 percent of votes in their favour), or more 
convincingly, through a plebiscite. The idea that making it into the provincial government 
would be enough to declare independence was entertained for a time in the 1970s by 
members of the PQ and Parizeau prior to the 1994 Quebec general elections (LeDuc 
2002b, 151; Lepage 2005).  
Despite being able to form a government at the provincial level, the PQ did not have an 
electoral majority, and opinion polls showed they were far from winning a referendum 
on independence with – depending on the wording of the question – a maximum of 40 
percent Yes support (c.f. chapter VII). Pinard and Hamilton (1977, 250) believe that 
including in their manifesto the holding of an independence referendum if elected was a 
strategy to gain the 1976 elections by separating the contentious issue of separation from 
their other policies; a strategy used for other political issues in western democracies (c.f. 
Björklund 1982; Morel 1993).  
The Montenegrin independence referendum of 2006 was first clearly called in 
2001(Dzankic 2009, 191). By the time the referendum was held, the commitment to hold 
a referendum of the DPS government and his coalition partners the SDP-LSCG was clear. 
The 1980 referendum in Quebec, given its wording, and the delaying of the 1995 
referendum, show that some of the PQ members were less inclined to commit to a 
plebiscite on independence. In Quebec, support for independence had surged since the 
mid-1990s, with for the first time a possible narrow majority in favour of secession 
detected in 1999 (‘Montenegrin Public Opinion at a Turning Point’ 1999). Yet, even in 
2001, victory was still within the margin of error. After the Montenegrin independence 
referendum had to be postponed in 2001 under the external pressure exercised by the EU 
(see below), 61.6 percent of Montenegrin supported the Belgrade Agreement to redesign 
and renew the partnership between Serbia and Montenegro. Moreover, when asked if a 
referendum on independence was to take place instead of the Agreement to renew the 
union, only 42.3 percent of respondents said they would vote for independence, and 40.2 
against (CEDEM 2002, 3–4; excluding “don't knows"). Securing independence in a 
referendum in 2001 would have been a challenge for the secessionists even if the internal 
opposition, Serbia and the international community had consented to it. 
Furthermore, in both cases, polls showed that referendums were a popular option among 
the public. In a DAMAR poll conducted between the 15th and 23rd of October 2000, three-
quarters of citizens consulted said that the question of the status of Montenegro should 
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be decided via a referendum (Radulovic 2000).122 In Quebec, despite few people 
supporting independence, a referendum on constitutional reforms was popular. In a poll 
conducted in 1977 for La Press, 78 percent of the Francophone population wished to have 
a referendum, although a majority of Anglophones (58 percent) opposed it (La Press, 27 
Sept 1977, p8). 
What is more, the constitution of the FRY of 1992 - and then more clearly the constitution 
of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro - also detailed the possibility of seceding via a 
plebiscite (c.f. next chapter). There was also the precedent set in the former members of 
Yugoslavia, and more importantly the unilateral referendum of 1992 demanded by Serbia 
and organised by the Montenegrin pro-Serbian government to assert the small republic’s 
desire to maintain the federation and boycotted by the pro-independentist actors (c.f. 
Appendix C). In Canada, Newfoundland decided by referendum in 1948 its status and 
whether to join Canada. 1980, and the 1992 Charlottetown constitutional amendments 
referendum also demonstrated that the consultation of the public on constitutional 
questions on how they should be governed was perceived to be a political requirement. 
These past events represent a form of internal pressure and precedent-setting on holding 
a plebiscite to secede.   
The lack of a clear majority in both cases – while making the calling of an independence 
referendum less desirable – is paradoxically also what made it necessary. In both cases, 
the electorate that put the secessionist parties in power, and especially the majority who 
did not, could have easily protested against a unilateral declaration of independence 
without any formal process that would reflect that this was indeed what they – the people 
– wanted. Accordingly, the independence referendums were ‘politically obligatory’ 
referendums (Morel 2007) and essential for internal legitimacy to bring the opposition 
and opponents of independence to concede to the creation of a new state. Internal 
legitimacy also reflects on external-legitimacy and pressures the host-state and 
international community into surrendering to the sub-national majority’s will.  
The reaction of the host-state was likely to be a strong consideration in both cases. If a 
declaration of independence occurred in the later 1990s or early 2000 when Milosevic 
was in power and tensions were already very high (see above), a possible escalation into 
violent confrontation might have been possible between pro-Serbian forces and 
Montenegrin independentists. Nonetheless, with the new government in Belgrade eager 
to move away from Milosevic’s policies and gain support from the international 
                                                          




community (S. Vuković 2015, 434–435), such escalation seemed less likely post-2000 on 
Serbia’s side. Yet, Serbia could still refuse to recognise separation and stand by the 
opposition, especially since the international community favoured the preservation of the 
common state and the Montenegrin population remained extremely divided.   
Some Canadians scholars have speculated what the secession of Quebec would look like 
(E.g. Freeman and Grady 1995; Dion 1995; Young 1995; Whitaker 1996). Young (1995, 
85–86) believes that the Canadian government would not have allowed secession to 
happen without a clear popular mandate, especially since the PQ did not hold a majority 
of votes and there were no clear indications that a majority of the province supported 
independence. The referendum was therefore both a means to further mobilise Quebecers 
in favour of independence and assert independence through the majority’s will.  
In Montenegro, the independentist coalition could not always agree on the referendum’s 
place as a means to achieve secession. The LSCG was always a strong opponent of 
Djukanović and together with the Social Democrats, were unconditional supporters of the 
referendum being held in 2001 (Bieber 2003a, 36–37). It often publicly accused the DPS 
of bad faith and a lack of commitment to holding a referendum (Radulovic 2001; Tadic-
Mijovic 2001b). The narrow margin of support for independence in opinion polls, the 
divergence over the referendum technicalities among the coalition partners (c.f. Chapter 
VII), and the US and European Union opposition, delayed the referendum and Djukanović 
felt increasingly pressured to engage in negotiation with Serbia to renew their union. 
Winning a majority was not enough in the case of Montenegro. The international 
opposition to the referendum and whether the “will of the people” would be recognised, 
should they decide to leave, was a major concern for the republic’s president.  
 
VI.3. Agreeing to the Referendum  
 
VI.3.a. Quebec: latent consent and legitimisation  
 
The Canadian federal government responded to the changes in Quebec society in the 60s 
and 70s, by granting some of the demands for more autonomy and the accommodation 
and preservation of the French language. In particular, Prime Minister Lester Pearson 
seemed open to the  “two founding nations” understanding of the Canadian federation and 
declared in 1963 that Quebec ‘is more than a province because it is the heartland of a 
people: (…) it is a nation within a nation’ (Quoted in Guibernau 2006, 52). Quebec was 
subsequently allowed to have a say in immigration matters, a task other provinces left to 
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the federal government. Most importantly, the Bilingualism Act of 1969 giving French 
equal status in the Canadian government ensured Quebecers’ inclusion within broader 
federal politics by guaranteeing them strong representation in the Cabinet (Mcewen and 
Lecours 2008, 230–38).123 Since then Quebecers have often been over-represented in the 
Canadian federal system and personal bilingualism is now the norm for top political 
positions at the federal level. 
The steps of the early 60s towards accommodating Quebec’s growing nationalism were 
short-lived. The federal government refused subsequent demands from Quebec for any 
particular status, stressing instead a symmetrical federal model under the pressure of 
Western Canada, and started cutting back Quebec’s special and distinct status within the 
federation (McRoberts 1991, 6). Trudeau offered an alternative vision of the Canadian 
federation based on multiculturalism and politicians in western provinces and Ottawa 
were taken aback by the PQ electoral success in 1976 (Laforest 1995).  In 1977, Trudeau 
created a Task Force on Canadian Unity (known as the Pépin-Robarts Commission) to 
gather insight on how to reform the federation and face this new challenge. The 
commission recommended that a new constitution ‘recognise the historic partnership 
between English and French-speaking Canadians, and the distinctiveness of Quebec’ 
(Pépin and Robarts 1979 art. 28, ii). By 1994, the federation was still in a predicament 
after two attempts to rally Quebec failed.  
During my stay in Quebec, reactions diverged widely among academics specialising in 
Quebec and Canadian politics when I first presented the proposed classification of the 
Quebec referendums as a “consensual” process, from outright endorsement or opposition, 
showing a very polarised understanding of the process.124 Once the definition was 
clarified, all scholars agreed with my classification of Quebec, but some remained 
sceptical about its utility.  
The resolutions adopted by the sovereigntist-led National Assembly in the late 70s to 
assert  Quebecers’ right to decide their status was never formally challenged by the 
opposition in Quebec or Federal Government, nor did they try to stop the referendum 
taking place (criterion 1 for an agreed process).125 The non-intervention by the federal 
governments and other provinces has been viewed by many as a recognition of the right 
of Quebec to decide alone its political status (Turp 1992, 51–52). While it holds some 
                                                          
123 The representation of Francophones of Quebecers however varies according to the political 
party in power at the federal level.  
124 This could also be explained by the stronger remembrance of the 1995 referendum than the 
1980 plebiscite, which was also a more “tense” process with a very close outcome creating more 
controversy.  
125 C.f. chapter VII for individual challenges made.  
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truth, I believe that this is a misleading interpretation of the overall strategy of the federal 
government and ROC to confront Quebec’s secessionist aspirations. Three reasons, in 
particular, can be put forward to explain why the political opposition in Quebec and the 
federal government did not stand against the referendum.  
Firstly, the PQ could legally put in the place legislation required to hold a plebiscite, 
although the subject matter – separation – was not within its sole jurisdiction (see next 
chapter). Secondly, and more importantly, the democratic need for a referendum 
discussed above also applies to the host-state government as primarily a political, rather 
than constitutional, constraint. This limitation cannot be said to be absolute, but the federal 
government’s room for manoeuvre was limited due to the strong possibility of suffering 
a negative political fallout if it stood against citizens’ ability to express themselves 
through peaceful democratic channels (Morel 2007, 1056). It might have ultimately 
heightened grievances in Quebec, increased polarisation among the Quebec electorate and 
ultimately increase support for separation. 
Finally, a Yes victory was unlikely (Hypothesis HRef.A.1). The low support for secession 
in Quebec meant a Yes victory was very unlikely, especially since Quebecers were still 
attached to Canada and feared the consequences of secession. At the time, there was not 
much need to engage with the question of whether secession was legal and how it should 
occur. It became more of a concern however in 1995 when the question was more clearly 
about an in-out option, rather than necessitating a second referendum to endorse secession 
as in 1980, and support for independence made grounds.  
Accordingly, the right of Quebecers to decide their political status was virtually never 
disputed prior to the 1990s by the federalists within Quebec and the federal government 
and was asserted throughout the 1980 and 1995 process. The Pépin-Robarts Commission 
draw a clear conclusion that the democratic will of Quebecers had to be respected by the 
ROC and federal government, emphasising the ‘compound’ and ‘willing’ nature of the 
federation (Pépin and Robarts 1979, 121–22). More importantly, the political opposition 
in Quebec and the federal government actively engaged with the referendum process and 
the Quebec public to convince them to assert their will to stay within the Canadian 
federation (Criterion 2).  
In 1980 this engagement consisted of ensuring that the referendum debate was clearly 
about whether to remain or leave Canada, paradoxically making it even more 
“secessionist” than the PQ was arguing for (c.f. Chapter VII for examples). The Canadian 
Prime Minister from 1979 to 1980, Joseph Clark, even declared himself open to 
negotiations over ‘sovereignty-association’ with Quebec in the case of a Yes victory 
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(Radio-Quebec, 10 September 1979). Even his successor Trudeau, who refused to 
negotiate, could not say that the will of a majority of Quebecers – often supplemented by 
the term “large” or “clear” – would be denied (e.g. The Gazette, 3 January 1978).   
The campaign strategy as we will see in chapter VII was focused on stressing that all links 
between Quebec and Canada will be cut if the latter’s citizens decided to endorse 
“sovereignty”, relabelled “separation” or “secession”. This is a strong symbolic 
legitimisation of the right of the Quebec people to secede. It is not denied, instead, it is 
even re-enforced by clearly envisaging this possibility – albeit very negatively. The 
modalities were rarely if ever, addressed between 1977 and 1980.  
The federal government did leave itself some room for manoeuvre by remaining vague 
on the legal implications of the plebiscite, with some No actors referring to the need for a 
“clear” or “large” majority for the referendum to be clearly binding (c.f. next two chapter), 
challenging my coding. Yet, one should not apply a retrospective coding on an event that 
did not happen – such as the federal government refusing to acknowledge the majority of 
the Quebec electorate endorsement of a Yes vote. The evidence at the time of the events 
of interest should take precedence in the coding process. Direct engagements with, and 
endorsements of the referendum process among Quebec and Canadian elites largely 
outweighed opposition. 
In 1995, the ambiguities over how much of a majority was needed were still present, but 
the 1980 referendum had created a strong precedent in allowing Quebecers a choice over 
their sovereignty. All parties had accepted the outcome in 1980, and denying the 1995 
referendum vote would have been very difficult, especially with a public frustrated with 
the failed federal reforms to accommodate Quebec. The Progressive Conservative Party 
in 1991 also had asserted the right of the men and women of Quebec to self-determination 
(but not the Quebec province itself) (Young 1995, 87).  
While a legal challenge was raised in 1995, focusing on the proposed bill by the PQ on 
the ability of Quebec to unilaterally secede rather than the referendum itself, it was not 
considered in time to stop the referendum (c.f. chapter VI). Furthermore, leader of the No 
camp Daniel Johnson announced that the court provisional statement of concern about the 
legality of the process would not change his strategy and the federal government would 
participate in the debate (Cardinal 2005). Although the issue was sporadically raised 
during the campaign, it is difficult to trace mentions of “legality” by the No camp or 
federal politicians.  To this day, there are divergent views of whether a narrow Yes victory 
would have led to secession.  
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Some actors in the No camp did maintain ambiguity, such as Chrétien saying a clear 
majority – without definition126 – would be needed (Campbell 1995). But these remarks 
were very controversial even among supporters of the federation. The Quebec Liberals, 
some of whom had clearly stated that they would endorse the outcome (e.g. Lucienne 
Robbilard), seemed to be more divided on how to answer a small Yes victory (Hebert and 
Lapierre 2014). Furthermore, in line with the 1980 strategy, pro-federal politicians had 
stressed the “determinant” nature of the plebiscite, including Johnson in his final speech 
making it clear that the referendum was about ‘stay or leave ... this is what is at stake’ 
(Cardinal 2005, part II, 14:10). The argument that the question was unclear, and a “clear” 
majority was needed only started to be clearly challenged when the Yes side made gains 
in the polls, but they remained rhetorical: ‘We had engaged in the referendum on a basis 
of 50 plus 1. You cannot change the rules afterwards’ (Brian Tobin127, quoted in Hebert 
and Lapierre 2014, 116).  
By participating in the campaign, convincing people to vote No (to what was a vote on 
“separation”), and seeking the will of the Quebec people to endorse the continuation of 
the federation, is a clear endorsement of the referendum process and, perilously, 
politically binding on accepting its outcome in the case of a Yes victory. Nonetheless, 
although there was a clear engagement with the referendum process and a lack of outright 
opposition in 1980 and 1995, clearly granting the possibility of secession, it was not at 
any price or under any circumstances. 
Chrétien remained hopeful that in the case of a small majority, the BQ and ADQ leaders 
would accept to negotiate a new arrangement, withdrawing their support for the PQ, since 
this is what ultimately the electorate would have wanted. Importantly, however, if 
negotiations failed and support for independence did not dissipate, the federalist leaders 
recognised that Quebec could not be “kept” (c.f. interviews with actors in Cardinal 2005; 
and Hebert and Lapierre 2014). Especially since one of the biggest challenges in 
accommodating Quebecers would have come from the rest of Canada and other federal 
political parties. It would have been misleading to expect that if the Liberals had lost the 
referendum, the other provinces would have allowed ‘Quebecers negotiating with a bunch 
of Quebecers’ as Tobin, put it, seconded by West’s Canada Reformed Party leader 
Manning (Hebert and Lapierre 2014, 115, 171) 
                                                          
126 Interviews conducted by Herbert and Lapierre with the key actors of the 1995 referendum 
suggest that the Liberal party conceived it as anything below 52 or 53 (2014, 69). 
127 Cabinet minister of the Chrétien government.  
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The rest of Canada was much more willing to “let Quebec go” than the federal 
government, as they grew frustrated with Quebec’s demand128, but also paradoxically 
potentially more willing to negotiate its exit according to some politicians at the time and 
scholars (e.g. Young 1995; Cardinal 2005). This assertion is difficult to test given that 
publicly acknowledging this possibility would have been detrimental to keeping leverage 
over how to respond to the referendum outcome and what to concede to Quebec. 
Furthermore, the ROC is not a unitary bloc but distinct provinces with their own interests 
(Martin 1995; Young 1999; Simeon 1998). Secession may have come at a cost: if Canada 
was divisible, so was Quebec.  
Accordingly, negotiating a new arrangement -whether entailing full sovereignty or not - 
would have been difficult, and the position of the ROC might have further frustrated 
Quebecers and their place in the federation, potentially further increasing support for 
secession. To gain recognition the Quebec government would have likely needed to 
consider how to satisfy the ROC that the country will not be cut in two and potentially 
amend its borders. A regional breakdown, possibly through sub-territorial referendums 
(Laponce 2004) remained a possibility. A new form of union between two sovereign states 
resembling the European Union was argued to be the best solution according to 
secessionists (Cloutier, Guay, and Latouche 1992, 71–72).  
Finally, while the question of independence and the referendum process was largely a 
Canadian-Quebec affair, international actors were not totally absent. France and the US 
notably, as territorial and cultural neighbours, influenced the independentist debate and 
legitimised/delegitimised the separatist claims. President Charles de Gaulle’s 
controversial declaration in July 1967 in Montreal ‘Vive le Quebec libre!’  insinuating his 
support for a “free” Quebec helped give credibility to a separatist cause (Saywell 1977, 
9). Interviews with ambassadors at the time of the 1995 referendum seem to show that the 
federal government was keen to ensure that France would not prematurely welcome an 
independent Quebec state in the case of a small Yes victory (Hebert and Lapierre 2014, 
153–55).  
Parizeau wished to ensure that the US would not stand against an independent Quebec, 
and believed securing France’s support was needed to pressure Washington to recognise 
a new state on its continent before Paris did (Cardinal 2005).129 The US, on the other hand, 
would have stood by the Canadian government and intervened in the referendum 
                                                          
128 see Laslovich (1978) on changing attitudes in ROC.  
129 For more detailed reviews of Quebec foreign relations see Legaré (2003) and Payette (2011). 
For Montenegro c.f. Đorđević (2011).  
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campaign by warning of the economic difficulties Quebec would face and a difficult 
accession to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Panetta 2014).  
Nonetheless, Canada, as the host-state, remained the primary actor able to grant 
recognition, contrary to Montenegro.  
VI.3.b. Montenegro: unavoidable referendum becomes agreed referendum  
 
After the victory of the For independence coalition in 2001, and unable to come to an 
agreement on redesigning the federal arrangement, Zoran Đinđić, the Serbian Prime 
Minister in 2001, conceded that a referendum was needed to answer the stalemate (Tadic-
Mijovic 2001a). Đinđić’s willingness to allow Montenegro to secede can be explained by 
the fact that he had good relations with the DPS government, thanks to years of 
cooperation against Milosevic and was more liberal in his views than many of its party 
colleagues (Huszka 2013, 125). After Đinđić’s assassination in 2003, Vojislav Koštunica, 
the last president of the FRY and prime minister of Serbia in 2004, effectively took over 
political leadership in Serbia. He was much less inclined to contemplate losing 
Montenegro and backed the Montenegrin internal opposition and their unwillingness to 
recognise the independence referendum process and outcome should a consultation take 
place. The host-state and internal opposition, however, are not the only reasons for why a 
unilateral independence was not held.  
The opposition of the European Union and, the more distant US, is more relevant in 
understanding the nature of the consensus needed to meet the binding and legitimate 
criteria argued to be essential for an independence referendum to fully fulfil its functions. 
The referendum and independence were not only opposed by the “host-state”, here Serbia 
representing the official, yet non-functioning, FRY, but external actors whose support was 
crucial to achieving the sought after recognition. The EU sent the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) representative Javier Solana to stop the referendum taking place 
and help the two republics agree on a new arrangement for a common state. As the 
negotiations were on-going, Podgorica announced a referendum for Spring 2002 if no 
agreement was reached (Radulovic 2002). 
The biggest worry at the time was not so much the new leadership in Belgrade, but the 
pro-Serb internal opposition in Montenegro, backed by Serbia. Koštunica, in particular, 
was seen as a hard-line Serbian-nationalist, not the most reassuring trait considering the 
recent history of the region. Yet, people I spoke to in Montenegro and some scholars (e.g. 
Hockenos and Winterhagen 2007) believe that Serbia’s opposition could have been 
overcome by the international community as the new leadership in Belgrade needed to 
normalise relations with the EU and neighbouring states in the mid-2000s. Furthermore, 
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Montenegro was not Kosovo. Serbia did not have the same societal and political 
attachment to the Montenegrin territory as Kosovo. Montenegro’s economy and the 
population were very small compared to Serbia’s (10 million vs. 620000 inhabitants and 
Serbia contributed to 94 percent of the federal funding (Macek-Macková 2011, 627)). 
Losing Montenegro did mean however becoming landlocked and the end of the “Great 
Serbia”. The Serbian government supported the opposition in the hope that secession 
could be avoided, especially with the EU reluctance to see it happen, but not at any cost 
for its own diplomatic standing with the EU.  
The international community involvement, and notably the EU which took the lead on the 
matter, was first driven by the memory of the Balkans conflict of the early 90s and feared 
for the future stability of the region, notably, how the Serbian population and the pro-Serb 
population in Montenegro would react (c.f. Batt 2005). With an evenly divided population 
in Montenegro on the question of secession, a referendum was seen as potentially very 
destabilising (Roberts 2007, 466). Secondly, they were concerned about a potential 
domino effect even a peaceful secession of Montenegro would have in Republica Sparka 
or Kosovo (S. Vuković 2015). This was despite the fact that Montenegro had a clear right 
to secession, unlike the latter cases.  
Indeed, Montenegro had the right to separate within the FRY constitution (see next 
chapter), coupled with the international assertion of this right by the Badinter Commission 
in 1992:  'By the decision of the Berlin Congress of 1878, the then Great Powers 
unanimously recognised the independence and sovereignty of Montenegro... When 
Montenegro, upon unification became part of Yugoslavia, the sovereignty and 
international personality of Montenegro did not cease to exist, but became part of the 
sovereignty of the new state’(quoted in Rich 1993, 47).  
The pressure from the European Union bore fruits and an accord to preserve the Union 
was signed by Djukanović (who did not consult his coalition partners the SDP and LSCG) 
and Koštunica on the 14th of March 2002.130 The Belgrade Agreement founded the State 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro (thereafter “State Union”) to replace the FRY.131 With 
the EU unlikely to recognise a unilateral referendum, and because of Montenegro’s 
reliance on its economic aid132, Djukanović had little option but to back-out from holding 
an independence referendum, notably when he had adopted a pro-EU and Western 
                                                          
130 For a review of the negotiation process see International Crisis Group 2002; Van Meurs 
(2003); and S. Vuković (2015).  
131 Available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/declarations/73447.pdf 
132 Montenegro was heavily reliant on foreign aid, with the EU and US bringing $90 million in 
direct aid in 2000 alone (Swardson 2000). 
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rhetoric to make his case for secession (see chapter VIII). Feeling betrayed, the pro-
independence SDP and LSCG coalition partners withdrew their support for the DPS 
government forcing anticipated elections. Djukanović declared that Montenegrins should 
not feel deceived: 
 If I were certain to obtain a sufficient majority to achieve without risks the 
national Montenegrin project, I would have done it. Sadly, we do not have an 
absolute majority, and it is much more important to preserve what we have 
achieved so far for the status of Montenegro than risk losing it because of an 
eventual unpredictable referendum result (Rudovic 2002). 
The north of Montenegro welcomed the renewed union while the rest of the republic with 
more mixed partisanship was less convinced (Cabarkapa 2002). Moreover, the lack of 
referendum to seal the elites’ driven agreement favoured the pro-independence camp who 
could, once again, criticise the new union’s legitimacy from the start. Many commented 
on the weak and likely unworkable arrangement between the two states (Bieber 2003b, 
36–38).133 The DPS leader had however secured that basis of an agreed referendum 
process so far lacking: the right to hold an independence referendum after three years in 
Article 60 (see Chapter VII). This ensured that a)  ‘the state union could never function to 
its full capacity’, and b) ‘that the statehood issue remained at the core of Montenegrin 
politics’ (Morrison 2009, 189).  
The following two years offered somewhat of a break on the referendum question, but the 
political battle and campaigning for or against independence did not lessen. In the 2002 
elections, two new camps were formed: Democratic Coalition for European Montenegro 
(with 48 percent of the vote share, and 38 seats), and the pro-Serb Together for Change 
(SNP-SNS-NS Unionist coalition) (OSCE/ODIHR 2002, 5–9). The DPS returning 
coalition government continued its efforts to assert Montenegrin nationhood and 
statehood, such as moving the presidency to the historical capital of Cetinje during a 
ceremony boycotted by the pro-unionist side (Andjelic 2005a). As 2005 loomed, the 
dispute between the two camps switched to when the three years’ moratorium on holding 
a referendum on independence was over: three years from the signing of the Belgrade 
Agreement in 2002 or three years from the adoption of the Constitutional Charter in 2003? 
In 2005, Serbia bluntly dismissed Montenegro’s demand for an “amicable separation” 
requiring that the Union continue for at least another year (McLaughlin 2005).   
                                                          
133 An extensive overview of the new federal arrangements goes beyond the scope of the thesis, 
but it is important to point out that it did not provide much room for a strong and working federal 
structure allowing for power-sharing (Tierney 2012, 399). 
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Most importantly, the referendum design was still to be agreed upon and neither the pro-
unionist coalition nor Belgrade recognised the referendum announced by the pro-
independence Montenegrin government in 2005. In December 2005 the President of the 
Republic of Montenegro, Filip Vukanović called on an extraordinary parliamentary 
meeting for February to organise the referendum by April 2006 and offered the opposition 
to negotiate the exact date and wording of the question (Andjelic 2005b). As the 
opposition kept refusing to discuss the referendum with Serbia’s support (Djuranović 
2006a), the European Union got involved once again to find a compromise.  
Now that the referendum had become unavoidable, the challenge was for all parties to 
recognise the process as legitimate and democratic, and accept its outcome as binding in 
order to put an end to the “Montenegrin question”. On the 10th of November 2005, the EU 
presidency declaration emphasised the need for the Montenegrin government and 
opposition to agree to the referendum process, and that if dialogue failed it would impact 
negatively on Montenegro’s future aspirations of European integration.  Solana 
emphasised that ‘the EU would not accept the outcome of a unilateral process, in which 
the Montenegrin authorities and the opposition fail to cooperate with the EU and other 
responsible international bodies’ (quoted in International Crisis Group 2005, 10). Special 
Envoy and Slovak diplomat, Miroslav Lajčák was appointed in December 2005 by the 
EU to lead the negotiations. Under his supervision, both sides of the debate appointed a 
negotiation team to deal with the legislative framework of the plebiscite (Friis 2007, 80). 
The Council of Europe, The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and its 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODHI), and the Venice 
Commission representatives were involved in the process.   
The numerous external actors were crucial in helping to increase the leverage and pressure 
both sides into an accord, according to Vuković, thanks to their power in conveying 
legitimacy (2015, 435). To oversee the negotiations, Lajcak and Frantisek Lipka134 were 
appointed to help reach an agreement on the referendum design and process with the latter 
chairing the Republican Referendum Committee (RRC). The EU overall approach 
focused on accommodating the unionist concern as much as possible while not 
undermining the existing institutional procedures or reforming the referendum process 
completely (c.f. next chapter).  
Following the EU intervention, the Serbian government declared that it would not oppose 
a referendum and accept that ‘ultimately, the will of the people (as expressed through a 
referendum) will prevail and should be respected’, provided the two camps agreed and 
                                                          
134 Slovak diplomat.  
181 
 
the result was clear (Committee on Foreign Affairs. Montenegro 2005 Paragraph 90). 
Besides, it is very likely Serbia never expected the State Union to work. The Serbian 
finance minister Dowidar Djelic, for instance, labelled the new union an ‘economic 
Frankenstein’, while the Serbian governor of the national bank Mljadan Dinkic believed 
it ‘unlikely to provide the basis for a lasting settlement’(quoted in Roberts 2007, 464).  
The biggest compromise to be made by the secessionists to secure an agreed process - 
binding the opposition, host-state and international actors to the “will of the people”- were 
also what endangered most a Yes victory. The concession of a  55 percent endorsement 
threshold can be attributed to the success of the European Union leverage and the promise 
of state-recognition and future EU membership (Friis 2007, 85). The Montenegrin 
independentists felt increasingly confident that victory was within their reach: by 2004, 
polls were showing that the pro-independence side could hope to achieve 56 or 57 percent 
when estimating the preference of undecided voters based on their socio-economic 
characteristics. Nevertheless, victory or defeat remained within the margin of error 




The case of Quebec and Montenegro and how their respective independence referendums 
came about offered an opportunity to review and refine some of the conceptualisations 
and assumptions discussed in chapter I and II. Firstly, the definition employed here of 
what constitutes an agreed independence referendum and its potential implications has 
been challenged. In the case of Quebec, the lack of a formal agreement questions the 
binding nature of the referendum. On the other hand, the acquiescence and clear 
engagement with the referendum question show that once political actors have legitimised 
the process and granted that people get to decide, they are ultimatetely, politically, bound 
to it. They may still wish to capitalise on the volatility of such will and leave themselves 
room for manoeuvre. The confidence of the No side in their chance of winning the 1980 
referendum resulted in a “relaxed” engagement with the referendum, paradoxically 
emphasising the possibility of secession even more forcefully than the Yes side.  
The belief of an easy victory (HRef.A.1) can account for why the federalists in Canada did 
not overly contest the referendum design. The No side complacency and precedent set by 
this first referendum almost cost the unity of Canada in 1995 as the next two chapters will 
demonstrate. The established democracy that is Canada also played an important role in 
explaining how the Quebec independence referendum came about and was agreed upon 
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(internal pressure – HRef.A.3). It made the consolidation of support for secession within 
the Quebec population essential to, in turn, legitimise the process and assent by all the 
relevant actors: the internal opposition, the federal Government and ROC (and 
international community as an extension), but most importantly, the Quebec population. 
In Montenegro, the order of importance of these actors challenges the presumption made 
in chapter I that the host-state consent is the primary factor in ensuring that the “will of 
the people” will be determinant in state-creation. The Canadian government was the 
primary granter of recognition. In Montenegro, this role was fulfilled by the EU which 
had the power to grant or oppose recognition and could compel the Serbian government - 
acting as the host-state - to do the same as the latter was not ready to engage in conflict 
over the republic (HRef.A.2 and HRef.A.3). Although Montenegro had a constitutional 
legal right to secession, and a good case that such right was asserted at the international 
level thanks to the Badinter Commission ruling, it did not weight much in reaching an 
agreed referendum. Contrariwise, in Quebec, the silence of the constitution on secession 
did not prevent a consensual referendum process (c.f. H.Ref.1-2). A constitutional 
requirement and the precedent set by its neighbours and then its own 1992 pro-Serbian 
government led the independence referendum likely to influence the existing secessionist 
parties’ call for an independence referendum in the 1990s, before being adopted and put 
into motion by the DPS post-1997. 
The historical and contextual review of Montenegro and Quebec provided support for 
some of the hypotheses laid out in chapter II and the previous quantitative findings. 
Contextual factors that would be primarily linked to support for secession hold little 
explanatory factors on their own about where independence referendums are more likely 
to occur. Montenegro lacked a clearly “distinct” proto-nation compared to Quebec, yet 
saw more support for independence (HRef.1), and both had a long-lasting partnership with 
the rest of the existing state (HRef.2). Although Montenegro and Serbia were at times 
under unstable regimes, and at risk of experiencing secessionist violence, support 
remained below a majority (HRef.3 and HRref.4). They also both enjoyed a form of 
power-sharing allowing for local elites and the population to feel that the current state was 
also “theirs” (HRef.6). Their respective economic situation does not by itself explain 
existing support for secession and the incentives, of the population or elites, to hold a 
referendum to achieve independence (HRef.9, 10 and 11). 
Instead, a more complex interaction between identity and the elite-driven historical 
salience and perception of these contextual factors, notably economic, can account for 
their partial mobilisation success. The motivation behind the use of a referendum to 
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achieve independence is also complex and context dependent, but in both cases, it required 
further mobilisation to achieve the desired majority. This contrasts with cases such as 
South Sudan or East-Timor where the independence referendums were primarily 
externally driven as part of a conflict-resolution process. Three variables stand out 
however in accounting for the DPS and PQ ability to call and hold an independence 
referendum, two of which had been detected as potential predictors of referendums in the 
previous chapter: the regime of the host-state (HRef.5), ethnic-federalism (HRef.7), and 
the ability to form a government within the region (HRef.8) facilitate the rise of 
independentist movements and their ascension to a position of power in their respective 
regions. They were all essential in facilitating initial popular mobilisation for secession 
and enabling the calling and holding of an independence referendum. Yet, in both cases, 











A referendum is a mechanism to allow citizens to have a direct say on a political 
matter. It is not, however, without considerable elite input and manipulation. This chapter 
engages with the referendums on independence in Montenegro and Quebec and their 
design. The shaping of the Montenegrin independence referendum procedures was a 
lengthy process started in the early 2000s. As the DSP leadership made its wish to hold a 
referendum on independence clear in June 2000, the constitutionality of such referendum 
and its modalities were put into question. It was not until March 2006 that the design of 
the referendum was finalised. In Quebec, the Referendum Act introduced by the Péquiste 
government in the late 70s served as the basis of the referendum procedure in 1980 and 
1995. This section will review the rules of the referendum on independence in 
Montenegro and Quebec, and focus particularly on the five areas of contention derived 
from both cases: (a) whether the independence referendum outcome was binding, (b) who 
was allowed to vote, (c) the majority needed to validate a Yes victory in favour of 
independence, (d) the actors and resources involved in the course of the plebiscite, and 
(e) the wording of the referendum question.  
We will see that in the two cases, some of these issues were less problematic than in the 
other. Furthermore, I will uncover how the negotiations and their outcome have favoured 
one side of the debate, and potentially increased or decreased the likelihood of achieving 
statehood. Through process-tracing, key time periods, actors and decisions made are 
uncovered. In the case of Montenegro, two periods can be identified in relation to the 
negotiations and finalisation of the referendum design: 2001 and 2005, with a “pause” 
from 2002 to 2004 following the signing of the Belgrade Agreement. In Quebec, the 
designing of the referendum was essentially in the hands of the secessionists and the 
procedure for the 1995 referendum differ little from the 1980 referendum. Aspects of the 
referendum would be challenged mostly after the second referendum following the close 
defeat of the Yes side. Finally, this section also considers the question of the legitimacy 




VI.1. Legality  
 
VI.1.a. The right of secession 
 
The previous chapter has shown how the independence referendums in Quebec and 
Montenegro came to be “agreed” upon. However, the agreement of the authority 
representing the existing sovereign host-state that renders the referendum legitimate and 
its outcome politically binding does not need to be legal in the first place. Whilst the legal 
path for Montenegro to secede was clear, it was insufficient without the independence 
referendum being a consensual process between the secessionist Montenegrin 
government and its opposition backed by Serbia, and to the satisfaction of the European 
Union. The existing legal provisions in the republic and FRY for a referendum on 
secession to take place were bypassed over concerns for the stability of the region. Indeed, 
Montenegro’s right of secession was rarely questioned. Yet, its demands for a referendum 
on independence were initially rebutted, unlike Quebec where its right to secession 
remains debated to this day without compromising the holding of two independence 
referendums.  
The brief historical overview in the previous chapter has already demonstrated that 
Montenegro’s right of secession could be argued multiple times and was embodied in the 
different legal documents of the “unions” it had been a part of. Firstly, because 
Montenegro used to be an independent recognised state from 1878 to 1917. Secondly, the 
SFRY constitution of 1963 and 1974 was one of the rare constitutions to provide its 
constituent republic a right to secede (Crawford 1999, 103). Thirdly, the right of 
Montenegro to self-determination was also clearly expressed by the Badinter Commission 
based on the right of utis-possedis. Fourthly, the union between Serbia and Montenegro 
included a constitutional right to secede and a referendum in 1992 to confirm the 
continuation of the federation, setting a precedent of legitimisation through popular 
consent. Last but not least, Montenegro had the entrenched right to secede in The 
Constitutional Charter adopted on the 4th of February 2003. Article 60 specifically stated 
the right of Montenegro to withdraw from the state union via referendum after a three year 
period, leaving Serbia the sole successor state (Constitutional Charter of the State Union 
of Serbia and Montenegro 2002, Article 60). 
In Quebec, the legality of secession, while discussed, was not at the forefront of the 
referendum’s debate. The right to secession and its modalities were generally an after-
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thought and the pro- and against- argument took centre stage. The British North America 
Act, or Constitutional Act, of 1867 which addressed the admission of provinces did not 
say anything about secession, and therefore did not explicitly forbid it. With the rise of 
independentist actors, legal scholars and political practitioners (some being both of those 
things) started to consider whether and how Quebec could secede (e.g. Woehrling 1991; 
Finkelstein and Vegh 1992; Gagnon and Rocher 1992; Balthazar 1995; Malkin 1998; 
Buchanan 1999). For instance, some argued that secession could be made official by using 
the amending formula in Part V of the Canadian constitution (c.f. Monahan 1995 for an 
overview of key federal legislations that would need to be considered). Woehrling (1991) 
argued that section 38 of the Constitutional act of 1982 would allow secession to take 
place if seven provinces, which would represent 50 percent of the population, agreed to 
it. Marchildon and Maxwell consider unilateral secession a realistic option for the 
provincial government in the early 1990s following the Meech Lake Accord with ROC 
unwilling to compromise (1991, 588). Resuming those perspectives, before the Clarity 
Act of 2000, the right of secession depended primarily on the interpretation of Canadian 
unification in legal and historical terms, the Canadian Polity as a democracy, and where 
Quebec and its people fitted within this. 
These perspectives on the federation, Quebec and democracy covered in the previous 
chapter justified the need for an independence referendum to achieve secession and 
contributed to the federal government to consent. They may have been genuinely endorsed 
or just taken into account by actors wishing to accommodate an electorate who might 
support these views. They also contributed to the referendum process and secession 
symbolic “legality”. Some Quebecers view the Canadian federation as a compound of two 
founding nations (Francophone and Anglophone). Within this premise, the right of the 
province to secede resides at two levels. First, as a nation; although, its status of nation 
was never formally recognised by the federal government.  Accordingly, secessionist 
actors had to first assert that Quebec was a nation and, as a continuation, its right to self-
determination (Henderson 2007, 88). Secondly, as one of the founding nations and 
constituent units of the confederation, it could argue its right to withdraw from this 
‘compact’ of provinces which willingly came together (Hueglin and Fenna 2015, 3).  In 
Montenegro, asserting the existence of a distinct Montenegrin nation was also in the 
programme of the separatist government; yet it could also rely on the existence of former 
statehood and legal provisions asserting its right to secession.  
Given the host-state response to the referendum and a campaign based on the dangers of 
separation (see chapter 7), the lack of any provisions on the right to secede does not seem 
to impede Quebec’s chances of achieving independent statehood, especially since the 
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international community remained silent on the issue and left it to Canada to decide 
whether Quebec could be recognised as a new sovereign state. On the other hand, in legal 
and constitutional terms, having a less obstructed and elusive right to secession did not 
necessarily help Montenegro’s case compared to Quebec. This provides further support 
for hypotheses HLaw.1 and HLaw.2 that an agreed independence referendum does not 
require a constitutional right to secession, and, reversely, that a constitutional right to 
secession does not guarantee an agreed independence referendum. Nonetheless, following 
the close 1995 referendum outcome, the Canadian host-state realised the need to clarify 
the right of its provinces to secede and which means could be employed to do so rather 
than leave it to secessionist actors to take the initiative (see next chapter).  
VI.1.b. A binding referendum?  
 
While the right to secede left little room for contestation in Montenegro, the means to 
achieve this were controversial. Montenegro had the capacity to hold referendums without 
federal government consent. A consultative referendum on independence could, in theory, 
have been held quite easily. However, how the referendum outcome should be interpreted 
and whether it was binding was another question. The existing Constitution of 
Montenegro of 1992 contained two somewhat contradictory provisions. While Article 2 
stated that ‘any change in the status...shall be decided only by citizens in a referendum’, 
Article 119 required that amendments regulating the ‘status of the country’ be approved 
by a two-third majority of the parliament (Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro 
1992). Accordingly, it was not clear whether the referendum result alone would be binding 
or a parliamentary decision would also be needed.  
The parties in favour of the preservation of the State-Union and Serbian politicians, not 
surprisingly, gave stronger credit to Article 119 and that the referendum should only be 
consultative (Tierney 2012, 176). Given the distribution of seats,135 a two-third majority 
was out of reach. The OSCE/ODIHR and Council of Europe which was asked by the EU 
to get involved in the early 2000s first left it up to the Montenegrin Constitutional Court 
to settle the question, although it primarily favoured the Serbian reading (Venice 
Commission 2001, 7). The constitutional court sided with the independentists and held 
that Article 2 prevailed and the referendum would, therefore, be final and binding (Şen 
2015, 123). Slovak diplomat Miroslav Lajčák, acting as negotiator and supervisor of the 
referendum on behalf of the EU, endorsed this view in 2002 (Friis 2007, 83). The binding 
nature of the referendum was confirmed in the Charter of 2003: ‘The decision on breaking 
                                                          
135 Together for Yugoslavia/Change (TfY/TfC) had 33 seats vs. 44 seats for Victory is 
Montenegro (DPS/SDP), Liberal alliance and ethnic-minorities parties, out of 77. 
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away from the state union of Serbia and Montenegro shall be taken following a 
referendum’ (Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro 2002, 
Article 60).  
Quebec’s official procedure to hold plebiscites was first considered in 1966 by the Union 
Nationale party but it was never enacted into law (Tellier 1967, 100).  Quebec, as with the 
other provinces, holds the right to modify its own constitution if it does not infringe on 
the federal constitution.  After coming to power, the PQ proposed a white paper on public 
consultation in the summer of 1977, detailing measures on the process and controls of 
expenditures. Bill 92, known as the Referendum Act, was passed a year later (Rocher 2014, 
30). The same regulations applied for the 1995 referendum, with minor amendments to 
the Referendum Act of 1978 in the interim years (e.g. Chapter V, and VI). Where the act 
was silent on the modalities, the Election Act regulating normal elections applied. A 
similar procedure was in place in Montenegro (‘Law on the Referendum of the Republic 
of Montenegro’ (Serbia and Montenegro’ 2001, Section IV, Para. 34-35)). 
The result of the referendum was non-binding on the Quebec government and was meant 
for “consultative” purposes (Referendum Act 1978 c. 6, s. 7). The National Assembly had 
to issue a writ setting the date of a referendum to be held on a specific issue. Polling day 
could not be held further than 60 days following the writ (Referendum Act 1978 c.6, s.13-
15). The procedure around the referendum itself did not go against the federal constitution, 
nor did it infringe on federal powers. Yet, the question to be addressed in 1980 and 1995 
by the Quebec electorate included changes to legislation that went beyond the power 
vested with Quebec’s government. This point was raised in a legal challenge in the process 
leading up to the 1995 referendum. The referendum question was to include reference to 
the adoption of a bill declaring Quebec’s sovereignty (Bill 1) ‘an Act respecting the future 
of Quebec’. The legality of this bill was challenged by Guy Bertrand in the Superior Court 
of Canada and asked for the referendum to be suspended (known as the Bertrand vs. 
Quebec case).  
The case did not proceed in time and the referendum went ahead. Despite allowing for the 
referendum to be held, Justice Lesage did make a statement that the bill could be in 
violation of the constitutional order. He also deemed that secession would need a 
constitutional amendment, and a unilateral declaration of independence would be illegal 
(Kohen 2006, 421–22). Parizeau defended the bill by arguing that the Constitutional Act 




VI.2. Referendum Design  
 
The lack of provision at the federal level on referendums before 1993, and the right of 
provinces to amend their own constitutions meant that the federal government had no 
control over the referendum design in the two Quebec independence referendums. The 
Quebec Referendum Act meant that the layout of the referendum process was almost 
exclusively in the hands of the National Assembly – lead by the Péquistes, who could 
submit a question or a bill it had adopted for consultation (Referendum Act 1978 c. 6, s. 
9). The federalist and opposition parties did not have a say in its formulation and the 
secessionists could, therefore, set the rules to their advantage.  Nonetheless, the 
referendum design was not completely undisputed, as we shall see when reviewing its key 
provisions.  
In Montenegro, the DSP and pro-independence coalition partners passed the Law on the 
Referendum in 2001 without the support of the pro-unionist parties. This law shaped the 
referendum structure that was to be negotiated and that would ultimately lead to the Law 
on the Referendum on State Legal Status adopted by the Parliament of Montenegro on the 
1st of March 2006. Despite the international community resistance to the referendum and 
notably the EU intervention to delay it in 2000, the existing provisions for a referendum 
were reviewed to decide whether they could be deemed acceptable to international 
standards (Cazala 2006, 165).136  
The OSCE/ODIHR was first to review the existing provisions in place in 2000, followed 
by the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters - the Venice 
Commission. These institutions' reports and recommendations helped shape article 60 of 
the Constitutional Charter, which “sealed” Montenegro’s right to hold a plebiscite on 
independence (Tierney 2012, 175). Their recommendations were not binding and the 
legislations to be adopted for the upcoming referendum had to ‘be implemented in a 
manner that maintains constitutionality within Montenegro’ (Introduction, Venice 
Commission 2005, 4). It is important to note that the Venice Commission originally found 
the existing Montenegrin legislations and Referendum Law acceptable and matching 
existing provisions in established democracies (c.f. Venice Commission 2011). 
                                                          
136 E.g. article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights on Civic and Political Rights 
which included requirements for the official authorities to remain neutral and provided unbiased 
information, and limit the use of public funds in the campaign. The 2001 OSCE/ODIHR 
assessment raised important areas to improve on, such as more transparency in the voting process 
and counting of the ballots, along with the need to provide adequate observation during the 
referendum (OSCE/ODIHR 2001a, 2.1). 
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Nonetheless, it repeatedly emphasised that for the sake of finding a consensus and 
increasing the legitimacy of the referendum outcome, revisions should be made to existing 
provisions. It was essential to have the pro-unionist actors on board as shown in the 
concluding remarks:  
However, this does not necessarily mean that the envisaged referendum on 
independence should be carried out on the basis of the existing legislation. On the 
contrary, the Commission strongly recommends that serious negotiations should 
take place between the majority and opposition within Montenegro in order to 
achieve a consensus on matters of principle concerning the conduct and 
implementation of the proposed referendum. (Article 64 Venice Commission 
2005, 16, Emphasis added). 
 
It is interesting to note that, in the established western democracy that is Canada, this was 
never brought up as a major concern. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe 
was an important factor in the legitimisation of the referendum process in Montenegro, 
while in Quebec, following the existing constitution and procedure at the federal and 
provincial level was sufficient not to delegitimise the referendum process itself, although 
the subject put to the vote was controversial. From the international organisation's reviews 
of the existing provisions to entrenching the need for external observers during the 
referendum (notably the EU) under article 60 of the Constitutional charter, the 
Montenegrin pro-secessionists had to contend with the international community accepting 
the referendum procedure as democratic and compromise with the opposition. Given the 
initial reluctance of the EU to see Montenegro secede, and strong internal opposition, 
secession via a referendum was compromised and made more difficult since the rules 
could be manipulated to the advantage of the status-quo. 
VI.2.a Who gets to vote?  
 
The nature of independence referendums, because of the important questions they ask in 
terms of popular sovereignty and identity, make them a potentially much more far-
reaching issue than normal elections, or referendums on societal (e.g. abortion) or 
constitutional questions. The very nature of the state is amended (in the case of 
Montenegro, in more symbolic than practical terms since the “creeping independence” 
policy), with the possibility of a very different political and economic trajectory following 
this change (see campaign in chapter VII). Moreover, because referendums on 
independence emerge from the postulate that a state is needed to preserve or pursue the 
interest of a nation or people, who is to form the future demos, and therefore have a say, 
is a critical question.  
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One of the most controversial points in Montenegro and one that could have been decisive 
to the referendum outcome was the question of who would be allowed to vote in the 
independence referendum. As seen in the existing literature in chapter II, we can expect 
that an electorate which closely follows the definition of the nation proposed by the 
secessionist actors might be easier to mobilise in favour of separation. The socio-
demographic profile of Quebec put the PQ at an advantage compared to the Montenegrin 
government. The Parti Québécois call for an independent Quebec was primarily directed 
at the 80 percent of Francophone Quebecers. They form the core the Quebec nation, 
holding a right to self-determine and statehood. Montenegro’s society is much more 
heterogeneous.  
The 2003 census registered in addition to the 40 percent Montenegrin identifiers and 30 
percent Serbs, 14 percent Bosnian/Muslims, 7 percent Albanians and 1 percent Croats 
identifiers (OSCE/ODIHR 2006a, 4). The “Montenegrins” self-identifiers, representing 
the old-standing nation to retrieve its lost independence, were not enough to secure victory 
in an independence referendum. The ethnic distribution of Montenegro meant that 
minorities’ support for independence was crucial for the separatist government to stand a 
chance at winning the plebiscite. Serb-nationalism and Belgrade policies in the region 
under Milosevic ensured that the ethnic minorities living in Montenegro would be more 
inclined to support independence, especially with the overall civic rhetoric employed by 
the separatist coalition governments in Podgorica (c.f. next chapter). Even then, victory 
remained within the margin of error, especially when some Montenegrin-identifiers 
remained ambivalent about breaking all links with Serbia.  
The citizenship law of 1999 increased the number of years of residency needed to establish 
citizenship and the right to vote. The legislation in force in 2001 in Montenegro, 
embedded in Article 11 of the Law on the Election of Municipal Councillors and 
Representatives, stated that only citizens of Montenegro who were permanent residents 
in the republic for a least 24 months were eligible to vote. There was a concern at the time 
that, if the referendum was to be held in 2000 or 2001, Montenegrin citizens would be 
denied a right to vote when they may have been able to do so previously (OSCE/ODIHR 
2001a, para. 3.47-3.49). The Venice Commission also believed the condition of 24 months 
of residence ‘excessive’, with international standards ranging between six to 12 months 
(Venice Commission 2005, Art. 63). 
This procedure was also contested because it excluded the substantial number of 
Montenegrin citizens residing in Serbia, who were generally more likely to support union 
with Serbia. The pro-unionist coalition in cooperation with the Serbian government 
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presented a list of more than 260,000 people who they believed were entitled to vote in 
an independence referendum in 2001 (Şen 2015, 141). The number advanced by the 
Serbian authorities and supported by the pro-unionists in Montenegro represented an 
almost 50 percent extra votes from Serbia, significantly influencing the outcome of the 
referendum. Adding all of the voters from Serbia would have been a game-changer in 
2001 given the electorate within the Montenegrin republic only showing a slim and yet 
uncertain majority in favour of secession. 
In 2006, the Montenegrin government was more confident given the polls; but they only 
predicted that the special threshold of 55 percent Yes votes (see below) would barely be 
met, excluding any supplementary votes from Serbia.  The question of voting rights for 
Montenegrins living in Serbia was raised again by the Serbian Prime minister Kostunica 
in June 2005. He handed to the EU commission statistical data on the number of 
Montenegrin residents in Serbia (a list comprising 64,802 names) and declared that 
without them the referendum was ‘undemocratic’ (Loza et al. 2005). The Montenegrin 
government answered by pointing out that the citizens cited already exercised their voting 
rights in Serbia in accordance with article 7 of the Constitutional Charter and were 
therefore not eligible to vote in Montenegro, and added that Serbia should not intervene 
in Montenegrin affairs (Dzankic 2013, 334–335). Meanwhile, the pro-union opposition 
leader declared on October 2005 that Montenegrins residing in Serbia ‘would not need to 
respect the referendum result’ if they were not consulted (Prelević 2005, 272; Vijesti, 14 
October 2005). 
The Venice Commission was also of the opinion that Montenegrin residents in Serbia 
were not eligible, yet Serb residents in Montenegro were (Venice Commission 2005, § 
62). Following the constitution’s provision, on December 3rd the Supreme Court of 
Montenegro reiterated that all Serbian adult citizens residing in Montenegro for over 24 
months would be allowed to register and vote (Vijesti, 6 December 2005, p3). Between 
the referendum announcement (in 2005) and the deadline to register to vote, an additional 
twenty-one thousand eligible voters were added (OSCE/ODIHR 2006b, 1). The 
mobilisation outside Montenegro, excluding those coming from Serbia, represented 
around 4 percent of the total electorate body of 485,718 registered voters according to 
Morrison (2009, 217).  
Changes to the electoral list so close to the referendum risked compromising the 
legitimacy of the outcome and accusations of gerrymandering. Yet, for the referendum 
outcome to be binding and settle the question of Montenegro’s status, pro-Serb 
satisfaction with the consultation process was crucial as discussed in chapter II. In this 
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case, the expansion of the electoral list, most notably to Montenegrins in Serbia, would 
have been to the advantage of the pro-unionist camp. The very restrictive inclusion of 
certain Montenegrin residents in Serbia was a considerable victory for the Yes side as 
their addition did not represent as much of a threat. The inclusion of a much smaller 
number of Montenegrins residing in Belgrade into the electoral list is primarily the result 
of the mediation work of the EU and the need to find an acceptable compromise for the 
pro-unionist camp and Belgrade.  
The question of franchise was much more straightforward in Quebec in 1980 and 1995 
for the reasons discussed above. To regulate the eligibility to vote in a referendum, the 
Referendum Act referred to the Quebec Election Act, as for normal elections. To be able 
to vote in the 1980 and 1995 independence referendum one had to be at least 18 years old, 
of Canadian citizenship and domiciled in Quebec for at least six months (Election Act 
1989). Some people, including five students of the Bishop University, were found to have 
violated this provision and voted in the 1995 independence referendum when they were 
not eligible to do so and were fined Can$ 500 (DGEQ 2016). Residents outside Quebec 
could still vote in the referendum in 1995 if they demonstrated that they had left Quebec 
temporarily after being domiciled in Quebec for 12 months, and 15,000 electors registered 
to do so (vs. 3,000 for the 1992 Charlottetown referendum). A majority of them supported 
the option to remain within the Canadian federation (Laforest and Montigny 2014, 5). 
Nonetheless, Quebec had a different problem when it came to its electorate. Cree and Inuit 
of northern Quebec were a possible obstacle to the territorial ambition of an independent 
Quebec. In 1980, the voice of Aboriginal peoples remained relatively unheard and 
unconsidered, the Quebec and Federal government rarely mentioning their status and fate 
in the debate over sovereignty despite the fact that many Aboriginal peoples were hostile 
to the Quebec government (Wherrett 1996, 3).137 In 1995, they clearly stood against 
Quebec’s separatist plans. They challenged the claim of Quebec territorial sovereignty by 
offering a competing right of self-determination and further allowed the No camp what it 
had previously argued: ‘If Canada is divisible, Quebec should be divisible too’ (Trudeau, 
quoted in Shaw and Albert 1980, 156). Most of the territory inhabited by these groups 
was not part of the original confederal borders (Whitaker 1999, 83).  
The secessionist side dismissed such claims. Prior to the second referendum being set in 
motion, Parizeau stated emphatically that, ‘If you think 20,000 Cree and Inuit are going 
to leave Quebec and take two-thirds of its territory - no way’ (quoted in Gerber 1992, 24). 
                                                          
137 Especially after the James Bay hydroelectric project in the 1970s which would have flooded 
vast areas of Cree and Inuit’s territories.  
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In 1995, the Quebec government reiterated again that, under international law, Quebec 
had the right to maintain its current borders and Aboriginal peoples did not have the same 
right of self-determination as Quebecers (Wherrett 1996, 8). Although they did not present 
a challenge in electoral terms, being a very small proportion of the total Quebec 
population and electorate, they could have had a strong symbolic impact on the legitimacy 
of Quebec’s territorial claim. They could be instrumentalised by non-Aboriginal actors 
opposing secession to withhold recognising Quebec’s independence if the Yes had won. 
Montenegro did not have such issues with its minorities as the vast majority supported 
independence.  
Aboriginal peoples argued the Quebec government threatened their language and territory 
(The National 1995). The Grand Council of the Crees stressed the right of Aboriginal 
people of self-determination in October 1995 by publishing a study entitled Sovereign 
Injustice: Forcible inclusion of the James Bay Crees and Cree territory into a sovereign 
Quebec (Grand Council of the Crees 1995).  In addition, they held their own pre-emptive 
referendum asking ‘Do you consent, as a people, that the Government of Quebec separates 
the James Bay and Cree traditional territory from Canada in the event of a Yes vote in the 
Quebec referendum?’ (Wherrett 1996, 5). The question in itself did not go against 
Quebec’s secession, but just the particular territory of James Bay. A similar plebiscite 
held by the Inuit of Nunavik and stood more clear against the Perquisites plebiscite: ‘Do 
you agree that Quebec should become sovereign?’.  
While First Nations did not threaten outright to boycott the referendum, the holding of 
two parallel referendums is a partial rejection of the Quebec’s government referendum. 
96.3 percent of the 77 percent of Crees and 96 percent of Inuit who voted in the 
referendums held prior to the Quebec government official plebiscite rejected that their 
territory be separated from the Canadian federation. Aboriginal peoples’ own claim to 
self-determination challenges the principle of one man/women one vote and at the same 
time that their belonging to the Quebec “nation”, or that Quebecers have full claim over 
the province territory. If the “people” of Quebec get to decide on their status, so should 
first nations, as a people, have a right to do so. While in 1995 their status was raised by 
the No side campaign and federal government, they never became a core issue, nor one 
that was instrumentalised by the No side to argue against Quebec’s independence. This 
could be partially due to fears of setting precedents for other first nations across the 
Canadian territory.  
Section 35.1 of the Constitutional Act, 1982 states that the federal and provincial 
governments need to consider Aboriginal people of Canada in major constitutional 
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changes, yet it does not state whether their consent is needed, only their consultation. 
Monahan believes ‘The judiciary requires it [the Canadian Government] to obtain the 
consent of Aboriginal peoples directly affected by the government endorsement of any 
amendments permitting a province to secede’ (1995, 17). The federal Clarity Act later 
conditioned the passing of a constitutional amendment to acknowledge a province 
secession to include successful negotiations on certain key issues including ‘interests and 
territorial claims of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, and the protection of minority 
rights’ (Clarity Act, [2000]. C.26, 3(2)).  
Şen believes that in the context of sovereignty referendums the residency criterion seems 
to be less controversial than ethnic or geographical origin (2015, 140), although not 
without issues in a context of post-violence, occupation or decolonisation with important 
movements of populations. This was indeed the case in Quebec (and Scotland) where 
residency criteria were accepted overall, but less so in Montenegro where the negotiations 
on who was allowed to vote were much more disputed. This controversy might have 
emerged as a result of the close polls and a relatively small Montenegrin population 
meaning a change to the electoral list could have made a substantial difference (less so in 
Quebec). It also has a more ethical dimension, given the different understanding of the 
Montenegrin vs. Serb identity and where the boundaries between the two lie, as discussed 
in the previous chapter.  
In Canada, English Canadians generally took a back seat on the question of secession as 
Francophones were more readily seen by their language as distinct. Moreover, Quebecers 
have a second identity to rally with: Canadian. In Montenegro, by the 2000s, the 
“Yugoslav” identity that was found to be the stronger in the small republic during the 
SFRY was no longer relevant. The identity related to Serbhood which encompassed early 
nationalism in Montenegro in the late 19th and 20th century was now strongly associated 
with Serbia (Dzankic 2009, 2013). These two examples show that the “people”, as an 
electoral body, can be constructed in different ways and be challenged by the number of 
individual voters or specific groups and counter claims of self-determination. 
While I agree with Laforest and Montigny that  ‘ […] gaining consensus between central 
and sub-state government is more important than maintaining consistency between pre- 
and post- independence enfranchisement’ (2014, 5); left-out actors at the societal/electoral 
levels could threaten the implementation of the referendum result and lead to further 
conflict. For the ‘loser’s consent’ discussed in chapter II to operate, one needs to have a 
chance to participate in the first place (Anderson et al. 2005, 20, 189). Accordingly, a 
voted casted against secession can be more favourable to independentists than no votes at 
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all. Even when such participation is possible, as with first nations in Quebec, competing 
claims of self-determination pose a more fundamental question of who has a right to self-
determination, a question without answer as chapter I has shown.  
VI.2.b. Qualifying majority  
 
The non-binding and consultative nature of the referendum did not require the Quebec 
Referendum Act of 1978 to specify a qualifying majority since the referendum was not 
designed to be determinant in legal terms, although it was meant to be politically binding. 
Once again the narrative around the independence referendum and how it is 
instrumentalised is crucial in understanding its effect and not solely the legislation around 
it. It is a political, not legal, configuration of the referendum design. The simple majority 
was stated in the 1979 white paper tabled by the Parti Québécois entitled Quebec-Canada: 
A New Deal. The Quebec government proposal for a new partnership between equals: 
sovereignty-association. It also stated: ‘We must […] convince ourselves that if the 
majority of Quebecers say YES in the Referendum, Ottawa and the rest of Canada, though 
they will be disappointed, will have no choice: they will negotiate’ (Quebec Executive 
Council 1979, para. 6.1).  
This threshold was never officially disputed and barely mentioned in 1980 by the 
opposition, which instead focused its criticism on the wording of the question. It became 
more problematic in 1995 as the wording was more clearly about the possibility of outright 
independence without negotiations involved and when polls started to show a majority in 
favour of the Yes (see next chapter). The Canadian Prime Minister at the time, Jean 
Chrétien rejected the simple majority in September and declared that ‘In a country like 
ours, to recognise that at one time a rule of majority plus one could break up a country 
would be irresponsible’, especially since the wording of the question was confusing, he 
argued (quoted in Campbell 1995). Preston Manning, leader of the Reform Party, 
denounced this statement as confusing and undemocratic as it would fail to honour the 
choice of a majority of Quebecers (ibid).  
The Quebec case shows the drawbacks of not having a clear agreement on the referendum. 
The lack of clearly agreed procedures meant that the referendum outcome could be more 
readily contested. The majority threshold became a core concern in 1996 when the 
Supreme Court of Canada was asked to deliberate in Quebec’s right of secession. The 
Canadian Supreme Court‘s Quebec Reference was then used by the EU and the Council 
of Europe to advise on the Montenegrin referendum design. For instance, the case of 
Quebec is used extensively from paragraph 34 to 37 in the Venice Commission report 
(Venice Commission 2005).  
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While the quantitative analysis did not provide support for hypothesis HSup4 that 
presence of endorsement quorums makes it more difficult to achieve a qualifying majority 
support in favour of independence, and therefore secession, in a case like Quebec and 
Montenegro, they can be a game-changer. The pro-Serbian TfY/C five-party coalition had 
argued in the early 2000s that given the importance of the question and the momentous 
consequences a Yes victory would entail, a simple majority was not sufficient. It called 
for a weighted majority mentioned by the OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission138, 
demanding as much as 70 to 75 percent of votes in favour of independence (S. Vuković 
2015, 436). 
Given the opinion polls in 2001, the DSP and pro-independentist coalition partners would 
have found it difficult to accept the TfY request. The Montenegrin Referendum Law of 
2001, passed without the opposition consent, clearly stated that for the change proposed 
in a referendum to be valid, 50 percent of the registered voters would need to cast their 
vote, and 50 percent plus one in favour of the proposed option (Article 37). These 
requirements followed the provisions already in place for referendums to be held in the 
republic and the SFRY constitutional provisions.139  
It was not until the negotiations under Lajčák in 2005-2006 that a crucial compromise was 
made on the threshold question. A 55 percent endorsement threshold, originally proposed 
by the EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana, was requested by the EU after it had rallied 
the No side to consent to it. From an interview with Lipka in 2001, it seems the mediators 
took into account that the government’s winning margin was never over 10 percent. This 
information was used to establish a buffer zone needed for either side to have a ‘clear, 
visible and convincing’ result (S. Vuković 2015, 437). The special majority was contested 
at first by the Montenegrin government which lobbied Brussels to have the rule amended 
for a simple majority endorsement of secession. It argued that this rule was unfair and 
went against the referendum set-ups found in Europe and pointed out the Danish 
referendum model only required 40 percent of the electorate in favour of the proposition 
subjected to them in a plebiscite (Traynor 2006).  
With the polls showing a 55-45 split in favour of independence when accounting for 
respondents’ socioeconomic profile by 2006, Djukanović accepted the 55 percent 
threshold under EU pressure. The EU insisted on those terms being respected to recognise 
                                                          
138 ‘Some level of weighted or qualified majority for a referendum question to be approved is 
preferable to ensure acceptance of the result and the safeguarding of stability.’ (OSCE/ODIHR 
2001b, 1). 
139 The Venice Commission had ruled that the simple majority and participation threshold were 
once again within adequate democratic international practices; yet, given what was at stake, a 
special majority would be more appropriate (Venice Commission 2005, Para. 40). 
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the outcome and monitor the referendum process which was a prerequisite set out in the 
Constitutional Charter for the referendum to be validated. Friis believes ‘the EU was 
capable of promoting the 55 percent threshold in the referendum since it had the “stick 
and carrot” power of future membership’ (2007, 86). Vuković (2015, 436) did not find 
evidence however that EU membership was used as a bargain, but the need to recognise 
the process and independence, which I agree would have been the priority. 
Yet, this endorsement quorum created a “grey-zone” between 50 and 54.99 percent, which 
remained a strong possibility given the poll’s margin of error. The separatist government, 
and/or its smaller coalition patterns in the Yes camp may have declared victory as it was 
still a majority in favour of independence. On the other hand, the opposition would have 
most likely not recognised the outcome as a Yes victory and backed by Belgrade, refused 
a second referendum after the 12-month probation between two plebiscites was lifted. 
This threshold poses the ethical question of whether a minority can decide for a majority 
(50+1). Some members of the pro-independence coalition had argued during the 
campaign that a simple majority would still be enough despite the threshold having been 
adopted by the Montenegrin government. Miroslav Lajcak denounced the members of the 
pro-independence bloc who made the public remarks: ‘There is a distinct lack of 
seriousness with politicians going around the world saying that as far as they are 
concerned 51 percent would be taken as a signal that the state union would no longer 
exist’ (quoted in Qvortrup 2015, 28).  
To be endorsed by all parties - secessionist, unionists and the international community - 
here symbolically represented by the EU - independence required 50 percent plus one of 
all eligible voters and 55 percent of those voting in favour. While not the best of “deals”, 
it constituted something of the victory for the unionists since, given the poll’s margin of 
error, they could still hope to win the referendum by reducing support for independence 
below 55 instead of 50. This threshold was also a motivation to mobilise pro-Serbs voters 
and reduce the incentive to boycott the referendum, legitimising further the referendum 
outcome in the case of a Yes victory.  
The quorum on participation had been problematic as it could have encouraged the pro-
unionist bloc to boycott the referendum, questioning the overall legitimacy of the vote. 
This possibility led to disagreements within the pro-independence coalition in late 2001. 
The SDP and LSCG wanted to introduce a specified provision on the referendum to 
dispose of the 50 percent turnout rule (International Crisis Group 2002, 3). The DSP did 
not support the new law in Parliament as, despite being advantageous, it would have been 
tricky to defend in front of those the party was trying to gain approval from, notably the 
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EU, and negatively impact the legitimacy of the referendum process. It was particularly 
risky for Djukanović’s image as he was dealing with the end of the “honeymoon” period 
following Milosevic’s fall at that time (interview with Bender in Dzankic 2009, 194).  
Furthermore, it would have been easier to claim victory with the boycott of the unionist 
forces if the pro-secessionist followed the legal provisions in place, rather than amend 
them to their advantage just before the referendum, and still risk a pro-unionist boycott. 
This relatively low threshold adopted did not considerably undermine the Yes side 
chances.  The DSP justified its decision by referring to the OSCE/ODIHR and Venice 
Commission reports at the time which were favourable to the 50 percent turnout quorum 
(OSCE/ODIHR 2001a; Venice Commission 2005, para. 22).  
The hypothesis formulated in chapter II in light of existing literature on referendums that 
turnout quorums can invalidate a majority in favour of independence (HSup3), while it 
did not occur, was a major concern for the Yes side and the international organisations 
which were to grant recognition. The Montenegrin case also shows that the chances of 
winning the referendum in terms of support were weighted against ensuring the process 
is seen as appropriate in order to confer legitimacy to the outcome.  
I did not find evidence that turnout was a concern in Quebec’s referendums. The general 
elections procedure applied. Furthermore, by engaging with the campaign and 
legitimising the referendums, the secessionist opponents ensured that the No voters were 
mobilised, notably as the campaigns got more intense when polls suggested a narrower 
chance of victory (c.f. Kriesi 2005 among others in chapter II).   
VI.2.c. What is the Question? 
 
The law regulating referendums in Quebec followed an exclusively PQ-led parliamentary 
process. The implementation of the law remained nonetheless controversial. Most 
contentious of all in the case of Quebec in both plebiscites was the question’s wording. 
The question was concluded by a motion after a 35 hour televised debate in the National 
Assembly in March 1980. The independentist actors, who had led the process so far, were 
better prepared than the opposition which was also less well staffed to deal with the 
upcoming plebiscite (Bergeron and Fischman 1980, 1). The 1980 question did not ask 
whether Quebecers agreed to outright independence, but whether they gave a mandate to 
the Quebec government to negotiate a new agreement with Canada as a sovereign nation 
with a second plebiscite to be held on independence once the terms of the new 
“association” had been settled:  
201 
 
The Government of Quebec has made public its proposal to negotiate a new 
agreement with the rest of Canada, based on the equality of nations; this 
agreement would enable Quebec to acquire the exclusive power to make its laws, 
levy its taxes and establish relations abroad — in other words, sovereignty — and 
at the same time to maintain with Canada an economic association including a 
common currency; any change in political status resulting from these negotiations 
will only be implemented with popular approval through another referendum; on 
these terms, do you give the Government of Quebec the mandate to negotiate the 
proposed agreement between Quebec and Canada? (Lévesque and Pelletier 2005, 
14).  
 
In the debate, the leader of the official opposition's opening statement directly attacked 
the ambiguous plan of the PQ and described the proposed wording as ‘arbitrarily and 
unfairly’ favouring the Quebec government. The concern that a biased question may sway 
voters in favour of independence is supported by some of the literature discussed in 
chapter II, along with specific studies on the Quebec referendum question wording (e.g. 
Yale and Durand 2011). Ryan accused the PQ of failing to meet its own promises, such 
as their 1971 programme which stated that ‘Referenda will offer the people of Quebec 
clear and distinct options, formulated unambiguously’. He also emphasised that a Yes for 
the proposed wording meant ‘a Yes to independence, to the political sovereignty of 
Quebec, to breaking the Canadian federal link’ (quoted in Bergeron and Fischman 1980, 
24, 28). The dispute over how the question should be worded, but also what the question 
meant is part of the bigger framing battle between the federalist and sovereigntists in 
Quebec and is explored in depth in the next chapter. Despite the length of the debate, the 
original PQ question wording was almost intact and the referendum was scheduled for 
May 20th.  
While some sovereigntists had wished to ask a more straightforward question on 
independence, Lévesque knew this would be too radical to stand a chance of success and 
drafted the question to ‘ease as much apprehension over sovereignty as possible’ (Mau, 
2005b:99). The PQ caution to suggest dismissing the link that unified Quebec and Canada 
since 1760 reflects the voters’ attachment to the federation (Henderson, 2007:124-126). 
It was also the product of well-researched electorate sensitivity to the terminology used. 
The terms “separation” or “independence” showed weaker levels of support than the term 
“sovereignty” when used in the question.  
The combination of sovereignty with “association” or “partnership” was even more 
popular (Cloutier, Guay, and Latouche 1992, 49–50; see also Pinard 1997). Indeed, the 
emphasis was placed on the process that was to take place, a clear “etapist” approach in 
1980, rather than the goal, “sovereignty-association”, to increase the chances of a Yes 
victory. The PQ ‘was asking for authorisation to begin negotiations because it knew that 
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a referendum on independence would fail’ (Rocher 2014, 29); in 1995 due to a change in 
the PQ leadership and increased dissatisfaction with the status-quo among Quebecers, the 
party felt more confident to skip some of those steps.  
The honesty and legality of the wording were questioned throughout the referendum 
process and campaign. For instance, Liberal member of the National assembly Herbert 
Marx alleged the question was illegal in regard to the referendum act as it did not provide 
equal space for both options and was biased towards the Yes option, but none of the critics 
went further to challenge it (Boyer 1982, 137). The lack of a legal challenge can be 
explained by the fact that the regular legislative route had been taken in its creation (Brun 
and Tremblay 1990, 602–3). The PQ had the power to pass the question because it had 
been democratically elected. By using the “normal”, political and institutional route it was 
difficult to challenge them beyond rhetoric. Yet the Quebec opposition or federal 
government still could have contested the legality of secession, especially unilaterally or 
negotiated the design, but the latter option would have likely meant a binding agreement, 
which, given the polls, was not needed.  
Nevertheless, while the question in the 1980 referendum in Quebec was about a mandate 
to negotiate, the actual content of the debate was very much about the issue of separation 
(Rocher, 2013:31). As the next chapter will demonstrate, this is mostly thanks to a 
successful federalist reframing of the question and the No side take on this controversial 
wording as being an attempt to hide an outright independentist agenda. The second 
referendum of 1995 had a somewhat clearer question and purpose. A first draft in 1994 
read ‘Are you in favour of the Act passed by the National Assembly declaring the 
sovereignty of Quebec? Yes or No?’ (Tierney 2012, 234). The final version, written in 
both English and French on the ballots140, changed substantially:   
Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign, after having made a formal 
offer to Canada for a new Economic and Political Partnership, within the scope 
of the Bill respecting the future of Quebec and of the agreement on 12 June 1995? 
YES or NO? (Lévesque and Pelletier 2005, 50). 
 
The 1995 shorter question had the merit to be more direct on the “sovereignty” side but 
remained complicated by the reference to an economic and political partnership with 
Canada and a Bill which required voters to investigate further what the question was 
about. It is still clearly about independence given the definition of sovereignty offered by 
the PQ, but it offered the possibility to relinquish part of Quebec’s sovereignty on 
                                                          
140 For first nation communities the ballots were also made available in their native language 
(Referendum Act 1978 c.6, s.20-21). 
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economic matters (using European Community as an example in discourses) in order to 
share these competencies with Canada (Parti Québécois 1993, 62–64). The Sovereignty 
Bill empowered the National Assembly to declare independence on behalf of the people 
of Quebec even if the negotiations it was “bound” to propose for a new economic and 
political partnership with Canada failed (Bill 1 An Act Respecting the Future of Quebec 
1994, preamble). This meant that the Quebec National Assembly could unilaterally 
declare independence.  
The polemic around the wording of the referendum question was addressed by the 
Supreme Court of Canada who stated the need for a “clear” question, (Reference re 
Secession of Quebec 1998, 2). The Host-state leaders have now legally bound the issue 
to be clearly about Quebec ‘independence’ and separation: ‘cease to be part of Canada’ 
(Clarity Act 2000, s 1(3)). The federal parliament would have 30 days to decide whether 
the question is indeed clear. The rest of the referendum’s modalities, bar the question of 
the qualifying majority, remain with the Quebec government. 
The two questions’ wording were meant to alleviate the fears of Quebecers about the 
uncertainties and drawbacks of a full break-up with Canada. In Montenegro, such fears 
were lessened by the context the republic found itself on the eve of the referendum. The 
word “independence” did not have the negative connotation found in Quebec. Serbia 
(particularly its elite) was framed as much more of a threat than the Canadian federation, 
meaning that separation could be seen in a more positive light. Finally, by the time the 
referendum was first announced in 2001, Montenegro was already acting as a de-facto 
independent state and its political and economic ties with the federation were already 
severed. Hence, there was little to lose in absolute terms in becoming independent. 
No evidence was found to suggest that the question’s wording had been a controversial 
issue in Montenegro. The debate surrounding the independence question had been around 
for a few years prior to the referendum leaving little room for rhetorical manoeuvres as to 
what “independence” meant. Moreover, the involvement of the European Union and other 
organisations such as the Council of Europe, concerned with the fairness and democratic 
process of the consultation also helped ensure that the question was clearly worded 
(Whitmore 2006).  The question was officially announced in March 2003 when the ‘law 
of the Referendum on State Legal Status’ was enacted and read:  
Do you want the Republic of Montenegro to be an independent state with a full 
international and legal personality? (OSCE/ODIHR 2006a).  
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The ballots were printed in Serbo-Croatian using the Cyrillic alphabet, and another set of 
ballots were available in both Latin script and Albanian.141 
 
VI.3. Campaign Design, Spending and Oversight  
 
The referendum design can set who can campaign and how they can mobilise voters. The 
literature on elections and referendums covered in chapter II has highlighted the 
importance of actors involved in the process and their resources in explaining public 
consultation outcomes. From political elites to the media and the electorate itself (de 
Vreese 2007, 7), all contribute to some extent to the referendum outcome, turnout, and 
the satisfaction with the overall referendum process. While it is not possible to test the 
effect of the media for instance or the external intervention impact on the perceived 
legitimacy of the outcome, it remains important to cover these elements. In particular, it 
is worth analysing who were the official and unofficial actors in the campaign, whether 
their intervention was seen as legitimate, how they were constrained, and which may have 
been in an advantageous position to mobilise support. Furthermore, the design, oversight 
and enforcement of rules can help increase procedural satisfaction to secure the outcome 
as binding on all actors (would it be at the societal, regional, host-state or international 
level).  
VI.3.a. Referendum oversight 
 
The administration of the referendum and its supervision is a key element to limit 
controversies and ensure that both parties can trust the running of the plebiscite and 
everyone accepts the referendum outcome as a true representation of the will of the 
people. It also dictates who officially can determine the referendum to be a free and fair 
process. In Quebec, the Referendum Act appointed the Chief Electoral Officer and his 
personnel as the core body to oversee the referendum process similarly to what would 
apply in normal elections; therefore, not creating an exceptional body for the referendum, 
unlike Montenegro. 
The Referendum Act did however provide for a special counsel, Conseil du Référendum, 
composed of three judges of the Court of Quebec appointed by the chief Judge of that 
Court. It had exclusive jurisdiction and final decision over the application of the 
                                                          




referendum proceeding detailed in the Referendum Act (Referendum Act 1978 c. 6, s. 3). 
The judges also receive contestations submitted by the chairman of the national 
committees - the only ones under the Act able to officially contest the validity of a 
referendum - to recount the votes within 15 days of the polling. Yet, the recount was to 
take place ‘only to the extent that it is of opinion that the facts alleged, were they true, 
would be susceptible of changing the total result of the referendum’ (Referendum Act 
1978, c.6, s. 41-42). 
To oversee the referendum in Montenegro, an ad-hoc institution, the Republican 
Referendum Commission (RRC), was created. It was presided by Lipka and composed of 
16 members, eight from each side of the referendum option. The president could only vote 
on a decision if the two parties were facing a stalemate. Unsurprisingly, given that each 
side tended to vote on what they believe would be favourable to their side, Lipka often 
had to intervene (Cazala 2006, 23). The RRC had two lower bodies, the Municipal 
Referendum Commissions and the Polling Boards, in charge of organising and 
administrating the referendum. It was initially suggested by the pro-independence block 
that representatives of the international community should also be involved in each of the 
administrative bodies and have a vote in the likely event of a stalemate, but their internal 
disputes were ultimately referred to the RRC body and Lipka (Tierney 2012, 181).   
The RRC’s task involved the monitoring of the referendum process from the 
administrative work linked to the plebiscite, to the behaviour of parties and campaigners, 
media coverage, organising and training over 1,300 citizens to observe the voting process, 
and oversee the working of 1121 polling stations and report on any irregularities. As a 
new body, fulfilling these duties might have been more challenging than in Quebec where 
the Chief Electoral Officer was already in place and more experienced in monitoring 
elections. All the proceedings and declarations from the Referendum Commission, along 
with the legal documents on the referendum procedure and agreements, complaints made 
during the referendum campaign or after the results, were made available on their website: 
www.rrk.cg.yu.142 Complaints on violations of the referendum procedures could be 
submitted by anyone to the committee within 72 hours of the anomaly occurring. The 
RRC was then to issue a decision on the submitted complaint within 24 hours (RRC 
2006c). By referendum day, it had met 15 times to review and rule on 59 complaints 
submitted over the referendum campaign (RRC 2006b).  
At the time of the referendum, the democratic credentials of Serbia and Montenegro left 
much to be desired (Radik-Vodinelic 2005; Vucinic 2005). 22 domestic and international 
                                                          
142 This website is no longer online but can be retrieved using web-time machine.  
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organisations including the OSCE/ODIHR, EU monitoring commission, Council of 
Europe’s Congress of the Local and Regional Authorities among others participated and 
produced reports on the referendum process. 615 foreign observers, excluding EU 
representatives, joined the 2771 RRC accredited local observers representing both sides 
of the debate, along with the local and foreign media to oversee the referendum process 
and 21 municipal commissions.  
The respect for international standards during the referendum was entrenched in the 
Constitutional Charter of 2005 and was to be determined by external actors. Despite 
acknowledging irregularities, international observers declared the result ‘free and fair’ 
(Cazala 2006, 172; OSCE/ODIHR 2006b; Council of Europe 2006). Note as well that the 
RRC was principally composed of the very political parties that formed the two 
campaigning blocks in the referendum; questioning their capacity or real intentions to 
investigate the accuracy of the statements subject to them. In Quebec, such standards were 
taken for granted and generally accepted. This comparison shows that contextual 
standards need to be taken into consideration when talking about what constitutes a 
democratic expression of the will of the people.  
VI.3.b. Official campaigns and funds 
 
The way the campaigning sides are set up may facilitate or hinder an effective campaign 
strategy and a coherent message (Iyengar and Simon 2000, 161; Budge 1996, 77). The 
Quebec Referendum Act set out a provision for national committees to represent the 
referendum options. Members of the National Assembly had seven days from the adoption 
of the question or Parliamentary Bill to register with the Chief Electoral Officer in favour 
of one of the options as provision committees and appoint a chairperson, name and 
internal regulations for the official committees (Referendum Act 1978). Under this set-up, 
anyone who wished to campaign had to register as an umbrella organisation.  All members 
of the national assembly, political parties and groups had to work within one of the two 
committees and within the restrictions imposed on them by the act. It was presented as a 
necessity to ensure the fairness of the referendum procedure by prohibiting spending from 
an unaffiliated (and unmonitored) individual or group.  
Third parties or organisations outside the two umbrella groups were barred from spending 
money in the referendum campaign, including the federal government. Furthermore, a 
third option/possibility or alternative to two camps was not possible. This provision was 
well received in Quebec (Feasby 1998, 26). Some scholars found strong support among 
electors for such rules in established democracies (e.g. Garrett and Smith 2005, 295). This 
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provision was nonetheless challenged by Robert Libman, former Quebec Equality 
Party143. The Supreme Court of Canada overturned the Quebec’s court earlier ruling and 
charges against 20 people in 1995, arguing that this law went against the freedom of 
expression entrenched in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom (Libman v. Quebec 
(AG) 1997, 567).  
Boyer believes this dual organisation was, in fact, a strategic move on behalf of the PQ in 
the hope that it would have made it difficult for the No side to organise itself (1992, 139). 
Indeed, the PQ was the only relevant party on the Yes side in 1980.144 It did not have to 
contend with other organisations’ own vision of what should be done to win the 
referendum. In 1995, the Péquistes had to accommodate the BQ and, to a lesser extent, 
ADQ. Nevertheless, according to Boyer, this tactic did not materialise as all No side 
parties (four federal and four provincial) already had some experience working together 
and had cooperated during the Council for Canadian Unity which was essentially a pre-
referendum committee as early as 1977. Similar restrictions on campaigning actors 
applied in Montenegro.  
Because the funding campaign procedure was primarily derived from existing electoral 
laws, only Montenegrin political parties with parliament status had the right to use the 
allocated campaigning budget (Vujović 2006, 84). This limited the ability of other 
interests and organisations to participate in the referendum campaign and concentrated 
the process on the Yes and No coalitions. This set-up lead to irregularities and abuse by 
some organisations who forged signatures to be able to register as a political party and be 
eligible to campaign during the referendum (e.g. Citizens Party in Cetinje).145 Two entities 
were accredited by the Credendum commission as representatives of the two referendum 
options in 2005 and bound to operate within the law of the referendum provisions: The 
Coalition (Block) for an Independent Montenegro and the Coalition (Block) for the 
Preservation of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro.  
On both sides, parties composing the two campaign blocks had already formed clear 
coalitions or alliances during the elections in the 2000 municipal elections, 2001 and 2002 
parliamentary elections, 2002 and 2003 presidential elections around the question of 
                                                          
143 Party created in 1989 to defend “English rights” in Quebec and notably stand against the 
Charter of the French Language (‘Bill 101’) which restricted the use of English in commercial 
signs or access to English schools in Quebec.  
144 Some members of Union Nationale joined the Yes ranks.  
145 In March 2004 a new section of the Law on Political Parties was introduced to change the way 
registration for political parties was done, now requiring 200 certified statements in court 
providing support to avoid the abuse when sole signatures were accepted. However this change 
was not introduced in the text of the Law on the referendum (Vujović 2006, 85).      
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statehood (c.f. Goati et al. 2015; and Bieber 2003). As in Quebec, this left little room for 
alternative visions or arguments. The Yes side in Montenegro worked well together 
despite the much more heterogeneous committee composed of 10 parties and coalitions: 
The DPS and SDP government coalition, LSGC146 , the Civic Party of Montenegro, 
Democratic Union of Albanians, National Harmony Montenegro, Civic Forum Niksic, 
Bosniak party, Croatian civic initiative, Democratic Union of Muslim Bosniaks in 
Montenegro, and the Democratic Alliance of Albanians in Montenegro.  
The Movement for the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was comprised of four main 
opposition parties: The People’s Party (NS), The Serbian People’s Party (SNS), 
Democratic Serbian Party (DSS), under the SNP leader Bulatović. Part of the SNP was 
apprehensive in forming a clear “Pro-union” camp as it could be perceived as 
acknowledging the upcoming referendum. Bulatović declared to the press that ‘For the 
SNP, the formation of the Movement [for the Union] did not mean acknowledging the 
referendum’ (Kaprovica 2005a). Moreover, the SNP was worried about associating itself 
with extreme Serb nationalism. Agreeing on a common campaign strategy proved 
challenging (see next chapter).  
In Quebec, the 1980 No campaign was headed by the Quebec Liberal Party (QLP) leader 
Claude Ryan. The No coalition counted in its ranks all the different political parties open 
to federalism in Quebec and support from those in the rest of Canada (Marsolais, 
1995:69). Its coordination was not an easy task, however. In particular, Liberal MPs from 
Quebec did not agree with some of the strategies and the organisational setting of the 
campaign under the federal umbrella group. In March 1980 they even proposed to launch 
their own referendum campaign since the current organisational setting was slow to 
materialise, making some federalist voters anxious (Globe and Mail, 27 March 1980). In 
1995, the Liberals once again led the official coalition, labelled ‘Comité des Québécoises 
et des Québécois pour le NON’, under Quebecois branch leader Daniel Johnson. 
In both cases, it seems that the No side campaign, despite not being necessarily more 
heterogeneous in the case of Montenegro, had more difficulty in working together and 
campaigning. It is impossible however to know how much of an impact this had on the 
referendum outcome, but the three No sides suffered criticisms during the campaign for 
being inefficient or overly negative (see next chapter).  
Officially, in both Quebec and Montenegrin referendums, financial resources were overall 
equal during the almost one month-long official campaigns. The legislation regulating 
                                                          
146 The LCGS dissolved in 2005(Kaprovica 2005b), the longest party that had fought for 
Montenegrin independence since 1990 and its members still campaigned in 2006.   
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referendums in Montenegro were negotiated under EU oversight. Section IV, article 34 
and 35 of the final Referendum Law provided regulations on the referendum campaign 
funds which was to come from the republic’s budget. 2,000,000 euros were made 
available to both camps three days after the legislative date of the decision to call a 
referendum was made (‘Law on the Referendum of the Republic of Montenegro (Serbia 
and Montenegro)’ 2001/2006). It did not address the allocation of funds within the blocks 
who were left to agree within themselves on how to allocate and use the money. While 
the Civic Party and the Democratic Alliance in Montenegro within the pro-independentist 
block received separate funding from the total Yes-fund (and were also required to submit 
their own individual reports on spending), the pro-unionist block handled the funds as a 
single actor (Vujović 2006, 85).  
The blocks were also allowed to collect donations to finance their campaign from 
individuals and private sources. Article 9 stated the upper limit for private donations to 
the equivalent of the state budget allocation (i.e. 1 million per camp); with individual 
donations capped at 2,000 euros and companies at 10,000. The two blocs had to fully 
disclose any donors’ identity and the total amount received to the RRC, to be made 
publicly available on their website.147 The Yes side gathered around an additional 400,000 
euros, while the No side received 247, 000 euros in donations (Vujović, Bošković, and 
Ferdinandi 2006, 88). 
Referendum spending and additional funds received by both parties had to be submitted 
for review to the RRC. If anomalies were found, fines or further prosecution were to be 
issued for the coalition responsible. 148 Yet, the two sides only submitted their reports in 
regard to their overall spending plan after the campaign and voting, depriving citizens of 
information during the campaign. Moreover, Vujović and colleagues believe the RRC was 
ill equipped to fully oversee the process and act on the misuse of state resources. Oversight 
was limited and the blocks documentation did not always meet to the best standards 
(Vujović, Bošković, and Ferdinandi 2006; Vujović 2006, 93–84).  
In 1980, each side of the campaign in Quebec could spend a total of 2.11 million Canadian 
dollars. Both stayed within this limit. The funds were channelled through the umbrella 
committees. This included a grant of C$1.061128 from the provincial government and 
additional personal contributions within the stated limit above. The No side benefited 
                                                          
147 The Centre for Monitoring and Research (CEMI) report contains the official documents 
relating to the campaigns’ spending and complaints (Vujović, Bošković, and Ferdinandi 2006).  
148 The control and review of finances during the referendum was done under its sub-committee 
composed of six members appointed by both sides of the referendum option and they were 
published the results on the RRC website, the “official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro” 
and state owned newspapers.  
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more from funds from political parties than the Yes who collected more individual 
donations. The sovereigntist side declared C$ 305,118 from almost 129000 individuals, 
while the Federalists only C$ 11,573 from individual donations (Directeur général des 
élections du Quebec 2000, 39–42; see also Boily 1992). Individuals could contribute up 
to 3 000 dollars but, as in Montenegro, voluntary work towards either side did not count. 
In 1995, the same formula was used to set the amount to be given to each side. It was not 
to exceed .50 Canadian dollars per elector. Both sides received 2 543 490 dollars from the 
provincial government, and with their own political parties and individual contribution 
the No side declared a total of 5 186 690 dollars, and the Yes 5 224 377 dollars. Every 
expense was regulated and recorded by both sides and reviewed and monitored at the 
provincial level by the Directeur général des élections du Quebec (DGE) (Rocher 2014, 
30).  For instance, the Director General of political party financing investigated 84 
complaints on campaign spending in 1980 (Boyer 1992, 141). The Grenier Report, 
commissioned by the Chief Electoral Office of Quebec published in 2007 a list of “illegal” 
spending from the No side (around 500 000 Canadian dollars) in 1995 (Raport Grenier 
2007). The No side funding bias was largely due to the Federal intervention. The 
Referendum Act did not allow for the control of spending outside of the Quebec province 
as it felt outside of its jurisdiction. The host-state intervention, in both Quebec and 
Montenegro, proved controversial.  
Host-state involvement  
 
In both Quebec and Montenegro, the only two official campaigning bodies were the Yes 
and No coalition campaigns. Yet, in both cases, many other actors got involved and tried 
to sway voters. When the Quebec government initiated the referendum process in the late 
1970s, it was made clear that this was a provincial matter. Premier Lévesque had 
previously said that ‘Any intervention, federal or otherwise, would be rejected as a 
manifestation of insupportable tutelage’ (Lévesque 1979, 108). The federal government 
intervention in 1980 and 1995 with indirect “advertisements” and spending skewed the 
flow of information in favour of Canada according to the Yes side.  
During the late 70s and 1980 information clips were broadcasted highlighting the current 
benefit the federation offered in terms of social programmes and investments in the 
province to ‘inform’ voters (Rose 1993). More controversial were the six million family 
benefit and old age pension cheques sent with an attached message reading ‘Non, merci… 
ça se dit bien’ (No, thanks … it sounds well) (Rocher, 2013). The federal spending- 
outside of the Referendum Law jurisdiction, was estimated to be between 5 to 17 million 
Canadian dollars in 1980 (Gagnon 1997, 10; see also Cloutier 1980; Marsolais 1992).  
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In 1995 another spending controversy from the federal level hit the No side. Some 
federalists called on Canadians from other provinces to come to Quebec and show their 
support even covering transportation costs, leading to sovereigntist attacks on the legality 
of such expenses (Young, 1999:35-36). On Friday 27th of October, an estimated 100,000 
Canadians gathered in Montreal for “unity”. The rally was not only controversial because 
of the subsidies involved, but also because it was seen by some as a foreign interference 
into Quebecers’ affairs. Even members of the No campaign, especially provincial 
politicians, admit that it showed poor judgement on behalf of the rest of Canada (Hebert 
and Lapierre 2014). It is difficult to say whether this event had a positive or negative 
impact on the No side. Despite press reports of these plans and the rally itself in the last 
week of the campaign, the Yes vote-share gradually grew from 51.8% to 52.6% on 
referendum day (see next chapter).  
These events show that which actors get involved in the referendum process and campaign 
can impact the perceived legitimacy of the process and what is seen as free and fair 
consultations. This can be particularly problematic if the result is very close. Moreover, it 
highlights the delicate balance needed from the No side in addressing Quebecers and their 
own perceived political status. In Montenegro, Serbian intervention was also 
controversial, but much less scrutinised than in Quebec.  
Belgrade supported the No camp, financially and logistically, however finding official 
proof of it is difficult. Compared to Quebec, the unionist side had to contend with the lack 
of a true “Federal” or “Unionist” presence in Montenegro. The Serbian government was 
still particularly involved in mobilising eligible voters within its territory and getting them 
in Montenegro on voting day, notably Montenegrin students in Serbia. Serbian railways 
offered free returns trip to them, while the Serbian state air Carrier JAT increased the 
number of flights from Belgrade to Podgorica on the 20th and 21st of May and No-rallies 
were organised in Belgrade (Morrison 2009, 216). Similar questionable and controversial 
practices could be witnessed on the Yes side as well but these interventions were not 
prosecuted on either side.  
Even if the Belgrade and federal governments in Ottawa were the sovereign authority over 
the host-state territory, and the primary entities able to withhold or grant secession, they 
had to respect and navigate some form of existing independence from their regions. The 
host-state involvement in the campaign was perceived in both cases by the Yes side, and 
even some among the No camp, as an illegitimate interference in existing levels of 
autonomy, and affairs of a stated “people”. It may have helped make the case for secession 
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as no amount of autonomy could alleviate the fact that the jurisdiction of a sub-national 
territory remains, ultimately, subordinate.  
The Media 
 
The mass media is an important channel of communication for both sides of the 
arguments, and an additional actor in the campaign (Wirth et al. 2010; Norris 2006). It 
also contributed to the quality of the debate such as how balanced it is or how much 
information is disseminated (Renwick and Lamb 2013). This brief review aims to assess 
whether one side was advantaged in the way the events were covered. The Conseil de 
Presse du Quebec (CPQ) monitored the press and was in charge of ruling on complaints 
about coverage brought to its attention. However, it had little power in ensuring 
compliance (Pritchard 1994). In Montenegro, while there were some, limited, official 
provision in place, and party agreements on neutral media coverage during elections 
(Kocan 2001, 2), their implementation remains limited and difficult to enforce.   
There are very few studies of the media in the 1980 referendum (Morel 1992); overall it 
seems that printed media coverage of the 1980 Quebec independence referendum was 
found to be relatively balanced; although this was truer for Anglophone newspapers than 
Francophone, whose editorials were more clearly leaning towards one side of the debate 
according to Lachappel and Noiseux’s (1980) review of eight newspaper’s editorials 
during the campaign period. In 1995, of the two major Francophone newspapers, La Press 
was known to have a more pro-federal position, while le Devoir was sovereigntist. The 
televised media, investigated by Monière, Perella, and Thalheimer (1996)149 was found to 
be balanced overall among the Francophone channels in the themes and times allocated, 
but the Anglophone less so, favouring a federalist message, especially in the last week of 
the campaign. In the 70s, Radio-Canada had been accused by PM Trudeau of encouraging 
separatism and undermining national unity. The Canadian Radio Television Commission 
was asked to investigate in 1977, but no evidence was found, nor in 1995 was a biased 
coverage of the CBC/SRC Francophone coverage of the Quebec referendum found 
following accusations by PM Chrétien (Hazel 2001).150 
                                                          
149 TV channels: CBFT, CFTM, CFCF.  
150 Intellectuals and some preeminent Francophone journalists were very critical of the liberals 
and supported the PQ and sovereignty during the 60s and 70s (Siegel 1996, 220). Montenegrin 
intellectuals also played a part in mobilising the population (Dragović-Soso 2002; Morrison 
2009, 86).  
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In Montenegro, Bestić, Komar, and Gegaj’s (2006) analysis of the printed,151 electronic, 
and broadcasting medias from the 10th of April to the 20th of May 2006 did highlight 
known biases. The pro-Serbian newspaper Dan was not surprisingly favourable to the 
Coalition for the Preservation of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro with 70 
percent of headlines covering the referendum either very favourable or favourable to this 
bloc. One of the most biased newspapers in favour of independence was found to be the 
Republika, while state-owned Pobjeda manage to keep around 65.5 percent of its 
coverage of the referendum neutral, but remained clearly in favour of the Yes side. Vijesti 
was the most balanced, with 24.5 percent of titles in favour of independence and 15.8 
percent in favour of the unionist block (Bestic, Komar, and Gegaj 2006, 52–53).152 TV 
Elmag with the MBC channel were found to be the most balanced in their coverage of the 
referendum. Yet, Elmag still clearly favoured the union side in its overall programmes, 
but it also had a smaller audience than other broadcasting agencies. All the other channels 
were biased towards the Yes side, also screening historical documentaries favouring the 
historical interpretation of the Yes side (Morrison 2009, 214). 
Overall, because of the DPS control of the Montenegrin state apparatus, and the public 
and private communication sector, the Yes side was clearly advantaged during the 
referendum campaign. The situation was more balanced in Quebec, except for the 
intervention of the Federal government information campaign in 1980. Given that 
Anglophones were already very likely to support a No vote, we may question how much 
of a difference this biased coverage could have made in the English-speaking media. 
Furthermore, Guay and Monière’s study of a potential effect of the referendum coverage 
and publicity did not uncover any autonomic and linear effect. The authors believe it 
mostly reinforced predisposition and only rarely persuaded (1996, 179), especially since 
such biases are generally known. The content of the message is ultimately what may 




The referendum design, starting with its legal basis and the right a) to hold a referendum, 
and b) the right to secede, exposed how the legitimacy of the referendum is constructed 
in two different case studies. It shows that the “agreement” does not emerge from the 
                                                          
151 Coverage includes: Vijesti, Dan, Pobjeda, Republika, TV CG1, TV CG2, ELMAG, TV IN, 
NTV Montena and MBC.  
152 Vijesti even provided a free red cap - the colour of independentists - to its readers on the 15th 
of May, (Morrison 2009, 221). 
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same source or for the same reasons and points of contention vary considerably between 
Quebec and Montenegro. It also shows, as hinted at by the quantitative review in chapter 
IV, that legality is not necessarily needed for a legitimate and binding process. 
Secondly, whilst the previous chapter highlighted the actors involved in bringing about 
the independence referendum and those who were important in making it an “agreed” 
referendum, this chapter went further by reviewing actors involved in the referendum 
process and how they could shape the referendum design to their advantage. The review 
of the sequencing of events that lead to referendum day in Quebec and Montenegro shows 
non-linear processes made of ad-hoc legislative provisions. Secessionists in Quebec had 
much more control over the referendum framework, from the timing, question, electorate 
and threshold. Every aspect of it enabled them to increase their chance of seceding by 
opting for a favourable wording, a known – existing – electorate, and a simple majority.  
The combination of historical circumstances and precedents, the presence of a regional 
and fairly autonomous provincial legislature in regard to public consultations, and the 
existing level of support for independence meant that the internal opposition and federal 
government did not strongly refute the process and extensively engage with it, overall 
legitimising its existence and form. Accordingly, Quebec had increased chances of 
achieving statehood, was it not for the actual level of support for independence. The 
general setting – bar the federal intervention in the campaign – made for a more “even” 
playing field than in Montenegro, and Canada’s status of established democracy ensured 
higher levels of satisfaction with the referendum process overall.  
In Montenegro, despite a legal right to secede and a referendum law in place, the lack of 
perceived legitimacy by the opposition and the potential very narrow Yes victory in 2001 
if a unilateral referendum was held, meant that the secessionists had to negotiate a less 
advantageous design. Although independence was still within reach despite the 
endorsement threshold imposed, it cancelled out the gains made between 2001 and 2005 
that would have guaranteed victory on a simple majority. Nonetheless, they secured 
something more important: a binding referendum. The possibility of the “grey-zone” of a 
majority of Yes vote but not 55 percent, however, would have greatly questioned the 
legitimacy of a No victory among the independentist supporters; especially when 
controversies during the referendum – as in Quebec – could challenge the perception of a 
“free and fair” process. 
The last chapter will now turn to the referendum campaign and how both sides of the 
argument for and against independence framed the existing context in Quebec and 
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Montenegro to make their case and convince voters. I also consider the referendum 
aftermath and how the satisfaction with the referendum design and process ensured a 
binding outcome for all actors explored so far. Furthermore, we will see how core aspects 
of the referendum design explored in these two case studies have informed other 









Throughout their history Montenegro and Quebec enjoyed a considerable amount of self-
rule within their respective host-states. They never ceased to exist as separate and distinct 
sub-national entities with their own political, economic and cultural spheres. While their 
ability to hold independence referendum with the consent of the host-state considerably 
increased their likelihood of successfully seceding and being recognised as independent 
states, achieving this outcome ultimately rested in the hands of the people. Quebec and 
Montenegro remained partial or incomplete nation-building projects when the 
independence referendums were called. To appreciate the ability of the referendum to 
sway voters and ultimately affect the likelihood of secession, Montenegro and Quebec 
represent ideal case studies. In both cases support for independence prior to the plebiscite 
stood close to 50 percent, +/-20 percent, meeting the selection criteria laid out in Chapter 
II on where an independence referendum is more likely to affect the likelihood of 
secession. Support for independence stood below a majority in Quebec and potentially 
behind the required 55 percent threshold in Montenegro. Hence, the referendum 
campaigns were crucial to achieving or preventing secession.  
This chapter starts by considering the evolution of support for independence prior to the 
referendum being called and during the referendum campaign. The socio-demographic 
composition of both regions which form the electoral “playing field” or battleground 
where secessionist and unionist make their case to voters is broken down. The campaign 
design and strategies on either side of the debate are then reviewed for the three 
independence referendums, considering which side was in an advantageous position to 
mobilise voters and was most successful in shaping the referendum outcome. Using 
Discourse Analysis and Framing theory core arguments and schemata of interpretations 
of the context by the pro-independentists and opponents are uncovered. This analysis 
shows how core societal, political and economic variables identified in the secessionist 
literature to affect support for secession come to be salient and interact in narratives for 
mobilisation. This chapter concludes by reviewing the referendum results, major 
controversies in the process, and the host-state and international reactions to the results. 
218 
 
The long-term secessionist prospects of Quebec and the Montenegrin-Serbian relations 
post-referendum, as well as the use of (agreed) independence referendum since then, are 




VII.1.a. Evolution of support 
 
In both Quebec and Montenegro, legislation set the length of time between the referendum 
being announced and the vote being held. In Quebec, the referendum period specifically 
refers to the period from the writ instituting the referendum until polling day (Referendum 
Act 1978 Act C.1 2). In 1980, the official campaign period lasted 35 days. In 1995, it was 
shorter: from 2nd of October until the eve of the referendum on the 28th of October, but the 
anticipation was longer given that the referendum was postponed due to unfavourable 
polls.  In Montenegro, the referendum was announced on the 2nd of March and the 
campaign lasted a month. All campaigning activity had to stop 48 hours prior to the voting 
on the 21st of May 2006. The relatively short official campaigns need to be contextualised 
in the lengthy debate questioning independence and the broader nation-building agenda 
of the Montenegrin government. Accordingly, while the official campaign started in 
spring 2006, the unofficial campaign really started in 2001 when the referendum was first 
called for. The parties clearly campaigned around the question of statehood in subsequent 
elections until 2006 (Hubeiras 2005, 70).  
Figures VII.1, VII.2 and VII.3 show the evolution of support during the referendum 
period.153 For reasons of comparability with Montenegro, I consider only opinion polls in 
Quebec that used questions whose wording included ‘separation’ or ‘independence’, and 
add opinion polls using the referendum question-wording once made public. This enables 
us to see not only how support for independence differed between Quebec and 
Montenegro, but also how within Quebec the referendum question played a part in 
mobilising voters in favour of independence. Before analysing the campaign strategies of 
both sides of the debate and how the context in the two cases studies were framed to 
                                                          
153 It is not my intent, nor is it possible within the time-constraint and data availability for 
Montenegro, to carefully scrutinise the polls leading up to the referendums or how they evolved 
during the official campaign. A considerable amount of work has been done in this regard in 
Quebec by more qualified scholars with individual–level data and show how the official 
campaign period made a difference to the referendum results (E.g. Cloutier, Guay, and Latouche 
(1992); LeDuc (1977); Yale and Durand (2011)). 
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maximise support, we can already conclude from this review that the campaign had a 
different effect in Montenegro and Quebec. Overall, as expected from hypotheses HSup.1, 
Montenegro saw much less electoral volatility during the referendum process than in 
Quebec’s referendums, as voters were already more familiar with the question of 
independence, and more polarised.  
In the year prior to the holding of the referendum in 1980, the PQ could count on just 25 
percent to 30 percent of the electorate to vote for independence if it could convince half 
of the undecided electorate (Figure VII.1). The numbers supporting independence were 
higher when using the question’s wording which included a ‘mandate to negotiate’ and 
‘sovereignty association’, even nearing the 50 percent in March among respondents who 
had made their choice.154 The Yes campaign momentum was short-lived however, with 
the No side changing its strategy for a more positive tone of federal reform and 
accommodation in the week prior to voting day (see below).  
The start of the official campaign in April led to an increase in undecided voters who, 
ultimately, sided with the No side. The referendum result of the 20th of May 1980 shows 
that the independentists managed to convince about 10 percent of undecided voters to cast 
a Yes ballot and that ‘sovereignty’ was the way forward. The overall upward trend in 
mobilising Quebecers indicates that the official referendum period (formally setting in 
motion the referendum process and official campaign period) offered an advantageous 
platform for the Yes side. Yet, the No campaign constrained its rise and won the 
referendum. While insufficient, the Yes gains put the sovereigntists in a better position to 
start the second independence referendums in 1995 (Figure VII.2). The young generation 
which was more supportive of independence than their older peers in 1980 was carried 
through in 1995.  
In 1994, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Parti Québécois came back to power in 
September having promised a second independence referendum, but once again it was not 
in a position to win it. Although it started with a more solid support base than 15 years 
prior, just below 40 percent of the Quebec electorate was inclined to cast a Yes ballot on 
‘separation’. The Party failed to make gains in its first year in office. The overall trend 
shows a more polarised electorate which was less sensitive to the referendum question 
wording, but also on average with more undecided voters.  
                                                          
154 The difficulty of measuring what remained a blurry proposal for many Quebecers was a 
challenge for PQ politician Claude Morin who was in charge of the referendum strategy to 
optimise the timing of the plebiscite. 
 (Cloutier, Guay, and Latouche 1992, 51).  
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Figure VII.1: Support for secession in Quebec’s first independence referendum process 
 
Source: Polling data in Yale and Durand (2011) – averages of polls using the same question during the month shown.  
 
The independence referendum’s debate in 1980 was comparatively new, with some of its 
key aspects and framing still being tested-out; by 1995, however, the Quebec electorate 
was much more familiar with the issue at stake, although ambiguities remained (see 
below). The campaign officially started on the 2nd of October, and although unofficial 
campaigning on both sides had started much earlier, it proved a critical period in 
increasing the number of undecided electors, and the sovereigntists rallied more of them 
on the 30th of October. As we will see below, a change in the Yes campaign strategy and 
especially an unofficial shift of leadership enabled the Yes side to further mobilise the 
Francophone electorate.  
Although we do not have as much data on Montenegro, it is clear that the overall trend of 
support is very different from Quebec. At the beginning of 2003, when the Constitutional 
Charter of Serbia and Montenegro officially came into force, the independentist campaign 
could hope to achieve a simple majority if half the undecided voters were mobilised. This 
position was slowly consolidated during the three-year probation period on the 
independence referendum, thanks to every election in the republic being run on a 












Nov-79 Jan-80 Feb-80 Mar-80 Apr-80 May-80 Referendum
Result
Quebec 1979-1980
Yes Independence/Separation No Independence/Separation
Undecided Yes RefQ
No RefQ Undicided RefQ
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partners continuing their nation-building programme (cf. chapter V). Undecided voters, 
on average more numerous than in Quebec, remained the key to secure independence.  
 
Figure VII.2: Support for secession in Quebec’s second independence referendum process 
 
Source: Polling data in Yale and Durand (2011) – averages of polls using the same question during the month shown.  
 
Despite the question of independence being much clearer and familiar to Montenegrin 
voters than in Quebec, the number of undecided voters increased as the referendum 
process was being negotiated and officialised between 2005 and 2006. Despite the more 
polarised context, there was still room for a deliberative process to make a difference (see 
also Table VII.1 below). Nonetheless, the No side lost more from the increasing numbers 
of undecided voters than the independence option. At the height of the campaign in the 
month prior to the vote, the number of undecided voters decreased. The Yes side’s lead 
remained throughout with no dramatic shift in the electorate during the referendum 
campaign period. 
Having presented the full picture of how ‘the people’ stood before, during, and after the 
campaign, I turn my attention to what lies behind this aggregate support for independence 













Yes Independence/Separation No Independence/Separation
Undecided Yes RefQ
No RefQ Undicided RefQ
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need to keep in mind the profile of the original electorate and the context within which 
they were held. The electorate in the three referendums came with specific, sometimes 
heterogeneous, concerns and demands to be answered by the Yes and No campaigns, 
some of which were already the product of the independentist campaign prior to the 
referendum process.  
Figure VII.3: Support for secession in Montenegro’s independence referendum process 
 
Source: CEDEM. Sample-size from 994 to 1481 respondents. Question-wording either “independence” or exact 
referendum question. 
 
VII.1.b. What lies behind support  
 
A particular challenge for both Montenegrin and Quebec secessionists was the risk-
aversion of the electorate (e.g. Hobolt 2009, 637; Liñeira, Henderson, and Delaney 2017), 
with women having been found to be more risk-adverse (Schubert 2006; Verge, Guinjoan, 
and Rodon 2015). This problem was likely more acute in Quebec than in Montenegro, 
where its de facto independent status left little room to the imagination of what 
independence would entail. There was less to lose for an individual in Montenegro than 
in Quebec in voting Yes as the latter was deeply integrated within the federation, not least 
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better position to make electoral gains than the sovereigntists in Quebec in 1980 and 1995. 
Yet, the context in Montenegro, given the centrality of the question of independence since 
2001, was more polarised from the start and thus less inclined to change. The polls put 
the victory of the Yes at 55 percent but still within a margin of error; independence was 
therefore not secured and every vote would count. 
In the three referendums studied, party-identification, national-identification and socio-
demographic characteristics such as class or gender are important factors in accounting 
for support for independence (cf. for example Guntermann 2012; Richez and Bodet 2012; 
Curtice 2013; McLean and Thomson 2014; Muñoz and Tormos 2015). While already a 
partial product of the mobilisation of independentist actors and counter-mobilisation by 
those defending the status-quo, they form a complex set of political cleavages to draw 
further support from. Additionally, existing attitudes and concerns – implicit and explicit 
– predispose an individual to favour one option over the other, and can even help predict 
the voting behaviour of individuals who do not initially express a preference (undecided) 
(Fenwick et al. 1982; Arcuri et al. 2008; Friese et al. 2012). Given such predispositions, 
each side of the referendum campaign had a sub-electorate that could ‘make or break’ 
independence. 
The independentists’ electoral-base, assuming the unlikely prospect that all of their voters 
would endorse independence, was insufficient in both cases to secure a Yes victory. The 
electoral mandate of the PQ stood at around 41 percent in 1976 and 44.7 in 1994. In 
Montenegro, while the pro-independentists parties gathered around 55 percent of the votes 
in 2002, the composition of this support base remained problematic. The Yes side in 
Montenegro could largely rely on ethnic-minorities within the republic to back 
independence (Sistek and Dimitrova 2003). The Bosniak majority municipalities of Plav 
and Rožaje showed the strongest level of support for secession (91 percent) followed by 
the Albanian municipality of Ulcinj (87 per cent);155 considerably higher than in 
municipalities traditionally inhabited by Montenegrin identifiers such as Cetinje 
(Morrison 2009, 210, 218). Yet, even with the almost 30 percent of minorities on the Yes 
side, victory was not guaranteed. 
An overwhelming majority of people who identified as Serbs opposed Montenegrin 
independence (84.8 percent). “Montenegrins” were more divided with 60 percent ready 
to endorse independence. Among the relatively young Montenegrin/Serbian identity 
                                                          
155 The one exception was, paradoxically, Bosniak Muslims in the north of Montenegro. The 
removal of power of Milošević made Serbia less of a threat and they valued the conservation of 
the Sandzack region were they formed a majority spanning over the Montenegrin and Serbian 
border (Filipovic 2001).  
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divide, 20 percent remained undecided on independence (Table VII.1). Montenegro’s 
electoral battleground was therefore among Montenegrin and Serb identifiers and how 
strongly they held either of the two labels and their implication for statehood. 
 
Table VII.1: Support for independence among Montenegrins and Serbs identifiers in 2005156 
 Serb-identifiers % Montenegrin-identifiers % 
 Independence Union Undecided Independence Union Undecided 
January 2.6 84.8 12.6 62.5 21.5 16 
May 2 78.2 19.8 57.7 15.8 26.5 
September 3 73.4 23.6 59.4 15.8 24.8 
December 4.6 69.9 25.5 59.5 14.5 26 
Source: CEDEM (2007) 
 
In Quebec, neither dedicated secessionists and federalists could rally a robust majority of 
public opinion. The No side could rely on Quebec’s Anglophones and ‘Allophone’ 
immigrants’ support for Canada. The northern part of Quebec and areas bordering Ontario 
and the United States, along with the more cosmopolitan city of Montreal, were likely to 
reject independence. Lastly, as discussed in the previous chapter, Aboriginal peoples 
within Quebec were also hostile to independence. Although they are an important 
symbolic group, their electoral weight was minimal. This was insufficient however to 
secure the union and both sides had to appeal to the middle group or “soft” nationalists 
(Richez and Bodet 2012, 78). Laponce believes that, among the 80 percent Francophones, 
a more realistic ‘group’ target was ‘the roughly 65 per cent who identify either as 
Quebecois or French Canadian’ (1999, 112–13).  
Both case studies show the limits of national/ethnic-mobilisation. Political (electoral) 
mobilisation becomes a more useful analytical tool to understand the strategies of either 
side of the campaign to mobilise voters. Returning to the work of Brubaker, identity can 
serve as a practical category through which politics and events are perceived (2002, 167). 
Yet, it is not a stable, all-encompassing property that can guarantee that someone will 
oppose or support independence.  Secessionist actors use identity to frame their goal of 
                                                          
156 Originally compiled by Dzankic (2009), extended to December.  
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statehood. But in both cases, it is not enough to convince people of Independence's worth. 
Material or rational calculations found in more traditional electoral mobilisation are also 
at work (Hale 2008, 33). People support a proposal based on whether they think they will 
benefit according to what they value most; which may or may not be closely linked to 
identity. Identification with the Quebec or Montenegrin national project can cognitively 
frame the perception of typical concerns over the economy, social services, employment 
or foreign policy.  
The arguments for and against independence become crucial to gain sufficient electoral 
grounds to win the referendum within the limited electorate likely to be open and 
responsive to the messages of either side of the campaign. Numerous studies have 
highlighted the typical profile of a Yes-voter in 1980 and 1995: Francophone, young, male 
with higher education, and more middle-class than a No supporter (Blais and Nadeau 
1984; Pinard 2011; Bernier, Lemieux, and Pinard 1997). In Montenegro, Montenegrin or 
non-Serb minorities, men, younger, educated electors were more likely to support 
independence (CEDEM 2004b, 8).  
The major concerns of the Montenegrin and Quebec electorate were similar and 
represented the major themes of the three independence referendum campaigns covered 
below. In 2001, the core concerns of the Montenegrin population were the economy, 
notably unemployment, followed by the question of continued federation with Serbia 
(NDI 2001, 3, 17). Montenegro was still plagued by high unemployment and sinking 
standards of living (International Crisis Group 2002, 5–6).  In 2004, when asked to 
identify the most important and second most important issues when deciding which party 
to vote for, 83 percent of respondents selected “improved living standards”. It was 
followed by concerns over organised crime and corruption and joining the EU in third 
place.157  The question of the survival of the State-Union only came in fourth position, 
with less than 7 percent believing it was the most, or second most important issue (NDI, 
2005, 2-5). 
The concerns of the Quebec electorate in 1980 and 1995 were similar in terms of the 
economy, standards of living, or corruption (Le Devoir, Tuesday 23rd of May 1978). 
Identity was also more salient, as a political and societal concern in itself. In 1980 
Francophones did not fare as well economically than their Anglophone counterparts; and 
low-birth rate meant that they risked becoming even more of a minority in the federation, 
especially as immigrants preferred to send their children to English-speaking schools 
                                                          
157 In the CEDEM opinion survey study of 2004 unemployment and crime were also perceived as 




(Conley 1997, 86). Both independentists, and those who proposed staying with Serbia or 
Canada, needed to address such concerns and convince them that their option offered the 
solution.  
 
VII.2. The Campaign  
 
The success of the Yes side in Quebec and lack of major shift in support in Montenegro 
can be explained by their respective contexts, and how the understanding of this context 
is framed. The secessionists’ ascendance to power in Montenegro and Quebec shows their 
partial success in questioning the workings of the existing unions with Serbia and Canada. 
Prior to the referendum, they had not yet convinced the vast majority of the electorate that 
independence was the solution. To do so, the core concerns of the inhabitants of Quebec 
and Montenegro needed to be taken into account and framed in a way that showed they 
could not be met under the current arrangement and separation offered the best option (a 
centrifugal dynamic). Yet, because we are dealing with two consensual referendums, the 
No side also had the opportunity to counter the secessionist rhetorical mobilisation 
strategies (a centripetal dynamic).  
The mobilisation strategies employed to reach a position of power and call an 
independence referendum (as covered in chapter IV) cannot be fully dissociated from the 
referendum campaign itself. The campaign represents the quintessence of mobilisation 
efforts for secessionist actors. The societal, political and economic contexts provide 
available material upon which to construct discursive frames (Goffman 1974; Entman 
1993) to highlight problems (real or perceived)  (Benford and Snow 2000). By framing 
the existing context in a certain way, problems and solutions can be developed 
highlighting the cost-benefit of secession to voters according to their concerns, values and 
needs. I will now demonstrate how the independentists addressed the status-quo and its 
limitations to offer solutions through the creation of a new independent state. The 
unionists on the other hand typically demonstrated the value of the union and the 
undesirability of secession. Both actors made use of different and competing frames of 
the contextual setting and tried to appeal to voters’ emotional and rational perspectives.  
In order to make the review of the campaign strategies easier to follow, I focus first on 
actors and their overall framing strategy, and then more specifically how societal, political 
and economic topics were used. We will see that it is often difficult to isolate those themes 
as they are used in combination as a more general construct (e.g. democracy was largely 
assumed to lead to economic development in Montenegro and amalgamated in the Yes 
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side rhetoric). This review also offers an opportunity to overcome the narrow and 
simplistic quantitative review in chapter IV and consider how these variables interact in a 
complex, multilayered framework to shape the perceived cost and benefits of secession.  
VI.2.a. Oui/Da 
 
Yes leaders  
 
The key secessionist figure in the Yes camp in 1980 was René Lévesque. A former PLQ 
politician and founder of the Mouvement Souveraineté-Association, he launched the PQ 
based on a ‘soft’ independentist stance which advocated an etapist approach (Quinn 1979; 
Fraser 2001). The new separatist leader of the Yes camp in 1995 – Jacques Parizeau – had 
more radical aspirations of independence (Conley 1997, 85).  Under his leadership the 
independence campaign failed to make gains in the polls and the referendum originally 
planned for the spring was postponed as it became clear it would be lost. Only after the 
unofficial replacement of the leadership of the Yes by the more popular BQ leader Lucien 
Bouchard did the referendum go ahead and the Yes campaign start to bear fruit.  
This change of strategy, known as the ‘virage’ (turn), was initiated after the referendum 
was pushed to the autumn and the PQ, BQ and AQC joined forces under the “Camp du 
Changement”. The PQ had to compromise with the BQ on its campaign strategy. 
Bouchard was keen to retain an association with Canada, notably a close economic 
cooperation, while Parizeau was ready to sever all ties. On the other hand, Dumont, the 
leader of the AQC party, did not have an outright independentist agenda but hoped to see 
Quebec’s position strengthen.  
Such compromises were also needed on the Yes side in Montenegro but the charismatic 
Djukanović and his party clearly took the lead in organising the Yes campaign. This, 
unlike in Quebec in 1995, allowed for a clear campaign message and reduced ambiguity 
and cues for the electorate (de Vreese 2007b, 10). Despite the much more heterogeneous 
committee composed of 10 parties and different ethnic groups representatives, the main 
challenges among the Montenegrin Yes camp were largely limited to the LCGS and the 
DPS leaders. Slavok Perovic was a fervent critic of Djukanović and his party for being 
undemocratic and corrupt and refused on occasion to stand with the official Yes coalition. 
As a result, the Yes camp emphasised the need to vote for independence as such and not 
because of loyalty to political figures (c.f. Vijesti, 24 March 2006, p6). Nonetheless, the 
LCGS brought legitimacy to the campaign as a long-standing independentist actor in 
Montenegro prior to the government’s change of trajectory (Morrison 2009, 208–9).  
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A different society 
 
The core strategy in Quebec in 1980, and which was ultimately brought back in 1995, 
consisted of framing secession as ‘sovereignty’ and emphasising a future partnership or 
association with Canada. In Montenegro, the framing of independence was focused on 
presenting the future state as ‘European and democratic’. These frames touched upon 
identity, societal and economic issues in order to show the existing situation from a 
particular angle where the existing union was failing and independence was needed. By 
highlighting how Quebec and Montenegro and their respective population were distinct 
from their federations, the benefits associated with secession and the cost or risk of staying 
within the host-state were made visible. 
The first rhetorical strategy consisted of consolidating the proposed national collective 
body through a ‘us vs. them’ approach and arguing that the host-state was detrimental to 
its needs and aspirations. In Quebec, identity was itself something to be secured through 
independence, while in Montenegro the way the nation was portrayed was part of a more 
general democratic and European frame focused on political and economic issues. The 
Péquistes issued a White Paper in November 1979, New Deal, detailing the ways the 
English majority allegedly mistreated Quebecers and political and economic grievances 
within the existing constitutional setting of the federation. This formed the basis of the 
Yes campaign in 1980 (Council 1979).  
The threat to Francophones was also framed positively by emphasising the need for the 
Quebec nation to show pride and take control of its destiny (e.g. Lévesque 1980b, 1980c). 
The lack of protection of the French language and its status in the political and economic 
Canadian sphere justified the need for independent statehood. Some of these concerns 
were alleviated by a succession of language policies in the 1970s to ensure the 
preservation of the French language, such as making French the only official language of 
the province in 1974 (Bill 22), and later the Charter of the French Language (Bill 101) 
asserting further the place of French in Quebec public institutions. The latter, however, 
was challenged in court over some clauses, notably the obligation of immigrant children 
to study French or the exclusivity of French in commercial signs which was found to 
breach freedom of expression (Coleman 1981; MacMillan 1998).  
These actions further alienated Anglophones and Allophone immigrant communities in 
Quebec, which risked becoming an isolated minority within a Francophone independent 
state (Taylor 1994, 67). While the PQ rhetoric wished to be an inclusive project, the 
framing of the collective Quebec ‘we’ as “our future as French-speaking people” 
(O’Connor 1998, 786) was ultimately excluding non-Francophones. Furthermore, some 
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of the declarations made by Yes politicians in the two referendums campaigns had ‘ethnic’ 
and chauvinistic nationalist undertones. The question of the declining birth rate of 
Francophones mentioned in both campaigns created controversies over what type of 
nation-state an independent Quebec would be. For instance, Yes campaigners had made 
remarks on the responsibility of women of Quebec to procreate in 1980, and in 1995 
Bouchard attracted concern by using the term “white race” (Venne 1996, 53–54).  
Another declaration which backfired on the Yes side raised the issue of women in the 
independence debate. Women, as in Montenegro, were less likely than men to support 
independence. This reality led to a derogatory comment by TV presenter Lise Payette, 
who said that women who would vote ‘No’ were “Yvettes”, referring to an image of a 
docile, conservative, schoolgirl. No supporters in Quebec City and Montreal went to the 
streets proudly branding themselves a bunch of Yvettes to campaign in favour of the 
federation (Jean and Lavigne 1981).  
In contrast, the Montenegrin Yes campaign adopted a form of civic-nationalism in an 
effort to clearly frame the Montenegrin identity as one of inclusion that contrasted with 
Serbian ethnic nationalist rhetoric. It sought to appeal to Albanian, Croatian and Roma 
communities by using their own historical figures, language and scripts in their campaign 
material and labelling an independent Montenegro as multi-ethnic.158 While extensively 
criticising the Serbian government and politicians as a threat to Montenegro’s prosperity, 
the Yes campaign was careful not to attack Serbia and Serbians themselves. For instance, 
Marović a DPS politician and head of the State Union framed Montenegro and Serbian 
relations as one of family: “Brothers do not end being brothers when they both have their 
own homes” (Dan, 25 April 2006). Yet the No side, and Bulatović, in particular, was often 
mentioned and associated with the authoritarian Serbian government and used as a counter 
example of what Montenegro stood for, e.g. ‘non-secular and retrograde’ (Vijesti 15 May 
2006; see also Pavicevic and Durovic 2016, 149). 
The rationale behind this framing strategy was twofold.  Firstly, the heterogeneity of the 
Montenegrin population meant that the support of non-Montenegrin or Serbian identifiers 
was crucial for the Yes side, while the border between a Montenegrin and Serbian identity 
was still debated and unclear, requiring the accommodation of an electorate emotionally 
attached to their neighbouring republic and identity.  Secondly, an Ethnic-Montenegrin 
conceptualisation of the nation would have contradicted the overarching democratic and 
                                                          
158 As a way to demonstrate this commitment to protect the different identities within Montenegro 
and as a way to appeal to already supportive minorities, the Montenegrin assembly passed a law 
on minority rights a few weeks prior to the referendum (Djuranović 2006b).   
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European frame adopted by the Yes campaign, and unacceptable to the EU which was to 
take the lead in recognising Montenegro’s independence. 
This framing of the future nation-state also served to conceptualise the shortcomings of 
the existing unions and how independence would answer them in Quebec. Independence 
was needed to protect the Francophone heritage of Quebec against a threatening – 
centralising – federation, e.g. “By voting No, Jean Chrétien is handed a blank cheque to 
crush Quebec. He will continue to crush us by centralising …” (quoted in O’Connor 1998, 
784; emphasis added). While the focus was more on the Francophone language in 1980, 
in 1995 the status of Quebecers within the nation had taken centre stage. The Yes side 
argued that the ROC would ‘deny’ and ‘deprive’ the people of Quebec of the means to 
self-government as to ensure their own development (ibid, p.8). Conversely, 
independence was the only way to ensure Quebec’s future as a Francophone nation, its 
emancipation and fulfilment of its distinctive social aspirations.  
Political and economic aspirations 
 
In both cases, the existing union was said to have failed Quebecers and Montenegrins 
political and economic expectations. In Quebec, those were framed in line with the recent 
Quiet Revolution in 1980 and the relative deprivation experienced by Francophones (as 
mentioned in chapter IV). Furthermore, accusations were made against Ottawa for having 
‘abandoned’ women, the elderly and unemployed and, less frequently, the need to achieve 
greater social justice (Sklar 1999, 111). These problems, and the inability of the federal 
system to reform sufficiently were advanced enough to convince the electorate that 
sovereignty was worth the risk. The Yes campaign played on the negativity of the No 
forces reviewed below and re-appropriated for themselves the ‘No’ slogan to rephrase it 
into what a no vote would entail: ‘No to a strong Quebec’, ‘no to better job opportunities’ 
(Monière, 1998:204-205). In 1995, posters read ‘Yes- and everything becomes possible’.   
In Montenegro, Belgrade was framed as an impediment – using terms such as ‘risk’ or 
‘economic disaster’ to Montenegro’s prosperity, and as an ‘authoritarian’, if not an 
outright threat to self-government as when it was governed by Milosevic (Bosković 2006). 
DPS politicians often referred to the loss of independence in 1918 - perceived then as a 
golden age to be retrieved - and the “injustices” under Serbia it had suffered since 
(Morrison 2009, 206). The take home message was unmistakably that independence was 




The overarching democratic and European frame encompassed economic and societal 
themes closely linked to improvements in standards of living for the population. The Yes 
side argued that Montenegro’s economy could be reformed faster by breaking with Serbia 
(Whyte 2001, 47 Opinion Expressed by Veselin Vukovic and Nebojša Medojević; Huszka 
2003, 56–60). A lexicon of difference and incompatibility was used to emphasise that 
attempts to make the existing economic cooperation work would be doomed as 
Montenegro’s economy was too different from Serbia’s. The Yes side also emphasised 
the risk of Montenegro losing its monetary sovereignty and central bank to Belgrade who 
had expressed its wish to create a common customs regime. Another economic argument 
against the union was the cost of the federation itself with, it was argued, little benefits in 
return. To back it up, Montenegro’s ability to function as a de facto independent state for 
several years was put forward. The independentist coalition also pointed out that inflation, 
GDP per capita, debts, and unemployment numbers were better in Montenegro than in 
Serbia (Huszka 2013, 138). 
This framing of an economic union as a threat contrasted markedly with the Quebec 
independentists making such an association a core element of their campaign strategies. 
Areas where Quebec, and especially Francophones, did worse than the rest of Canada 
served to show that the province was being held back by the federal government (La 
Presse, 1st April 1980). Yet, the independentists did not wish to cut economic ties, but 
mostly political ones, allowing Quebec an equal role. This approach can be explained by 
the sovereigntist politicians’ own ideology of what independence was to look like, and as 
a deliberate attempt to alleviate Quebecers’ apprehensions. While NAFTA was mentioned 
as an economic association that would favour an independent Quebec’s economy, it did 
not take centre stage in the referendum debate as the EU did in Montenegro. The PQ’s 
focus was on a renewed economic association with the ROC.  
 Independence and new partnerships  
 
Quebec independentists made the deliberate choice to use the word ‘sovereignty’ to define 
their secessionist goal, and to ask for a mandate to negotiate it in 1980. Opinion polls 
backed this lexical choice: Quebecers were more likely to support ‘sovereignty’ over 
‘independence’ (Pinard, 1994). It was argued that economic ties would not be severed, 
the Canadian dollar would be kept as currency (e.g. the one Canadian dollar coin was used 
for the ‘o’ of ‘oui’ in posters). The 1980 television campaign advertisements often used a 
scale to demonstrate how an independent Quebec would become an equal partner. They 
argued that an economic association would be undoubtedly in the interest of everyone 
(Jones, 1997:27). The debate and proposed vision of “sovereignty-association” was 
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however not fully understood in 1980 and remained ill-defined (Boyer 1982, 78–79), 
although as the campaigns progressed, the implications of the referendum became better 
understood (Durand 2008, 33). 
While the now very familiar term of ‘sovereignty’ was retained, the more outright 
secessionist approach of Parizeau in 1995 failed to convince the Quebec electorate. Only 
with the arrival of Bouchard, the official negotiator for a renewed association on the 7th 
of October 1995, and a framing strategy closer to that of 1980 which emphasised a new 
partnership with Canada, did the Yes side start to make electoral gains in polls. This also 
enabled the economic argument for independence to become more convincing (Nadeau, 
Martin, and Blais 1999; Blais, Martin, and Nadeau 1995).  
The 1995 frame concentrated more on the federation and its constitutional shortcomings 
but also the ‘project de société’ for Quebec to meet the challenges of the twenty-first 
century (Mau 2005, 112–13). In 1980, the parameters of independence and the articulated 
failings of the federation to accommodate Quebec were present, but less clearly defined 
and new to the public. The failures to deliver the promises made by the No side in the 
1980 referendum campaign in the successive attempts to renew the constitution were 
brought as evidence in 1995 that Quebec needed to take on a new trajectory.159 The 
declaration on the No side that the ROC was not interested in negotiating with a sovereign 
Quebec was also used to show the need to strengthen Quebec’s position (e.g. Cardinal 
2005, 53:32 min.; Conley 1997, 85).  
In Montenegro, although the Yes political parties were keen to sever all ties with Belgrade, 
they produced an official declaration on cooperation with Serbia to show its dedication to 
retaining a close relationship with Belgrade (Declaration on Relations with the Republic 
of Serbia after Gaining Independence 2006). This document aimed to make an emotional 
appeal to the undecided elements of the electorate who were more likely to be ambivalent 
towards Serbia. The use of this rhetoric was limited however compared to the economic 
dimension of independence. Indeed, Djukanović called on independence to be viewed 
“rationally” (BBC Monitoring/ Mina News 2006). 
Nonetheless, the Yes campaign focused on a different union to make their case for 
independence: The European Union. The term ‘Europe’ was in itself symbolic and 
provided a lexicon of what Serbia was not: peaceful, prosperous, civic and democratic.160 
                                                          
159There is no strong evidence however that these constitutional failure directly benefited the 
secessionists by increasing support for secession between 1980 and prior to the referendum 
campaign of 1995 (c.f. Yale and Durand 2011, 252–53). 
160 Review of original campaign material.  
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Joining the European Union was a key item on the agenda in Montenegro, and to a lesser 
extent in Serbia at the time, and closely linked to an opportunity for economic 
development. It had become more preeminent after the fall of Milosevic since its previous 
argument for independence to be protected against an “undemocratic” Belgrade was now 
less relevant, although the democratisation of Montenegro and moving away from the 
‘corrupt’ Serbian elites was still mentioned throughout the Yes campaign (Huszka 2013, 
130).  
The Yes side emphasised that EU accession would be faster if Montenegro broke away 
from the Union with Serbia. It blamed its neighbour for slowing down its chances to join 
the regional organisation due to its reluctance to cooperate fully with The Hague Tribunal 
(BBC Monitoring 2006a). This argument was considerably strengthened when the EU 
suspended negotiations with the state Union during the official referendum campaign 
(International Crisis Group 2006, 6). Finally, because of the negative image of Serbia in 
Europe, leaving the Union would free Montenegro from this negative association and 
encourage international investments and tourism in a ‘multicultural’ and ‘tolerant’ place 
(Huszka 2013, 139). 
VI.2.b. Non/Ne 
 
Regional and Host-state figureheads  
 
The Quebec No campaigns in 1980 and 1995 lacked the Yes’ charismatic figures at the 
provincial and federal level, with the exception of Trudeau (Segal 1997, 462; Pammett 
and LeDuc 2001, 273). Trudeau replaced PM Joe Clark 11 weeks prior to voting day. As 
a Quebecer, he was in a more legitimate position to get involved in the campaign, but his 
vision of the Canadian nation and his stance against negotiating a new deal with Quebec, 
unlike Clark, was deterring some Quebecers (Boyer 1992, 145). Although a major 
figurehead, his Minister of Justice, Jean Chrétien followed the No camp’s official leader 
Ryan in touring through Quebec (Laforest, 1995:29). Chrétien would be in the same 
position as Trudeau in 1995 as federal PM, but the latter was less charismatic and lagged 
behind Bouchard in popularity. In both referendums, the No camp struggled with internal 
divisions over the strategy employed (e.g. Le Devoir 28 February, 13 April 1980, Ryan 
2000, 20). 
While the Canadian government got involved in the campaign to support the No camp, 
the rest of Canada was deliberately kept out of it as much as possible (Hebert and Lapierre 
2014, 106). Firstly, because declarations from the ROC could be perceived as interference 
in the internal affairs of Quebec. Although the No side did not officially recognise Quebec 
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as a nation, it was treated as a distinct entity and population to mitigate its electorate’s 
self-perception. Secondly, interventions were not expected to help the No side’s case, 
given that the other provinces were reluctant to accommodate Quebec, especially in 1995 
(Manning 1992; Young 2000). 
The block in favour of the State Union struggled with internal divisions and rivalries as 
well. Although the two campaigning camps were already formed in 2005 (and had 
experience of working together when forming electoral coalitions since 2001), it was not 
clear at the time whether and when the pro-union actors would recognise and participate 
in the independence referendum, legitimising the process. The “movement for the Joint 
European State union of Serbia and Montenegro” representing the NS, DSS and SNS was 
originally set up with Belgrade and was largely directed from Belgrade by Montenegrins 
living in Serbia. They were a heterogeneous and rather disorganised bloc with varying 
commitment to the Serb cause.  
The campaigning bloc was formalised by Zoran Zizic, vice president of the SNP, by 
uniting the smaller pro-unionist parties and other organisations without the consent of the 
party leader and the support of the party congress as they were still debating whether to 
engage with the process (International Crisis Group 2005). Ultimately, Bulatović asserted 
that its opposition block would “not boycott [the referendum] if the EU indicates that it 
approves of a referendum” (quoted in ICG 2005:5). As with the federal involvement in 
Quebec, Belgrade’s intervention was a double-edged sword for the No side. It was 
difficult to find the right balance between respecting Montenegro as an equal partner, 
while pointing out that Montenegro would lose out from ending the union with Serbia 
(Morrison 2009, 212).  
 Counter-frames 
 
While the Yes campaigns highlighted the benefits of secession and the drawbacks 
associated with the existing host-state, the No sides asserted the benefit of their union and 
denounced the illusions behind the Yes discourses, emphasising instead the ‘risks’ and 
‘losses’ of independence. The No sides in both cases were in the disadvantageous position 
of being primarily reactive to the – already partially successful – Yes rhetorical framing 
strategy. This meant they had less room than their opponents in framing the debate to their 
advantage (Druckman 2004, 675; see also Lemieux 1978 on the early strategies adopted 
by the PQ government and Ottawa). On the other hand, they had the advantage of having 
the known and safer position of defending the status quo, and were much better placed to 
deliver the promises made during the campaign.  
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The major component of the No campaign in Quebec, especially in 1980, was to counter 
the Péquistes ‘sovereignty-association’ narrative. The use of specific words, notably using 
the terms ‘separation’ and ‘secession’ was an attempt to challenge the Yes side’s 
contextualisation of the issues as a step toward a new association. It re-interpreted their 
framing to redirect the campaign debate towards independence and the negative 
consequences of separation. This reframing was possible because the question of 
independence remained relatively new in 1980. Furthermore, the federalists were 
confident they would win and therefore did not need to address the legality of secession 
and the modalities of independence.  
The Yes side “association” was also dismissed in both referendums. During a televised 
debate on the 15th of April 1995, the ‘take-home message’ was that a Yes victory would 
lead Quebec into a political and judicial impasse as the rest of the provinces had rejected 
the idea of economic association (Marsolais, 1995).  A Yes vote would leave Quebec out 
of the union and considerably worse-off. Saskatchewan Premier Blakene also expressed 
his doubts that a smooth transition to sovereignty was possible, as Quebec would have to 
‘be treated by the rest of Canada as a separate country (…) just like Australia, France, the 
United States or Mexico’ (Globe and Mail, 9 April 1980:8). This choice of comparison 
and words clearly set the referendum as a state-creation tool by the No side.  
In Montenegro, the No side – together for change – countered the independentist 
European and democratic overarching frame and focused on economic arguments with a 
slogan stating that ‘Montenegro is not for sale!’. It also called on the emotional attachment 
to Serbia with ‘Heart says No!’ banners. But in doing so, the No campaign largely failed 
to consider minorities by focusing on orthodox Serb and Montenegrin communities, with 
the only exception the “Bosniak block” alliance which had little success in attracting 
Muslims votes (Morrison 2009, 210).161 It had therefore much less room and resources to 
attract potential supporters than the Yes side. Support and manpower were concentrated 
in the north of the republic as opposed to the pro-independence camp who had a broader 
electorate and area to campaign within. Even if the pro-union side wished to appear more 
minority-friendly, its strong association with Serbia, and Bulatović with Milosevic, 
affected the No camp and the federation’s image negatively (Kola 2003). 
This was not helped by some members of the No camp’s campaigning strategy. The SNP 
insisted on avoiding traditional Serbian symbols – such as the Serbian flags or other 
nationalist symbols. More radical members still used them along with xenophobic 
                                                          
161 My own review of the campaign material and its publication in the two main newspapers Dan 
and Vijesti highlighted the predominant use of Cyrillic, while the Yes side tended to use both 
scripts and also messages in Albanian. 
236 
 
comments about Croat, Albanian and Bosnian citizens during the referendum campaign 
(Morrison 2009, 212, Huszka 2013, 137). In particular, the No side raised the risk of these 
minorities seeking secession from an independent Montenegro. The pro-union media 
notably Dan and the Belgrade-based daily Politika continuously reported rumours on 
minorities’ illegal activities and their own separatist plans (International Crisis Group 
2006, 5). The xenophobic narratives likely only appealed to pro-Serb extremists who 
would already vote No to independence, making it a counterproductive strategy. 
The pro-union camp believed that Montenegrin and Serbs were the same ethnicity and 
people, and made the sentimental and identity union the core of its campaign strategy, 
emphasising historical and cultural links (Huszka 2013, 105; Morrison 2009, 201). In 
contrast, the federalists in Quebec emphasised a vision of Canada as a place of tolerance 
and multiculturalism. Nonetheless, the No campaign was careful to assert Quebec’s 
distinct status such as when using a play on words with ‘name’ and ‘no’ sounding the 
same in French in their slogan ‘My No is Quebecer’.  
In the 1970s, Trudeau had adopted a discourse framing Canada, and Quebec, as a 
multicultural society to challenge the Quebec Liberals and the Parti Québécois quest to 
have Quebec recognised as a distinct and co-founding nation of Canada (Blattberg 2003, 
68–69; Laforest 1995). This attempt to shape the understanding of the Quebec identity 
within Canada was largely dropped during the 1980 and 1995 campaigns. Canadian unity 
was portrayed positively to the public, emphasizing the terms of equality, democracy, 
diversity and strength. The phrase ‘two people’ often recurred in the texts (Sklar, 
1999:16). Nonetheless, concerns over the No side’s attempts to ‘assimilate’ rather than 
‘accommodate’ Quebec were brought up against it, especially when it remained vague 
about what it proposed to do to answer these grievances in its campaign materials and 
discourses (e.g. Rose 1993, 8–9; Laforest 1995, 15). 
The unwillingness to engage with the question of the status of Quebec could be explained 
by a fear of further polarising the Quebec electorate for some federalists, while for others, 
this was not a question worth addressing in the first place. Focusing on the risks of 
‘separation’ knowing that most Quebecers were opposed to such a radical move also 
ensured that the federalists did not have to question the right to decide of an electorate 
who had just found a new political identity and sense of nationhood. When a speaker at a 
No rally declared that winning the referendum was not enough, and the sovereigntists will 
also be ‘crushed’, the No leaders quickly distanced themselves from such language and 
Johnson, leader of the Quebec Liberal party, called for moderation and respect (Young, 
2000:312). The sovereignists’ true nature was also identified on occasions as being overly 
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nationalist. For instance, Ryan declared that he ‘profoundly reject(s) the appeals to 
discrimination which have been issued by the other side’, hitting at chauvinistic 
tendencies in the PQ (Gibb-Clark, 1980).  
Cost and deception  
 
The three No campaigns have in common their framing of independence as a risky and 
costly endeavour and questioning of their opponent’s integrity, making for a much more 
negative campaign that the Yes sides. In 1980, the No camp presented an independent 
Quebec as ‘foreign’ and weakened. Trudeau warned that an independent Quebec state 
would resemble Cuba or Haiti (Laforest, 1995:30-31). The No camp questioned the 
validity of the sovereigntist project, notably in terms of the economic and social 
downturns it claimed independence would entail. The stock market’s negative reaction to 
the rising possibility of a Yes victory was used as evidence for the negative consequence 
of independence; while Parizeau used it as an indication that both sides needed to 
negotiate an economic arrangement as soon as possible (La Press, 14 September 1995, 
p1).  
The Serbian PM Kostunica declared that “the creation of new borders would not cause 
good things to happen” (Dan, 17 May 2006). The SNP argued that ‘a modern, functional 
and organized diplomacy’, ‘funding membership in international institutions’, and 
sustaining a separate army would mean huge expenses, which ‘the government is 
purposefully avoiding mentioning” (quoted in Huszka 2013, 137).162 Bulatović sought to 
target a “pauperised population” in an unequal society by associating the federation with 
its socialist past and by asking how, without Serbia, the needs of the middle-aged and 
older generation, in particular, could be met. It was also argued that the desired European 
integration and the economic and social benefits it was believed to bring was more likely 
to be achieved with Serbia since the EU was disinclined to see Montenegro become 
independent (BBC Monitoring 2006b). 
A major aspect of the No camps’ rhetorical strategy was to attack the credibility not only 
of the independence plan but also of those who proposed to execute it. Djukanović and 
his allies were accused of attempting to create a ‘private state’ (BBC Monitoring 2006c). 
One of the slogans chanted during the pro-unionist rallies was “Milo-lopov” (“Milo is a 
thief”). SNP politician Zoran Zizic stated that “the citizens are being manipulated, 
impoverished, and at the verge of existence; they are pushed in a situation to deny their 
                                                          




roots, language, church, which affirms that the only interest of the government coalition 
is to remain in power” (quoted in Dzankic 2009, 205). Corruption was also found to be a 
major angle of attack for the No side, with advertisements in newspapers showing 
definitions of key words such as “undemocratic”, or “corruption” as part of their campaign 
strategies.163  
In Quebec, during the Charlesbourg meeting campaign in 1980, leader Ryan also accused 
the PQ of acting illegally by financing studies to discredit federalism with public funds 
(Carrier, 1980:9). The No leader even used the words ‘fraud’, ‘manipulation’, 
‘dissimulation’ and ‘dupery’, in one sentence to refer to the opposition (Le Devoir, 20 
April 1980:1). In 1995, Chrétien accused the sovereigntists on numerous occasions of not 
showing their true separatist colours by arguing that people should be ‘asked an honest 
question, (…) not a trick question, no clever twist and turns’ (Chrétien quoted in Young, 
1999:55). This re-framing of the issue away from the Yes conceptualisation consisted of 
showing that the real issue worth focusing on was over separation, not ‘partnership’, and 
as in Montenegro, attacking the credibility of the messenger.   
Benefits and concessions 
 
To counter this overly negative framing to convince the electorate to reject secession, the 
No sides appealed to the benefits of the union in emotional and rational terms. The latter 
was an easier task for Canadian federalists than for Serbian supporters in Montenegro. 
Given the de facto independence of Montenegro, arguing for the benefits of the union, 
notably in economic terms, proved difficult. The pro-union camp focused on tax, property 
ownership rights, pensions and health care (Morrison 2009, 201). Among such arguments 
were the possibility of Serbia introducing higher fees for Montenegrin students, patients 
and visas, and essentially being treated as “foreigners” (BBC Monitoring 2006c).  
In Quebec, the Federalists in Ottawa defended the status quo on the constitutional 
dimension at the start of both campaigns and argued, not without grounds, that the 
economy and job prospects were the real concern of Canadians and Quebecers alike 
(Monière, 1998:202). Ryan emphasised that the important economic resources of Canada, 
not least oil and gas resources, ‘contributed enormously’ to the province of Quebec (Globe 
and Mail, 26 April 1980:3). The Yes side, in turn, was keen to criticise this strong 
emphasis on economic arguments. Chrétien refuted these claims saying that the federalist 
                                                          
163 Review of original campaign material.  
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forces did not intend to appeal to Quebecers solely via their pocketbooks but on their 
patriotism and attachment to Canada as well (Globe and Mail, 26 April 1980:3). 
The overall negative tone of the campaign focused on economic losses and risks had to 
be addressed in Montenegro and Quebec by the No campaigners. Furthermore, the No 
campaign was described as largely complacent during, even by their own members (Le 
Devoir, 14 January 1980). In 1980, as the Yes side campaign gained momentum, the 
Federalists, who had stated so far that the federation was sufficiently flexible as it was, 
started to shift their framing strategy for a more positive message focused on change.   
On the 14th of May the No side committed itself to a renewed federalism as a strategy to 
convince as yet undecided voters a week prior to voting day (Laforest, 1995:31). Trudeau, 
who had until then been very reluctant to grant any clear concessions, declared that ‘we 
will not tolerate interpreting the victory of the No as a sign that all is well again and we 
can return to the status quo’ (La Press, 15th May 1980). A similar change of strategy took 
place in 1995 after the Yes vote took the lead in the polls. Johnson’s party was already 
supportive of offering a concrete project during the campaign to show that a ‘No’ vote 
also meant change, but Ottawa was reluctant (Young; 1999:30-31). In the last few days, 
fearing a secessionist victory, Johnson emphasised Quebec’s status as a distinct society, 
followed by a reluctant Parizeau a few days later: “They [Quebecers] want to see Quebec 
recognized in Canada as a distinct society by its language, culture and institutions. I agree. 
[…] Voting no means rejecting separation. It does not mean that we give up anything 
regarding the Canadian Constitution” (Globe and Mail, 26 October 1995). 
In the last weeks of the Montenegrin referendum campaign observers also noted that the 
No side adopted a more positive rhetoric and attempted to reach a younger support base 
(CEMI 2007, 106). This seemed to have had an impact as its biggest rally in Niksic on 
the 15th of May was well attended by younger voters which until then had been largely 
absent (Morrison 2009, 212–13). Nonetheless, because of the state union already being 
extremely decentralised, the No side in Montenegro had little room to grant concession or 
affect the cost-benefits of the union, unlike Canada. The new Union had just been created 
and it was already a very loose arrangement (Fraser 2003).  
In Quebec, the federation had, overall, a much more positive image, despite the economic 
and cultural frustrations of Francophones since the Quiet Revolution. Some declarations, 
however, weakened this perception. Ontario premier Mike Harris, one of the rare premiers 
to step into the referendum campaign, declared that if Quebec was to secede then the 
province was to be treated like any other foreign country and there were no requirements, 
historical or otherwise, to give Quebec special privileges (Young 1999:30). This 
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declaration was controversial and contradictory to the message of the unity and affinity 
shared by the two entities that was being stressed simultaneously by the No campaign. It 
was strategically ‘awkward’ for the No side to ‘formally dismiss the offer of political 
partnership’ because this could drive away voters attached to Canada (Young 1999:46).  
In the three independence referendums studied, it seems the Yes side, although less so in 
1995 in Quebec, were in a slightly better position to engage in the campaign compared to 
their unionist counterparts. Furthermore, as we will see below, the Yes side, as the 
initiator, had an advantage in its ability to be the first to frame the question of 
independence, while the No side was by default having to react to a rhetoric and 
mobilisation effort that had already started to show success.  
The Quebec secessionists went from having 20 to 30 percent support for ‘sovereignty’ in 
the 1970s to losing the referendum in 1995 by less than 0.60 percent, or 54, 288 votes. 
During the 1980 referendum campaign, they consolidated up to 40 percent of the 
electorate, a generation that was carried in 1995, giving it a better head start the second 
time around. In the second independence referendum, the No camp originally had a 20 
percent lead according to some polls and the wording of the question prior to the start of 
the campaign, but lost at least 10 percent of originally pro-union electors to the 
sovereigntists. In Montenegro, the polls and final result remained within the margin of 
error, making it very challenging to assess the referendum effect, especially when 
individual level data is missing. It shows however that there were no major gains by either 
side during the referendum campaign in the same way witnessed in Quebec.  
Both examples, however, show the potential negative effects of a referendum campaign: 
increasing polarisation, mounting controversies delegitimising the referendum and 
threatening its ability to compel the losing side to respect the outcome, and campaign 
narratives that question the foundation of an existing or future state, with potentially long-
lasting consequences for Montenegrin and Quebec society.  
 
VII.3. The Referendum Result 
 
VII.3.a. A legitimate and acceptable outcome? 
 
Under the watch of international observers, the Montenegrin polling stations opened from 
8 a.m. to 9 p.m. on the 21st of May 2006. Although the pro-independentist side had already 
declared victory the next day, the RRC announced the preliminary results two days after 
the closing of the polls with 55.5 percent for and 45.5 percent against independence. The 
241 
 
Secessionist option only passed by a narrow margin: a difference of 2,095 ballots. The 
turnout, just over 86 percent, put the Yes side below a majority of all eligible voters: 48 
percent. Among those about 19,000 voters were still disputed (BBC 2006b). With about 
30 percent of the minorities Yes vote, the 55 percent result shows that only a minority of 
ethnic Montenegrins and Serbs supported secession from the State Union with Serbia. The 
official results were made public on the 31st of May 2006 by the RRC, but the No side 
refused to sign the minutes as it contested the result.  
To justify its refusal to acknowledge the referendum outcome, the No side mentioned 
fraud and irregularities. The “Zeta film” was particularly controversial as it depicted a 
DPS activist bribing voters in Podgorica. The Yes campaign was also accused of coercion 
and low-level pressure among state-employees (Dan, April 25, 2006) - something 
common during elections in Montenegro, even today (Morrison 2009, 210, 215; Huszka 
2013, 139). In four percent of the polling stations visited by OSCE/ODIHR 
representatives, the ballot boxes were not properly sealed (OSCE/ODIHR 2002, 16–17). 
Both sides were guilty of a clear breach of conduct in what would be considered ‘free and 
fair’ elections, especially when it comes to mobilising expatriates. Montenegro Airlines 
decided to cancel all flights from Belgrade a week prior to the referendum, which was to 
be re-directed instead to bring expatriates free of charge to Montenegro (Monitor, 26 May 
2006). Republika claimed that some 6000 Montenegrins from the US had made the trip 
back home to cast their vote (Republika, 22 May 2006, p2; Vijesti 23 May 2006). 
Morrison’s research shows that the pro-union block did the same once it “screened” 
potential voters and subsidised transport from Serbia to Montenegro (2009, 216).  
These events were used by the No side to delegitimise the referendum outcome. Although 
many verbal complaints were made by the pro-unionist camp, no official complaints 
reached the constitutional court within the required deadline. The Montenegrin parliament 
voted to acknowledge the results of the referendum, officially declaring Montenegro an 
independent state on the 3rd of June 2006, but the No camp politicians refused to attend 
the parliamentary secession (OSCE/ODIHR 2006, 19). The pro-union block reaction 
shows that even in an agreed, binding referendum, the process and the outcome can still 
be contested. The close results and contentious process undermined the perceived 
legitimacy of the referendum outcome at the societal/electoral level and regional/party-
system levels. The outcome was however legitimised by the international-level 
representatives (cf. Figure I.1, Chapter I).  
Despite acknowledging irregularities on both sides, the international observers’ final 
assessments of the voting process remained positive overall (Cazala 2006, 172). The 
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recognition of the process as free and fair by internal and external observers validated the 
result. The EU approval of the referendum results, despite clear breaches of the electoral 
process, can be explained by the need to settle the question and not risk destabilising 
further the polarised and tense situation. I believe that, despite the very close results and 
the controversies, the 55 percent threshold saved the day. Although the extra 5 percent 
could be debated and a non-biased result might have ended within the ‘grey-zone’, it 
remains clear that over half of the Montenegrin population who expressed an opinion 
supported independence. This, I think, made the outcome satisfactory to the EU and the 
international community, although such a close call with evidence of unfair tactics and 
irregularities remained problematic for the opposition.  
The endorsement of the referendum outcome by the OSCE/ODIHR and European 
observers allowed for the cascade of recognitions discussed in chapter I. The Croatian 
President and Iceland’s PM were the first to congratulate Montenegro on its 
independence. Solana, EU’s foreign policy chief, said that the EU member states ‘are still 
awaiting the final results but according to preliminary official results it seems likely that 
more than 55 per cent of Montenegrins voted for independence yesterday. The majority 
requirement was therefore reached and surpassed’. He added that the high turnout 
‘confirms the legitimacy of the process’ and stressed for both sides to recognise the 
outcome (Solana 2006). The United States endorsed the OSCE assessment of the 
referendum and urged Serbia and Montenegro to work together to implement the “will of 
the people of Montenegro” (United States Mission to the OSCE 2006). Soon many more 
states and international organisations (e.g. NATO) followed, including the five permanent 
members of the UN security council, noting that the referendum had complied with 
international standards (BBC 2006a). 
In Serbia, the host-state and official successor state164, elites were divided. President Boris 
Tadić accepted the primary result on the 23rd, while PM Koštunica declared he would wait 
for the final results once the irregularities raised by the No camp had been investigated 
(BBC 2006c). In mid-June, it stated that “conditions have been created for the government 
of Serbia ... to recognise the Republic of Montenegro and establish diplomatic ties” (BBC 
2006d), officially acknowledging Montenegro as a peer sovereign state. The pro-union 
opposition in Montenegro had lost their last ally and had not much choice but to accept 
the outcome and try to find a new place in an independent Montenegro political scene.  
                                                          
164 The Constitutional Charter of State Union article 60 clearly stated that Serbia would inherit 
the FRY ‘international instruments’ such as UN membership.  
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In Quebec, the Yes side conceded defeat on the night of the referendums, even with the 
close result of 1995. The sovereigntists defeat in 1980 was clear, when only 40.44 percent 
of the electorate endorsed ‘sovereignty-association’ and a mandate to negotiate 
independence. While Lévesque’s concession speech denounced the Canadian 
involvement in the campaign as “scandalously immoral”, he called on the Yes supporters 
to respect the No outcome nonetheless and remember that the people of Quebec, clearly 
divided, still had to live together (Brousseau 2002). On the No side, Ryan’s discourse, 
overly ‘victorious’, made some Quebecers uncomfortable, while Trudeau’s thoughts for 
the losing side was much better perceived by the divided electorate (Gagné 2010).  
While the Yes victory in Montenegro had attracted big crowds in the majority pro-
independence constituencies, the No victory in Quebec was followed by few signs of 
celebration and some minor incivilities from Yes supporters (La Press, 21 May 1980, p4; 
La Press, 31 October 1995, p1-2). The rapid acknowledgement of the referendum 
outcome by both sides, and the No camp and federal government’s promise to bring the 
changes promised during the referendum campaign made for a comparatively smooth 
post-referendum transition. Overall, in Quebec, the referendum process had been 
recognised as free and fair, and a true representation of the people of Quebec’s will.  
On the other hand, the 1995 Yes side concession speech delivered by Jacques Parizeau 
called into question the integrity of the process by declaring that the defeat – by about 55, 
000 votes – was the result of “money and ethnic votes”. This declaration was heavily 
criticised by the opposition, and other sovereigntists stressed that this was not what 
Quebec nationalism was about (Béland and Lecours 2006, 82). The Yes leader also 
referred to “us” as the 60 percent of Francophones who had voted for independence. While 
this number shows that the separatists in Quebec had succeeded in mobilising a majority 
of their targeted ‘ethnic’ group, it was not sufficient. Furthermore, this rhetoric posed 
problems as minorities did not support the proposed new state and their voices could have 
been lost had the sovereigntists won slightly more than the 49.4 percent of 94 percent of 
the electorate.  
The 1995 campaign, more tense and polarised than the one in 1980, gave way to a stronger 
‘post-referendum syndrome’ according to sovereigntists, affecting Quebec economically 
and culturally as it lost confidence in itself as a nation (Bock-Côté 2013, 128). The very 
close victory of the No side was a relief, not a cause for celebration. The 1995 referendum, 
in particular, is often referred to as “the referendum nobody won” (Clarke and Kornberg 
1996, 681), highlighting the potential larger negative impact of an independence 
referendum process. The ROC was once again faced with the need to accommodate 
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Quebec following the No side and federal campaign promises made as the Yes was about 
to win the plebiscite. Yet, the reluctance of some provinces to accommodate Quebec was 
made clear during the campaign.  
The narrow result was feared to give way to a third referendum. Parizeau controversially 
declared during the referendum process that Quebec sovereignty was inevitable and that 
regardless of the outcome of the referendum, the fight would continue (Smith, 2013:14). 
The rhetoric was that it might even be in the ROC’s self-interest to see secession happen 




The effects of the three independence referendums studied are multiple and complex. 
They affect the likelihood of seceding ranging from specific legal, political and social 
consequences. In Montenegro, the – agreed- referendum was critical in securing 
statehood. It did not make for a more united ‘nation’ however. The newly independent 
state of Montenegro still has a long way to go to bring all of its peoples together and 
deliver the promises made by the Yes campaign. 
Tensions ran high during the referendum process, which can be argued to have lasted for 
almost five years since a plebiscite was first tabled in 2001. The only major related 
incident recorded during the campaign process took place in the capital football stadium 
where shots were heard but it did not escalate further (Vijesti, 17 May 2006), and ‘both 
blocs invested extra effort to prevent the spread of religious and national hatred and 
intolerance’ (CEMI 2007, 106). Nonetheless, relations between the two sides became 
tense at times. Djukanović and Bulatović did not want to shake hands before televised 
debates and both parties accused the other of criminal involvement and undemocratic 
practices (Morrison 2009, 213). 
A similar narrative is still present in contemporary Montenegrin politics, 10 years after 
independence. The parliamentary elections of September 2016 were particularly tense 
with accusations from the DPS, which has been consistently in power since independence, 
that Serbia and Russia had attempted a coup against the Montenegrin government to bring 
a pro-Serbian and Russian coalition to power (Higgins 2016). Diplomatic ties with Serbia 
have been severed at times, notably over Montenegro establishing diplomatic relations 
with Kosovo (Dérens 2010). 
The democratic credentials of Montenegro have not improved much since independence 
(I. Vuković 2015; Komar and Živković 2016). A year on, it ‘boast[ed] stability and 
245 
 
macroeconomic growth’, notably thanks to EU aid, and continued to benefit from the 
expansion of tourism (Hockenos and Winterhagen 2007, 39). The 2008 financial crisis 
put a stop to further infrastructure development and economic growth and it is yet to join 
the European Union. The debate over its accession to NATO, in particular, re-opened the 
old Serb/Montenegrin divide (Radoman 2007). About 30 percent of the population 
considered itself ‘Serb’, and 44 percent ‘Montenegrin’ according to the 2011 census 
(MONSTAT 2011). The nation-building process continues (Malešević and Uzelac 2007, 
714).165  
The inclusive civic nationalist discourse during the campaign for independence also hides 
a more mitigated reality when it comes to the position of non-Montenegrin minorities. 
Minorities’ employment, especially in public-sector jobs, lags behind Montenegrins, and 
Albanians notably are still campaigning against linguistic and political discrimination 
(Tomovic 2016, 2015). In 2007, the act that guaranteed minorities seats in parliament was 
almost scrapped by the DPS (Balkan Insight 2007). Fear of pan-Albanian sub-nationalism 
in the Balkan states has also been raised in Montenegro (Andjelic 2009). 
The referendums in Quebec had the consequence of laying bare the different 
understandings of the Canadian federation and the disparities between Quebec and the 
ROC. Although all secessionist movements, to some extent call into question the 
legitimacy of the existing union, a referendum, especially the 1995 plebiscite, put such 
questions at the core of the national political agenda. The referendum process creates a 
momentum galvanising attention on what should be a decisive answer to the question of 
independence; although as the presence of two referendums suggested, this is not 
necessarily the case.  
Despite the polarisation generated during the second referendum process, the federalist 
fear of witnessing a third independence referendum did not materialise. The Partie 
Quebecois under Lucien Bouchard came back to power in the 1998 provincial elections 
but there was no desire to call another referendum, the party having gathered a very similar 
vote-share to that in 1994. Since then the PQ has been in and out of power in the province 
and has entertained at times the idea of holding another ‘public consultation’ on 
sovereignty (e.g. in 2008 and 2012; Seguin 2012). The party does not plan to hold another 
referendum on sovereignty before 2022 (Montreal Gazette 2017). Support for 
independence has steadily declined, and the new Francophone generation seems overall 
happy with the status-quo (Yale and Durand 2011; Gagnon 2014).  
                                                          
165 Serbian parties have requested Serbs be made a ‘constituent people’ of Montenegro as 
opposed to national minority (DANAS 2008).  
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Some of the grievances among the Quebec electorate articulated since the 1970s have 
been answered. Quebec’s economy is doing well relative to the rest of the world, and 
better than some of the western provinces despite periods of recession, but still lags behind 
in terms of individual income compared to the ROC (Dauphin 2002; Godbout and Joanis 
2008; see also Albouy 2008 reduction of wage gap between Francophones and 
Anglophones). Some scholars have argued that the ‘neverendum’ question of Quebec’s 
independence might have contributed to the Quebec economy underperforming since the 
1980s (Somers and Vaillancourt 2014). Immigrants in Canada still favour English, and 
the 2011 census showed that bilingualism is shrinking in the ROC (Souza 2012). In 
November 2006, the federal House of Commons voted to recognise the Quebec people as 
a ‘nation within a united Canada’. The Party and Bloc Quebecois supported the motion, 
while some politicians from Western Canada abstained as they feared this was a slippery-
slope that would lead to Quebec asserting its right to be a nation-state (Galloway 2006).  
In constitutional terms, the referendums in Quebec had a clearer long-term impact. 
Following its narrow victory, the federal government realised that a future referendum 
process could not be left solely in the hands of the separatists and asked the Supreme 
Court of Canada to decide on the legality of a unilateral secession of Quebec. The Court 
decision, known as the ‘Secession Reference’, was made public on the 20th of August 
1998. The court asserted the need to consider ‘legitimacy’ over simply ‘legality’, and that 
‘a political system must also possess legitimacy, and in our political culture, that requires 
an interaction between the rule of law and the democratic principle’ (Reference re 
Secession of Quebec 1998, Para. 33, 67).  
In its review of the federation’s history, the court gave emphasis to the idea of different 
entities coming together (Para. 55-60). While this favoured the independentists’ vision of 
the federation, the court also asserted that unilateral secession was illegal under 
international and Canadian law. Yet, because of ‘the federalism principle, in conjunction 
with the democratic principle’ – as government by consent– and ‘the accommodation of 
cultural and identity groups, Quebecers, and their sovereign ‘will of a people’ ought to be 
considered by the federal government’ (Para. 61, 64, 66). This would mean an ‘obligation 
on all parties of the confederation to negotiate constitutional changes to respond to that 
desire’, but not that Quebec could unilaterally act on such desire and secede (Reference 
re Secession of Quebec 1998 paras. 87, 88, 135)  
The emphasis is therefore on the right to seek independence and for Quebec to initiate 
through constitutional means, and in cooperation with the federal government and the 
ROC, a new constitutional arrangement. This can include separation, over a right to 
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secede per se. This ruling essentially keeps secessionism: (a) internal, (b) constitutional, 
(c) consensual, and (d) a political process. It also stated two important conditions on how 
the will to secede should be expressed, referring to two aspects of the referendum design 
that proved most controversial: through a clear majority (left unspecified) on a clear 
question (Para. 76).  
The federal government took the Supreme Court ruling as an opportunity to take back 
control of the design of a possible third independence referendum. The Clarity Act of 
2000 gave the federal House of Commons the competency to decide whether a future 
referendum question’s wording was sufficiently clear, and specify the ‘will of the 
majority’ threshold; in essence allowing it to decide the legitimacy of the process. This 
was done without consulting the Quebec government, which had simultaneously passed 
Bill 99166 to assert what has been the case in the two previous referendum: the Quebec 
national assembly had exclusive competences over the referendum process and officially 
set the majority at 50 percent of the cast votes plus one (Pavković and Radan 2007, 84; 
Şen 2015).  
The current disagreements over a possible referendum design in Quebec means that the 
PQ is headed for a unilateral process. The party justifies its stance on a simple majority 
being enough, based on international practice, but more importantly, the precedent set by 
the two previous consultations and referendums held in Canada on other issues (c.f. Parti 
Québécois 2017). It was also suggested during my stay in Quebec that the party could 
consider holding a series of referendum on the province’s competencies (e.g. control over 
key jurisdictions such as immigration), which would exclude any reference to self-
determination (what the Clarity Act touches upon), but would result in the Quebec 
province gaining key, de facto, state competencies.  
These legal developments, in light of the two independence referendums, make the 
holding of a third referendum a much more controversial process, and less likely to be 
agreed upon. While they entrench the right of the Quebec people to decide on how their 
sovereignty should be exercised and put pressure on the Canadian government and the 
ROC to answer such demands, the design of the referendum is heavily contested. 
Furthermore, it shows how, although the referendum might not be legally binding the 
process of consulting the people is politically binding. Through the referendum, the 
symbolic sovereign authority of the people has been legitimised (Jackson 2003, 791; cf. 
chapter I discussion on Democracy, Legitimacy and Legality).  
                                                          
166 Became law E-20.2 (Loi sur l’exercice des droits fondamentaux et des prérogatives du peuple 
québécois et de l’État du Québec 2000). 
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The Quebec case was referenced on multiple occasions in the run up to the Montenegrin 
independence referendum of 2006. Notably, the Secession Reference discussed above was 
used by the Venice Commission to justify some of the changes to existing procedures to 
ensure Montenegro would have a clear question and a special majority in favour of 
secession (Venice Commission 2005, 1–16). Partially as a result of using the Quebec case 
as a precedent and the specific secessionist dynamics in Montenegro, the referendum on 
independence was subject to (a) both internal and external forces, and as a result was (b) 
a negotiated, agreed, referendum based on (c) unconstitutional/ad-hoc measures.  
As with Montenegro, the post-Quebec-referendums developments show that the 
boundaries between what is a legal and legitimate process can be very blurry and 
contested, and no formal agreement – even one signed by all parties concerned as in 
Montenegro – can guarantee how the referendum process will be interpreted. In 2016, on 
the 10th anniversary of Montenegro’s independence, Donal Tusk, President of the 
European Council, reflected very positively on the Montenegrin referendum: “You have 
built your independence wisely and patiently, without needless victims, and after gaining 
it, you nurtured good relations with your immediate neighbours in a most mature way. 
Everyone valued it highly”. 
In turn, the Montenegrin case has been used by Canadian scholars to consider the special 
majority in Quebec should a third independence referendum take place (Oklopcic 2012, 
24; Choudhry 2008, 7–9).  The UN also considered both cases in crafting the Southern 
Sudan Referendum Act of 2009. The South Sudan independence referendum of 2011 
required 51 percent of votes in favour of independence, and a minimum of 60 percent 
turnout; much less than what the No side had hoped for in the negotiations (Sudan Tribune 
2009). Post-secession negotiation started shortly after an overwhelming majority of voters 
endorsed independence (cf. Jumbert and Rolandsen 2013 for an overview).  
The EU member states welcomed the Republic of South Sudan as ‘a new independent 
state’, stating that ‘The Referendum was conducted peacefully and credibly and its 
outcome was a true reflection of the democratically expressed wishes of the people of 
South Sudan’ (EU 2011). The case of Quebec and Montenegro were also used as evidence 
in the Scottish independence referendum process (e.g. Parliament Committee 2012; Select 
Committee on the Constitution 2014; Robertson 2015); which in turn has been used in 
Catalonia to make the case for the referendum and independence (Govan 2014). We may 
ask, however, to what extent we can learn from the Quebec and Montenegrin cases, and 




If anything, the review of Quebec’s and Montenegro’s referendums has highlighted how 
context-dependent essential aspects of the referendum are in its ability to answer the 
present conflict over statehood, notably its perceived legitimacy and what constitutes a 
free and fair process binding a maximum of actors to recognise the outcome. Furthermore, 
both cases have further supported the argument made in chapter I that the inherent 
legitimacy of popular sovereignty in current international norms takes precedent over 
legality. The case of Quebec further shows that trying to set constitutional rules after the 
facts result in a lack of legitimacy for the legal provisions.  
The situation of the First Nations in Quebec or the still ambiguous status of Kosovo 
demonstrate that the potential precedent set in the two case studies fails to answer the 
essential question of who has a right to secede in the first place. Agreed independence 
referendums apply the plebiscitary right theories covered in chapter I by asserting that (1) 
a people exists, and (2) they have a right to decide which state they wish to live under and 
be represented by. This in itself always increases the likelihood of secession in absolute 
terms and, once acknowledged, is very difficult to withdraw. However, the host-state still 
gets to decide in the first place whether such people do indeed form a collective distinct 
from the rest of the population and are entitled to internal and external self-determination. 
The referendums in East Timor and South Sudan have been mandated by international 
actors under similar pretexts found in remedial right-only theory to answer violations of 





The review of the independence referendum campaigns in Quebec and Montenegro has 
shown that in both cases, the campaigning period enabled the secessionist actors to 
increase their support base. While it was sufficient in Montenegro, it fell short of victory 
in Quebec. Yet, the Yes side gains in Montenegro were limited from 5 to 7 percentage 
points between the first call for a referendum in 2001 and when it was held in 2006. In 
Quebec, where ‘independence’ as defined in Montenegro remained an unclear project, 
support for independence grew from 20 to 30 percent, prior to the first referendum, to 40 
                                                          




percent, and another almost 10 percent in 1995. Accordingly, the referendum campaign 
proved to be a more important mobilisation platform in Quebec than Montenegro.  
The campaign strategies on both sides of the referendum options showed similarities 
between the two regions. The framing strategies in the three Yes campaigns saw identity 
surrounding most of the other major themes. While it was in itself an essential feature of 
the argument in favour of independence in Quebec, it blended with the theme of Europe 
and democracy in Montenegro. The discursive construction of the nation also allowed 
secessionist actors to channel political and economic arguments to highlight the 
disadvantage of the status-quo and the benefits of independence. Independence in both 
cases was framed as a need to achieve broader economic and political goals. Key to the 
Quebec frame, however, was ‘sovereignty-association’ which aimed to retain close links 
with Canada, contrasting with the context of Montenegro where the union was seen as an 
impediment to prosperity.  
The No campaigns were comparatively more negative. To counter the Yes sides’ criticism 
of the status quo, they highlighted the benefits of the union, and more importantly the 
drawbacks of independence and the Yes side actors’ credibility. While in Quebec those 
were focused on the economy, the context in Montenegro meant that the benefits of the 
union were more difficult to defend. Instead, the pro-Serb campaign ended up at times 
being overly nationalistic and Serb-focused. The Montenegrin unionist block was not in 
a strong position to increase its electorate due to the Montenegrin minorities’ hostility 
towards Serbia, and because it could not really affect the cost/benefit calculation in staying 
in a Union that had just been reformed and with a much more powerful ‘big brother’. In 
Quebec, Ottawa was originally reluctant in both campaigns to grant concessions to the 
Francophone provinces, especially when facing reticence from the ROC in 1995. The high 
levels of support for the Yes in opinion polls compelled the No camp and federal actors 
to promise that a No vote did not mean maintaining the status-quo and that Quebecers 
could have some of their grievances met without risking secession.  
In the three campaigns, controversies over the rhetoric employed (e.g. over minorities, or 
opponents), as well as breaches in the campaign procedure, such as the intervention of the 
host-state, led to aspects of the referendum process being contested. While it did not 
delegitimise the outcome in Quebec, the No side in Montenegro was reluctant to recognise 
the result. Despite obvious violation of what would be considered a ‘free and fair’ process 
by international standards in Montenegro, the international community was key in 
legitimising the referendum outcome and pressuring all actors to abide by it.  
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Finally, the three referendums under study had important long-term consequences on the 
societies where they were held and the broader international context. Notably, they set 
important precedents and examples that were then used in other independence 
referendums. I will now expand further on this while bringing the two cases back into a 









In 1990, 28 new states joined the international system.168 Among them, 18 have since held 
independence referendums asking their citizens directly whether they should stay within 
the existing state or form a new independent sovereign nation-state. When excluding 
states born out of the dissolution of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, four out of six new states had an 
independence referendum: Eritrea in 1993, East-Timor in 1999 (fully independent in 
2002), Montenegro in 2006 and South Sudan in 2011. Other regions held independence 
referendums in the meantime, with Scotland and Crimea in 2014 being the latest 
examples, without leading to secession. This review and the thesis findings suggest that 
independence referendums may have an increasingly important role to play in state-
creation. 
This thesis asked whether independence referendums affect secessionist dynamics and 
can increase or decrease the likelihood of secession occurring, and if so, how? Using a 
mixed- quantitative and qualitative method approach, I uncovered how ‘the will of the 
people’ is utilised in an independence referendum to separate from an existing sovereign 
state, and to create a new independent state based on the sovereignty of a designated 
‘nation’. From the theoretical and normative underpinnings of popular and state 
sovereignty, to the empirical practice of referendums on questions of sovereignty, I have 
demonstrated how an independence referendum offers a strong legitimisation tool for 
secessionist actors to further their goal.  
In the first chapter, I reviewed how the only clear determinant of international recognition, 
outside of decolonisation, is the lack of opposition from the existing host-state. 
Accordingly, only when the host-state does not stand against the referendum and declare 
it an illegal or illegitimate practice, is there room for the ‘will of the people’ to determine 
the secessionist outcome. This proposition was backed by the quantitative review in 
Chapter IV. Independence referendums where the host-state government and secessionist 
leaders agree to let the regional population decide how their sovereignty should be applied 
                                                          
168 Slight variations depending on definition (Griffiths and Butcher 2013; Correlates of War 
Project 2016). The numbers excluded small island-states such as Micronesia.  
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generally lead to statehood when a majority of voters endorse independence. On the other 
hand, a unilateral referendum does not guarantee that the ‘will of the people’ will be 
definitive. However, the qualitative analysis showed that host-state opposition, while 
important, might not be the primary concern or obstacle in achieving a consensual 
consultation process. The host-state obstruction can be supported by regional internal 
opposition to secession, or international actors.  
Exceptions, such as the case of Iceland in 1944, and the review of Quebec and Montenegro 
pointed to some limitations with this classification and questioned to what extent an 
‘agreed’ process can be binding. Such cases however, while limiting the effect of the 
referendum itself, did further support the argument that once the people have been given 
the choice, it is difficult for elites to withdraw it, and their decisions become politically 
binding. Furthermore, there is still some room for interpretation when it comes to 
classifying agreed vs. unilateral referendums on independence. The requirement for a lack 
of opposition and the host-state government consent may be problematic in cases where 
such government own existence can be questioned, as with the SFRY or USSR.  
The thesis also demonstrated, quantitatively and qualitatively, that consent trumps 
legality, and independence referendums are primarily a political phenomenon. Chapter V 
and VI showed that while Montenegro had a legal right to secede, it was insufficient to 
ensure a binding referendum outcome. Canada’s silent constitution on the matter did not 
prevent Quebec from holding two referendums during which the federalists ensured that 
the debate was indeed about ‘separation’. The present situation in Catalonia goes against 
this general trend, as potentially the only referendum to be held where the constitution 
forbids secession.169 The (il)legality of secession is to date the core argument of the 
Spanish government in opposing the holding of an independence referendum and forceful 
intervention on voting day on 30th October 2017. The subsequent refusal to engage in 
negotiations with the Catalan government prior to its declaration of independence seems 
to be a further attempt to avoid any legitimisation of the region’s demand for self-
determination (internal or external). Accordingly, consideration for legality remain 
important when looking at independence referendums and may be more or less salient 
depending on context, limiting the generalisability of these findings.  
Furthermore, while the Spanish government, like the UK or Canada, is largely left to 
decide on its own how to deal with the secessionist movements within its territory, The 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (Chapter V), Sudan or Ethiopia had to contend 
                                                          
169 The Spanish Constitution, it is argued, forbids secession as it stresses the existence of a single, 
and indivisible, Spanish nation (Guibernau 2013, 382). 
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with external intervention in their internal affairs. The normative debate covered in 
Chapter I around the question of who has a right to secede shows that this question is still 
to be answered by the existing state or other powerful states (Great Powers) within the 
international community. Nonetheless, plebiscitary theories of secession might provide 
grounds for a new norm on what means may be used in state creation as more precedents 
of consensual independence referendums are set. Indeed, it becomes increasingly 
inconceivable that a state could come into being today without a clear popular mandate, 
most likely to be made apparent via a plebiscite.  
Chapter II offered hypotheses on why independence referendums are called and come to 
be agreed upon by the host-state. This review contributed to the referendum literature on 
why and when referendums are held on the specific topic of independence. The 
quantitative analysis in Chapter IV provided limited evidence in identifying a contextual 
factor that may increase incentives to secede, and therefore the attractiveness of a 
referendum by securing a majority of votes in favour of separation. The limited and 
somewhat crude contextual measures in the quantitative analysis cannot account for the 
complexity of factors involved in the process of calling an independence referendum and 
its outcome. It also proved limited in overcoming the problem of endogeneity. The 
qualitative analysis did show that the motivations behind a secessionist movement 
decision to call an independence referendum, and a host-state to agree to it, are complex 
and context specific.  
Nonetheless, concerns for legality, legitimacy, and international recognition were 
important elements in both Quebec and Montenegro. Furthermore, sub-national 
institutions were crucial in both cases as seen in chapter V.  The quantitative analysis 
showed that the capacity to hold a referendum at the subnational level in the first place is 
an important element to consider. Secessionist regions which lack institutional capacity 
may indeed have a harder time organising an independence referendum. The example of 
Catalonia in 2017 also shows how difficult it can be for a central government to prevent 
the holding of a plebiscite when such institutions are in place, or do so without employing 
exceptional measures. Indeed, the Spanish government had to dispatch special forces to 
physically prevent voters to cast their ballot.  
An institutional arrangement that allows for internal self-determination (such as ethnic-
federalism), and access to executive powers at the regional level, facilitates the 
mobilisation of the population in favour of secession, and the ability to call and hold a 
plebiscite. On the other hand, the absence of such political institutions was found to be 
potentially associated with increased support for secession, along with the experience of 
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violence as the result of an independentist movement. In fact, the thesis finds that such 
constitutional arrangements bring both contradictory centrifugal and centripetal dynamics 
in the process of holding an independence referendum by providing institutions which 
facilitate the holding of a plebiscite and initial mobilisation, yet also limits support for 
independence.   
The in-depth study of Quebec and Montenegro further informed the possible complex and 
context-specific reasons behind a host-state willingness to ‘let the people decide’. Internal 
and external pressures, the perceived cost of standing against the secessionist movement, 
and the likelihood of winning or losing the referendum played an important part in the 
decision to consent to Québécois and Montenegrins deciding on whether they wish to stay 
or leave their existing union with Canada and Serbia respectively. Existing support for 
independence, and how close to the 50 percent majority it stands is likely to play an 
important part in the decision to call, hold and agree to an independence referendum. The 
selection of these case studies however limits the generalisability of the findings. Cases 
where support is very high, or other context outside of the European continent and North 
America should be considered to appreciate how a host-state government may respond to 
demands for an independence referendum. Indeed, contextual knowledge remains 
valuable and while the study of Quebec and Montenegro have considerably improved our 
understanding of independence referendums as secessionist tools, further study is needed 
to understand to what extent lessons learned here can be applied to other cases. 
Once the referendum is a consensual process and binding on the secessionist actors and 
host-state, support for independence becomes crucial to determine the referendum 
outcome. Based on Chapter II’s conceptualisation of support and existing literature on 
societal, political and economic factors, I considered when and how an independence 
referendum could not only mediate the relationship between existing secessionist 
dynamics and outcome but also moderate it to the extent that it can affect the secessionist 
outcome. Based on existing literature on secession and referendums, I identified the most 
likely scenario for this to happen when support for independence stands closest to 50 
percent prior to the referendum being called, +/- 20 percent.  
Chapter VI and VII further showed how the referendum design and the campaign could 
be critical in winning or losing the referendum. Who has the most control over the 
referendum framework, notably who gets to vote, the qualifying majority and how 
legitimate the process is perceived to be by individuals, political leaders, and the 
international community can considerably increase or decrease the likelihood of 
secession. The referendum campaign notably offers an important mobilisation platform 
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for secessionist actors. In Quebec, and to a lesser extent in Montenegro, it proved critical 
it increasing support for independence, despite the No side counter-mobilisation efforts. 
The referendums did not, however, create a lasting wave of support nearing the majority 
found in 1995 in Quebec. The limited support for independence in Quebec presently acts 
as a check on secessionist actors and, unless a considerable change in context occurs, 
secession is an unlikely prospect in the near future.  
A similar trend could be witnessed in Scotland. When the Scottish independence 
referendum was called by the SNP in 2011, support for independence stood at around 30 
percent (Carrell 2011). Three years later, after an intensive referendum campaign which 
has come to be regarded as a ‘model for citizen engagement’ (Tierney 2016, 72), 44.70 
percent of Scottish electors cast a Yes ballot to separate from the United Kingdom. 
Returning to the case of Catalonia, polls show that existing preferences between 
independence and supporter of the Spanish state make a referendum outcome very 
difficult to predict (around 44% Yes, and 46% No; Jones 2017). While it is believed that 
the actions taken by the Spanish government on voting day might have increased support 
for independence, the actual referendum result limits the legitimacy of the secessionist 
claim due to a small turnout estimated at 43 percent, despite 90 percent of voters endorsing 
independence (Reuters 2017).  
Assessing the campaign effect in cases such as Eritrea or South Sudan would pose more 
challenges, not only because we may be dealing with a more polarised context from the 
start, but also because campaigning as known in a western democracy is potentially less 
effective. An independence referendum in such context comes with a range of challenges. 
For instance, international observers estimated that 80 percent of Southern men and 92 
percent of women in the northern territory of South Sudan were unable to read (Lunn 
2010, 8). A deliberative process and mobilisation around independence would have had 
to take place without the mass communication media and well established political parties 
network. One of the priorities in East Timor was not only whether the electorate and both 
sides of the debate would be satisfied with the process, but also for participation to be safe 
in the first place (Maley 2000).  
The review of Quebec and Montenegro also showed that while economic concerns are 
indeed strong drivers in individual level support for secession in line of the existing 
literature (e.g. Martin 1994; Blais, Martin, and Nadeau 1995; Curtice 2014; Muñoz and 
Tormos 2015), and were important elements in the Yes and No campaigns, they should 
not be disconnected from broader political and societal factors. Notably, how the host-
state is perceived and how one places his or her identity towards it (c.f. for example Rico 
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and Liñeira (2014) in the case of Catalonia; or Brown (2004) on Aceh and the protection 
of the group interest and ideological concerns). The way the existing context is framed, 
and whether such framing is successful in mobilising support is crucial to the chances of 
either side’s success in a referendum. Yet, the ‘rhetorical war’ generated during a 
campaign can lead to further polarisation among people that ultimately have to live 
together, be it within or outside the existing state. More research is needed to consider 
these potential negative consequences of independence referendums.  
The referendum design and process are essential components to ensure that such negative 
effects are mitigated and the losing sides consent to respect the referendum outcome. No 
independence referendum context will ever be totally unbiased. The host-state 
government remains the ultimate sovereign authority over the disputed territory. The 
ability to call and hold an independence referendum is likely to be a reflection of an 
already successful mobilisation by independentist actors; albeit not necessarily with 
majority support. The more satisfied actors involved within the referendum process, 
including international, state, sub-state and societal levels, the more likely a referendum 
will bring a lasting conclusion to the question of secession. 
While there is a lot to learn from previous independence referendums, we should be 
careful to pay attention to context-specific legal, normative, societal and political 
dynamics behind a specific secessionist movement. What is appropriate in one context is 
not necessarily in another. The acceptability of the referendum design, for instance, is 
likely to be determined by actors’ interests, culture, existing constitutional arrangements 
or former experience. Setting a blueprint on how independence referendums should be 
conducted can, therefore, be problematic. While the opportunity to exercise sovereign 
decisions in terms of governance offered by referendums is laudable, elite control and 
negative dynamics brought about by independence referendums should not be neglected. 
The mixed-methods employed offer both an additional and different way to address the 
research questions (Blaikie 2000); enabling me to consider the practice of independence 
referendums within the secessionist dynamics that bring them to life. Chapter I showed 
how existing literature lacks a clear definition of what constitutes independence 
referendums. By applying a restrictive definition and classification in order to improve 
compatibility to draw comparisons, a more robust base of such referendums and their 
effect was made possible. The visits to Quebec and Montenegro also proved essential to 
gain a better understanding of the case-studies and ensure that a maximum of perspectives 
was taken into account. Throughout this thesis a paradox between competing norms and 
values as been highlighted, notably that while secession is not a right in the current 
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international system, it is not necessarily illegal and sovereign state legitimacy today relies 
on the democratic will of its people. It has shown how such concerns have been answered 
in different ways through the use of an independence referendum, and how the referendum 
itself affects existing secessionist dynamics. However, limitations persist.  
Further study is needed notably, as noted earlier, in non-Western democratic contexts and 
using individual-level data. We still lack an understanding of individual-level motivations 
to support independence at large, and especially in such context. Even in a Western-
democracy where the amount of data gathered is much more substantial, there are still 
impediments to understanding motivations within campaigns and over a greater period of 
time. The lack of data makes it difficult to assess the effect of the independence 
referendum on the behaviour of voters and what key aspects of the design or campaign 
may have an impact. In this thesis, this effect has largely been assumed based on the study 
of macro opinion data and therefore it could not isolate which distinct aspects of the 
referendum design would be the most important in increasing or decreasing support for 
independence.  
The findings in this thesis around support for independence and electoral mobilisation 
require further in-depth study to fully appreciate whether individuals do indeed respond 
to such framing strategies and what factors are considered in their appreciation for the 
cost-benefit of secession. The quantitative analysis in particular, while important in giving 
a thorough overview of the subject of study, proved limited. More data and a time-series 
analysis would be able to test further some of the hypotheses developed here by increasing 
the amount of observations. Further case-studies should also be considered in more depth, 
including unilateral referendums to test the presented hypotheses on why a host-state 
government consents or not to an independence referendum. While the thesis has shown 
that it is important to distinguish between consensual referendums and one-sided 
referendums, it does not presume that the latter are not important events devoid of 
consequences. 
The independence referendum campaign in Montenegro, and more recent and equally 
data-rich cases such as Scotland and Catalonia, would also merit further study to 
appreciate the centrifugal and centripetal dynamics generated during independence 
referendums. The thesis has also shown that the nature of the electorate is important not 
only for the referendum outcome in terms of the likelihood of achieving secession, but 
also for a peaceful transition following this form of popular consultation. Quebec and 
Montenegro showed two examples of how the electorate can be drawn and negotiated, but 
more are possible (e.g. ancestry in South Africa, or residency in Scotland). The 
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consequences of different electoral bodies should be further assessed to allow for more 
generalisability.  
More importantly, future research should engage with the problematic aspects of 
independence referendums mentioned in this thesis when considering their effect on 
secessionist dynamics. The ‘tyranny’ of the majority is a well-known problem among 
political scholars (e.g. Setälä 1999; Bowler and Todd 2001), but the presence of quorums 
also questions whether a minority should be able to decide for a majority? Voter 
assessments of the consultative process and democratic satisfaction should also be at the 
centre of any referendum process, but especially those on the question of independence 
given its considerable impact on the existing, or future state’s perceived legitimacy. 
Additionally, the motivations of elites and their ability to manipulate the referendum 
process considerably constrains the ‘will’ and the ‘people’ which are to determine the 
outcome. Further considerations for such questions, in light of empirical evidence, would 
be a valuable contribution to the study of independence referendums, which, increasingly 
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Appendix A: Cases 
 
Home-state – Region Referendum Agreed 
Referendum 
Year of the 
referendum  
Angola - Cabindans    
Australia - PNG    
Australia-Western 
Australia 
Yes No 1933 
Azerbaijan - Nagoro-
Karabakh  
Yes No 1991 
Azerbaijan - Talysh    
Bangladesh - Hindus    
Belgium - Belgian 
Congo 
   
Belgium - Burundi     
Belgium - Flemish    
Belgium - Rwanda    
Bolivia - Cambas    
Bosnia and Herz. - 
Croats/Muslisms 
   
Bosnia and Herz. - 
Serbs 
   
Burma - Arakanese    
Burma - Kachins    
Burma - Karenni    
Burma - Karens    
Burma - Mons    
Burma - Shans    
Cameroon - Southern 
Cameroon 
Yes No 1995 
Canada - Quebec I Yes Yes 1980 
Canada - Quebec II Yes Yes 1995 
China - Hui    
China - Manchukuo    
China - Southern 
Mongols 
   
China - Tibet    
China - Uighurs 
(Xinjiang) 
   
China/USSR-Outer-
Mongolia 
Yes Yes  1945 
Comoros - Anjouan Yes No 1997 
Comoros - Moheli    
Croatia - Serbs    
Cyprus - Turkish 
Cypriots 
   
Czechoslovakia - 
Carpatho-Rusyns 
   
Czechoslovakia - 
Slovakia 
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Denmark - Faeroe 
Islands 
Yes Yes 1946 
Denmark - Iceland Yes No 1944 
Denmark- Greenland    
DRC - South Kasai    
DRC - South Katanga    
Ethiopia - Eritrea Yes Yes 1993 
Ethiopia - Somali    
Ethiopia - Tigray    
France - Alawites 
(Hatay) 
   
France - Algeria Yes Yes 1962 
France - Basques    
France - Brittany    
France - Casamance    
France - Comoros Yes Yes 1947 
France - Corcica    
France - Dahomey 
(Benin) 
   
France - French Eq. 
Africa (CAR) 
   
France - French Eq. 
Africa (Chad) 
   
France - French Eq. 
Africa (Gabon) 
   
France - French Eq. 
Africa (Congo) 
   
France - French 
Indochina (Cambodia) 
   
France - French 
Indochina (Lao) 
   
France - French 
Indochina (Vietnam) 
   
France - French 
Somaliland I 
Yes Yes 1967 
France - French 
Somaliland II 
Yes Yes 1977 
France - French West 
Africa (Cote d'Ivoire) 
   
France - French West 
Africa (French 
Soudan)(Mali) 
   
France - French West 
Africa (Guinea) 
   
France - French West 
Africa (Mauritania) 
   
France - French West 
Africa (RDA) 
   
France - Madagascar    
France - Morocco    
France - Mossi 
(Burkina Faso) 
   
France - New 
Caledonia 
Yes No 1987 
France - Niger    
France - Savoy    
France - Senegal    
France - Syria    
France - Tunisia    
Georgia - Abkhazia    
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Georgia - South 
Ossetia I 
Yes No 1992 
Georgia - South 
Ossetia II 
Yes No 2006 
India - Assam    
India - Boro/Bodo    
India - Hyderabad    
India - Kashmir    
India - Meitei    
India - Mizos    
India - Nagas Yes No 1951 
India - Sikhs    
India - Tripuras    
Indonesia - Acheh    
Indonesia - Ambonese    
Indonesia - East Timor Yes Yes 1999 
Indonesia - Papuans    
Indonesia - Sulawesis    
Indonesia - W.Papua 
(Iran Jaya) 
   
Iran - Arabistanis 
(Ahwaz)(Khuzestan) 
   
Iran - Azeris    
Iran - Kurds    
Iraq - Kurds    
Italy - Giulians    
Italy - Italian 
Somaliland 
   
Italy - Montenegro    
Italy - Padania    
Italy - Sanusis    
Italy - Sardinia    
Italy - Sicily    
Italy - South Tyrol    
Ivory Coast - Anyi    
Malaysia - Singapore    
Mali Federation - 
Senegal 
   
Moldova - Gagauz    
Moldova - Transnistria Yes No  1991 
Morocco - Saharawis    
Namibia - Basters 
(Rehoboth) 
   
Namibia - Lozi    
Netherlands - Dutch 
Guiana (Suriname) 




   
Netherlands - W.Papua 
(Iran Jaya) 
   
New Zealand - Maori    
New Zealand - Samoa 
(W.Samoa) 
Yes Yes 1961 
Nigeria - Edos    
Nigeria - Ibos (Igbo)    
Pakistan - Baluch    
Pakistan - E. Pakistan 
(E.Bengal)(Bengalis) 
   
Pakistan - Pashtuns    
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Papua New Guinea - 
Bouganville 
   
Philippines - 
Mindanao 
   
Portugal - Angola    
Portugal - Cape Verde    
Portugal - East Timor    
Portugal - Guinea 
Bissau 
   
Portugal - Sao Tome & 
Principe 
   
Potugal - Mozambique    
Russia - Chechnya    
Russia - Dagestanis    
Russia - Finland    
Russia - Tatars    
Saudi Arabia - Asiris    
Senegal - Casamance    
Serbia - Kosovo    
Serbia and 
Montenegro - Kosovo 
Albanians 




Yes Yes 2006 
Solomon Islands - 
Guadalcanal 
   
South Africa - Inkatha 
(Kwazulu) 
   
South Africa - 
Namibia 
   
Spain - Basques    
Spain - Catalans Yes No 2014 
Spain - Spanish 
Guinea 
   
Sri Lanka - Tamils    
St.Kitts and Nevis - 
Nevis II 
Yes Yes 1998 
Sudan - South Sudan Yes Yes 2011 
Sweden - Norway Yes Yes 1905 
Thailand - Malays    
Turkey - Kurds    
Uganda - Bankonjo    
UK - Bahamas    
UK - Baluch    
UK - Basuotoland 
(Lesotho) 
   
UK - Botswana    
UK - British 
Somaliland 
   
UK - Brunei    
UK - Burma 
(Myanmar) 
   
UK - Ceylon (Sri 
Lanka) 
   
UK - Cyprus    
UK - Egypt    
UK - Fiji    
UK - Gold Coast 
(Ghana) 
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UK - Guyana    
UK - India    
UK - Iraq    
UK - Ireland    
UK - Jews 
(Palestine/Israel) 
   
UK - Karen    
UK - Kuwiat    
UK - Malaya (Straits 
Settlements)(Malaysia) 
   
UK - Malta    
UK - Mau Mau 
(Kenya) 
   
UK - Mauritius    
UK - Newfoundland    
UK - Nigeria    
UK - Northern Ireland    
UK - Pakistan (West & 
East) 
   
UK - Rhodesia    
UK - Rhodesia - 
Southern Rhodesia 
Yes No 1964 
UK - Rhodesia - 
Zimbabwe 
   
UK - Sanusis    
UK - Scotland Yes Yes 2014 
UK - Seychelles    
UK - Sierra Leone    
UK - St.Kitts and 
Nevis - Nevis I 
Yes No 1977 
UK - Sudan    
UK - Swazi    
UK - Tanganyika    
UK - Uganda    
UK - Wales    
UK - Yemen (FLOSY)    
UK - Yemen (NLF)    
UK - Zanzibar     
Ukraine - Crimea Yes No 2014 
USA - Hawaiians    
USA - Marshall 
Islands 
   
USA - Philippines    
USA - Puerto Rico    
USSR - Adzhar 
(Georgia/South 
Ossetia) 
   
USSR - Ajars    
USSR - Armenia    
USSR - Azeris Yes No 1991 
USSR - Balkars    
USSR - Belarus    
USSR - Estonians Yes No 1991 
USSR - Georgia Yes No 1991 
USSR - Kazakstan    
USSR - Krygstan    
USSR - Latvians Yes No 1991 
USSR - Lithuanians Yes No 1991 
USSR - Moldovans    
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USSR - Russian    
USSR - Tajiks    
USSR - Tatars    
USSR - Turkomen Yes No 1991 
USSR - Ukrainians Yes No 1991 
USSR - Uzbeks    
Vanuatu - Tafea    
Vanuatu - Vemeranans    
Vietnam - Chams    
Yemen - South Yemen    
Yugoslavia - 
Montenegro 
Yes No 1992 
Yugoslavia - 
Albanians (Kosovars) 
Yes No 1992 
Yugoslavia - 
Bosnia/Herz. 
Yes No 1991 
Yugoslavia - 
Macedonia 
Yes No 1991 
Yugoslavia - Croatia Yes No 1990 









































Support for Secession 
(Continuous)  
 





% Yes votes 
% Yes vote/Turnout 


























0= Share language and Religion  
1 = Share language or religion 
2= share both 
Coggins (2011), MAR, EPR + + + 
Violence (Dummy) 
 
0 = No violence / 1 = Violence (over 25 
death/year) 
PRIO, COW - - + 
Length Union (Continuous) Number of years since formal integration of 
the region within the existing host-state 
Historical accounts - - - 
Regime Durability (Continuous) Number of years since the last change of 3 or 
more points in the Polity IV (within 3 years 
or less) 








Democracy (Continuous) From 0 = least democratic to  
10 = most democratic 
Polity IV -/+ -/+ - 
Ethnic-Federalism (Dummy) 0= Not part of an ethnic-federation 
1 = Part of an ethnic-federation  
Roeder (2007) + +/- +/- 
Power-sharing (Dummy) 0= Regional group has no formal or informal 
power-sharing at host-state level 
1 = Formal or informal power-sharing in 
place 
EPR - - - 
Regional Government (Dummy) 0= Regional group representative not in 
government at regional level 
1 = Regional group representative in 
government at regional level 












GDP per capita (Continuous) GDP per capita estimates in 1990 Geary-
Khamis dollars 
Maddison Project   - - - 
Regional population size  (Continuous) National population in thousands Maddison Project – National Statistics 
bureau 
+ +  
Regional population/Host-state 
population (Continuous) 
Regional population divided by National 
population 
OCESD – UNSD - National Statistics 
bureau 
+ +  
Regional GDP per Capita/ Host-state 
GDP per capita (Continuous) 
Regional GDP per capita divided by a 
corresponding year and measure of National 
GDP per capita 
OCESD – UNSD -  National Statistics 
bureau 


















Unilateral  1= Referendum declared illegal by the host-
state/ host-state did not engage with the 
process  
0= No referendum/referendum agreed 
SUDD/IDEA/C2D – Historical academic 
accounts 
   
Agreed 1= Referendum agreed between the host-
state government and secessionist leaders 
0= No referendum/unilateral referendum 
 +  
% Yes vote (Continuous) Official registered percentage of Yes voted 
casted 
SUDD/IDEA/C2D  +  
Turnout (Continuous) Official registered percentage of the 
registered electors who casted a vote 




Q. Type 1= Turnout quorum in place 
2=Endorsement quorum in place 
0= No special quorum 
   
Q. Threshold Percentage of the electorate required    
Campaign Length (Continuous) Number of days between the official 
announcement of the referendum date or 
enactment of legislation allowing the 
referendum to take place, and the holding of 
the referendum (voting day) 
Online National Archives, Academic 
publications, Official IOs reports, 
Newspapers. 
  +/- 
No campaign (Dummy) 1= Officially registered No campaign 
0 = No registered No-side campaign, or no 
indication of a No campaign activity 
Online National Archives, Academic 
publications, Official IOs reports, 
Newspapers. 




Appendix C: The 1992 Montenegrin Independence Referendum 
 
The first independence referendum to be held in Montenegro in 1992 stands out as an 
outlier among unilateral independence referendums as it was not organised by the 
secessionist side. Montenegrin independentists, much weaker than in the other republics, 
hoped to see Montenegro regain its independence during the ‘dissolution’ of the Soviet 
Federation. Yet, the referendum that ended up being held was aimed at securing it. It was 
originally not even aimed at Montenegro in particular, but as an answer to the secessionist 
calls around the SFRY (Rich 1993, 53). By the time the referendum was held however 
unilateral referendums and/or declaration of independence in other republics had already 
taken place under anti-Serbian nationalist oppositions in 1990 and 1991.  The referendum 
in Montenegro was, therefore, more a symbolic move to secure what could be saved of 
the former Yugoslavia.  
The referendum was organised under the supervision of the Democratic Party of Socialists 
(DPS – Demokratska Partija Socijalista Crne Gore), headed by Momir Bulatović and 
Milo Djukanović, created to replace the former Montenegrin Communist party, but its 
members and structure remained intact (Bieber 2003b, 11–12). Given that the referendum 
was mandated by those wishing to stay in the federation, it is fair to ask whether 
independence was an option on the table at all. The decision to retain this plebiscites rests 
with the wider context and the fact that, had a majority voted to secede, even if it was not 
the intention of the elites who called the referendum or Serbia acting as the host-state, 
Montenegro would have been very likely to be recognised as an independence state under 
the ruling of the Batinder commission which granted Montenegro the same right of 
recognition as the other republics shall it decide to become independent (Pellet 1992; Roth 
2015, see also chapter V).  
The Belgrade and Podgorica governments were confident in holding the referendum given 
the weakness of existing independentist parties and the Montenegrin majority support for 
the continuation of the union, although how big of a majority is difficult to determine 
(Morrison 2009, 105; Roberts 2007, 443). The pro-independence actors in Montenegro – 
a marginal but more organised political force since 1990170 –refuse to take part in the 
referendum held in 1992.  Rallies were organised to oppose the referendum and the 
                                                          
170 The Social Democratic party of Reformers was formed to oppose aggressive Serb nationalism, and a 
smaller but increasingly active Social Democratic Party (SDP, formed in 1990), and the Socialist Party of 
Montenegro (SPM) lead by Srdjan Darmanovic. Their ranks were also filled by Muslims and Albanian’s 
parties and organisations opposing “Serbia’s war” in the rest of the Balkans. 
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creation of the joint state. Leading the march was the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro 
party. Its leader, Slavok Perovic, called on an independent and multicultural Montenegro 
which would endorse “European values”, presenting a “liberal” alternative to the 
establishment. A rhetoric that will be ironically at the forefront of the DPS independence 
campaign in 2006, a party composed of some of the people who oversaw the referendum 
in 1992.   
The referendum was held on the 1st of March 1992 and asked citizens “Do you agree that 
Montenegro, as a sovereign republic, should continue to exist in the joint country of 
Yugoslavia, on a completely equal basis with other republics which wish to do so?”. The 
question use of “sovereignty” and “country” favoured the Yes side. It was also a 
controversial question in respect to the term “Yugoslavia”, as the SFRY very existence 
could be questioned by the time Montenegrins express their wish to remain part of it 
(Ramcharan 1997, 1291). Furthermore, Serbia, the only other remaining potential 
member, did not hold a referendum. 
To ensure a shift approval and transition to the new FRY, the “Law of the Referendum” 
introduced by the Montenegrin government at the time limited the period of public debate 
to seven days prior to voting day which allowed little room for those opposing the 
referendum or lobbying for a No vote to make their case. The press, controlled by the 
state, largely supported the new arrangement arguing that endorsing a Yes was protecting 
Yugoslavia and Montenegro from the nationalists who destabilised the region and 
personal threats were made against DPS opponents (Morrison 2009, 105).  
The result reflected the biased context with 95.7 percent of Montenegrin casting a vote to 
preserve the union with Serbia, with a moderate turnout of 66 percent bringing some more 
controversy as to the legitimacy of the referendum outcome (Cohen 2001, 163). The 
LSCG called the referendum “a fraud”, along with Albanian and Muslim parties which 
had called for a boycott of the plebiscite.  Montenegro and Serbia jointly established the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) as the continuation of the SFRY formed of two 





                                                          
171 The international community refuted the claims that the FRY was the continuation of the SFRY (Rich 
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Appendix D: List of hypotheses  
 
Likelihood of secession and independence referendums:  
HSec.1:  Colonial Secessionist movements should result in a successful secession, 
regardless of whether a referendum was held.  
HSec.2: Having held a unilateral independence referendum does not make a region more 
likely to have achieved independence than if no referendum was held. 
HSec.3: Having held an agreed independence referendum makes a region more likely to 
have achieved independence than if a unilateral referendum, or no referendum, was held. 
HSec.4: A unilateral independence referendum should not result in secession, even if a 
majority of voters endorse independence, and even there is a constitutional right to secede. 
HSec.5: An agreed independence referendum should result in a successful secession if a 
majority of voters endorse independence, even if there is no constitutional right to secede.  
Independence referendums and legality: 
HLaw.1: An agreed independence referendum does not require a constitutional right to 
secession.  
HLaw.2: A constitutional right to secession does not guarantee an agreed independence 
referendum process.  
Where independence referendums are held:  
HRef.1: an independence referendum is more likely to be held in a region where the 
population is culturally distinct from the host-state population.  
HRef.2: an independence referendum is less likely to be held the longer the region has 
been part of a union with the host-state.  
HRef.3: an independence referendum is less likely to be held if violent confrontations 
occurred between the region at risk of seceding and the host-state.  
HRef.4: an independence referendum is more likely to occur during a period of political 
instability for the host-state.   
HRef.5: an independence referendum is more likely to occur in a democratic host-state.   
HRef.6: an independence referendum is less likely to occur if power-sharing is in place. 
HRef.7: an independence referendum is more likely to occur in an ethnic-federation.   
HRef.8: an independence referendum is more likely where the region’s culturally 
distinct population representatives dominate the regional government 
HRef.9: an independence referendum is less likely to occur in richer host-states.    
HRef.10: an independence referendum is more likely to occur in more populous regions.      
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HRef.11: an independence referendum is more likely to occur in a richer regions relative 
to the host-state.    
Where agreed independence referendums are held:  
HRefA.1: A host-state government will consent to an independence referendum being 
held if support for secession is low.  
HRefA.2: A host-state government will consent to an independence referendum being 
held if it deems the cost of retaining the territory and population outweigh the benefits. 
HRefA.2a: an agreed independence referendum is more likely to occur the 
bigger the population of the region at risk of seceding is relative to the host-state. 
HRefA.2c: an agreed independence referendum is less likely to occur if the host-
state faces other secessionist movements within its territory. 
HRefA.3: A host-state government will consent to an independence referendum being 
held if it deems it feels it has no choice but to do so due to external (e.g. great-powers or 
international organisations) or internal constraints (e.g. popular protest). 
Support for secession and independence referendums:  
 
HSup.1: the more familiar and polarised the electorate is with the debate around 
independence prior to the referendum being called, the less volatile it will be, limiting the 
ability of the independence referendum to affect the likelihood of secession occurring.  
HSup.2: Support for independence will be higher among an electorate which has 
experienced violent conflict and/or lacks access to political representation.  In this context, 
the referendum will act a mediator, facilitating secession, but not a moderator and 
substantially affect existing support for secession and the likelihood of seceding.  
HSup3: the presence of a quorum on turnout can invalidate the expressed support for 
independence and make it more difficult to achieve secession. 
HSup4: The presence of endorsement quorum will make it more difficult to achieve a 
qualifying majority support in favour of independence, and therefore secession.  
HSup5: The longer the referendum campaign, the more opportunities offered to increase 
support for independence and the likelihood of achieving statehood.  
HSup6: the presence of a No side campaign reduces support for independence.  
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